

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS

A course given in the Spring quarter, 1960

in the

Department of Political Science
University of Chicago

by

Professor Leo Strauss

This transcription is a written record of essentially oral material, much of which developed spontaneously in the classroom, and none of which was prepared with publication in mind. The transcription is made available to a limited number of interested persons, with the understanding that no use will be made of it that is inconsistent with the private and partly informal origin of the material. Recipients are emphatically requested not to seek to increase the circulation of the transcription. This transcription has not been checked, seen, or passed on by the lecturer.

The production and distribution of this transcription are subsidized by the Rehm Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Financial assistance has granted by the Rehm Foundation on application made in behalf of the recipients of the transcriptions. The Rehm Foundation is not responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

Copyright © 1962 by Joseph Cropsey

97 Sophists ^{and 287}
111 change of control
112 P. & Nat. law
116 polybius
218 revolution idealist
224 H. political
223 parties
228 freedom democracy
Montesquieu 219 #

98 Br. II
173 Br. II

116 - definition of the regime
153 - good man/citizen, polis/regime, science/law

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 1, March 29, 1960

This class is to be a seminar and this means that we will have a paper at the beginning of each meeting, apart from today's meeting. That means fifteen meetings and there is a convenient way of dividing Aristotle's Politics into fifteen parts as I know from former experience. Book VIII will be one part; otherwise each book will be divided into two parts. But I don't plan to divide the papers today because today no one knows which is which, I mean who is registered and who is not but I look around for one acquaintance of mine, Mr. Schrock. Mr. Schrock, could you read a paper next time? Now I would suggest that you take the section on slavery, from the beginning until slavery is included; first book, that is not too long -- you should have sufficient time to prepare it for next Thursday. All right; the other papers will be divided next time, and by that time you are requested to think of it, about the question what paper you would like to read.

Now I call this course which is devoted to Aristotle's Politics (I might say something else: I suggest that we use the translation by Ernest Barker, Oxford of which there is now available an inexpensive paperbound edition. That's the most convenient edition and translation available and we well could use it).

I call this course an Introduction to Political Science by which I wanted to say that I do not regard Aristotle's teaching as a historical subject. Now to treat Aristotle's Politics as a historical subject is a rather common procedure and we have to explain why I deviate from it but in order to do so I must first indicate the reasons why Aristotle's Politics is treated as a historical subject or rather, what does it mean to treat it as a historical subject? In the first place, to treat such a work as a historical subject means to treat it as belonging to the past and the second indication which is more interesting means the teaching is not true because otherwise you do not treat it as a historical subject. But if this is so; if we assume from the outset that Aristotle's teaching belongs to the past and is therefore not true, why should we study it at all? Now there are indeed quite a few political scientists who say we should not for this very reason. They wouldn't say Aristotle is an old fogey, at least not in writing, but that is what they substantially mean. The right thing, is scientific social science as now practiced and this social science as they mean it I think can be described as a mixture of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons on the one hand and Freud and Karl Marx on the other; Marx less now, but still somehow. But the point is this: we cannot assume

long
long

without argument that this scientific social science is the correct approach to the understanding of social reality, as the men holding this view themselves admit and they emphasize. Social science as it is now understood is a product of a very long development. It is the mature approach to social reality which as the mature approach was, of course, preceded by immature approaches. The mature approach of present day social science presupposes the experience of the failure of the earlier approaches. Now we today who enter college or graduate school in the 1950s or 60s do no longer make the experience because the old approaches no longer exist. But we presuppose the experience of the failure of these old approaches, and what we imply is, if I may use a proverbial expression, that George did it. George made that experience and we know now that this doesn't work anymore and we don't have to go through the experience vicariously. Yet to leave it at this is unbecoming to scientists or to scholars. We cannot leave it at hazy if someone tells us how that was taken care of in the past. And now among the representatives of the immature approach -- I'm using the language of the social scientists -- of this early approach which failed, the most outstanding admittedly is Aristotle. Aristotle controlled the study of social reality for a longer time than any other man, with greatest effect: a great effect on classical antiquity and a still greater effect in the Middle Ages and even in the early modern times. Around 1640 someone who knew, who was competent to judge, said Aristotle (named Thomas Hobbes) said Aristotle is -- I forgot the exact wording but it was how he controls the university, and it was around 1640, not so far away.

Now if this is so, if we have to know at least the essential character of the immature approach to social reality in order properly to appreciate the mature approach, the historical concern with Aristotle's Politics is outside of it. The concern with, for example, Aristotle is a philosophic reflection without which all scientific work is strictly speaking, blind. We use these tools but we do not truly know why we use them, because we do not truly know why the alternative is impossible. I think right away I will make this clear. I have to proceed, the respect. Now of course someone will say, why Aristotle? Granted that Aristotle had this much more powerful effect than any other earlier social thinker but similar considerations apply to the other great figures. After all, Aristotle was not the only one. There was once a man called Machiavelli. There was Locke, and so many others whose names and works you have heard of and may have even read. But this leads only to a minor modification of my earlier proposal. We have to study not only Aristotle but we have to study what is called the history of political thought or political philosophy as a whole and that this is

a perfectly legitimate and respectable proposal I believe every-one of you will admit who puts any faith in the announcement of catalogues by political science departments. Such a course is given in many political science departments. Yet the whole of political philosophy -- now a whole is something which has a beginning and which has an end. Naturally it has an end because now political philosophy has disappeared; we have now only mature social science. That's clear. The question is the beginning. Where is the beginning? Again that is controversial among people who worry about these matters, but one can still say with great plausibility that this beginning can be definitely located in place and in time and there is an old saying of Cicero according to which the first man who brought science or philosophy down from heaven to earth and introduced it into the cities and houses of men; cities, political science; houses, economics; was Socrates. Therefore that is still the best proposal that anyone can make: that the beginning is Socrates and the end is today. But that is not enough. A whole must also have a middle, not only a beginning and end. And if the middle of this whole should be of any interest or any sophistication higher than that of one-celled animal then there will be a division within the middle. What I'm implying is that the division of the history of political philosophy into periods -- that we must have some notion of that in such a preliminary consideration as we are now engaged in. Now do you understand my thought up to this point? We cannot

leave it at Aristotle. We have to study the history of political philosophy as a whole. This history must have an end. That is easy. It has a beginning; that's fairly easy. But what about the middle? The middle must have -- it's likely to have some articulation, that is, the division of the history of political philosophy into periods. Now that is a very controversial subject, much more than the beginning and the end.

According to one famous historian, Carlyle -- not Thomas Carlyle but somehow a relative of his -- he wrote a six or seven volume history of political thought which is used by almost everyone. The whole history of political philosophy consists of three parts. First, the beginning. So that's Plato and Aristotle and that was a time of the Greek city-state. And then we get something new with the emergence of Alexander the Great. The city-state becomes unimportant. The empire -- and of course Alexander's empire was only a foreshadowing of the Roman empire, and where is the man who started that? Where is -- the Stoics. There was a school called the Stoa from a place in Athens and the Stoics are the men who belong to that school. Now these men -- the Stoicks are said to be the men who developed a new kind of political doctrine according to which the central theme of political philosophy was the natural law that began with, I had almost said with Alexander the Great

but one should say with the Stoics who followed this doctrine and that lasted until the French Revolution inclusively, after which there began something rather new, which Carlyle, being a somewhat old fashioned Englishman, doesn't call scientific social science, but he would probably say a historical approach began to predominate in the 19th century and our age.

Another classification is the one which is the most simple-minded one and, well we all know that history is divided into three parts, ancient, medieval and modern, and the same applies to the history of thought and therefore in particular to the history of political thought. There are perhaps other ways in which one can find one's bearings in this complicated story but this mere variety of opinions shows that we are in need of a criterion which is not arbitrary, which is objective. Now there is only one way in which one can find an objective criterion and that is paradoxically at first glance subjective. I mean, what did the people who were best informed think about the period? What did the political thinkers, the great political thinkers, themselves say -- (tape broke) -- period of political thought starts with the stoics. We go a step further when we turn to the Middle Ages. We must -- it is difficult to distinguish there, but it is important, between the political theologicans, as we can say, and the political philosophers. Now sometimes that may be in one individual. St. Thomas Aquinas has both a philosophic teaching regarding politics and a theological teaching. But there are some cases also where the two things are separate. Now in the Middle Ages the philosophers -- political philosophers -- they are all of them Aristotelians. That is, they did not have the feeling that there was some new element introduced within political philosophy itself.

But then we move on. We find a moment where people say all this teaching starting from Socrates and culminating in antiquity in the teaching of the Stoics is fundamentally wrong. We are in need of an entirely new teaching, and I, x y, am the one to supply it for the first time. Now the man who said this with the loudest voice, the clearest voice, was Thomas Hobbes, but Hobbes was not the first. Machiavelli had made the same claim with a slightly more subdued voice before, and therefore we come -- are driven to the conclusion that a fundamental change, a radical change occurred only once, in the 16th and 17th century at the beginning of the modern times, and if this happens to agree with the most common view according to which there is ancient, medieval and modern -- at least to that extent there is a difference between ancient, medieval and modern, that cannot be helped. One must not be -- always try to be iconoclastic. From time to time one should agree with simple

5

Now from this point of view the primary task for our orientation in this field would be to understand the meaning of this fundamental change from classical thought to modern thought. At the end of the 17th century this issue became a popular issue and was called at that time the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns. Those of you who have only read Swift and nothing else, Swift's Battle of the Books or perhaps Gulliver, but Gulliver is a bit more complicated, would know that this was the issue at the time. Who are better, the ancients or the moderns? Swift, of course, being a paradoxical fellow in every respect, says the ancients. But still -- but we must not forget this literary controversy because if we are particularly concerned with the modern literature was as good as or better than the ancients, that was a kind of rear guard fight of no great interest. The big battle was of course that between the modern physics -- Newton -- which was won a generation before, but before this great victory of modern physical science through Newton there was already a fight regarding human thought as a whole and in particular, political thought, and the greatest colleagues in that fight, on the modern side, were Machiavelli and Hobbes'.

Now we must try to understand this issue, and in order to do that I will begin with something that is most accessible to everyone of you, and I will tell you why I proceed to begin -- to proceed in this way in which no factual knowledge of any kind in this field is presupposed because I have been told that there may be college students in this class and so I do not make them, have the usual expectations one has of graduate students and if the graduate students think I talk down to them, I apologize. I do not plan to talk down; I only don't want to have them enjoy an unfair advantage compared with the younger students who may be here.

Now in order to prepare to get the first inkling of what this issue is between the ancients and the moderns I proceed in the following way. I compare two comparable things, in the ancient version and in the present-day version, and that is the division of philosophy. And I take as a representative of the older view, Aristotle. (inaudible). Now Aristotle's division of philosophy -- philosophy consists of two parts. One he calls theoretical and the other he calls practical. And this theoretical part is subdivided into three: mathematics, physics -- which means the whole of natural science -- and the third he calls, or not he but is called, metaphysics. He calls it first philosophy, but that doesn't make any difference. Practical philosophy is divided into three parts: ethics and economics and politics. And then there is an additional seventh discipline which doesn't belong to either part but is a kind of preamble or prelude to the whole and that is called logic.

Now let us compare that with the present situation. One thing is striking. Aristotle does not make a distinction between philosophy and science, whereas we today take this distinction between philosophy and science for granted, and that shows itself within political science. We make a distinction between political philosophy and political science, whereas according to the earlier usage political philosophy is the same as political science. There is no difference. Now what does this mean? You see here if you look at this list -- you see that there are at least four sciences out of these seven which are today clearly subsumed under science in contradistinction to philosophy: mathematics, physics, economics and politics. Metaphysics and ethics will still be regarded as philosophic disciplines; I come to that later.

Now what does this mean? There were at all times -- and Aristotle, of course, admitted it: there were certain intellectual pursuits which were not philosophic. Take the activity of a shoemaker. The activity of a shoemaker according to Aristotle is not simply manual labor. That is an intellectual pursuit. You have to know what you do; it is not as if you were to carry logs where you don't have to -- you know, you must have the proper arms and legs and so, but you don't have to think about it, at least not very much. But the shoemaker must know what he does. He must know his materials. So there are always let us say, non-philosophic, sub-philosophic, intellectual pursuits and quite a few people would also have said mathematics is such a thing, and the sciences connected with mathematics like acoustics, or music rather, and so on. The only interesting case and the decisive case is that of physics. Up to 1650 -- one can even say up to Newton, generally speaking, physics was of such a kind that you had to have a metaphysical commitment in order to be a physicist. And what do I mean by that? Physics was either Aristotelian physics or Platonist physics or Epicurean physics or Stoic physics but there was not in existence a metaphysically neutral physics. This is a work of modern times: the emergence of metaphysically neutral sciences. Present day physics, present day chemistry, biology or what have you is so that everyone has to accept them just as the art of the shoemaker. You may think about God and the world what you please but here you have to accept it. The establishment of metaphysically neutral sciences is the most striking thing which has happened in modern times, and the crucial thing was physics but a consequence of that was also that you get gradually an economics and a political science which are, rightly understood, metaphysically neutral. That means in this sense, in this context, ethically neutral. But this is only an aftermath of the great event in the 17th century, or the 18th century, the emergence of this new -- let me call them that way -- metaphysically neutral sciences.

I give now only an enumeration of the most important facts which show the issue. You see also from here if you compare this with present day situation that the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences has disappeared. We do have a distinction which reminds of it. That is a distinction between theoretical and applied sciences, but that is an entirely different distinction because applied sciences presuppose theoretical sciences. You cannot have applied -- physics applied in engineering, for example, without a previously purely theoretical physics. The Aristotelian distinction means that these practical sciences are fundamentally practical. They do not have, essentially, a theoretical foundation. They are of an entirely different kind. A third point which I also mention as a crude fact for the time being is that logic, which was not a part, which, for Aristotle, was not a part of philosophy of science, but a mere prelude to it, is now taken, of course, as a part of philosophy ---

I come now to the last point I think I should mention now. And that is this. We have in modern times and that is now predominant, dogmatic, a distinction between philosophy and science along the lines indicated. Now how the sciences are divided you all know and you can see from any announcement in any lecture course, the general division at any rate. I will concentrate on the division of philosophy. And here I will begin. (Interruption because of shortage of chairs). Now let me see. I will just give an enumeration of the parts of philosophy which are now generally admitted, not universally. Of course logic, with which they frequently put together methodology, epistemology, and this kind of thing; then ethics is clearly a subject matter of treatment and then they have another discipline called aesthetics. Then you have philosophy -- political philosophy -- which is also sometimes called philosophy of the state; and then you have philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of language perhaps. But one thing is controversial. And therefore its presence in the list is not necessary, and that is metaphysics. There are quite a few people who say metaphysics is impossible, and so on.

Now if you would now look at this whole list you would see there is one thing -- there is one common formula. I will illustrate it by the last example, philosophy of religion. Religion is, to speak in a somewhat old-fashioned way, the human attitude toward God. There is then a part of philosophy which deals with the human attitude or attitudes toward God. There is no philosophic discipline...believes God. That would be metaphysics and that is excluded as a hypothesis, a modern hypothesis, but present day hypothesis in many schools. So it is not God but the human attitude toward God. Now let us generalize from that. All these parts of philosophy deal with man. They deal with man differently than the sciences of man, like the social sciences, like linguistics

and all that, but they deal, nevertheless, with man. Look at a few famous book titles of modern philosophy. Locke: his great philosophic work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge. Hume: A Treatise on Human Nature. Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, Critique of Judgment, which are all human faculties. They all deal with man, whereas the older books, in ancient times, had entirely different titles, and these titles correspond of course to subject matter. They dealt -- I mean a typical title in the ancient time, prior to Socrates, was On Nature, the philosophical question (?). In the Middle Ages the subject was much more theoretical, or you can hardly say metaphysical, but man was not the guiding theme of philosophy. In our age, and that age dates back some centuries, the guiding theme of philosophy has become man. That is, philosophy, we can say, has become "humanistic," as distinguished from cosmological, or theological. There is a connection between this most interesting phenomenon and one perhaps still more interesting which I mentioned first, namely the emergence of modern physics, of the metaphysically neutral physics.

For what is the outcome of the emergence of the modern physics? I mean that was not yet the view of Newton but it gradually became the view of physics about itself. Physics, the science of the universe, has the character of a human construct; naturally, not of an arbitrary construct -- there are certain devices by which we distinguish between better and worse constructs, experiments and such things, but fundamentally that is a human construct. By this very fact the starting point, the center of the modern physics proves to be man, the human mind. One can also say -- this has been stated -- that in pre-modern times the emphasis in the word, in the expression natural science, was on nature. In our times the emphasis in that expression is on science, on method, on procedure, on forms of proof, and so on, rather than on the subject matter itself. True, there is a connection between this change in the meaning of philosophy and the more basic change, the emergence of what I call metaphysically neutral sciences. Now this is only meant here as one illustration, and I believe good enough for the beginning illustration, of the fact that a fundamental change in human orientation has occurred and the change which we can very well identify historically as a transition from pre-modern to modern thought.

Now I come back -- I will give you an opportunity to raise your objections and so on at a very short moment, but let me only finish one point. Now I said my concern was not with the historical subject. The historical reflections are only secondary, by which I implied although out of a justifiable cowardice -- I didn't say at the beginning -- I implied that Aristotle's

approach is the sound approach, and that is what I meant. And we must -- of course, that is an absolutely paradoxical assertion and we must -- I beg you to be as resistant to that proposition as you can. But I would like now to say something more simple -- the hypothesis that the Aristotelian understanding of social matters is fundamentally superior to our present day understanding is necessary as a heuristic device. That one -- I believe one can prove, as follows.

We are perfectly open to the possibility that Aristotle was wrong, and maybe wholly wrong, but we cannot know this, we cannot know that his teaching was wrong if we do not know first what his teaching was. That seems to be absolutely necessary. Otherwise you talk about some -- perhaps a figment of your imagination, or the figment of the imagination of a historian, and not about Aristotle. Now what does this -- we have first to know what Aristotle himself taught, and that, however, must be understood more precisely. It means to understand his teaching on his terms. You have to understand his teaching as he meant it, because if you re-write it from the beginning in other terms, say modern terms, then you have killed his teaching and then you can easily prove that this corpse is not comparable to this highly alive social science -- present day social science. Is that clear? For if someone -- if you say, if you translate a word which Aristotle uses from time to time and rather frequently, which is, in English transcription, polis; if you translate that by city-state, as I believe even Barker does and surely many other people do, you impute to Aristotle a doctrine of the state, and you cannot speak of the state without implying that state is something different from society. Today you cannot use the word state unless you imply that, and then you get into very great troubles because Aristotle doesn't make that distinction, and then you say in advance -- well, I proved that he is wrong. I know that in advance because I know by something approaching divine revelation -- I mean what I have been told since my childhood -- that there is a distinction between society and state. Aristotle doesn't make that distinction. Hence, he's wrong.

So we have to understand him as he understood him -- in his own terms. But that means a bit more. It means, if we want to understand him in the good intention of refuting him and of showing him up as an old fogey we have first to understand him as he meant it; we must take his teaching seriously. Otherwise you will not even be able to understand an essay by Ann Landers. If you do not listen to Ann Landers while you read it -- I admit, the effort required is not very great. It is much smaller than with Aristotle, but you have to listen. It means, in other words, to give him the benefit of the doubt. Say perhaps he is right -- perhaps -- only this way can you . It means, to say it differently and so that you see it is not entirely trivial what I say, although it

ought to be trivial, we want to study his doctrine. Since we want to do that we cannot be interested at all in any explanation of the doctrine in non-doctrinal terms. For example, assuming that a psychological -- maybe even a psychoanalytic explanation -- we may find out something of Aristotle -- about Aristotle's relation to his nurse when he was a baby and say here we've got it. Or we may find out something about his social position, his class relation, and you know this kind of thing, and say that's the key. That is absolutely impossible -- to proceed in this way. Why? Because all these explanations presuppose something which must be true, namely that Aristotle is wrong. If Aristotle is right, who cares for these conditions of his thinking? These conditions are absolutely ambiguous. They are the conditions that may be helpful for understanding the truth and they may be hindrances to the truth. This crucial ambiguity is, of course, denied by every psychological or sociological explanation as such.

Once you know that Aristotle was wrong either in general or in the particular then it becomes necessary to ask or to raise the question, what could induce such a great mind to commit such a strange error which no child would commit today, and then we may, perhaps, find such reasons. But that can only arrive in the second stage, and a stage which, I believe, is no longer of interest to us as political scientists, because we are looking for a good framework for understanding political things. Does Aristotle supply it? We must see. If Aristotle does not supply it, throw him out. These are rational and sensible procedures, but the explanations are of no interest for our purpose at all.

I did not mention the fact why one should consider at all such an outlandish proposition; I mean that Aristotle might supply us with the framework. This is, of course, connected with the question, do we have such a framework now? If we have a satisfactory framework for the understanding of social phenomena now, why then it would of course be a waste of time to study Aristotle with any intensity, but that is a question to which I will turn later.

Now, before I turn to that subject and say a bit about it I would like to know whether there is any point where I have made too many jumps and should proceed more slowly and more step by step, in your opinion.

"What is the paperback edition that we are supposed to buy?"

(Laughter). No, no. That is a perfectly legitimate question. That is also Oxford Press. Oxford University Press; and that you get -- there are bookstores. Do you also want to get guidance -- directions to the bookstores? There are two editions. There is one which contains only the text of Barker's translation and the other contains, also, his introduction. I would advise you to buy that with the introduction because Barker's introduction contains quite a few things which are valuable, which I will

not take up in class, but which would be quite helpful to read.

"What did you mean when you said that modern physics is based upon a human construct?"

Yes, well what about such things? I mean, is this not what you are told by those who reflect on physics itself. I mean, the simple physicist may not bother about that — that in all theorizing — all theories are not simply generalizations from experiments or experiences but are projects made by the physicist, projected by the physicist, and have their character — in other words, what is a hypothesis? There was a time when a certain simple empiricism prevailed, you know; according to which all doctrines are merely the generalized formula for empirical observation. The only thing are the facts, that is the substance, and the theory is simply derivative from the facts. Now this is today generally rejected. The facts which a scientist studies are relevant facts, relevant for his purpose. The criterion of relevance is not given by the fact as fact. That is given by the purpose of the whole science, by its interest, and that means that that is the inevitable "subjective element."

(Inaudible question).

The same: nature-centered, derivatively meant. I cannot go — I mean that is a very long question. I mean, the Sophists are a very difficult subject. We know hardly anything of them except what Plato or Aristotle tells about them. We must never forget that, but if you — so we turn to Plato. There is a Platonic dialogue which presents the Sophistic position in the most comprehensive way. Its name is *Theaetetus*. In this dialogue Plato presents the famous thesis of the Sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things — that is what you think of, I believe. But that is a derivative from a certain cosmological thesis that everything is in flux; you know, that there is nothing but motion or process. It's a derivative from that — of the basic thesis. Perhaps we come to that at a later occasion when we come to Aristotle's mentions of Sophists.

"I believe one of your statements was the merely practical, for Aristotle, has no theoretical foundation. Do you think that's the Aristotelian position?"

Yes, well it was as all statements, I have to make this correction, somewhat overstated, but I said that, yes.

"Because in the Metaphysics and some other places he seems — does not really try to divide this sharply and I wonder if this is not some modern look at Aristotle, a Kantian look?"

Yes, that would be fatal, but I think it is not and I will prove it to you as follows. Aristotle makes a distinction between the wise man and the man of practical wisdom. Now the latter word, practical wise man, is translated into Latin and therefore also into English, by prudent. But prudent does not mean he is a smooth operator; it has a moral connotation. So now let me speak of the difference between the wise man and the prudent. The wise man is not a prudent man and vice versa. So the wise man is not as such able to conduct his affairs or the affairs of his city. Not even his affairs, because there is a famous story of a wise man who contemplated the whole and fell into a ditch. So little was he able to take account of it. The prudent man, on the other hand -- the highest form is a statesman -- is not a wise man. He does not -- he knows practically nothing of the -- except what every child knows, not more. That is -- so, prudence is the highest form of practical understanding. Prudence is -- Aristotelian Ethics, sixth book. Then, there arises a difficulty, a complication, and that is what you had in mind. Men cannot help having opinions about the whole, which is the theme of theoretical science. I mean even the most primitive tribe has such opinions -- not express science for them; there may also be scientists of various degrees of development. Now, there are opinions about the whole -- theoretical opinions which are harmful to prudence, which are destructive of prudence as far as they go. Therefore -- and prudence cannot defend itself against that enemy. Therefore prudence is in need of a wise defender of the whole realm of prudence. This is clear? To that extent, and that is, indeed, what Aristotle claims, that his philosophy, or something like his philosophy we can say, is indispensable if there is to be prudent handling of human affairs. In other words, if the universe had a nihilistic structure and people believed that this would inevitably lead to a false handling of human affairs, individually and collectively. That is all. So one can put it this way: de jure, as of right, prudence is autonomous. But de facto, in fact, prudence is always in need of a defender, of a philosophic defense of prudence.

But take a case today. Marxism would be an example -- from Aristotle's point of view -- of a false theoretical view which is bound to have a fatal effect for the prudent handling of political matters by those who believe Marxism. And therefore it is necessary for the defense of prudent political action that theoretical men refute Marxism. Do you see? But you must not underestimate, however, the first part of the statement that fundamentally man is so equipped by nature that he would develop prudence on the various levels, from the very simple level of a father of a household to the very broad statesmanship. He has all the materials there, but there is something which enters and deflects from all his theories. That, I think, is what Aristotle means.

(Inaudible response from student).

It is not so simple. You see, I can also show it another way. The premise -- I mean the fundamental of the practical sciences is ethics. Ethics deals chiefly, you can say, with the

virtues. Now, how does Aristotle get this knowledge of the virtues. If you were right, the knowledge of the virtues would be derivative from a preceding theoretical science, say metaphysics, say psychology, whatever it is. That is not the case. There is a new beginning. He begins with the virtues and no attempt is made by Aristotle to derive them from a higher, theoretical tract.

(Inaudible response from student).

That may be the defect of Aristotle, the debility, but, in fact, he did that. Perhaps that is a point where we have to criticize him. Perhaps he had good reasons for this seemingly unclegant procedure — irrelevant procedure. That we must see. But there is a difficulty here; you are perfectly right. But you must not under-estimate that part of the picture which I emphasize.

"I have one question about political science. Would you say it's possible for a modern political scientist, and I use the word scientist advisedly, not to be ethically neutral and yet to use quantitative methods?"

Well, I mean no one in his senses would have anything anything against quantitative methods where they are manifestly required by the subject matter. For example, if you want to find out the proportion of poor and rich — I mean, to use old-fashioned language — in the society, how can you find out except by counting? I mean, counting both the noses and the property, and the various kinds of property, and figure out how you can assess the monetary value of non-monetary property such as fields, houses, and so on. Sure. The question is only if someone tells us that any statement in non-quantitative terms is inadmissible in science; then he makes an unwarranted assertion. You know? That's clear, yes? Sure — no, there is no question whatever. Now — but I will turn to the question of political science in particular very soon. As a matter of fact, as soon as I am certain that no one among you would like to raise another question regarding my previous statement.

"I'd just like to say that it seems to me that this division, therefore — I would draw the conclusion from what we've agreed on that the division between political philosophy and political science is not an absolute or rigid one in terms of at least a fair number of political scientists today who seem to be interested in both."

Yes. Sure. Well, you see these people are, in my opinion, wiser than the fanatics who throw out political philosophy altogether. But they are also a menace, because they divorce the other fellows; you know, the young fellows, the radicals

who say political philosophy is bunk. A nihilist who sees the problem more clearly than these people, who are wiser, and therefore say political science is fine, political philosophy is fine, but don't help us very much in clarifying the relation between the two. You know? I suggested some time ago, precisely for these peaceful reasons, public relations — I suggested that we should make a distinction between political knowledge and political philosophy or political science. Political knowledge is something which is absolutely unproblematic for all practical purposes. I mean that is something which everyone of you and even every man or woman in the state possesses to some extent. You know? I mean everyone knows that there are laws, for example, which are clearly political phenomena, and that there are elections, and that there are parties, and so on. And some people know quite a bit about that without any political science. Now this can be had in a very — you can — how shall I say — you can "systematize" the political knowledge available at a given time into a body of knowledge and you can write a text book on comparative government or on public administration, whatever it may be, and that is o.k. but that doesn't raise the problem. The problem comes in only when this is linked up — here you have a simple transition, in this case, only a difference of degree between so-called common sense knowledge or political phenomena and academic knowledge. But when you speak of scientific political knowledge today you mean a break — you imply there is a break between common sense knowledge and scientific knowledge. In practical terms, it could look like this: in the first case, quantitative knowledge, of course, is implied in every political knowledge. And another one which says only quantitative statements are admissible in science, which is an extreme position.

"I agree with everything you said. All I say is that however much they may obscure, from the standpoint of analyzing their foundations, the (partly inaudible) obscure the differences, and however much they may try to disguise, in their own work, a real tension between problems of political philosophy and the foundations of political science, I would say that this kind of dilemma — this personally may be unavoidable and very likely could be absolutely more fruitful precisely because they do obscure the differences, because there is a conflict and a tension going into their philosophy."

Yes, sure, that is a very wise remark of you, and I fully agree with you, but you must also admit that there must be some individuals who take up these issues which are left in a comfortable darkness by these wise men. Would you admit that?

"Oh, sure."

All right. In other words, that is a reasonable division of labor. That doesn't raise any question of principle. Now the real problem, however, on which I must touch in each meeting

is the implication of what I have said all this time, namely that I do not plan to treat Aristotle historically but I plan to treat him with the assumption that we may have to learn something very important from him — things which we do not learn from merely contemporary political science, as another distinction which I address to you, in particular. I mean in our present day political science there is now, of course, a variety of strata. Not everything is 1960. And in the various disciplines — for example, public law is a much older discipline in our present set up than the other disciplines. It's much more old fashioned in its subject, except those who look — who are too much concerned with the psychology of the supreme court judges rather than with their juridical logic. There is this modern tendency, but public law is, of course, infinitely old. And so there are many strata. You know? Many strata — and one cannot reduce it to a simple formula. That is, the people who try to do that are these scientific political scientists who would like to have all parts of political science treated in this particular "scientific" way.

So, in other words, every sane or normal political scientist would admit, even today, that there are certain things which Aristotle has seen which are true. That I think one can say, but I say a bit more about it. I say that his overall approach is sound. I do not say that every individual statement is scripture. Once one — one cannot say that without being aware of the fact that this assertion encounters a very great obstacle in the certainty that Aristotle's teaching is fundamentally wrong — in the prejudice against Aristotle. This prejudice can be expressed simply by two propositions: (a) Aristotle's teaching is unscientific, and that is — I mean those of you who have had any training in social science at the college level must have come across that opinion. And the other — that is the academic prejudice against Aristotle — but there is a non-academic prejudice against Aristotle, and that says Aristotle is undemocratic, and therefore nothing to boast about. Now I will try to take up these two prejudices if I can in today's meeting.

First, the academic prejudice against Aristotle or the difference between Aristotle and present-day scientific social science. Aristotle's view of the situation is as I have indicated before. Political philosophy is identical with political science. The study of parties in a given commonwealth does not belong to a different discipline than the question of what they call the ideal state. The same discipline must be concerned with both. Now this one and the same discipline contains within itself what is now called economics, sociology, social psychology, theory of education, principles of jurisprudence, and what have you. Today, we have instead of that a mere coordination of various behavioral sciences: sociology, political science, history, economics and so on. And they are — now but they form some unity; otherwise we couldn't speak of the social sciences. These various behavioral sciences are united by one of them as the fundamental social science and that is controversial, which it is.

Some say sociology. Others say psychology. But some say also, there is none of them can be the basic science. . . .

(Change of tape).

Aristotle claims that he looks further afield than the citizen and even the statesman does, but he looks in the same direction. Now what can that mean? If this is the progress of the citizen and this Aristotle's phenomena, here, Aristotle says that -- looks deeper into that center. The position of the modern social scientist is radically different. Not here -- here. He looks from the outside as a spectator, as an observer, as a contemplator, as a theoretical man. He anonymous terms, at the whole thing, at the whole social reality including the citizen's perspective. The citizen's perspective is for him an object of research as much as to say the economic resources. He treats this as one of the possible subjects of political or social science, whereas Aristotle uses, or exercises, this perspective, if one can use that expression. He does not look at it, except accidentally. That is only an other side of the phenomenon you know, perhaps, better: that the scientific social scientist who is up to date conceives of social science as not evaluating. The evaluating is done by the citizens or by the statesmen, whoever they may be. The social scientist does not evaluate. For Aristotle, the social scientist is necessarily evaluating, essentially evaluating.

Now this -- in other words, Aristotle takes -- I mean, Aristotle was a rather theoretical man; he did not run for elective or appointive office and he did not give political advice to Alexander the Great as far as we know, or when he gave one it was turned down by this practicing statesman, and there may be a present day political scientist who is terribly active politically -- obviously -- but that is not with which I am concerned. I am concerned now with the approach to social phenomena he has while being a social scientist and not while being engaged, as it may happen, in political activity. I hope that is clear. In Aristotle, the approach he has in his capacity as an analyst of political phenomena, not as a politically active man -- in this analysis his perspective is identical, in principle, with that of the citizen or statesman. An external consequence, but which is very illuminating, is this. We will read the Politics and we will not find any technical term, hardly any technical term, in the whole book. All the terms used by Aristotle which deal with -- which refer to political or social phenomena -- are all "common sense terms," terms used by citizens on the market place or by counsellors in cabinets of kings or what have you, whereas, it is of the essence of present day social science to abound with technical terms. Now that these technical terms are put back into the market and then very innocent people use them, maybe, even in election speeches and so on, I know. But that doesn't do away with the fact that they originate in the schools, in the academies, whereas for Aristotle just the opposite is true. The terminology is of market place origin and is clarified, to

somewhat, in its academic use, but it is fundamentally the same.

The third point which I would like to mention is this. Modern social science as it is now understood conceives of itself as essentially dependent on natural science, whereas Aristotelian social science is relatively independent of natural science. Now that is a difficult question; we got a sketch of it before in our discussion and let us first develop this point. How does it come? From which point of view can we understand it? Now Aristotle's political science starts from a premise which he develops to some extent at the beginning of his Politics, that there is an essential difference between men and brutes, an essential difference. Man has a certain character or characteristics which no brute possesses. That is -- everything is involved in that little proposition. Now when we speak today of natural science we mean thereby, in the first place, the science dealing with the sub-human, animate or inanimate. What Aristotle implies is that our understanding of the sub-human, animate or inanimate, is of very limited use for the understanding of what is characteristically human. And political life, surely, is characteristically human. When we speak of political matters we presuppose, in ordinary language, the essential difference between man and brutes as a matter of course. If I may use an example which I may have used once too often: when President Roosevelt spoke of the Four Freedoms and mentioned among them the Freedom from Want everywhere, what did he mean? Did he mean freedom from want for all tigers, rats, skunks? No -- of course only for human beings -- sure. So lions, tigers, rats, simply don't count in this context; we take that for granted. That is -- and Aristotle would say we take it rightly for granted because there is an essential difference between men and brutes and we cannot -- it doesn't make sense to speak of the rights of brutes in the same way in which one can speak of the rights of men. Now, science -- this crucial presupposition of our present-day social science is based on a premise which is today obscured by a great sophistication, but this science understands, it says basically: to understand something means to understand its genesis, to understand its coming into being. Therefore, the essentially human or what we ordinarily understand by the essentially human is not understood if it is understood as essentially human. It is understood only if it is understood as having come into being, and that means, of course, as having come into being out of the non-human. Only by the reduction of the human to the non-human, to the sub-human, do we understand the human.

It means -- in other words, speaking common-sensically, scientific understanding is essentially, according to this modern notion, to understand the higher in the light of the lower. Now if you take these two schools which exercise such a very great influence on social science, Marx and Freud, you see that almost

immediately. That is, an attempt to understand the higher in the light of the lower.

Now the whole Aristotelian project implies that man is higher than the brutes and that that which distinguishes man from the brutes, if he takes it in its purity, isolated, is the end of man, the purpose, the goal of man. In other words, what Aristotle says is man is, of course, also — has many things in common with the brutes naturally: eating, digestion, propagation and such. Man has many purposes, many ends, but there is an order of these ends and the highest place among these ends is occupied by that end which is purely human, which transcends the bestial. There is — this one specifically human end is the one thing needful, if we can use this New Testament expression, and hence it is the one over-arching end. Now since there is a variety of ends there is, in principle, a variety of practical sciences dealing with the procurement of these ends. But there must be an order of these sciences and at the top of the order we find that practical science which is dedicated to the highest end. Therefore, the hierarchic order of the social sciences with political science or political philosophy at the top.

Now, in order to illustrate again, here, the difference, the radical difference between Aristotle and present day political science is, of course, as I mentioned before the so-called fact-value distinction. No distinction between good and bad ends, between natural and unnatural ends, however you call it, between higher and lower ends, is scientifically possible. Now this is an inevitable consequence once you take as your model the science of inanimate things as it was developed in modern times, especially physics, because there the question of ends cannot possibly arise and does not arise. In other words, that is not a discovery of a methodological or other genius. It was in the cards from the very beginning that social science modelled on physics would be as value free as physics. The interesting question is why it took such a long time until it became accepted, and you know it did not become accepted, this distinction, until about 30 or 40 years ago. It emerges about 70 years ago, but very slowly and not in this country, and it is only about 30 years that it has become the generally accepted doctrine. But this much only in an illustrative way regarding the fundamental difference between Aristotle's political science and present day political science. Now let us see whether there are some points which need further discussion; I mean, which are felt to need further discussion today. They need further discussion at every point.

"You mentioned Freud and Marx as examples of evaluating the higher by the lower, but it seems there are ends explicit in these two."

Absolutely, and you know, Marx wrote — conceived his notion of social science, if you can call it that, around 1848. You know. And Freud conceived it around 1905 or so. These — methodologically, they are old fogeys. This — the value-free social

science does not stem from Marx or Freud. I mean, not that they did not have some inference of that, but they were not -- that comes from an entirely different point. I can tell you the story, the main story; it's very simple. It emerged under the influence of Nietzsche. Nietzsche himself was not a value-free social scientist but somehow a part of his teaching led to that. And now I come to thoughts which I learned from Arnold Brecht's Political Theory, a book of about six hundred pages which has the great merit of giving a straightforward history of this distinction -- you know, the fact-value distinction -- and it seems that the first man who made it in the context of social science was George Simmel, a German sociologist; some of his works have been translated into English; 1892, that's the first time. But the man who really trumpeted it in the world and made it famous and so that all people who still evaluate it have the feeling that they are -- lack intellectual probity; that was not Simmel. That was Max Weber, whose works were translated into English in the 20s if I remember well.

if I remember well. I think was around, first And now it is absolutely in control in the Western world, this view. And it was long -- there are various different versions of that. Prior to Max Weber, if you want to speak of that -- prior to Max Weber's influence I think the greatest power in the Anglo-Saxon world was a kind of modified utilitarianism. I mean the people who spoke of the greatest happiness or the greatest number -- you must have heard that. And you must have heard of people who spoke of progress, and of underdeveloped countries, have you heard that expression? Which are all value judgments. And who spoke of prosperity and long life and such things as desirable things. Did you know that there were once such fogeys who had a great influence on social science? That all existed, but that, in the last thirty years, that has disappeared and is permitted only on the margins or when these same people take political action, but as social scientists you can't do this. That's a long history and it's really difficult to understand what this value-free social science means, but it is, undeniably, today the accepted methodology. I mean -- by accepted, I mean, generally accepted. And surely you are perfectly right, Marx and Freud are evaluating all the time, but they are not of the 1000 subtle -- in other words, the understanding of the higher in terms of the lower does not as such mean value-free, but it is a part of it, of this development. Now, someone wanted to say somethin'?

Yes, sure, absolutely. The same is done by Aristotle, but Aristotle would say you don't have to think of very high and sophisticated things. For example, one possible object -- I mean out of the realm of possible objects -- now let me give you an example -- a horse, everyday object. When you look at a horse with the eyes of a hunter, and on the other hand, with the eyes of a farmer, one can rightly say these are points of view extraneous to the horse. The evaluations which the hunter or the farmer puts on

the horse are extraneous to the horse. Can one say that? Good. But what about the chair? If you take -- I mean, if you look at a chair as a horse, but here you look at the chair and one form to find out about the chair is, of course, to try to sit on it, because chairs are made for sitting on them, not for looking at them. Now you try to sit on it and then you fall down and then you say it is a broken chair. You can even -- if you want to use very high-falootin words -- you can say it is a valueless chair or simply, a worthless chair. Then you don't say something which is not pertinent to this chair here. As a chair it, as it were, pretends to be a thing on which you can sit and it disappoints that legitimate expectation. That is as much a part of the story as to say it is broken or it is -- has a circumference of so and so many inches and what not. That you could say. In other words, object is a very vast thing. There are such objects and there are such objects. And the objects of the practical sciences -- that is what Aristotle contends -- not only chairs which are -- that is a very limited thing -- I mean, making of chairs. The more important things are, of course, the political things. But all these things essentially belonging to human action -- essentially belonging -- the horse does not essentially belong; only accidentally it can be used by man. Belonging essentially to human action are essentially for something and must be judged accordingly. So there is no -- I mean, if you, if a man gave a description of broken chairs, for example, or broken cars -- you know, these collections of broken cars you see in certain razed areas around the city and so forth -- someone can make this an object of contemplation -- as heavenly bodies -- there are some painters who try to do this kind of thing. You know? But that becomes something different. You know, the painters always try to convey a message which has no longer so much to do with the broken cars as what broken cars and such an assembly of broken cars could mean to men, which is a different story. But it is even not the proper attitude to them. The proper attitude to them is to throw them out and to think, perhaps, that their disposal may be a deliberative disposal, but that is not, in itself, a theoretical object.

(Inaudible question).

Many things. Surely I have given that some thought and I could, perhaps, give a lecture on this subject. But let me repeat one thing which I stated, I think, relatively elaborately, and that is this. We may assume that present day social science is basically sound. We are still under an obligation to understand it -- understand the whole project, not this and that particular hypothesis. This cannot be done if we do not understand the alternative because the alternative and the experienced failure of the alternative enters into the very fabric of present day social science, number one. Number two, and that I did not elaborate in any way -- I mean I did not even say a word about

it, I believe — is that we see this predominant project of scientific social science suffers from very great defects, and therefore we should look around for an alternative, and the most prudent procedure would be an alternative which was sufficiently elaborated so that we can see what promises, if any, it holds out. And that — Aristotle would there be the natural for that purpose because of the comprehensive character of his teaching. But I didn't go into that today.

(Inaudible response from student).

Yes, but you see, as I indicated in my conversation with this gentleman — I forget your name at the moment. [Greenstone]. My difficulty is this. That is a good, prudential procedure, to say let us get in some fresh blood from another source, but in theoretical matters that obfuscates clarity. I think it is really theoretically necessary, if the foundations of present day social science are unsound, to look for other foundations and try to integrate the good — or tolerably good things which were developed on the new basis into an Aristotelian framework rather than the other way around. That is, theoretically, more satisfactory.

"In this theoretical consideration of Aristotle's teaching, is the question of the true political teaching a theoretical question only or must you then consider also the practical — "

What do you mean? I believe I understand what you mean, but I would like to find out whether it's true. How do you mean that?

"When we consider Aristotle as a political theorist and when we consider the question whether or not as a political theorist he may give a true or correct political teaching, how do we evaluate the truth or correctness of his political teachings?"

I see — whether the theory corresponds to the facts.

"When we consider this correspondence we necessarily, then, take into account the consequences of the teaching."

How do you mean that? The consequences for what?

"That's another question — whether the consequences of the teaching are beneficial or harmful. For example, take Marx.

Sure, naturally; in other words, if one could show that Aristotle's teaching, political teaching, is excellent for producing crooks and very bad for producing nice people, then I think that should prove that it's wrong, because a political theory is meant to be -- to do good to man.

"I doubt if you could show anything so specific as that, — "

Well, I'm surprised that you are not in the political science department. Otherwise you would say Aristotle didn't have an inkling of the atomic age. All our problems are problems of the atomic age. What can a fellow who lived in an economy of scarcity, in a predominantly agricultural, and even rather primarily agricultural world — what can he teach us? That is an objection which is frequently made and I don't believe that Aristotle gives us any recipes for how to deal with the Eastern bloc, for example, or with the farm problem in this country. Surely not. But the question is — I mean I didn't speak of political theory; I spoke of political science. But if you be wanting to use that distinction for a moment, then we would, perhaps, say this. From the fact that there have taken place incredible changes, changes of which Aristotle did not have any inkling, it does not yet necessarily follow that the principles are wrong. Maybe — if I may again use somewhat loose language — maybe the spirit for handling our situation is as the spirit the same in which every situation should be handled. Or to say it more theoretically, every political situation, however unprecedented, has something in common with all political situations. Aristotle's political situation, the situation with which he was familiar, had one thing, surely, in common with our political situation, and that was that it was a political situation, meaning by that, that was a situation of men who had a certain understanding, for example, of the division of power both within the city or state and internationally, and of the intentions of the various cities and their propclivities and what not. And now I come to the crucial point. And we are absolutely unable to predict in the decisive respect and that is the same situation in which we still are. Now if we are unable to predict in the decisive respect, think of this very simple thing, that the future of the human race will depend considerably on whether there will be thermo-nuclear wars or not. No one can make a prediction on this absolutely crucial point. No one. One can say unlikely, to be sure, but everyone who thinks about that says granting even that neither of the atomic people wants to have thermo-nuclear war it will go off by itself. This is the really daily terrible situation. So you cannot even predict who the next American President will be. Not even that. You can have guesses and the guess can prove to be right, but you cannot predict this with any certainty in the way in which I can predict that you and I will die, and some other things. And so, in other words, political situations, however the details differ from one case to another, and in some cases the differences are absolutely hair-raising, and yet certain fundamentals are the same, and the most fundamental issues concern that — the most fundamental things and with which Aristotle is concerned. There are other reasons for that. I mean, another reason is this — to which I can now only allude. Aristotle's subject, at first glance, seems to be that thing, polis, which I will translate city; that was not a prejudice of Aristotle.

because he just happened to live in a society in which the city was the predominant form of social organization. Aristotle had a very -- gives a very philosophic reason already. In other words, polis is for Aristotle a philosophic concept and to say the Greek city-state shows a deplorable lack of understanding. The city is the preferred form of human society, quite regardless of whether you can have it everywhere on the globe or not: say on the North Pole and so; that's uninteresting. But it is the preferred form of social organization. One reason is this; no -- the reason is this: it is the natural form of association. Now why it is natural -- of course, not because Greeks are accustomed to that; that would be absurd; but because it is large enough so that all human or natural purposes of men can be satisfied and not too large so that the mere bulk might prevent the proper solution of these problems. And one can state it descriptively, as follows. A society in which everyone knows everyone else is too small for fulfilling all purposes of men, performing all functions of men. A society in which most members do not have any personal knowledge of most other members is much too large because then you make all real decisions on the basis of very insufficient knowledge. For example, if you elect the people to governing offices. The right mean is the society in which everyone knows a personal acquaintance of everyone else so that if someone is running for election you have a reliable way of finding out about them, and not too small -- this was the logic. In other words, that was despised as a silly prejudice and idiosyncrasies and such people scorned that and yet in our society suddenly -- and Aristotle called the other thing which was unbearably big -- he called — with a word which also plays a certain role in the Biblical tradition as you know, it so happens --

— the big city where no one knows one another really, and where all kinds of terrible things can go on, and no one is aware of them. And that was old-fashioned -- city, in other words; also the whole thing. But now, what is the problem of the metropolitan areas, except in a complicated, round-about way a return to Aristotle's problem? And don't think that I, who somehow have some love for Aristotle, say that. Other people who are studying this urban problem are compelled to use the Aristotelian model in order to articulate this problem of the metropolitan area. So this -- that is not merely -- no earlier thinker, however great, can help us in the solution for present day problems for the same reason for which Aristotle couldn't solve the problem of any of you if you lived contemporary with him. For example, whether you should marry or not. Aristotle could really not solve that problem. He could help you in clarifying your mind about it, but the jump has to be made by the individual. And the same applies of course also to political matters. That could not be done, but Aristotle might very well have been more enlightening about the principles than others. You see, you must -- I suggest also another consideration, a very extraordinary one. If you

look at the great -- the classics -- at the famous political works written throughout the ages, I think there are only two which deal in -- for political purposes, social purposes, with all relevant considerations. For example, you cannot say that Locke, in the Treatise of Government deals with all. He deals with a very narrow, but as he saw it, the central issue, but not with . He wrote his treatise, his letters on toleration is an entirely different thing and -- to say nothing else. There are only two and Aristotle's Politics is the ancient one, and the modern equivalent -- I think the only one is Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, which has the same breadth, and that is an important consideration. I don't say that it is the only one, but an important consideration whether someone in trying to understand political phenomena really enters with the necessary completeness into the teachings. Aristotle does that. Montesquieu does that. I don't believe anyone on the same level -- I mean someone who writes a kind of text book, perhaps even a collective text book, could, of course, in an encyclopedia way deal well with that, but that an individual with a first rate mind and with -- tries to penetrate the whole in all its important parts; I think Aristotle and Montesquieu are the greatest examples of that, we could go on and I haven't touched our -- the non-academic prejudice on Aristotle, against Aristotle, and quite a few other things, but perhaps Mr. Saarcock and I will divide the next meeting among ourselves.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 2, March 31, 1900: MISSING

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 3, April 5, 1900

I don't know whether the main features of Aristotle's argument in this part of the Politics has become clear to those of you who have not read, as we are supposed to have read, this part. As the question which Aristotle has described at the beginning the relation of the polis to the primary association, and the most important primary association is the household because a village is superseded by the polis. You cannot live in a village and in a polis at the same time. But the household remains. While being a member of the polis, you are also a member of the household. Therefore the household is more important, the most important of the primary associations because it survives in the polis. And now Aristotle speaks, then, of the household first or more precisely, of the art of managing the household. The household is called -- many things the household is called in Greek -- something like oikos is the household, and oikonomos is the management of the household. That's the origin of our term economics. So we can, then, use the word the economic art, but we must understand it as Aristotle means it. The economic art is the art of managing the household.

Now the household consists of two parts, obviously: human beings and beings which are not human, either animate or inanimate, and the most important part is, of course, the art of managing the human beings, and this again is subdivided into two parts: the art of managing the free human beings, this is the wife and the children, and the unfree part are the slaves. There is -- so to repeat, the main part of managing a household is the managing of human beings, but that does not exhaust the art of managing the household, because these people must also eat, to take the most elementary thought. Therefore it is his function somehow to supply food for them and, of course, also drink and shelter and so, but that's clear. Now let us call this the art of acquisition because acquisition is even involved in a sense, even you have an inherited estate, because still something has to be done to get this year's produce. Now this art of acquisition is absolutely essential to the art of managing the household, but subordinate because we do not live in order to eat, but we eat in order to live. And the difficulty which arises here on this level is this: by some strange accident, let us say to begin with, it happens that many people say the art of acquisition is the art of making money. And Aristotle regards this as an atrocious error, as a perversion of something or other. Therefore, the discussion of money making plays such a great role. If men were sensible that would not be necessary, but unfortunately, they are not sensible and therefore this great error is to be discussed

at great length. This is the main subject of this part: the distinction between the general art of acquisition, the natural art of acquisition, and an unnatural art. Now we must read some of these sections in the text. That is indispensable. Well, we do not have to read everything. Perhaps 1256a15, on page 19, about ten lines from the top.

"That the art of household management is not identical with the art of acquiring property is obvious."

Yes, or with the art of acquisition, I would say --- all right.

"It is the function of the latter simply to provide, but it is the function of the former to use. . . ."

In other words, we acquire in order to use and therefore the higher thing, that in the service of which acquisition has its basis, is use. What the manager of the household has to do is, chiefly, to take care of the proper use of the acquisitions. Well, for example, to take care that people don't ruin the furniture and get the right kind of food and are properly taken care of. The acquisition is only subservient, but indispensable.

"for what art can there be, other than that of household management, which will deal with the use of the resources of the household? But the question whether the art of acquisition is a part of it, or a separate art altogether, is one which admits of a divergence of views. If a man who is engaged in acquisition has to consider from what different sources he can get goods and property, and if property and wealth include many different parts we shall first have to consider whether farming is a part of the art of acquisition, or a separate art: indeed we shall have to ask that question generally, in regard to all modes of occupation and gain which are concerned with the provision of subsistence. This leads to a further observation. There are a number of different modes of subsistence; and the result is a number of different ways of life, both in the animal world and the human. It is impossible to live without means of subsistence; and in the animal world we may notice that differences in the means of subsistence have produced consequent differences in ways of life."

So now that is a very broad question, this question which seemingly belongs only to the household, the question of how to acquire food, in the first place. This affects the whole way of life of men and therefore it affects the polis too. Aristotle will, then, go into the various forms in which men can take care of their food and the outcome, although not explicitly stated, is this: that there is only one way of supplying food, as general way, for the community, which is appropriate to the city, and this is agriculture. But he leads up to that. So that --- in

other words, that has a very great consequence regarding the polis. Therefore, Aristotle enters into it. Now let us read that.

"Some animals live in herds, and others are scattered in isolation, according as they find it convenient for the purpose of getting subsistence -- some of them being carnivorous, some herbivorous, and some, again, omnivorous. Nature has thus distinguished their ways of life, with a view to their greater comfort and their better attainment of what they need: indeed, as the same sort of food is not naturally agreeable to all the members of a class, and as different sorts suit different species, we also find different ways of life even inside the class of carnivorous animals -- and equally in that of the herbivorous -- distinguishing species from species. What is true of animals is also true of men. Their ways of life also differ considerably. The most indolent are the pastoral nomads. They acquire a subsistence from domestic animals, at their leisure, and without any trouble; and as it is necessary for their flocks to move for the sake of pasture, they also are forced to follow in their tracks and to cultivate what may be called a living and moving farm."

The implication is they can never live in a polis because they have to live through change in their domicile.

"There are others who live by hunting; and of these, again, there are different kinds, according to their different modes of hunting. Some live by being freebooters: some, who live near lakes and marshes and rivers, or by a sea which is suitable for the purpose, gain a livelihood by fishing; others live by hunting birds or wild animals. Most men, however, derive their livelihood from the soil, and from cultivated plants."

So in other words that -- and they are -- these last class, the agriculturers, are those from which the citizens, the inhabitants of a polis, stem. The polis is a community that is mentioned here only at the beginning, but that goes without saying throughout the book; the polis is a community primarily of agricultural people. That doesn't mean that each one has to do the farming himself. He can have servants and so, to do it, but the source of livelihood is farming. Yes?

Question: "What is a freebooter?"

Robber, robber. Barker was a very delicate Englishman, and robber would perfectly do as a translation. Robbery -- we come to that question of robbery later. Yes. You see also that Aristotle distinguishes the ways of life in a manner which might remind you, and may have reminded Mr. , of Marx. The economic conditions determine the way of life. That could almost

be read out of it. We have to make one correction immediately. What determines the way of life according to Marx, and what according to Aristotle? How does Marx call that basic stratum which, according to him, determines the whole human life? Production. Aristotle doesn't speak of production. Aristotle speaks of food or sustenance. That is important. And the second point, of course: Aristotle never says that this is determining of everything else. He only says that it is one determinant or rather, to speak more in the manner of Aristotle, is one condition. You cannot have a polis without agriculture, but you can have agriculture without a polis. And moreover you can have an agriculture and a good polis, or an agriculture and a bad polis, and agriculture of this type and of that type and so on. Agriculture is only a condition, not a determinant. Yes. And you see throughout the emphasis on nature. Just as nature assigned, as it were, to the different species of animals different food, a similar division is effected by nature regarding men. Some are nomads; others are fishers; others are robbers; others are farmers. Yes. Now is there another point you would like to bring up? We must put the emphasis on the big things. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

Yes. The word economic conditions is so ambiguous. That is the reason why I brought in Marx. Economic conditions may mean the modes of production, as Marx,

(Student responds inaudibly). Yes, the ways of getting food. (Student: "Can that determine the way of life?") To some extent, yes. Yes, but it is more precise to say it is a condition. It is something without which the polis is not possible, but it does not give the polis its character. It does not even, as such, necessitate the polis because there are tribes, agricultural tribes, who have no -- who live in villages, and have no polis. That's also possible. It's only a minimum condition: without agriculture you cannot have a polis. And what Aristotle is going on to say in the sequel: while agriculture is absolutely essential and healthy, trade is a problem. To some extent it is necessary. Aristotle admits that. But it must be subordinate, in the overall picture, to agriculture. That is also Plato's view and we must come to that later. Now let us go on where we left off.

"The different ways of life (at any rate if we take into account only those who follow an occupation dependent on their own labours, and do not provide themselves with subsistence, may be roughly classified as five -- the pastoral, the farming, the freebooting, the fishing. . . ."

Yes, but why -- he changes the order without anything -- the nomadic, that of the robber, the fisherman, the hunter and the farmer. Yes?

"But there are some who live comfortably by means of a combination of different methods, and who eke out the shortcomings

of one way of life, when it tends to fall short of being sufficient in itself. . . ."

Yes, well I understand now. In other words, you can mix the various ways. Yes?

". . . by adding some other way. For example, some combine the pastoral way of life with the freebooting; others combine farming with the life of the chase; and similar combinations may similarly be made of other ways of life, as needs and tastes impel men to shape their lives.

"Property of this order is evidently given by nature to all living beings. . . ."

Yes, by nature herself; that's emphasized.

"from the instant of their first birth to the days when their growth is finished. There are animals which, when their offspring is born, bring forth along with it food enough to support it until it can provide for itself: this is the case with insects which reproduce themselves by grubs, and with animals which do so by eggs. Animals which are viviparous have food for their offspring in themselves, for a certain time, of the nature of what is called milk."

The nature of the so-called milk. You see, Aristotle steps outside for a way where it says -- speaks then of the so-called milk. You see, as if he did not know of it; everyone knows of

milk. That is now utterly understood milk. We understand really what we name by that word milk which we use thoughtlessly all the time. In other words, the fact that, for example, human beings -- the mothers of human beings are supplied with milk for taking care of the babies. That's the clearest case -- most familiar to all of us -- of how nature supplies the proper food. That's not a human contrivance, in other words. And Aristotle says something like this obtains even for men from -- later on. Yes?

"It is equally evident that we must believe that similar provision is also made for adults. Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and animals to give it to men. Animals, when they are domesticated, serve for use as well as for food; wild animals, too, in most cases if not in all, serve to furnish man not only with food, but also with other comforts, such as the provision of clothing and similar aids to life. Accordingly, as nature makes. . . ."

If, if, if -- that's a crime. You see why that is a crime -- because as states it as a fact; if states it conditionally.

"Accordingly, if nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature, . . ."

No. Purposeless is also not correct -- nothing incomplete, which of course, is not quite true; as Aristotle says, nature makes many mistakes. There are people born without sight and so on and so on. So he makes it -- I mean the statement is rather

extreme for Aristotle, but Barker makes it still more extreme. We will discuss it when we are through.

"... all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men. It also follows that the art of war is in some sense a natural mode of acquisition. Hunting is a part of that art; and hunting ought to be practised -- not only against wild animals, but also against human beings who are intended by nature to be ruled by others and refuse to obey that intention -- because war of this order is naturally just."

Yes. Let us stop here. Now that is a very strange statement; isn't it? I mean, a very simplistic teleology: the lions have been created for the sake of man and the poisonous snakes have been created for the sake of man. Well, probably -- perhaps you can get some medicine out of the poison or we can have very nice carpets from the skin of lions or what. What does he mean? How the statement deviates radically from what Aristotle says in his biological writings. There is no end of an animal of
that species outside of that species. The horse is meant to be a horse and not for human use. The rattlesnake is meant to be a rattlesnake and nothing else. So that is a great problem -- why Aristotle introduces here this extreme statement in which he admits not only the internal teleology, if one can call it, namely that the stomach, for example, of a lion is useful, necessary for the lion and his living, but it's useful for something outside of the lion, namely man. That is a very great question. What does he mean by that?

(Student responds inaudibly). The species: that's the important thing. The horse does not live merely for its own sake, from Aristotle's point of view, but it lives, also, and especially, for the species: namely to propagate another horse.

Student: "Now which is the primary instance of the horse as such: its own self, or the species as such?"

Well, the two things are really inseparable in Aristotle's view, and one could say the emphasis is on the generation of beings equal to it. The horse generates a horse. I mean, you see, the fact that the desire for self-preservation and the desire for the preservation of the species. Now there are certain signs of that. For example, the latter is called in the case of man, love, and that has given -- naturally gives rise to poetic presentation of love. It is much harder to give a poetic presentation of the desire for food than the desire for procreation. That is not a proof, but it is only an indication that even in our ordinary understanding we admit that this procreating is of a higher dignity than the mere preservation of the individual. And it is also indicated by the fact that the pleasures deriving

from thicse two -- or connected with these two desires are so much more intensive in the one case than in the other. So that from Aristotle's point of view the procreation of the species -- that has something to do -- propagation has something to do with eternity, to put it very simply. Always. Whereas, self-preservation has -- mere self-preservation of a mortal being cannot have anything to do with eternity. These are so much the reasons which Aristotle has in mind. But the difficulty here is this: the difficulty here is the external -- the simple and almost unqualified statement of an external teleology. We must try to understand that. Yes?

"Jarker translates it as -- he says 'it is equally evident that we must believe that similar provision. . . .'"

Yes, sure. You see the ambiguity. It is manifest that we must believe; that we must opine, one could translate. That shows, I mean, the one thing seems to convey the notion of necessity: knowledge. The other -- the verb, then, takes it back. There are more indications of it. But let us not -- let us try to understand the thesis in itself, and I think we should start in considering that from the other parallelcy occurring here. The other parallelcy you must have observed is the statement about robbery, robbing. You see, it is very strange. Aristotle thinks that trade is something rather low and morally dubious, not natural. But robbery is one natural form of gaining one's livelihood. Is not strange? Well, what he means by that robbery is, of course, how all kinds of things -- well, hunting, hunting. But that means not only the hunting of animals, but also slave raids, as it appears. Naturally we have to be decent about it and have to raid only such people as are, by nature, slaves. That goes without saying. But unfortunately we know that the slave raiders do not make these nice distinctions and therefore it seems to be a rather shocking proposition. Now what does Aristotle mean? What does he mean? The statement of that external teleology, that all plants are for the sake of the brutes and the brutes are for the sake of men and that is so simply -- you know, no problem. Let us call that a simple expression of the belief in the beneficence of nature. Yes, but that is so, and there is some evidence that this was taught in Greece prior to Aristotle. But Aristotle makes a certain change in that immediately -- on the surface. That benevolent nature also rises war, so this beneficence is not such a simple beneficence. You know, because slave raid is one part of the art of war, as he indicates.

On the other hand, to understand that let us consider the alternatives. Beneficent nature authorizes only the most peaceful activities. Then nature would be perfectly beneficent. But then you must be radical. Then you have even to exclude agriculture because agriculture is a harsh thing. That we have forgotten. It means violating the mother earth. Then we must be radical and say only a nomadic, vegetarian life is worthy of man. And we have traces of that in Plato's Republic; in the first city they are vegetarian. And of course we have also the great example

of the Bible: Cain and Abel, Abel being the nomadic shepherd and Cain being the agriculturalist; and only the victim of Abel, not that of Cain, was pleasing to God. And these notions we find also everywhere. So in Aristotle, in other words, it does not go to that extreme. But then we modern ones smiling about these primitive notions — we say: well, that's nonsense, to talk of beneficent nature. Nature is so far from being beneficent. It is malignant; it is inimical to man. This is not much more realistic. Must we not get everything from nature, against her will? That notion is implied in the familiar phrase, conquest of nature, which Aristotle rejects all the time. You know, he says nature supplies, nature supplies; you don't have to fight her. She gives. But — that is one possibility. And then some people will say well, that is much too melodramatic or poetic to speak of nature as the enemy. Let us speak as practical men, and as scientific men, of nature as indifferent. She doesn't turn upon man, either in a friendly or in an inimical way. All right; let us consider that. These people say man is an accident. Man was produced by natural forces, but it could have happened differently. Some little change, slight change, a couple of million years ago — then man would never have seen the light of the sun — a mere accident. But that is the issue. This little thing. Is man an accident? Is it an accident that there is a being in the world which can behold the world? Now, in order to understand this one must consider Aristotle's notion of God.

The Aristotelian God is not like the Biblical God, omniscient. What Aristotle thought about God is difficult, but one thing is clear. The Aristotelian God is not omniscient. The Aristotelian God knows only the forms, the essences, you can say. Even that is a problem, but let us assume that. The laws of nature, in modern language; not the individuals, not the particulars. Man knows both the forms and the individuals, the particulars, Man is the only being which is open to the whole as whole. Now that a world which is, without containing within itself a being which can see it, which can understand it, is an imperfect whole. It is a desert. Now maybe the world might abound with lions, tigers, rats, vipers, eagles; what have you? And if there were no man there it would be a desert. Now the modern answer is, of course, well, that is human pride. If the foxes could talk they would say exactly the same thing. The trouble is only the foxes cannot talk. Therefore this argument is not valid. I mean, or even if it is mere pride, there is some reason for their pride. Or in other words it is — improbably be described as pride. This — therefore — if therefore a certain — one cannot — an indifferent nature would be a nature for which man is simply an accident. That is denied by Aristotle. Whether that denial is defensible or not is a long question, but it is a serious question. It's not something which one can dispose of like that. And therefore if nature is not indifferent to the being of man, then it becomes inevitable to discuss the two simple alternatives: inimical and beneficent. Aristotle implies an argument which shows that to understand nature as inimical is indefensible, and one

can show this very simply in the following way. I use an example which I have used frequently in classes. Those who have heard it are requested to forgive me for the repetition. A nineteenth century writer has brought out very forcibly the view of nature as an enemy, and that was Melville. Now in one of his novels this passage occurs: someone who believes in the beneficence of nature, who plays the role of a confidence man in Melville's novel, you know because he wants to make people confident in the beneficence of nature — now this man speaks of the beneficence of nature and then another man — and he says who has given you eyes to see all these beauties, and to which this other fellow says, an oculist in Philadelphia. My eyes are so poor — you know, so poor that I would be blind if human art, as distinguished from nature, had not given me my eyesight. Aristotle was familiar with the fact that nature does not always produce perfect human specimens. He was very much aware of it, as we shall see. But he said this: look, what did this fellow in Philadelphia do in curing the defect of your eyes? How did he know that it was a defect, except by looking at an eye which was perfect by nature. This art merely imitates or assists nature. It cannot be described as simply acting against nature, as conquering it. Nature — the goodness of nature is presupposed in this very argument which claims to establish the inimical character of nature.

One can therefore state this argument presented here by Aristotle as follows. A certain harshness of life which makes it necessary for man to violate mother earth by becoming agriculturalist and also to introduce slavery, if a certain kind of slavery, is essential to the very goodness of nature. There could not be man, and man developing his highest faculties, without these certain kinds of harshnesses. Differently stated, pity or compassion is in itself a passion, an affect, which is as much in need of control and — rational control — as anger or any other affect. It is not the guiding affect of Aristotle, and, in particular, not of his Politics.

Still, this does not quite explain the Aristotelian preference, or apparent preference, for brigandage or robbery, as distinguished from trade. Why has robbery a certain superiority? What is characteristic of a robber? He takes away from other human beings. That is very bad, and so, but it has, and can have, a certain respectability. He doesn't crawl; surely not. He is, in a peculiar way, free. I will elaborate that. It is found absolutely inevitable for man to be dependent on nature. Man cannot be the master of nature. Even if he is a master in the sense described here: the plants for the sake of the brutes; the brutes for the sake of man; that is not mastery proper, because he was put into that by nature. So man is dependent on nature, essentially. This dependence on nature must be included in every sensible concept of human freedom. Freedom could

then mean, at the most, that one is not dependent on men. More precisely: that this individual is not dependent on other individuals. Still more precisely: that man is not dependent for his livelihood on other men's good will. A man who is dependent for his livelihood on other men's good will is an unfree man. He doesn't have to be technically a slave. He may be a beggar, but that is not a form of human freedom. Now if you look at the situation from this point of view you see that in this perspective the robber has an initial advantage over the trader. The trader cannot demand -- and he is in this sense subject -- in the olden times when socialism was not yet so rampant as it is now you could see it when entering into any shop. The people were excessively polite. Today they are excessively impolite because they know they will not be thrown out for bad service, but this excessive politeness is something slavish, something servile from Aristotle's point of view. That's not -- please don't misunderstand Aristotle to mean that he is in favor of gangsterism. No: he would be in favor of very severe punishment for robbery within society. But only in this broad consideration at the beginning where he does not yet speak with necessary precision as to what is to be done within civil society, he expresses this slight preference.

Now he develops in the sequel the crucial point, because the correct question for Aristotle is the difference between two arts of acquisition: the natural art, which in the most desirable case and also the more frequent case is agriculture, and the unnatural art, which is trade. What is the distinction between the two? Let us read the sequel, where we left off.

"It follows that one form of acquisition is naturally a part of the art of household management. It is a form of acquisition, which the manager of a household must either find ready to hand, or himself provide and arrange, because it ensures a supply of objects, necessary for life and useful to the association of the polis or the household, which are capable of being stored. These are the objects which may be regarded as constituting true wealth; and the amount of household property which suffices for a good life is not unlimited, nor of the nature described by Solon in the verse,

"There is no bound to wealth stands fixed for men."

"There is a bound fixed, as is also the case in the means required by the other arts. All the instruments needed by all the arts are limited, both in number and size, by the requirements of the art they serve; and wealth may be defined as a number of instruments used in a household or state.

"It is thus clear that there is a natural art of acquisition which has to be practiced by managers of households and statesmen; and the reason for its existence is also clear."

Yes: this is the conclusion of the discussion of the natural art of acquisition which is based on this notion of nature of which I spoke and which leads to the practical conclusion that the natural form of acquisition, the most favored form of natural acquisition, is agriculture. Most favored because without agriculture you cannot have a polis. You cannot have a polis on the basis of nomadic life and of fishers and so on, except very accidentally. Now we have to understand that other art -- that other possibility of understanding; the art of acquisition. You see already here a point. The natural art of acquisition is finite, limited by its nature. You cannot -- of course a man can collect innumerable sheep, innumerable forks, innumerable spoons, but that is plainly silly. But if someone would collect innumerable dollars it is not so plainly silly. There is no intrinsic limit if you look at money as money, whereas there is an intrinsic limit if you look at things for use. I mean you can have surely a house. You can also have another house in the country, but fifteen houses, if you are three people, does not make any sense. But this consideration does not apply to money because of the homogeneity of dollars. One dollar, whether it is the first dollar you have or the forty-millionth, is homogeneous to the first. There is no natural limitation here. Someone raised his hand -- yes?

Students "The first fork is the same as the forty-millionth fork too."

Yes, but still, what do you want to do with forty million forks, if you are three people in your house.

"Yes but you have to apply the thing that if you can do things with two dollars that you can't do with one dollar, whereas if you have a fork you can't use a second one to feed the same meal."

So that forks are by nature limited: yes? And you can even make a distinction between forks used for this kind of work and that and so on.

"Not because they're homogeneous, but because there's a limit to the number you can use at any one time."

But that is precisely what I mean. You can have a very large number of objects and still there would be a very small number of each kind: houses, forks, combs, whatever have you. But regarding money, there doesn't enter the difference of kind. It is all of one kind, and therefore there is no natural limitation. I mean therefore -- that is the basis for the fact that the object of avarice is money, coins or bank notes, and not forks. I mean the typical -- look at all the famous presentations of misers in the tradition. I mean, these people who collect forks or pancakes, for that matter -- there is a famous story about

that -- they are plainly crazy. But the miser who collects money is not plainly crazy. That's the problem. Now?

"I think the point being raised here is -- comes out when he talks about usury. It's that the money isn't, in any sense, real or useful in itself. Isn't that the point that's being raised?"

That is also a point, but that -- both things are connected. The derivative character of money, the abstract character of money, is the reason for the possible infinity. Now there was someone else who was displeased with this -- yes?

(Inaudible question).

Oh well, I don't know this well, but I suppose you use a different fork for eating a certain kind of fruit cake than for a steak. Or am I completely wrong in that? I believe it is really true. Is there someone here who has upon reality? I think it is true.

Student responds: "Or the difference between tablespoons and tea spoons."

Spoons. Yes. Yes, but -- oh you know that. If you go to any restaurant you will see it immediately. So we can forget about that.

Now let us go on. There is another kind of acquisitive art?

"But there is a second form of the general art of getting property, which is particularly called, and which it is just to call, 'the art of acquisition'."

No: acquisition is really not a good word for that. I would call it the art of money-making.

"It is the characteristics of this second form which lead to the opinion that there is no limit to wealth and property. There are many who hold this second form of the art of getting property to be identical with the other form previously mentioned, because it has affinities with it. In fact it is not identical, and yet it is not far removed. The other form previously mentioned is natural: this second form is not natural, but is rather the product of a certain sort of experience and skill.

"We may start our discussion of this form from the following point of view. All articles of property have two possible uses. Both of these uses belong to the article as such, but they do not belong to it in the same manner, or to the same extent. The one use is proper and peculiar to the article concerned; the other is not. We may take a shoe as an example. It can be used both for wearing and for exchange. Both of these uses are uses of the shoe as such. Even the man who exchanges a shoe, in return for

nancy or food, with a person who needs the article, is using the shoe as a shoe; but since the shoe has not been made for the purpose of being exchanged, the use which he is making of it is not its proper and peculiar use. The same is true of all other articles of property."

Now is this clear? Is this distinction clear? That everything of this kind of -- but in principle, everything is susceptible of a twofold use: of its proper use and of the use of it which is not proper. Not proper does now not mean improper, but it means it's not peculiar to the thing. You can exchange shoes, trees, chalk, eyeglasses, what have you. That applies in the same way to everything, but then there is also a peculiar or proper use for the things: of eyeglasses, to see better with; of shoes, to be protected against stones while walking, and so on and so on. And the whole discussion, later discussion, follows from that. Some of you will know that this is, in a way, the starting point of Marx later on, for his understanding of what commodities is, commodity as distinguished from the thing itself. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

He will say that. Well, you know quite well that gold has a twofold use. You can use it as ornament, and some people do, but it has this peculiarity: that it can also -- is fit as a means of exchange, more fit than, say, paper, and that is one great invention of modern man: that he could make paper as a means of exchange. You know, that was a great feat, that you have something which has no intrinsic value whatever and is a means of exchange. But Aristotle didn't know about that, and whether his economic doctrine has to be re-written for this reason I'm not competent to say. But Aristotle lived in a society in which the means of exchange were themselves intrinsically valuable things. But still, gold as used as a means of exchange is not the same thing as gold itself, which has also its use values, obviously. I mean not only for ornament but also for useful purposes like teeth, for example. Now is this point clear, that everything is susceptible of this twofold use. Take the shoemaker: he doesn't make the shoes for wearing them. He makes the shoes, except perhaps one pair, from time to time, for exchanging them. So he uses the shoes for a purpose not peculiar to the shoes. He could do the same thing also with chalk: exchange. Is this clear? So there is -- it is -- exchanging, one could say, is the abstract use of the thing, as distinguished from the concrete use. Yes?

"Is it totally irrelevant to bring up the point that Plato says this is very natural, this is the essence of being natural: to have the shoemaker make shoes because he's naturally fitted for it, or is that irrelevant?"

No, it must have -- it probably has something to do with that, but perhaps -- do you believe that there is a contradiction between Aristotle and Plato at this point?

"Well I just have the sensed feeling that the fact that division of labor is, after all the basis of the exchange in the first place, and since that's considered so radically natural I just have the feeling that . . ."

(Change of tape).

. . . infinite units of grain to get infinite other things. You will produce grain all the time and what will happen to you? That is what Aristotle is driving at. What will happen to you? You will forget to live which becoming ever better at acquiring and that is an absolutely unnatural life. That is the point at which he is driving. Acquisition is essentially something subservient to living, but by the perfectly natural and necessary exchange, and even money, because exchange would be much too cumbersome if there were no money, we create the possibility that men become acquisitors and cease to be livers, if I may say so. Do you understand? That is the point. As long as production manifestly serves the purpose of life there is no danger; there is no error possible. Money creates the danger, although money itself is innocent. But it creates the danger which wouldn't exist without it. Now he is working up his way toward that: will you go on?

"Exchange is possible in regard to them all: it arises from the natural facts of the case, and is due to some men having more, and others less, than suffices for their needs. We can thus see that retail trade is not naturally a part of the art of acquisition. If that were the case, it would only be necessary to practise exchange to the extent that sufficed for the needs of both parties."

In other words, the retail trader is a man who does not involve trade, whereas Aristotle thinks of the case in which one neighbor has too much milk and the other has too much grain and they exchange. And there is no problem here, because everyone will not -- no one will become a mere acquisitor because of this inevitable convenience. Yes?

"Barker has here in parenthesis that if that were the case (this is Aristotle) it would only be necessary to practice exchange to the extent that sufficed for the needs of both parties, and then Barker says, "and not to the extent of the making of profit by one of the parties at the expense of the other." Do you think that that's a justification -- ?"

Yes, that is in a different way -- in different words -- what I said. I mean that was -- in other words, exchange is not necessarily retail -- the retail trader as retail trader lives -- does not ever exchange and he is speaking here of neighbors who, on occasion, exchange. This occasional exchange is inevitable. It's inevitable because, let us assume that everyone has the same plot of land -- let us take the simplest example -- the same amount of cows or sheep or whatever he has -- there is always, by some accident, some shortage at one point. For example,

the farmer has been ill, and couldn't work properly and -- or something else -- or they might have two children too much -- there is a shortage. But they have something else which they can offer their neighbors in exchange.

"But is the great part that Aristotle stakes in this that somebody is gaining at the expense of the other, which is what Barker says."

Yes, that is in the spirit of Aristotle, but it is not said here. We come to that later. Yes?

"In the first form of association, which is the household, it is obvious that there is no purpose to be served by the art of exchange. Such a purpose only emerged when the scope of association had already been extended. The members of the household had shared all things in common: the members of the village, separated from one another, had at their disposal a number of different things, which they had to exchange with one another, as need arose, by way of barter -- much as many uncivilized tribes still do to this day. On this basis things which are useful are exchanged themselves, and directly, for similar useful things, but the transaction does not go any further; wine, for instance, is given, or taken, in return for wheat, and other similar commodities are similarly bartered for one another. When used in this way, the art of exchange is not contrary to nature, nor in any way a form of the art of acquisition. Exchange simply served to satisfy the natural requirements of sufficiency."

In other words, that is not essentially different from what you do when you cultivate your plot and milk your cow. That is only -- there is no essential difference, that you get the milk, today, from your neighbor, because your cow, for one reason or another, doesn't function. That is not a fundamentally changed situation.

"None the less it was from exchange, as thus practised, that the art of acquisition developed, in the sort of way we might reasonably expect. The supply of men's needs came to depend on more foreign sources, as men began to import for themselves what they lacked, and to export what they had in superabundance; and in this way the use of a money currency was inevitably instituted. The reason for this institution of a currency was that all the naturally necessary commodities were not easily portable; and men therefore agreed, for the purpose of their exchanges, to give and receive some commodity which itself belonged to the category of useful things and possessed the advantage of being easily handled for the purpose of getting the necessities of life."

You see now: it's easier to handle gold than cows. Think of transportation.

"Such Commodities were iron, silver, and other similar metals. At first their value was simply determined by their size and weight; but finally a stamp was imposed on the metal which, serving as a definite indication of the quantity, would save men the trouble of determining the value on each occasion."

Now let us stop here. What Aristotle describes in the sequel is when once there is such a homogeneous element, let it be iron to begin with: that doesn't make any difference -- but which is exchangeable everywhere and therefore indirectly usable for every purpose. Then the desire for acquisition has no longer a goal, a natural goal, as you have in the case of forks, of houses, and what have you. And therefore this way of life starts -- which is simply the acquisitive life. One can state the Aristotelian doctrine as follows. Life is impossible without acquisition. Even if you have as an estate, landed estate, which is sufficient for your life; you have inherited from your parents so you do not acquire a new land or so. Still, the yearly produce has to be acquired again and again. In this sense, acquisition is essential to human life. But one thing is the acquisition essential to human life. An entirely different thing is the acquisitive life, a life devoted to acquisition so that it forgets life itself. And that becomes possible only through the introduction of money, and this is a wholly unnatural life. One reason which Aristotle gives is later on. It is this point: a man may have innumerable coins, gold, and he can starve to death. A famine, for example. He refers to the Greek story of Midas: whatever he touched became gold, so even his food became gold, and he starved to death. And the first condition of natural wealth is, of course, that it keeps you alive by giving you the sustenance which you need. Now I must bring in a wholly extraneous question: I mean what is the time because my watch doesn't function. Ten past five? Then we have to hurry a bit and read only the most urgent passages. There is a remark about the infinity which is of some interest, a bit later on. Paragraph 13.

ted

"It is a further point of difference that the wealth produced by this latter form of the art of acquisition is unlimited. The art of medicine recognizes no limit in respect of the production of health, and the arts generally admit no limit in respect of the production of their ends (each seeking to produce its end to the greatest possible extent) -- though medicine, and the arts generally, recognize and practise a limit to the means they use to attain their ends, since the end itself constitutes a limit. The same is true of the retail form of the art of acquisition."

Now let us stop here. Do you understand this remark about a certain legitimate infinity and an illegitimate infinity? Every art is, in a way, infinite. He gives the example of medicine. It is impossible to say that a certain, for example, successful operation cannot be made still better; still better, perhaps only in the form of still more convenient: that you can do it without having so and so many instruments 'around' and so and so many nurses around or to have the period of recovery reduced and all this kind of thing. In this sense there is an inner infinity of art. But this inner infinity has nothing to do with a bad infinity, namely with the multiplying of means which only obstruct and are in no way a help to the art. Each art limits, both quantitatively and qualitative, the means which it can use. And the same is true therefore, also of the economic art. The economic art proper sets a limit to wealth, whereas this acquisitive art of which we have spoken is, in every respect, infinite. And somewhat later when he speaks of the reason of this disposition, he speaks of theories about living: paragraph sixteen.

"But the fundamental cause of this state of mind is men's anxiety about livelihood, rather than about well-being; and since their desire for that is unlimited, their desire for the things that produce it is equally unlimited. Even those who do aim at well-being seek the means of obtaining physical enjoyments. . . ."

Bodily enjoyments -- I mean that is

. Yes?

" . . . and, as what they seek appears to depend on the activity of acquisition, they are thus led to occupy themselves wholly in the making of money. This is the real reason why the other and lower form of the art of acquisition has come into vogue. Because enjoyment depends on a superfluity, men address themselves to the art which produces the superfluity necessary to enjoyment; and if they cannot get what they want by the use of that art -- i.e. the art of acquisition -- they attempt to do so by other means, using each and every capacity in a way not consonant with its nature. The proper function of courage, for example, is not to produce money but to give confidence. The same is true of military and medical ability: neither has the function of producing money: the one has the function of producing victory, and the other that of producing health. But those of whom we are speaking turn all such capacities into forms of the art of acquisition, as though to make money were the one aim and everything else must contribute to that aim."

That is really the reason for everything which preceded it. The end is man's life as a human life. This human life needs

money
ordering
up the
its service

acquisition as subservient function, but this function can be made -- can become -- this means can become the end. However this is possible only on the basis of money, as Aristotle explains. But Aristotle makes it apparent it is not merely the money -- the hoarding of money, which is the danger. The other is the variety of mere bodily enjoyments. That is infinite. You can always have more and more comfort. You can have air conditioning, but then you might have a more refined air conditioning, so that you never for a moment have any unpleasant feeling on account of weather, and that can go on infinitely. In other words, to use the expression of Locke, which is really very -- brings out very beautifully what Aristotle has in mind, the wrong end is that end which Locke recommended: comfortable self-preservation. That's infinite. The true end is virtue, a human life, a humane life, and this humane life consists in treating everything according to its particular character: properly, as he said before. For example, to treat medicine as the art of healing, and regard the monetary receipt as purely accidental. The physician who is primarily a money-maker is not a true physician, as a general who is primarily concerned with victory, monetary or not, which he makes, and not with a victory for his state, his society, is, as such, a bad general, and so on. Now Aristotle goes into all kinds of questions which are important which we cannot, unfortunately, enter. There is only one point which seems to me indispensable for our purpose, and that begins at 1259b -- no, we can, perhaps, begin at 1259b37. Let me see. "Since there are three parts of the art of the management of the household, one that of ruling as a master, of which has been spoken before. . . ." Do you have that? "One the art of the father, and the third the matrimonial one." Do you have that? Go on.

"While the head of the household rules over both wife and children, and rules over both as free members of the household, he exercises a different sort of rule in either case. His rule over his wife is like that of a statesman over fellow citizens; his rule over his children is like that of a monarch over subjects."

Yes. Do you see the difference? The statesman cannot boss around -- cannot command the way in which a king commands. He is only temporarily in charge, so to speak, the statesman. The king is permanently in charge.

"The male is naturally fitter to command than the female, except where there is some departure from nature; and age and maturity are similarly fitter to command than youth and immaturity. In most cases where rule of the statesman's sort is exercised there is an interchange of ruling and being ruled: the members of a political association aim by their very nature at being equal and differing in nothing. Even so, and in spite of this aim, it is none the

less true that when one body of citizens is ruling, and the other is being ruled, the former desires to establish a difference — in outward forms, in modes of address, and in titles of respect — which may remind us of the saying of Anaxis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is permanently that in which the statesman stands to his fellow-citizens."

Well, what he means is this: there are certain forms of rule where the ruler and ruled are clearly distinguished by nature: say, father, children. There are other cases in which they are not distinguished by nature, and that is in a republican society where the ruler of today will be the ruled tomorrow, and so on. Since there is no natural distinction between them, but only the accidental fact of having been elected, men must make conventional signs by which to show the difference. Well, I'm sure you all know what these conventional signs are. For example, you say Mr. President; you don't say Ike, and this kind of thing, and others. So that is clear. Now, here he comes back to the question of male and female — husband and wife. The husband is by nature the ruler of the wife. Aristotle knew, of course, of hen-pecked husbands. He alluded to them here, but that is something wrong. That is something very like saying someone is shortsighted or limping or has some other defect. But the natural thing for the husband is to rule the wife. Or it has something to do with this more respectful relation which the statesman has to the others who will be statesmen next year, and not the king towards his subject, but only with this understanding: of course, they won't change their places. That is what he says here. I mean, the wife of today will not be the husband of tomorrow, whereas the ruled today — ruled citizen today may very well be a ruling citizen tomorrow. Yes?

"Paternal rule over children, on the other hand, is like that of a king over his subjects. The male parent is in a position of authority both in virtue of the affection to which he is entitled and by right of his seniority; and his position is thus in the nature of royal authority. Homer, therefore, was right and proper in using the invocation

Father of Gods and of men
to address Zeus, who is king of them all. A king ought to be naturally superior to his subjects, and yet of the same stock as they are; and this is the case with the relation of age to youth, and of parent to child."

Yes: well, it is so difficult to follow Barker because he is so very . . . (rest of comment inaudible). Here, paragraph two, on the next page.

"Here a preliminary question may be raised in regard to the slave. Has he any 'goodness' beyond that of discharging his function as an instrument and performing his menial service — any goodness of a higher value, such as belongs

to temperance, fortitude, justice, and the rest of such moral qualities? Or has he no "goodness" outside the area of the bodily services he renders? Either alternative presents difficulties. If slaves have a "goodness" of the higher sort, in what respect will they differ from freemen? If they have not it is a surprising thing: they are human beings, with a share in reason."

Do you see the point? Let us stop here because we cannot read all. Do you see the problem? The question is, can slaves have virtues? If they have no virtues, they are useless even as slaves. Think of a slave who is constantly drunk and thievish and lazy. What's the use of that fellow? So he must have some virtues. But if he has virtues, why is he a slave? Could he not be a freeman? Is it not a real difficulty? Now Aristotle finds the solution in the sequel and I believe you should read that because that is a typical example of Aristotelian thinking and analysis. The crucial point is that virtue differs as -- from type of man to type of man. The moderation, the temperance of a man, for example, differs from that of a woman. Women were supposed to be more reserved in former times, not to talk in the presence of men. The opposite was not true. So if a man were as reserved as a woman ought to be, there would be something wrong with him as a man, and vice versa. Also, of a child it has been said, and so Aristotle would have fully approved of it, they should be seen but not heard. That's the virtue of a child. It would obviously not be the virtue of a man, and now starting from this principle Aristotle reaches a conclusion. Of course, a slave must have virtues, but the virtues of a slave. So that what makes him a good slave disqualifies him from being a freeman. So the problem is solved. And then the paradox which seems very strange: what about a craftsman -- free craftsman, you ask to do some plumbing or what not, in your house? Must he have virtue or not? And Aristotle says no, because you don't live with him. He has to be sober during the few hours when he works, naturally. Otherwise he would be poor as a craftsman. But what he does outside of it -- I mean outside of these hours where he serves -- that is not necessary. And so we reach the seemingly paradoxical result that the higher degree of virtue is required of the slave than of the free worker. There is no contradiction whatever in Aristotle, but it is one of these peculiar subtleties which modern thinkers try to abolish in favor of a more simplistic but also more formalistic view. Now there is only one point which I think -- one thing we should discuss because it has a very important application. . . .page 37, paragraph 15.

"This may serve as a sufficient discussion of these topics. There remain for discussion a number of questions -- the relation of husband and wife, and that of parent and child; the nature of the goodness proper to each partner in these relations; the character of the mutual association of the partners, with its qualities and defects and the methods of attaining those qualities and escaping those defects."

In other words, that is the most important subject for management of the household: how to treat the wife and the children. This remains. It will not be discussed here by Aristotle, the most important part of the economic art. Why? Why does Aristotle not discuss the most important part of economics in the economic section of his Politics?

"All these are questions which must be treated later in the discourses which deal with forms of government. Every household is a part of a polis. The society of husband and wife, and that of parents and children, are parts of the household. The goodness of every part must be considered with reference to the goodness of the whole. We must therefore consider the government before we proceed to deal with the training of children and women -- at any rate if we hold that the goodness of children and women makes any difference to the goodness of the polis. And it must make a difference. Women are a half of the free population: children grow up to be partners in the government of the state.

"As we have already discussed some aspects of the household, and as we are to discuss the rest at a later stage, we may dismiss our present inquiry as finished, and make a new start. Let us first examine the theories of those who have expressed opinions about an ideal form of government."

Yes: well, the translation is very bad in certain crucial points; I will come to that later. Now what does Aristotle discuss -- which present-day problem does Aristotle discuss here and not quite recognizable, but recognizable with a little bit of an effort. I mean, you know in present-day analysis of political phenomena all kinds of suggestions are made where to begin. Aristotle has made a remark at the beginning, you may recall: you'd begin with a smaller unit. For example, with a household. Now what is the contemporary equivalent to the beginning with a smaller unit in order to understand political society? You laugh: you know it. Primary groups. That is, in a way, Aristotle -- the issue. Of course a primary group is studied in as value-free a way by present-day social science as political society, but still it is important. Now what does Aristotle -- if we translate what Aristotle says into present-day language, what would it mean? The family is a part of the polis. Therefore it can, only to a very small extent be properly studied by itself. The most important information about the family depends on the political association, and its peculiar character, Now, translate that in terms of primary groups.

Student: "Well, he'd say that man considered first of all the forms and substance of government in order to understand primary groups."

A primary group in Moscow is not a primary group in New York. And that has something to do with the fact that New York is a part of the United States and Moscow is a part of the Soviet Union.

16

And therefore -- in other words, the primary group is always already nolded by the political society within which it occurs. You do not get a pure primary group anywhere because the whole affects, decidedly, its parts. That is -- Aristotle speaks here of -- naturally, because he is concerned not only with describing political society, but with finding out what is the best political society; and regarding the family he's not concerned with describing it, but with finding out what is the best form of living together of husband and wife and of parents and children. At the end he gives the remark -- makes the remark about what the whole book is about, which he has not stated as clearly at the beginning. He says we shall speak after we have made a new beginning and we shall first consider those who have made assertions regarding the best regime. That is the form in which I think that should be translated: the best form of government is too narrow because when you speak of a form of government in our age you imply a distinction between the government and the sovereign. The form of government is something different from the form of the sovereign. That distinction is absent from Aristotle. The government is the sovereign, and therefore the so-called form of government means so much more than it means today. It means the whole way of life of a society. We will come to that later. This is the theme, the guiding theme of Aristotle's Politics: the best regime, the best way of life of a human society. Why the governmental element is so important for the best way of life: that we must try to elaborate -- to understand. But it isn't -- Aristotle doesn't have a mere prejudice in favor of politics, but that is based on certain reasonings concerning the peculiar contribution of government to the way of life.

Yes. I'm sorry we have to rush things only so much, but I said at the beginning that we will have a cursory reading of the whole Politics, and that means that we have to rush things much, but everyone of you -- especially those who read papers -- can contribute to the improvement of our procedure by concentrating on the most important subjects in this whole presentation. That would make it easier.

17

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 4, April 7, 1960

... sensible people would wish and that is here only implied. This is because sensible people don't wish for impossible things. That is somehow, in these olden times, taken for granted. So the theme is on the best political associations, and this is possible only under the most favorable conditions; not always. This is best for those who can live to the highest degree according to wish. In other words you do not live on the North Pole for this project. There it would be impossible because there too much energy were needed for keeping warm. And that energy is taken away from other projects, and similar considerations. Or on the you could also take as an example. Now go on.

"We must begin by investigating ideal forms of government other than our own; and we must investigate not only forms which are actually practised by states that are accounted to be well governed, but also forms of a different order which have been designed by theorists and are held in good repute."

Now let us stop here for a moment. Now here he reveals the word idea, which he avoided before. Aristotle says we must also consider the other regimes which some of the cities use, some of the cities which are reputed, or which are said to be well governed by law. And if there happen to be some others which have been said by some men -- said, meaning only spoken, not in practice, not actually used -- and which are reputed to be all right. Now you see this point here. Aristotle says our theme is the best political association. But in order to prepare that study we look first at the other political associations: (a) those which are actually in use in given cities, but not at all because there some which have already such bad reputations, a bad smell to begin with, that no sensible man would waste his time on their study. So we are prudent men: we limit ourselves to those which are worth considering because they have at least the reputation that they have. This will prove to be Sparta and Crete and Carthage, especially, as we shall see later. But Aristotle says also we will consider those which are not in actual use, but which are only, as he would say today, on paper. But Aristotle -- since they were not so bookish at that time as we are now, he'd say -- which are spoken, which exist only in speech. And here the most important example is, of course, Plato. Aristotle treats the actual constitutions, if I may use that term and the blueprint constitutions on the same level. That's important. Aristotle is not such a narrow realist that he would dismiss the blueprint constitutions if they are made by sensible men, experienced men, without inquiring into them. You seem to be surprised by this observation?

(Inaudible response).

45

Well, what Aristotle calls a spoken one. We would say blue-print or in book form. Aristotle says which are spoken. Now let us go on. Now why do we do that?

"The gain of such a discussion will be twofold. In the first place, we shall discover what is right, and what is useful. . . ."

Yes: right does not mean here --that's not what I would say. I would say the correct, because he doesn't have the connotation of justice. So that the correct and the useful can be seen. You see, the useful is not as very correct. Something can be useful under very unfavorable circumstances, but it is not a correct solution. Two different considerations: that's clear. In other words, we can learn something from these constitutions already in existence, either in practice or on paper. Yes?

"In the second place, when we proceed to seek for something different from the forms of government we have investigated, we shall not be thought to belong to the class of thinkers who desire at all costs to show their own ingenuity, but rather to have adopted our method in consequence of the defects we have found in existing forms."

Isn't that a strange reason? Isn't it sufficient to say we look at them because -- we look at these other things because we can learn something from them. Aristotle adds here what he does in no other book of his, another consideration. Lest we be accused of showing off. You know? Aristotle wants to show there is need for a new investigation because of the defects of the associations which are already known, either from books or from practice. Why does he make this strange remark which he wouldn't make in his Physics or in other places?

Student answers: "One reason would be the political things are things that can be known, at least in some way, at least in opinions, by everybody. . . ." (Mr. Strauss: I don't get it.) "Well, everybody has some opinion about political things, whereas in physics or. . . ."

Yes, but could one not be excused in a purely theoretical book too of trying to -- be inspired by ambition by desire for novelty for novelty's sake?

(Inaudible answer).

Yes, but what has the second reasoning to do with that? (Student answers inaudibly). No, he simply says he doesn't want to be accused of wishing to show off. Yes? (Student answers). Yes, but why does he do that in the Politics? Well I think it is something very simple: ambition is somehow more at home in

47

politics than in academies. Aristotle was not a fool. He'd know that professors were , this kind of thing. But there the inappropriateness is so clear, but in politics a certain ambition and a certain detracting, therefore, from the is more taken for granted. It is not as shocking. . . So Aristotle -- that has something to do that he is aware of the fact that even speaking as a theoretician about politics, he somehow takes on the character of a politician. It has something to do with that. Now let us go on.

"Our beginning must start from the point which is the natural starting-point of such a discussion. One of three alternatives must be adopted. All the citizens must have all things in common; or they must have nothing in common; or they must have some things in common, and others not."

Now that is a complete in that all cases are covered by that: in everything, in nothing or in something. Whenever this simple logical procedure is helpful Aristotle avails himself of it, of course, as every sensible man would. And then he disposes immediately of one: that the citizens should have nothing in common. That is impossible: they must at least have in common the place. At least: some, more than that, but at least that. But still, which of the two other alternatives: all or some? Now that becomes such an enormously wise man as Plato said they should have everything in common. So, in other words, Plato's Republic is of the utmost importance because it is one of the basic alternatives in describing society. Aristotle regards it as a wholly wrong position to take, but, to begin with, logically, it is as important a possibility than the other which Aristotle regards. The third which is possible is immediately impossible, on the face of it. The Platonic alternative is the investigation to which he then turns. Now, we cannot read that all, of course. I mention only a few points here. A little bit later when he says -- now when he raises this question -- in the Republic of Plato, for there Socrates says. Will you read that? A few lines further on: six, seven, eight lines further on -- that children and women should be in common.

"It is certainly possible that the citizens should share children and wives and property with one another. This is the plan proposed in the Republic of Plato, where Socrates argues for the necessity of community of wives and children and community of property. We are thus faced by the question whether it is better to remain in our present condition or to follow the rule of life laid down in the Republic."

Yes: I would translate this more literally: or according to the law written in the Republic. That is, I think the expression is deliberately chosen. Plato's Republic contains a written law. This written law -- in other words Plato's Republic is not

simply the rule of living intelligence. That would be entirely without basis. There is a law governing this rule of living intelligence. That is of some importance. Now when we look at Aristotle's account of Plato's Republic one thing must be absolutely striking to every reader, and I'm sure it struck Mr. Steintrager. What are the institutions of Plato's Republic, the key institutions? (Answer: "Guardians.") That is not characteristic. We have guardians in Chicago too: you could call them cops. (Answer: "But he does not consider the place of philosophy at all.") Yes -- complete silence about philosophy. In Plato's Republic there are three institutions: community of women, children, property, what you may call absolute communism; equality of the two sexes; and third, and highest, the rule of philosophers. And Aristotle is absolutely silent about that. That seems to be grossly unfair to Plato. In other words, we can transform our initial impression of Aristotle's pedestrian characterization by simply saying Aristotle is silent about the most striking feature of Plato's Republic: the rule of philosophers. How could one defend Aristotle -- I mean, not out of a childish desire to defend him, but simply taking into consideration that Aristotle was a serious man, you know -- who would not -- simply who would not make an unfair criticism for the simple reason that an unfair criticism is uninstructive, and Aristotle wants to learn something and to teach something. There is a school of thought, I have been told, which argues as follows: that Aristotle misunderstood Plato -- that has been said n times, but this school of interpretation goes on as follows and says every great thinker misunderstands every other great thinker, and Aristotle is only a beautiful example of that, and which has this very flattering and very confirming implication. Those who do not understand great thinkers are the mediocrities. That means, of course, far more: that the mediocrities are the only ones who are truly wise, because the man who understands n different positions of the highest order is, of course, wiser than a man who understands only one position. Now that, I think, is absolutely absurd, and only must be held up to ridicule. Now why did Aristotle make this seemingly gross blunder, or permit this gross act of injustice, to be silent about Plato's most splendid or extravagant proposal: that the philosophers should rule. Do you want to say something?

"I was going to say that since he's a philosopher, to tend to this point again means stepping out into the role of politician."

Yes, but still, after all, Plato's reasoning -- Plato is a philosopher political reasoning. Yes?

"It seems to me that it was assumed that the people who would read this were aware of Plato's philosophy and that Aristotle was only interested in disproving certain parts of Plato's philosophy: namely. . . . the part about absolute communism. And so if he could disprove one portion of Plato's Republic it wasn't necessary for him to disprove the rest."

51

Yes, but does he limit himself entirely to the communism issue here? For example, look at this — he plainly discusses love. The communism issue doesn't arise and since he was speaking about Plato's famous proposal he also loves, not because it is relevant to communism but it is because it is, how can I say, the second part, the second version of Plato's famous proposal. I think that is not sufficient really, to say that, although it is not important.

(Inaudible answer).

That is true, but only in principle. He does not argue it out against Plato here, especially. But still there are other things which he has said in the Ethics which he repeats here, because they are pertinent to the argument here. No, I think the reason is much simpler. Plato — Aristotle read Plato very carefully. That's all. Now when you read the Republic carefully you see that the philosophers are introduced only as a means for an end. Later on they become an end, but they are introduced only as a means for an end. They build up this communist society with equality of the sexes and everyone is charmed by that proposal, and then the question arises: how can we get that duty, and in this connection the philosophers are introduced. The philosophers are introduced only as a means for an end. Now you can say that is one of Plato's jokes, and it is, in a way, true, but we have another proof. Plato wrote a summary of the Republic in the dialogue called the Timaeus. At the beginning Socrates gives the summary of a conversation they had the day before and that makes sense only as a reference to the Republic. I mean not to the conversation of the Republic itself, but to a conversation in which Socrates told the Republic to some people. You remember, the Republic is not a dramatic dialogue but a narrated dialogue. Socrates narrates it to someone, and in the Timaeus you see to whom he narrates it. Now in this summary there is no reference to the rule of philosophers. So Plato emphasizes this thing which appears already from the Republic: that the rule of philosophers is, in a way, an afterthought. And today when people speak of the political part of the Republic which is a rather loose expression, they mean by that the part preceding the introduction to philosophy. That has some basis in what Plato means. So that is not due — in other words, Aristotle is simply precise by sticking to the fundamental things which are communism and the role of the women. Now, what then is the fundamental error of Socrates in the Republic, according to Aristotle? We cannot read everything: I will summarize this point. The fundamental error consists in Socrates' assertion that goodness is identical with oneness. If goodness is identical with oneness that city is best which is one to the highest possible degree, but a communist city is more one than a non-communist city; hence, a communist city is best. The reply of Aristotle is, generally, this: of course, in one sense it simply must be one, but it cannot be one beyond a certain point without ceasing to be a city. If it becomes too much one it becomes a household, and if it would become ever more one it would become a human individual and hence, not a city. A city is necessarily an

52

articulated thing consisting of many human beings and even of many kinds of human beings and this must be the starting point for any plausible remark regarding the good city. There is a passage which has a certain difficulty which we should read. It is toward the end of 1266a, when he says -- after he has referred to the ethics.

"It is a principle which has to be observed even among free and equal citizens. They cannot all rule simultaneously; they must therefore each have office for a year -- or by some other order of succession and for some other period. In this way it comes about that all are rulers, just as if shoemakers and carpenters changed their occupations, and the same men were not always shoemakers and carpenters. It would be better indeed if the principle followed in the arts and crafts were also applied to the affairs of the political association; and from this point of view it is better for the same men always to be rulers wherever possible. But where this ideal is impossible, through the natural equality of all the citizens -- and also, it may be argued too, because justice requires the participation of all in office (whether office be a good thing or a bad). . . ."

Now what does he mean by that? And what does he mean in the context? Now let us first see this: even if men are equal i.e., even if there is no difference of kind. If they all are members of the same species: all are free citizens -- it is necessary that some of them should be ruled at a time and others be rulers, because the qualitative difference between rulers and ruled is one crucial qualitative difference, qualitative multiplicity within the city. This qualitative difference is compared by Aristotle, for a moment, to the qualitative difference between shoemakers and carpenters. A city cannot be a city if it doesn't have craftsmen of various kinds, and Aristotle refers, then, in passing, to another possibility. There might be -- we might go -- under certain conditions, we could have a clear cut, permanent distinction between rulers and ruled. Some people rule always and others are always ruled, and that is a preferable possibility, according to Aristotle. Let us keep this in mind for further reference. The word ideal is Barker's own use, of course, and not there, and should simply be that the best. The reasons are not stated. But the best is not always possible. You may have a multitude of citizens who are equal, and where, therefore, it would be unfair, and unworkable that some would be permanent rulers and others permanent ruled. Therefore, you can there only have ruling and ruled in turn. There can only be an exchange of ruling and ruled and Aristotle gives as an -- to illustrate this for a moment -- and that is an indication of the reason why the permanent rulers would be better, as if the shoemakers and carpenters would change every year. This year Mr. X is a shoemaker; next year he's a carpenter, and vice versa. Now, that is not desirable because we don't want a jack of all trades but

men thoroughly aware of all niceties of the arts which comes with long time and — I mean after experience. And that is of course the reason why rulers, rulers who accumulate the experience of government throughout their lives are preferable to people who are only temporary rulers. But Aristotle — notice this point in passing: what is best in itself is not always possible, and where it is not possible it is not just, and this leads to a crucial distinction. What is best is everywhere the same. What is just differs from place to place and from time to time. That is the crucial character of the Aristotelian Politics, distinguishing it from the doctrines which were developing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which tend, at any rate, to develop a doctrine which would show what is just everywhere, and at all times. Taking the example of Hobbes' Leviathan there the key teaching is the teaching regarding sovereignty. What are the rights of the sovereign? And that means, of course, these are rights which a sovereign must have at all times, in all places, regardless of circumstances. For Hobbes, the best and the just coincide. The same is true, with minor modifications, of Locke, of Rousseau, Tom Paine and many others. And this little remark at the end when he says regardless of whether ruling is good or bad; what does he mean by that? That's also a great question discussed in Plato's Republic. Well, the solution there is in Plato's Republic is this: that only those can be rulers who regard ruling as a nuisance, as a burden, as something bad. The ordinary politician or statesman regards ruling as a boon, and Aristotle says I don't have to decide the question whether it is a boon or a burden. Whatever it may be, if the citizens are equal both boons and burdens must be distinguished as equal. Otherwise, you sound unjust. If equal people get unequal burdens or unequal boons. He develops, then, the point further on and states the principle very clearly. The end of the polis is not properly described by unity, although some unity is essential, but by self-sufficiency, as he has said here before: a society self-sufficient for the actualization of man's potentialities. The kind and degree of unity to be demanded from the city or for the city depends on the function of the city. We cannot simply speak of unity without considering that function. Now Plato — we cannot go into that. If we would consider Plato's doctrine carefully — Plato, in his way, of course considers all these things. The difference is very subtle and does not come out in each remark which Aristotle makes, not because Aristotle is unfair. He brings out the salient point very clearly but he says Plato obscures certain things which Plato himself admits and even emphasizes. Now let us consider the question for one moment, what is Plato's concern in the Republic? Why did he make these outlandish proposals? Of absolute communism? Let us say this: communism means the abolition of privacy, and that is Plato's explicit intention. Plato goes beyond present-day communism not only because of the community of women and children but the abolition of privacy is very strict. Not only the police, however it may be called, but everyone, can enter everyone's room at any time in Plato's Republic. That is abolition of privacy.

Now why does Plato do that? What is the reasoning behind that? Privacy means to have a sphere where you are somehow except from the city, from supervision by the city -- where you can do what you please. And therefore that creates a tension to the city. Here there is a private sphere and there there is a public sphere. Plato follows, in a way, the logic of politics or of patriotism by saying full dedication to the polis demands abolition of privacy. Or differently stated, a city, a political society to be good must be inspired by fraternity. There must not be strangers living side by side, but there must be fraternity, strictly understood. It does not avoid, as it is in the French formula, but strictly understood. How to be strictly understood it means literally that all citizens are brothers. It means a reduction of the city to the family or the household. Now what does family mean? That means that all the members are kindred by common descendants from the same father and the same mother. That, of course, doesn't spell out Plato's doctrine quite well, although something like it is suggested. We have at least the same mother: same father or motherland, stemming from the same soil. I cannot go into this extremely interesting subject which raises the great question of incest. You see, one could perhaps say this: in Plato's Republic you have the strongest bond among the citizens through incest. That's a very paradoxical element because obviously A marries B, but in Plato's Republic it means a brother marries a sister. That is the practical meaning of the abolition -- of the reduction of the polis to the household. I cannot go into that although that is of the utmost importance, because the reasoning is roughly this: the institution of incest is the basic institution by which civilization stands or falls, but what the rationale of these commands, of these provisions are, is difficult to say. Plato suggests this reasoning: we have the family which is self-sufficient for procreation, but not self-sufficient for defense -- much too small a unit. Therefore it is necessary to enlarge the household so that we arrive at a society which is large enough for defense. One must overcome peril; the members of the family to marry outside of the family so as to establish strong bonds among the members of that larger unit -- among the citizens. Now that means one must forbid incest. The forbidding against incest forces the member of that family to marry outside, and against this background can one understand the paradox of Plato's Republic where you -- in the Republic, one can say, Plato experiments with the notion that you can have the strongest bonds among the members of the polis through incest. That is the great -- one of the great paradoxes. But less paradoxically stated, Plato tries to combine the virtues of the household, closely knit character, and the virtue of the city, sufficiently large for self-sufficiency. Now why is this not possible according to Aristotle?

He discusses this proposal: in the Republic all call everyone and everything mine. Shall we turn to that? 126lb1b. At this point: far so it is believed that this is a sign that the city is one.

5

"Even if it were the supreme good of a political association that it should have the greatest possible unity, this unity does not appear to follow from the formula of 'All men saying "Mine" and "Not mine" at the same time', which, in the view of Socrates, is the index of the perfect unity of a polis. The word "all" has a double sense. If it be understood in the first sense, the object which Socrates desires to realize may perhaps be realized in a greater degree: each and all separately will then say "My wife" (or "My son") of one and the same person; and each and all separately will speak in the same way of property, and of every other concern. But it is not in the sense of "each separately" that all who have children and wives in common will actually speak of them. They will all call them "Mine"; but they will do so collectively, and not individually. The same is true of property also: all will call it "Mine"; but they will do so in the sense of "all collectively", and not in the sense of "each separately". It is therefore clear that there is a certain fallacy in the use of the term "all". It is a term which, like the similar terms "both" and "odd" and "even", is liable by its ambiguity equally to breed captious arguments in reasoning. We may therefore conclude that the formula of "all men saying "Mine" of the same object" is in one sense something fine but impracticable, and in another sense in no wise conducive to harmony."

Do you understand that? What does he mean by the twofold meaning of all saying Mine and Not Mine at the same time? That can be said -- Aristotle says distributively, we may say, and collectively. For example, all men do the same thing: say, all , all pay taxes; that's distributively. Each does it. But when you say collectively we all elect the President; not -- I mean there is not a single individual who can say I elect the President, but we all do it. That are the two different meanings. Now what does it mean in application to our case? Distributively, each will call the same thing or woman or child mine. Each will call the same thing mine. What is the consequence? (Student answers: "It doesn't belong to any of them.") Yes, they will fight. I mean, think of it in practical terms to mean something which cannot be jointly enjoyed like an apple, for example. You see immediately where you get. Only by distribution and by different people saying of different apples that's mine could there be peace. Now what is the alternative? All men call the common things mine. So no one will say I, as this individual, regard this as my property, but in the sense in which he says I elect the President, namely, we all elect the President. That is -- Aristotle says that's beautiful, but not possible. Why? Because nobody will ever get that thing. It will remain common property. It cannot be appropriated. So that sounds fine; it is impossible. The other is manifestly leading to enmity and the destruction.

Question: "Why do the children have to be appropriated?"

Well. . . let us assume that all regard all men, regard all children, as their children. That he discusses later: this is the most undesirable solution because it is as good to have no father than to have all as fathers of all. That he develops later on. What he tries to make clear was now only a certain ambiguity in the very formulation — in the formulation, all say of the same, it's mine. And think of the two different cases: your taxpayer, your President. When you are tax-paying it is yours alone, not someone else. Your President is the President not of you in particular, but of you as a member of the community, i.e. all, collectively — not individually. That is, he wants first to make clear only a fundamental fallacy implied in this formula. The specific reasoning he gives later. Now let us go on where we left off.

"Not only does it not conduce to harmony: the formula also involves an actual loss. What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is common; or, at any rate, they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned. Even where there is no other cause for inattention, men are more prone to neglect their duty when they think that another is attending to it: this is exactly what happens in domestic service, where many attendants are sometimes of less assistance than a few. The scheme of Plato means that each citizen will have a thousand sons: they will not be the sons of each citizen individually: any and every son will be equally the son of any and every father; and the result will be that every son will be equally neglected by every father."

That is the point which -- where it would become clearer. The crucial point of the — one's own. We can also say the private, to make it quite clear. The distinction between the common and the private must be preserved, so much so that even the common must, in some way, be private: meaning, it must be someone's business, for example, to be the general. Otherwise, if you give the responsibility to many, no one will regard it as his business, and the thing will be neglected. That is the point where the question of one's own, or the private, comes in. Now this is, from Aristotle's point of view, the fundamental error of communism, of Plato's in particular, but of everyone: that the most common, we can say, the simply universal, is the most private, the most intimate. Only under that condition would communism be humanly a solution: that the most common. . . . is the most personal, the most intimate. Now I have spoken of that before, I believe. I don't know whether it was in this seminar or the other. Yes, I think that was when I discussed what Aristotle means by saying that man is the most social of all beings, of all animals. Man is more social than any beast and so because he is an animal which possesses reason or speech. Pure thought, pure and true thought alone makes possible a perfect union among human beings. Every other union is less perfect. Think of bodily union as encompassing that. Bodily union can never be as perfect

and can never be this full identity of feeling which you can have, to take the extreme case, in the case of a mathematical demonstration where there is full identity of the thought in each mind and at the same time, knowledge that we both think the same thing, but precisely for this reason communism is impossible. That is, one can say, Aristotle's reasoning, because the political association is not an association of thinking beings regarding their thoughts. These are living beings which possess reason, animals which possess reason, but which have also something else than reason. Now what is that? What is the reason why -- what is the fundamental reasons of privacy? What is that which makes privacy something which cannot be overcome? Plato has said that, although he hasn't said it clearly in the Republic, but rather in the passage of the Laws, that single passage of the Laws in which he refers to the Republic. It is either 719 -- ne -- 749; Laws, 749, where he speaks of the difference between the set up of the Laws and the set up of the Republic. In the Republic -- that is almost said in these terms -- everything is made common except the things which are, by nature, private -- which are, by nature, not collectivizable, if I may use this word. Everything else can be collectivized. That is, for us, a paradoxical thought, because we think the mind or the consciousness is the most private. That was not Plato's view, but the body. The body is the least communicable. Of that we have seen many examples. If one man has hunger, we can have the greatest compassion and sympathy with the hungry man: we don't have the hunger. Or look at -- too though. I'm taking now mental phenomena which are obviously inseparable from the body. The body is necessarily each one's own body, and because man is a bodily being communism is impossible. Pure minds could have such a perfect communism. If one would go, which I cannot do here, to Marx, for example, one would see that at the origin of Marx's thought there lies such a notion. The German philosophers had developed a certain doctrine and the paradox of Marx is that he believes he can have communism, not in spite of the body, but through the body, through bodily labor. . . . I cannot go into that here.

Man is not a purely thinking being, but an animal. Therefore he has things which are ineradicably his own, and therefore there must be private property. The first is a very simple one: the most elementary form of appropriation. This point has been elucidated very clearly. . . . The most elementary form of appropriation is eating because that you know from everyday experience. Once you have something, I don't say in your mouth, but surely once you have swallowed it, it cannot possibly belong to anyone else. That is absolute appropriation and Locke builds his argument for private property on this fact which is in a certain agreement with what both Plato and Aristotle teach. Now there was someone who -- yes?

"I don't think, however, reasoning from this analogy of Locke's, that it's self-evident that possession is required for intimacy. In other words, the assumption of Aristotle is that the relation of father to son, and a fatherly relation, can also be a relation of husband to wife, the heterosexual re-

lution, possible. Is this possible without possession?"

- Yes, it all depends what you mean by that. I mean, if you mean . . . as implied in possessiveness. Did you mean that? That would be partly taken care of by mutual possession.

"Well my point is, the analogy, for example, of food, is -- doesn't seem to hold, because when food is consumed -- once you eat it, no one else can eat it."

But the question is whether this elementary fact does not have consequences on the less elementary reality Aristotle did speak of. But I wanted to say only one thing where there is agreement between Plato and Aristotle, and that concerns the fact that there are things which are, by nature, private, so that they cannot be collectivized -- and that is, primarily, the body, according to Plato, and Aristotle would admit that. Aristotle's argument means, fundamentally, this. That has consequences on the highest levels. Because man is a bodily being he must have privacy, and this privacy also requires then, on a higher level, private property, because privacy would be imaginable on the basis of common property. For example, if all men could live in barracks and it would be an iron rule, punishable by death, that no one may enter anyone's -- other's rooms without their permission, that is, permission of the occupier there. I mean you can have privacy without private property. You can have it. But Aristotle's argument can also be stated as follows: the basic privacy admitted by Plato is the body. That leads to privacy in the common sense of the term: we will find a simple example later on. And then that leads on a higher level to private property, as also required. We must follow that. I only try to bring it down to the principle involved. The fact that man is not simply rational, and then I don't think of the fact of passions and so: that is derivative. The basic fact is the body: the fact that man has a body which cannot possibly -- and its parts -- which cannot possibly communicate as such, which are essentially a man's own, leads to the rejection of communism in Aristotle's argument. We must proceed step by step. Yes?

"In this section where he refers to the father and son relationship being destroyed by every son having, say, a thousand fathers, and therefore having none, does he mean that this will be pernicious to the physical development or to the existence of the child -- "

Why don't you wait a moment -- we come to it. Aristotle will bring out this more clearly in the sequel. What Aristotle has in mind is something which you all know, but he will develop it, nevertheless, for your, as well as for mine and everyone else's . . . so I suggest that we go on. Let us see. Where were we? In 1262a, line 13. This sentence: where he says it is better to be one's own nephew, another man's nephew, than to be a son in this way. That's the answer to your question. If you have -- the whole relation becomes watered down. Well, we can read that.

"... I thought that Plato's ideal wasn't absolute communality of fathers and sons but rather that in practice it would seem to be that as Plato had it worked out that these children would be kept with the parents for a certain number of years and then put into private classes to be instructed so that they wouldn't be -- they would not compete with the (rest of remark inaudible)."

No. What Plato means is absolutely no one is supposed to know who his parents and his children are. That's the idea because otherwise privacy would develop which Plato regards, in the Republic, as such an evil.

"Then I must be thinking of something else where the children stay with their parents. I guess it was Sparta."

Oh, Sparta was not communistic; no, no. I think, Mr. Steinrager, if you go on where you left off that would be the best. 1262a, beginning.

"There is still a further objection. Each citizen, when he says 'Mine' of any child who is prosperous or the reverse, is speaking fractionally. He does not mean that the child is wholly 'Mine', but only that he is 'Mine' to the extent of a fraction determined by the total number of citizens. When he says 'He is mine' or 'He is so-and-so's', the term 'Mine' or 'So-and-so's' is used with reference to the whole body concerned -- the whole thousand, or whatever may be the total number of citizens. Even so he cannot be sure; for there is no evidence who had a child born to him, or whether, if one was born, it managed to survive. Which is the better system -- that each of two thousand, or ten thousand, persons should say 'Mine' of a child in this fractional sense, or that each should say 'Mine' in the sense in which the word is not used in ordinary states? As things are, A calls by the name of 'My son' the same person whom B calls by the name of 'My brother'; C calls him 'My cousin'; D, E, and so forth call him 'My relative', because he is somehow connected with them, either closely or distantly, and whether by blood or by marriage; while besides these different modes of address X and Y may use still another, and call him 'My clasman' or 'My tribesman'. It is better to be own cousin to a man than to be his son after the Platonic fashion."

Do you see the point? That is the answer to your question. You see, it becomes absolutely watered down; it becomes a mere convention that you say of people younger than you, "These are my sons and my daughters." You have not the slightest reason to assume that these are your sons and daughters. It becomes a mere label. The element of affection, which issues of both, cannot subdivide and therefore people will not -- now, as Aristotle says, in the cities now, people, generally speaking, take an interest in their children -- are concerned with them. How can you be concerned with people who are your sons and daughters?

only in name? And even a cousin in the second degree now -- that means something to you, provided -- you know, if it's your grandparents or great grandparents and so, and that means something to you. But there it doesn't mean anything because one's own has been abolished.

"In other words, Aristotle is not concerned that these people -- well, nobody will take an interest in those children so that they will not have difficulty surviving."

Oh, they can be taken care of by sufficient police methods and so. I mean, the nurses and hospitals do that all the time. That would not be the problem but this particular affection which children should have they are most likely to get when they are brought up by people who regard them as their own, their own flesh and blood. I mean why have the words like step-father, step-mother, foster father, foster mother, such slightly complicated meanings? Even in the best cases compared with the simple parents -- why? Because there is some truth to this assumption. There can be foster fathers who are better than natural fathers, without question, but that is not the rule. Yes?

"Wouldn't the Platonic formulation deal with the objection that affection can arise between two people as, for example, a teacher and a student, which seems to me Plato might now quite easily. And this affection would also lead to an area of privacy which of communism."

Yes, but what does Plato do for that reason? Well, Plato is not proved, as you know, and so he puts it in the strongest terms and he says there are all kinds of bodily relations. We don't have to think of extremes, but simply touching, and even kissing, he speaks of -- is admissible under certain conditions as a reward for particular heroism in war, for example. So, in other words, these privacies are publicly instituted for the sake of the public. I mean, especially that these fellows, in the case of heterosexual relations should generate more children than the others. Now teachers, and this kind of thing -- that would emerge in an important level only among the rulers, the philosophers, and that is an entirely different sphere. You know, the mind is so much the preponderant consideration. In addition, the political function is . Surely, there are holes in Plato's thing and no one knew that better than Plato. Plato was experimenting with that for certain reasons which we cannot discuss while we are trying to make some sense of Aristotle.

(Change of tape).

Well, I think we must, now, go on, and we have to skip quite a few things. If you will give me your book I will find -- 1262b7 -- let us take page 60, paragraph 5.

"Generally, a system such as Plato suggests must produce results directly opposed to those which a system of properly constituted laws should produce, and equally opposed to the very object for which, in his view, this community of wives and children ought to be instituted. Fraternity is generally held to be the chief good of states, because it is the best safeguard against the danger of civil dissensions. Plato himself particularly commends the ideal of the unity of the state; and that unity is commonly held, and expressly stated by Plato, to be the result of fraternity. We may cite the argument of the Symposium. . . ."

Does he say fraternity? That is wrong: friendship. That's really in his reading here — friendship, which has the clear connotation of love, in Greek, *philia*.

"We may cite the argument of the Symposium, where, in the discourse on love, Aristophanes is made, as we all know, to speak of two lovers desiring in the excess of their "friendship" to grow together into a unity, and to be one instead of two. Now in the case of two lovers, the result of an excessive desire for a unity must be either the disappearance of both of them into a new being, or the disappearance of one of them into the other."

Do you see that? I mean, if the lovers seek perfect union, as they are said to seek according to Aristophanes' story, then either they are destroyed or wholly one or -- some mixture of the two will survive, but they cannot both survive the union. Yes?

"But in the case of the political association the result of an excessive desire for unity would be different: it would be merely a watery sort of fraternity. . . ."

Of love, of friendship, yes.

". . . a father would be very little disposed to say "Mine" of a son, and a son would be as little disposed to say "Mine" of a father. Just as a little sweet wine, mixed with a great deal of water, produces a tasteless mixture, so family feeling is diluted and tasteless when family names have so little meaning as they have in a constitution of the Platonic order, and when there is so little reason for a father treating his sons as sons, or a son treating his father as a father, or brothers one another as brothers. There are two things which particularly move men to care for an object and to feel affection for that object. One of them is that the object should belong to yourself: the other is that you should like it. Neither of these motives can exist among men who live under a constitution such as the Platonic."

So, in other words, the phenomenon of friendship or love is inseparably linked up with one's own, with privacy. There are

two things which to the highest degree make men caring for some one and loving: one's own and the precious; one's own and the preciousness. The preciousness goes together with rarity: I think that is what Aristotle means. If something is very common -- we don't love air. Well, after someone has tried to strangle us, for a moment, but not ordinarily. But the precious is a rare. Now if you have a thousand sons -- St. Thomas, in his commentary, gives this example, that single children -- why are they so frequently spoiled? Because of their preciousness -- they are the only ones. If there are ten, there is a reasonable watering down of the maternal and paternal affection and which, perhaps, is better than this kind of preciousness. But, in other words, one's own essentially enters this thing. This gives -- by the way, here is his reference to Aristophanes which is of some interest, perhaps not in connection with this seminar in particular, but I would like to mention that. The point which Aristophanes makes in his speech in Plato's Banquet is that love is horizontal, meaning two beings try to unite and become a perfect union, and the Platonic doctrine of eros is that eros is vertical -- towards something higher. And therefore the equality of the lovers, of sexual lovers, for example, can only be understood in terms of a vertical love: namely, the lovers wish the sameness of the human race. They are concerned not simply with their union but with the sameness of the human race, something higher than they. For Aristophanes, love is simply horizontal -- and that is the Platonic system -- Aristophanes refers to it. Now what Aristotle's criticism here, of Plato, suggests is this; and that is a very interesting thought which I submit to those of you who are interested in this kind of thing: that in the Republic Plato himself seems to make the mistake for which he reproved Aristophanes in the Banquet -- to have the maximum of union in a horizontal way. I merely mention this to you because it may give you food for thought. By the way, that is by no means far fetched because Plato's Republic is a reply, an extraordinarily ingenious reply to a comedy of Aristophanes in which communism was suggested, The Assembly of Women, but this only in passing. Let us go on where we left off.

"There is still a further difficulty. It concerns that part of Plato's scheme which may be called the transposition of ranks, under which children born to parents in the inferior rank of farmers and craftsmen are to be transferred to the superior rank of the guardians, and vice versa children born to parents in the superior rank are to be transferred to the inferior. How such transposition is actually to be effected is a matter of great perplexity; and in any case those who transfer such children, and assign them their new place, will be bound to know who are the children so placed and with whom they are being placed. In addition, those problems of assault, unnatural affection, and homicide, which have already been mentioned will be

55

raised even more by this part of his scheme. Transposition of ranks will mean that those transferred from the rank of guardian to an inferior rank will cease for the future to address the guardians as brothers, or children, or fathers, or mothers, as the case may be; and it will have the same effect for those who have been transferred to a superior rank. Such persons will thus lose entirely any deterrent which kinship provides against the commission of these offenses.

"This may serve as a determination of the issues raised by the idea of community of wives and children."

What he means is this: that's a special point of criticism. The baby transferred from the lower class to the guardians -- you know, in the scheme of Plato's Republic -- may very well beat or kill his own father. For he becomes a guardian, say a policeman. In that function, he may very well kill his father without knowing it. Now this would lead to -- in other words, he commits a terrible crime and he does not have the possibility of purification from the crime, religious purgation, because he does not know that. Impious deeds will be done without the possibility of purgation. Similar considerations apply also to incest. I mention this only because that is one of the parts -- Aristotle argues here from canon opinion. There are certain common opinions regarding what is pious and impious and he accepts them. Plato does not do that. Plato's Republic is a very iconoclastic book. Plato reduces the pious, the holy, to the useful. He makes explicitly the remark: we will regard only those marriages as holy which are useful. Aristotle does not do that, and we must keep this in mind. On the contrary, he keeps these standards intact. Now we have to read a few more passages -- can you turn to 1263all. That is about half a page later, must be, when he speaks about the problem of privacy.

"When the cultivators of the soil are a different body from the citizens who own it, the position will be different and easier to handle; but when the citizens who own the soil are also its cultivators, the problems of property will cause a good deal of trouble. If they do not share equally in work and recompense, those who do more work and get less recompense will be bound to raise complaints against those who get a large recompense and do little work. Indeed it is generally true that it is a difficult business for men to live together and to be partners in any form of human activity, but it is especially difficult to do so when property is involved. Fellow-travelers who are merely partners in a journey furnish an illustration: they generally quarrel about ordinary matters and take offence on petty occasions. So, again, the servants with whom we are most prone to take offence are those who are particularly employed in ordinary everyday services."

You see, that has very much to do with privacy. One can put it this way perhaps: the lower and pettier the things are, the greater the need for privacy. That is, we begin with the fact that the parts of the body and the body is not communicable, and then we see that immediately reflected in these lower and petty things. When we get nervous because people are too close on us: in barracks, in boats, or wherever it may be. And then we gradually ascend to that. And precisely in lower and petty things, precisely because property is not such a high thing, is it necessary to make it private, because it will lead to constant annoyances. And now this question which he raises there: that some work hard and get little, and some work — the opposite; this problem, of course, arises under any form of communism. Does any of you remember how Lenin solved this problem in his State and Revolution? Because he has to admit that such shirkers might come up even in this — after the complete collectivization of the means of production. There are people who can cut corners under any conditions and such a radical regeneration of human nature will not be brought about by the socialization of the means of production. Well, the state will wither away and it will have withered away in the end. Of course, there will no longer be courts of law. What do you do in such a case? I forgot the words — do you remember?

"He says that socialism for the time being is sort of a capitalistic system where each man will receive according to what he puts into the system."

No, no. Finally — but — when you have —

"Oh: well, after the state withers away then every man will become so accustomed to working to ..."

Yes, but there is one passage in which Lenin admits, somewhat grudgingly, that even then you might find this kind of shirkers. Well, his suggestion is consistent and at the same time outrageous, which is perhaps not — well, I shouldn't have said at the same time: a type of lynching. The other workers will take care of him, but there is no longer a law for it, so there is no possibility of a real fair investigation whether this particular individual is or is not a shirker. Good. Now let us see. Let us read the summary judgment on the Republic in 1263b15, that this legislation has a beautiful face.

"Legislation such as Plato proposes may appear to wear an attractive face and to argue benevolence."

Yes — may seem to be not benevolent — seem to be philanthropic. Philanthropic in the primary Greek sense: love of human beings. It had a very limited meaning originally. It could

be used as Socrates occasionally says: some people love dogs, others love birds, and he loves human beings. That exists. It did not have this full meaning which it took on later on.

"The hearer receives it gladly, thinking that everybody will feel towards everybody else some marvellous sense of fraternity -- all the more as the evils now existing under ordinary forms of government (lawsuits about contracts, convictions for perjury, and obsequious flatteries of the rich) are denounced as due to the absence of a system of common property. None of these evils, however, is due to the absence of communism. They all arise from the wickedness of human nature."

Human nature is a criminally bad translation because of wickedness. Aristotle would never say human nature is wicked.

"Indeed it is a fact of observation that those who own common property, and share in its management, are far more often at variance with one another than those who have property in severalty -- though those who are at variance in consequence of sharing in property look to us few in number when we compare them with the mass of those who own their property privately."

"Another consideration must also be pressed. Justice demands that we should take into account not only the evils from which men will be liberated when once they have turned their property into a common stock, but also the benefits of which they will be deprived. The life which they are to live appears to be utterly impossible."

Yes. That is the conclusion: communism is utterly impossible, bearing this demand for privacy without which we cannot live well and pleasantly are not fulfilled. There will be a constant necessity of friction. But also, the constant interference with another fellow's life in the most petty things this is unbearable. There is one passage which we should also read -- in 126a, the beginning, where he makes the general remark: but one must not ignore --

"We are bound to pay some regard to the long past and the passage of the years, in which these things would not have gone unnoticed if they had been really good. Almost everything has been discovered already; though some of the things discovered have not been co-ordinated, and some, though known, are not put into practice."

Yes, let us stop here. That is a very characteristic remark which -- and very important for Aristotle. What does he mean by that? That can easily be misunderstood. I mean, if everything is already known, Aristotle's political science would seem to

have the function to understand what is, and not to propose what should be. What does he say here, as a matter of fact? What does he say? I mean, why does Aristotle's investigation for the best polity make sense? The implication is -- of Aristotle's inquiry -- is the best polity does not exist and, to his knowledge, has not ever existed. He makes a blueprint of it for possible future use. How is this reconcilable with what he says here?

"Well, he says a lot of things are known that aren't put into practice."

Yes -- and also not put together. Both; but the main point -- also not -- and what Aristotle, in other words, what he says: there is no institution, we can say, not a single institution which has not, in fact, been discovered by man in the course of the ages, but they are not always, or very rarely, put together in the best way and that he will try to do. Yes?

"Does Aristotle find himself here in a certain sort of position; that position being the position after which everything . . . has been discovered. . . ."

No. You can put it this way: there can be -- yes, which he says, also to some extent, in his philosophy. He has discovered the truth, and all his predecessors knew the truth only partially -- not in every detail, of course; that is not interesting. But the fundamental truth he thinks he has discovered. That is a very important point. The same is true, in another way, of political subjects, only where the proper putting together is being done by him in speech, in books -- not yet in practice. What's the difference between him and Hegel? You know, Hegel himself regarded himself as the modern Aristotle, the man who summed up the whole previous development, but so that Hegel is now the true end, whereas Aristotle was only the Greek end, as we could say. What is the difference? -- between Aristotle and Hegel? Apart from that -- I mean, apart from what Hegel says about it.

"For Hegel, not only did he know the things but they were in actual existence, for the most part. . . ."

In other words -- that is one point -- for Hegel, the factual establishment of the just society is a condition for the completion of the theoretical philosophy. The metaphysical truth, to use that, could not have been seen before the just society was, in principle, established. Nothing of this kind in Aristotle. There is no such connection between the establishment of the just society and the finding of the final metaphysical truth, but there is something else, which is perhaps more important. How did -- what about the future? What about the future, from Hegel's point of view and from Aristotle's point of view? From Hegel's point of view we saw that once the truth is known -- the theoretical as well as the political truth -- it cannot but spread. There cannot be -- at least not -- there may be temporary lapses and errors, but they cannot last because they have the conscience

of the time against themselves. So there cannot be a relapse into barbarism. For Aristotle, of course there can be relapses into barbarism, and for Hegel the older schools of thinking, say Kant, say Descartes, or what have you, say Aristotle — are finished. There is no possibility of their return or of a return to them. For Aristotle, all the errors which are possible can have a most fantastic future. There is no law of progress in this way. So that the truth is — the error of stupidity — I mean there is a — of Hegel's contemporary, Cocthe, which is roughly to this effect. He compares progress to this situation: a ship displacing water. The ship is the truth displacing error, making headway, and at the end the water, the displaced water, is again in control. The ship passes through and the situation remains as before. That is Aristotle's view of it; the older view, generally, of the situation. But this peculiar "optimism" is Hegelian and never Aristotelian. So, in other words, for Aristotle the situation is — if I may conclude that — there is a thousand years, five thousand years, ten thousand years; I don't know exactly how Aristotle would have figured it out. There would be a destruction of all civilization through natural causes: floods, earthquakes, what have you. And then there would be, after a long lapse, a recovery; and not in every detail, of course, but in principle there would be a new development and there could be another Aristotle in the next period and that could happen infinitely over, because the world is eternal, according to Aristotle.

"Even if the truth has been discovered, to discover it again is still to discover the truth."

Yes, if there is no memory, surely yes.

"When he turns to political science, however, it seems to me that — am I right in saying that Aristotle is saying to Plato that you, Plato, didn't rest your search for wisdom enough on the examination of past and present policy of states?"

In other words, Aristotle did not know especially the modern development.

"No — that he's saying to Plato that Plato didn't look at political facts enough. Is that what he's saying to Plato?"

Well, unfair — but he did not have sufficient respect for what men had done; omitted it — and Aristotle says political men are sufficiently competent without philosophy to discover all institutions. They may not be quite competent to put them all together in the best way, and there is where Aristotle comes in. And Plato has a lower view of the competence of political men: yes, sure, there is no question. Let us turn to 126b — there is probably a new beginning there, a new paragraph.

"There is also an element of danger in the method of government which Plato proposes to institute. He makes one body of persons the permanent rulers of his state. This is a system which must breed discontent and dissension even among the elements which have no particular standing, and all the

more, therefore, among the high-spirited and martial elements."

Now, does he not flatly contradict himself — contradict something which he said before? What did he say before?

"We said it was best that one body should be the permanent rulers; that this was not always possible."

Yes, that's one thing, but here he seems to say it is always impossible. But here is a qualifier which is not unimportant. What is a special difficulty in the Republic: that Plato makes some men -- the philosophers — the permanent rulers and who are the ruled?

"The high-spirited and martial ones."

In other words, the rulers are not the soldiers. That's the point and that — Aristotle will comply with this demand. In his solution presented in Book VII and VIII the ruling class is the armed class, and then the things appear in a different light. The armed men are simply the younger rulers. Contrary to the suggestion of President Eisenhower that who is old enough to bear arms is old enough to vote, Aristotle thought that bearing arms comes first, and at a later age the voting, and therefore there is perfect harmony. These boys who are drafted will not resent being sent out to war by their elders because they know we will be the rulers ten years from now. That's Aristotle's — so there is no contradiction. And the last point, a bit later, perhaps one or two sentences later when he comes to speak about happiness.

"It is a further objection that he deprives his guardians even of happiness, maintaining that it is the happiness of the whole state which should be the object of legislation. It is impossible for the whole state to be happy unless most of its parts, or all, or at any rate some, are happy. The quality of being happy is not of the same order as the quality of being even. The quality of being even may exist in a whole without existing in either of its parts: the quality of being happy cannot. A further point may be raised. If the guardians are not happy, what are the other elements of the state which are? There is certainly no happiness for the craftsmen, or for the mass of the common people."

Do you see that point — Plato's great paradox — that he says I'm not concerned with the happiness of any part, be that part a section or the individual. I'm only concerned with the happiness of the polis, to which Aristotle replies you cannot have a happy polis consisting of unhappy members. While six may

nay be a composite -- the even number six -- of the three odd numbers, three and three. That's possible, but you cannot add up happiness of the sum out of unhappiness of the numbers. That's again the same point: one's own -- happiness must be happiness of the individual and there cannot be a happiness of the whole if the individuals are not happy too. There are many more things which we have to dismiss. I mention only one point which is important for the further development and that concerns Aristotle's critique of Plato's Laws.

Aristotle rejects Plato's Laws, which is a much more commonsensical thing than the Republic, on one ground of special importance and that is that Plato's -- the regime in Plato's Laws is oligarchic, which means it gives preference to a part of the population on grounds of wealth. The wealthiest people have the strongest voting right merely because they are more wealthy, and Aristotle thinks that this is a vicious principle. That's very interesting, that the "idealist Plato" when he comes to a practical proposal in his Laws should be so tough as to be more oligarchic than the "realistic Aristotle." For Aristotle there is perfect equality -- no consideration of wealth -- in his best polity. I mean, the whole citizen body consists of reasonably wealthy people; the non-wealthy are not citizens. That is Aristotle's ingenious solution. You see there's a difficulty: no one is preferred among the citizens on account of wealth. There is no -- that is his point. Aristotle will try to give the solution of the political problem by finding a city without a demos; demos means the common people. That is his resolution at which he ends at books VII and VIII. We will come to that later. I believe someone wanted to say something? Yes -- Mr. Faulkner.

"I don't understand your explanation of why Aristotle does not refer to the rule of the philosophers or your explanation of why Plato himself doesn't refer to it in the Timaeus."

I think that is -- well, that is -- the immediate reason for that: that in the Republic the philosophers are introduced as a means to an end and not as an end. The question therefore concerns the Republic, because both the Timaeus and Aristotle simply follow the Republic on this point.

"But surely in the Republic if the end is political then the rule of philosophers, as a central part of that political regime, would be worthy of comment."

Yes, but the philosophers are introduced, not as the rulers, but as the instruments for putting the communistic society into practice. Now the question -- well, Plato had, of course, his reasons for that. Very generally stated within the political context, philosophy can come in only as a means, and not as it ought to: as the end. Well then, next time Mr. [unclear] will read a paper on the rest of Book II. . . .

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 5, April 12, 1960

. . . and that you understood in the main, but you took it lying down as far as your paper was concerned. You know what I mean?

"No -- not exactly."

I mean, after all, you must have had a reaction to it.

"I was impressed mostly by Aristotle's thoroughness. As the footnote in the book says, when he criticizes, he criticizes."

Yes, still, well the question, of course, is whether the criticism is -- I mean there are certain cases where I believe we are unable to judge: when he speaks of, at that time, well known political arrangements and presupposes some knowledge of it which we may not have. That can't be helped. But still -- you noted one difficulty. He criticizes Sparta and so on very severely, and yet he says of these three regimes, Sparta, Crete, and Carthage, they are justly famous. That sounds almost like irony.

"I put it in there because I didn't understand it, but it was mentioned. In fact, I could try to explain it. It can be said that for all their defects they are better -- they try to be mixed regimes. This is practically closer to an ideal form than most of the unmixed regimes and most of the existing regimes in the Greek world. I didn't think I would have very much to say there."

No; I think it would be helpful. The only trouble, I believe, is that this is not what Aristotle himself says. But still I'm glad that you tried, at any rate. Now, you make clear -- I mean I take the terminology which you use, which goes back to Barker, I suppose, that Aristotle looks at these various regimes from two points of view: from what you call the ideal and from the point of view of its inner consistency. Can you explain that -- and you try to show this in detail even when Aristotle himself does not make the distinction which may very well be a wise procedure. But could you explain to the class in general by a simple contemporary example, what this distinction means?

"Well the example of the system of / with Sparta is supposed to be a democratic institution. As a matter of fact, because the unequal division of property, the Spartan laws do not operate as they should. The unequal division of property is an ideal defect, but it might be that the unequal division of property, presumably you could make the system of common meals operate so as not to discriminate against the poorer citizens. The Spartan laws do not do this; they make it worse."

common
meals

By the way, ideal defect is, of course —

"is my own phrase, not Barker's."

Yes, very shorthand —

"Yes, very shorthand, indeed."

But we understand you, anyhow. Now, what I was thinking of was your simple contemporary example. You can criticize a given institution in this country, for example, as not democratic, assuming that the American polity is meant to be a democracy. That's one thing. And then you can raise the more far-reaching question: is the basic intent of the legislator, of the founding fathers, itself sound or not? So the meaning of the distinction is clear. Thank you very much, then.

Before we turn to today's assignment we have to consider a few things occurring in the preceding section because we naturally devoted the time — all the time, last time to Aristotle's critique of Plato, which we couldn't discuss sufficiently even then. Now there are two more blueprints which Aristotle discusses in Book II. One is by Phaleas and one is by Hippodamus. Now Phaleas' notion was — do you remember, Mr. Strickland, the key idea of Phaleas?

"That all disturbances within the society resulted from unequal distribution of property."

And what does — do you remember what Aristotle says about that?

"He says that even if property were made equal, this does not get at the real problems, the real causes of disturbance, because there are at least two other causes of disturbance that — are lack of moderation on behalf of an individual and seeking after some kind of pleasure which is independent of any other kinds of pleasure, being philosophy."

Now let us wait a moment. Do you remember that in the section on Plato, Aristotle had made clear that private property is absolutely essential? And Phaleas takes up the question of property again and he makes a more specific suggestion regarding property: namely, equality of property, which means, of course, also equality of private property. Now Phaleas' suggestion implies a considerable interference with private property. For example, inheritance must be watched. A man cannot leave his property as he sees fit — and other kinds of interference with private property. That raises a question of principle: is the legislator, according to Aristotle, entitled to interfere with

property -- to some extent, to redistribute property? What would you say?

"I think he does say that it's all right to interfere with -- "

Sure. So, in other words, Aristotle is in favor of private property, but he is not opposed to government interference with property. So his position is very different from that of modern economic liberalism. That should be clear, as it should have appeared already from the economic section in Book I -- you know -- which is not inspired by the spirit of Adam Smith. For example, one is -- prohibition against selling one's estate, and that it goes down to the family, remains within the family, is taken for granted. But the main point to which we referred is this: Aristotle questions Phaleas' principle that property is the cause of civil war and other civic unrest. How does he justify this criticism? Perhaps we read that, 1266b -- do you have it? b36, which means almost before the beginning of 1267a -- men make rebellion not only because of inequality of property -- do you have that? I'm sure it's a new paragraph in Barker. Here: paragraph 10

"Paragraph 10 on page 65. This raises a further point: civil discord arises not only from inequality of property, but also from inequality of the offices which men hold. But here we must note a difference. The distribution of property works in the opposite way from the distribution of office. The masses become revolutionary when the distribution of property is unequal."

Yes -- Aristotle, of course, says only the many. The term masses is itself a very interesting thing. I don't know when it came into general use. Surely in the French Revolution it was La Vie En Masses that was used, but it is not much older, I think, and I wonder whether it has not anything to do with modern physics -- you know, mass -- and the theological term, the mass of perdition, which, as far as I know, goes back to Augustine, does not have this meaning of mass. It has no -- I mean, as a concentrated, powerful thing. The Latin word masses means originally something like dough: my pronunciation being so bad I spell it: d-o-u-g-h, and so I really think it stems from physics. Aristotle simply says the many, which is -- masses would be an absurd expression in a Greek city. You know, there are four or five thousand men or perhaps less who would be relevant. The many is clearer.

"Men of education become revolutionary when the distribution of office is equal."

No, when the distribution of offices -- yes, when the honors are equal. In the one case, when the property is unequal the multitude is dissatisfied. When the honors are equal the gentlemen are dissatisfied.

"This is the point of the verse in Homer:
Office and honor are one and the same
for the good and the bad man."

There are some crimes which are due to lack of necessities; and here, Phaleas thinks, equality of property will be a remedy, and will serve to prevent men from stealing simply through cold or hunger."

In other words, you know in modern times this doctrine is quite popular. That is a part, if a subordinate part, in the Marxist argument. There is a part of the population which suffers very great need. They don't have the necessities of life and others live in plenty; and then the men in need rebel in order to get a redistribution of property. But Aristotle says that is only one cause for change. The other?

"But want is not the only cause of crimes. Men also commit them simply for the pleasure it gives them, and just to get rid of an unsatisfied desire. Vexed by a desire which goes beyond the simple necessities of life, they will turn criminals to cure their vexation. Men may not only commit crime to cure a desire they already feel: they may start some desire just in order to enjoy the sort of pleasure which is unaccompanied by pain."

Do you understand that difference? I mean, some want the mere necessities of life; that's one thing. And the others want things which are not necessary, and they are sub-divided. In the first are things -- the first class of non-necessary things are those who want to have more than the necessary things: big houses, parks, and what have you, and that is the reason why they commit crimes, and consequently also political crimes: a change by virtue of which they come on the top and can milk the population. That's one thing. The others: what are the kinds of things which he means by this rather strange remark: so that they enjoy the pleasures not accompanied by pains. The first ones, who want to have wealth -- these pleasures are not without pains, as you can easily see that because you have wealth you have the pains of watching it and of ministering it, which is a great nuisance. But there are pleasures not accompanied by any pain and they are, of course, the most desirable ones. Does anything occur to you -- I mean every day experience -- that is not accompanied by any pains. The bodily pleasures, however pleasant they may be, are accompanied at least by the pain of satiety. But there are pleasures where you cannot become satiated, nor do you have any pain like the pain of administering wealth.

Student answers: "Honor."

That's a question, you know; you have to watch -- look at these people running for office. No -- even once they are in

office. No — something very simple: I give you an example of pleasure. (Here there are chairs; you can sit if you want to). You just go for a walk and suddenly you smell the orange blossoms, quite unexpectedly. There was no preceding desire and you enjoy it and it is not so that if it stops you are unhappy. This kind of thing exists. Now, of course you can say these are — no one assassinates a ruler in order to — that's clear. But Aristotle, taking a broad view of the situation and trying to consider all kinds of motives, makes first the distinction between desire for necessities of life and desire for things which are not necessary; and here he makes — in the latter case he makes a sub-division. Those luxuries which are necessarily accompanied by pain and the other "luxuries" which are essentially free from pain, and now let us see what he says about that.

"What is the remedy for these three kinds of crime?"

Well crime is, of course, Barker's interpretation. Of course, these three — how shall I say — illnesses, you could also say.

"For the first kind, we may answer, some modicum of property and some sort of work: for the second, a temperate disposition . . ."

Is this clear? In other words, the people who suffer from the necessities when they should have some property so that they don't hunger and so on, and also work — you know — and so that they don't get funny ideas. And the second ones, who want to have these big palaces. They should be — learn to become moderate in their desires: moral education. And the third?

". . . as for the third kind, we can only say that if there are men who want to get unmixed pleasure purely by their own independent effort, they will find no satisfaction except in the aid of philosophy. . . ."

Now what has this to do? I mean, we are practical men and political scientists. What has this to do with that, this seemingly far-fetched thing. In other words, what Aristotle means is this. What we all knew from the smell of a rose or similar — or perfume, maybe; that, on the highest level, the most complete way is philosophy. This affords pleasures much more intensive than those of perfume of any kind; and the perfume of the mind, one can say, and in addition it has also some other meaning apart from that pleasure — that we need it, ultimately. Why does Aristotle refer to that here in a political book where we really speak about serious matters? Well, Aristotle implies — and that will become clear from other passages — we cannot reach full clarity about political things if we do not think of that text called philosophy as the highest of which man is capable and which is — which, in a way, limits political society.

because political society as such is unable to philosophize. The polis cannot philosophize and that is important to know because we must not expect the highest satisfaction from the polis, from political life. If we have the highest expectation from the polis, then we will engage in visionary politics and will not get those solid goods which political life can procure. So it is impossible to clarify politics without having some understanding of the trans-political. That is one occasion which Aristotle uses to refer to that. Yes?

"Well isn't this inconsistent with the statement that the polis is in every way self-sufficient, both morally and externally and physically?"

Another student: "We philosophize outside of the polis. . . ."

Can you? In what sense? Let us look at our friend Aristotle himself. Where did he live? Did he live in a desert? Did he live in some mountainous district without any conveniences whatever, or where did he spend his life? A considerable part he spent in the city of Athens. Plato spent practically his whole life in Athens and some others still more. So, in other words, philosophy somehow needs the city, because if everyone has to take care of all his needs in every respect he won't be able to think. There are needs of the body which must be fulfilled. The problem is more complicated. One can say philosophy is not possible without the polis, and yet the philosophic activity is not a political activity, just as an example. One can also say the polis needs philosophy, as we shall perhaps see later on, and yet that again does not make philosophy a political or party affair. It's a complicated relation. I only wanted to show now why Aristotle is compelled to indicate from time to time: for example, at the beginning of Book VII but also other passages -- to refer to philosophy. Quite a few -- we will cover, of course, certain passages in the third book where Aristotle suggests the perfectly satisfactory political solution. Every man would think -- every sensible man dreams that that's the real thing. And Aristotle makes a question mark. The question mark is related to the fact that the solution has been reached in entire disregard of philosophy and we must never forget that. Well I can give you a simple modern equivalent to the problem of Aristotle which makes it in a crude way more intelligible to you, but in a deeper sense makes it much more unintelligible, and that is culture. You know, culture in the sense of culture of the mind, which you use in the composite culture vulture. This higher thing, which we somehow divine is higher than the political -- that takes on, for Aristotle, the precise form of philosophy because the other things which are related to that -- for example, poetry -- is essentially subordinate to philosophy and therefore becomes a theme of Aristotle's Polities, as you will see in Books VII and

VIII. The polis has somehow to take care of poetry. It cannot take care of philosophy; a great problem up to the present day: all questions of censorship today are naturally affected by it. Academic freedom, as we say, is not quite the same thing as the freedom for anyone to write any novel or poem he pleases. I mean, maybe the two cases should be treated in the same way by law, but that meets with no argument because the two cases are different. Well we may take this up later when we come to Aristotelian — what Aristotle says about censorship. Now let us go on.

"... for all pleasures other than that of philosophy need the assistance of others. The greatest crimes are committed not for the sake of necessities, but for the sake of superfluities. Men do not become tyrants in order to avoid exposure to cold."

Is this clear? And that proves that the greatest crimes are not committed by men in need because there are other ways of — smaller crimes are sufficient, like theft and so. But the biggest crime, high treason, establishing of tyranny, is not committed for this reason. And therefore Phaleas is wrong. He believes that the root of crime is need. That is not unimportant to mention today because there are some people who really believe that need today -- need, poverty and all that kind of thing are the causes of crime. There are occasions but other things also give equally occasions.

"This is the reason why the honours paid to the man who assassinates a tyrant — and not a mere thief — are also great. We thus see that the general scheme of the constitution proposed by Phaleas avails only against the lesser crimes."

So that's the completion of this. Now this is all I have now to say about the Phaleas section. Let us turn to the Hippodamus section, 1267b22. We might read the beginning here because that is a unique thing in Aristotle's work as we will see.

"Hippodamus the son of Euryphon, a citizen of Miletus, was the first man without practical experience of politics who attempted to handle the theme of the best form of constitution. He was a man who invented the planning of towns in separate quarters, and laid out the Peiraeus with regular roads. In his general life, too, he was led into some eccentricity by a desire to attract attention; and this made a number of people feel that he lived in too studied and artificial a manner. He wore his hair long and expensively adorned: he had flowing robes, expensively decorated, made from a cheap but warm material, which he wore in summer time as well as in winter; and he aspired to be learned about nature generally."

Yes: let us stop here. Aristotle never again, either in the Politics or elsewhere, goes out of his way to describe the character of a thinker he criticizes. Apparently, in this case it is very necessary to do so. You remember when he — at the beginning of this book when he said we must study the earlier doctrines lest we be accused of ambition — what he ~~said~~ says in the political book. In political matters these qualities of the individuals count; in a purely theoretical discussion they are irrelevant. Now this was a man — the first man not engaged in politics who attempted to speak about the best regime. Since, for Aristotle, the question of the best regime is identical with political philosophy or political science we can say Hippodamus was the first political philosopher—especially — or the first political scientist; especially if we consider the fact — the other qualification — not engaged in politics. If someone engaged in politics thinks about the best regime, that's his business in a way. But the man who is not actually engaged in political activity and yet thinks about the best regime; that is the theoretical man regarding politics: political philosopher or political scientist. Now this first political philosopher and political scientist was a strange fellow. He was a town planner in the first place, and then he had a very — was a fussy fellow. You know, some things would remind one of a Bohemian and other things would remind him of a kind of — how do you say — snob? Is this a kind of snobbish thing? Certainly he was — he wanted to show off. This much is clear. And then he also was a natural philosopher, in a way. He wished to be a man able to speak competently about the whole nature. Now that is remarkable. Aristotle makes clear to begin with that he was a somewhat ridiculous figure, and this ridiculous character of Hippodamus indicates the problem of political philosophy or political science. And what is that problem? I mean, the basis was natural philosophy. And from natural philosophy he learned — that does not appear immediately from Aristotle, but from some other reports we have about that man — he believed he had found the key to all natural phenomena, and this key was the number three. Every thing, every being, proved to consist of three elements, three parts, and once you understood them, once you had the formula you had understood it. And then he's trying to apply this natural science to politics, and he divides all political things: laws or what have you or the polis itself, into three parts as lucid as the natural science was. The result was utter confusion. That is the first form which political philosophy or political science takes on: a simple imitation of natural science, and some essential difference between natural things and political things is missed; a simplistic view of political philosophy or political science, not limited, by any means, to Hippodamus as shown by the following fact: one of his suggestions is the legislator ought to encourage inventions, these innovations — the same spirit, in other words, which is at home in the sciences and arts: progress, necessarily then,

should also be at home in the polis. There is a perfect coordination of the polis and of science or knowledge: that view which in modern times was so powerful and triumphant and is known by the name of The Enlightenment. Society is subject to the same law to which science is subject: the law of progress. And therefore the most important part of the discussion of Hippodamus has to do with this problem. Is the polis -- are the political things, and especially the laws, of the same character as sciences or arts? By the way, there is this formula from Dewey: the method of democracy is identical with the method of intelligence. However, the method of intelligence is of course the method in science. The democratic method is the scientific method. That is one version of this thought: there is no essential difference between political thinking and scientific thinking. Now let us see how Aristotle discusses this point. Now, we cannot read the whole thing; there are only a few points. I mention the main point. I'll state it in modern language; fundamentally the thought is the same. If you encourage invention you encourage, in our language, technological change. But how do you know that technological change will not lead to social change? Everyone will admit that. But now we come to the great problem: will not social change also lead eventually to political change? And then, can the statesman who is concerned with stability simply encourage inventions, i.e. technological changes? As a very grave problem with which we live, if you think only -- well, a point which Aristotle will discuss later -- the crucial importance of military technology for political things. If you have civilization as it existed in the Middle Ages in Europe, and the Greeks had similar periods which they remember, where the nerve of the army was the cavalry, the knights. You had a rule of knightly feudal rule. In the moment infantry became the queen of battle, more democratic regime emerged and this beautiful phrase, the gat as the great equalizer is very revealing. Here this could be bought by practically everyone and handled by practically everyone -- establishes a very massive form of equality. And these military changes have had great political consequences. Now, do you see what happened in the meantime? The equivalence of a gun, and even of a machine gun, has faded absolutely in the age of these terrific super-weapons which can be handled only by a very small part of the population and gives, of course, a tyrannical government infinite power. They can simply send over an atom bomb if need be and then that settles the rebellion. Therefore, these questions we must keep in mind. Yes?

"I just wondered if a practical example of this in Aristotle might have been the -- if I'm not wrong -- the Athenian dependence upon light infantry after, I guess, 500 B.C. or so, when the fallen power of the heavily armed nobles; in other words. . . ."

The heavily armed were not the nobles; the heavily armed were the middle class and even lower middle class. No -- no.

The were still regarded by Aristotle in his time -- the heavily armed soldiers -- as the queen of battles. The problem to which I will speak later on in this book was created in Athens by the navy because for the navy you needed people who did not have -- and you preferred people who didn't have -- any property whatever because, you know, the . And they acquired political power via the need for the navy. That's another trouble. Now let us see. Aristotle says there is first the case for change. We cannot read these extremely interesting passages, and I can only summarize them. We cannot read them for reasons of time; you should really read them.

Now in Aristotle the case for political change is very simple. We find progress everywhere: look at the physicians in Homer and look at a first class contemporary physician -- I mean in Athens -- what a difference. All kinds of things can be done -- cured now, which were hopeless in the case of -- in the time of Homer. And in gymnastics, and in what have you: progress everywhere. The principle is this: man in general seek not the inherited, the ancestral, but the good. The ancestral as ancestral has no claim to authority. They may have been old fogeys, as Aristotle says here. What we seek is the good and not the ancestral. That's a clear case for progress -- you know, and that state of mind which you all know. But then he states the case against change, and that is more interesting because we are less familiar with that. Will you read that, in 1269a12?

"But while these arguments go to show that in some cases, and at some times, law ought to be changed, there is another point of view from which it would appear that change is a matter which needs great caution. When we reflect that the improvement likely to be effected may be small, and that it is a bad thing to accustom men to abrogate laws light-heartedly, it becomes clear that there are some defects, both in legislation and in government, which had better be left untouched. The benefit of change will be less than the loss which is likely to result if men fall into the habit of disobeying the government. We must also notice that the analogy drawn from the arts is false."

Now, listen carefully: law has a fundamentally different character from art or science -- a fundamentally different character -- and this was overlooked by the others. What is that?

"To change the practice of an art is not the same as to change the operation of a law. It is from habit, and only from habit, that law derives the validity which secures obedience. But habit can be created only by the passage of time; and a readiness to change from existing to new and different laws will accordingly tend to weaken the general power of law."

Now, let us stop; that is all we need. So that's the crucial point. To repeat it, literally translated: for the law has no power whatever toward being obeyed apart from habituation or custom. That's the crucial sentence. However, that's a very paradoxical sentence in a way. Does it not mean that the law derives no power whatever from its reasonableness, from its convincing character? Yes?

"What of the initial acceptance of law? Obviously, when a law is enacted it is followed at first, for some time. What is it then that -- "

That is a point, but must it not have some correspondence to other habits already in existence?

"I meant in this sense: that perhaps in the initial acceptance we find some of the other requirements involved."

Yes, but let us assume that people were, to begin with -- in the remote beginnings, less intellectually active than they are in a more sophisticated age. Yes?

"Isn't this perhaps more an argument for incremental change rather than against change at all?"

Yes, sure; surely, he's not against change at all. Aristotle is only against precocious change -- cautious change. What Aristotle says is that if it were the case -- the burden of proof rests always on the changers, not on the preservers. But of course, they may have a very strong case -- the changers. Sure. Yes?

"Would Aristotle see a distinction between two different peoples, one of whom seems to be more law abiding in general -- would tend to follow bigger changes in law than another people which has less respect for law in general and therefore couldn't be trusted to accept fluctuations?"

Do you mean to say this: that a part of the population might very well be rationally convinced that this change is good, but not all. Would you mean that?

"No, I don't think so. What I meant was that, say, the English tend to be more -- tend to obey laws passed by Parliament or something even if it's new and of a certain amount of radical nature, whereas another people, with less experience in government, might be so much more upset by any change in their -- "

Yes, that would amount to the same thing. If a high degree of rationality exists, laws can really be changed. But the question is precisely -- let us radicalize that. It would mean that

the most rational: one wouldn't need any laws. It is perfectly sufficient to prove to them that this is sound that they do it that way, then they do it. So the law is primarily addressed to those who do not follow reason. And therefore it would mean we must take for orientation a society which is not outstandingly rational, as the British, in your hypothesis, are.

"Well, this is not -- I think you mis-stated what I was trying to say. I wouldn't agree that the British are necessarily more rational than anybody else, but rather --"

In one way they are. I will give you an example later, but go on.

"My point is that it seems to me that an act of the British government, simply because it's an act of Parliament, may be followed more because the British people are used to obeying duly constituted laws, simply because they're duly constituted, not because of the rational content of the law, and that other people, who are less used to following laws simply because they are duly constituted, they tend to follow more. . . . and therefore the British are in a better position to accept faster change because of the greater respect for the law-making process."

Sure. But the problem is a very interesting one because it shows, to satisfy some among you, the obvious limitations of Aristotle's Politics. What I mean by that is this: Aristotle did not anticipate modern society. That's absolutely clear. And he did not know certain possibilities which developed in modern times. Now one of these possibilities is what we all know as the distinction between the constitution and the laws. This distinction is -- has its likely older origin, but not an Aristotelian origin by a long shot -- and this older distinction, occurring in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, is that between fundamental laws and laws which are not fundamental. Out of that distinction proves the distinction between the constitution and the ordinary laws. Now, once this distinction has sunk in deeply and the fundamental laws are not touched you do not -- no conclusion regarding the fundamental laws follows from changes regarding the ordinary laws. Is this clear? Once you know, for example, Parliament is the legislating body and Parliament is elected in this and this way. That must not be changed by any. Then the individual measures of Parliament, say the individual laws, are not so terribly important. But that required a very great step. Furthermore, regarding the distinction between constitution and the laws -- ordinary laws -- you mustn't forget, not in the British theory -- you know, which that doesn't exist -- but in those countries which have a more theoretical basis like this country and France and other countries, there is the

notion -- there is the sovereign people. The sovereign people gives itself first the constitution and then, derivatively, the law. All legislation, in other words, is somehow self-legislation, although in practice it doesn't look that way frequently as we know, but that is, at any rate, the theory then. Now all these enormous changes have molded the habits, the ways of thinking, of all of us. And Aristotle did not know that; he did not take it into consideration. Aristotle would be wholly objectionable and deserve to be thrown into the dust bin if he had not considered the principles of modernity and not the developments; and that he did, by implication. And that is -- I mean, I cannot develop this now; we will have better occasions later. But now let us -- I want to read to you two modern utterances, one American, one British, regarding Aristotle's problem. The first comes from The Federalist Paper, number 49, Hamilton or Madison: "If it be true that all governments rest on opinion it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual and its practical influence on his conduct depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion." In other words, in the language of Mr. Riesman, men are very much other-directed and not only now. "The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone." I suppose most of you know how unpleasant it is if you have an opinion different from everyone else you know on a matter of some importance and that's really most uncomfortable and because, like Hamilton or Madison said, "The reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left alone." "And acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated." The most absurd opinions become respectable if many people hold it. I mean, I do not want to give you some examples from social science because that would be unfriendly, but I know that to be. "When the examples which fortify opinion are ancient as well as numerous they are known to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers this consideration ought to be disregarded." You see: even the Federalist Papers must speak of the philosophers in order to make clear what they mean. "A reverence for laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason" which would tell you (a) that you have to obey laws regardless, in the first place, because lawlessness is a much greater evil; secondly, which would show you in this particular law how reasonable that law is -- take any of the niceties of the tax laws; then you will see what I mean. "But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as a philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato, and in every other nation the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side." That is what -- you see. Now let us look at the arts.

It would be absolutely fatal to any art, whether it is that of the shoemaker or that of the physician, that this would be based on prejudice. It would detract from its quality as an art.

In the arts instruction proper is necessary. The young apprentice of the shoemaker is instructed by the shoemaker. He tells him why to use this kind of needle and not that kind; why to prefer this material to that; and every action is rational. There is perfect rationality here, based on one premise: that man should wear shoes. That is no longer a problem for shoemakers naturally. But still, we all have some access to a rational discussion of that problem. So, in the Laws there is no instruction possible because the transmission of prejudices is not instruction. In the extreme case: when you say to a child, do this; do not do that -- that is not instruction. That is a kind of training, or however you call it, but it is not instruction because you cannot give a reason and even if you give a reason that is in most cases not the sufficient reason, because the child will not understand it. That is what Aristotle means, and it transfers over to grown-ups.

Now I read to you a British statement and there you -- let me see whether I find it -- and that occurs in Macaulay's History of England in the third volume. Well, the edition which I have is so bad that I am not able to give the page. "Of all the acts that have ever been passed by Parliament, the Toleration Act is perhaps that which most strikingly illustrates the peculiar vices and the peculiar excellences of English legislation. The science of politics bears in one respect a close analogy to the science of mechanics." This is the same problem which Aristotle has: the arts and laws. "The mathematician can easily demonstrate that a certain power applied by means of a certain lever or of a certain system of pulleys to raise a certain weight. But his demonstration proceeds from his position that the machinery is such as no load with gaining of weight. If the engineer were to lift a great mass of real granite by the instrumentality of real temper, real , should absolutely rely on the propositions which he finds in treatises on mathematics and should make no allowance for the imperfection of his materials, his whole apparatus of beams, wheels and ropes would soon come down and with all his geometrical skill he would be found a far inferior builder to those cave men and barbarians who, though they never heard of the development of horses, managed to Stonehenge. What the engineer is to the mathematician the active statesman is to the contemplative statesman. The perfect lawgiver is the just temper between the mere man of theory who can see nothing but general principles and the mere man of business who can see nothing but particular circumstances. In English legislation the practical element has always predominated and not seldom unduly predominated over the speculative. To think nothing of symmetry and much of convenience, never to remove an anomaly merely because it is an anomaly, never to innovate except when some grievance is felt, never to innovate except so far as to get rid of the grievance, never to lay down

any proposition of wider extent than the particular case for which it is necessary to provide. These are the rules which have from the age of John to the age of Victoria generally guided the deliberations of our 250 Parliaments. Our national distaste for whatever is abstract in political science amounts undoubtedly to a fault, yet it is perhaps a fault on the right side. That we have been far too slow to improve our laws must be admitted, but though in other countries there may have occasionally been more rapid progress it would not be easy to name any other country in which there has been so little retrogression." But that was written 100 years ago and so on. "The Toleration Act approaches very well to the idea of a great English law. To a jurist versed in the theory of legislation but not intimately acquainted with the temper of the sects and parties into which the nation was divided at the time of the revolution that act would seem to be a mere chaos of absurdities and contradictions. It will not bear to be tried by sound general principles. Nay: it will not bear to be tried by any principles." Sounds all Aristotle. "But these very faults may perhaps appear to be well when we take into consideration the passions and prejudices of those for whom the Toleration Act was framed. This law abounding in contradictions which every smatterer in political philosophy can detect did what a law framed by the utmost skill of the greatest masters of political philosophy might have failed to do. That the provisions which have been recapitulated are cumbersome, purile, inconsistent with each other, inconsistent with the true theory of religious liberty must be acknowledged. All that can be said in a defense is this: that they removed a vast mass of evil without shocking a vast mass of prejudice."

Now that is a modern British formulation and very British as you see also on this nice humor -- you know, not to be tried by any principles and so on -- what Aristotle means. Only Aristotle states it with classical simplicity and not with British humor.

(Inaudible question).

Yes: what is the difficulty. . . . (Inaudible exchange). Let us assume that the best regime is the rational regime of a perfectly rational society. Then Aristotle would say a perfectly rational society is not possible and therefore we have to see the society which allows for the preponderance of

in such a way that these rational rulers have the proper. . . . (This part of the lecture off-microphone).

. . . A perfectly rational society would be a society in which every member at least can be perfectly rational. You see what you have? That is a very important point. And our troubles today in political science are due to the fact that this notion -- what some people call the classical theory of democracy -- as the physicists speak of the classical theory of physics. The classical theory of democracy meant something like that: that

the democracy is a regime in which every human being has rationality, and fully develops his reason. And therefore the true democracy would be a universal aristocracy. They are all gentlemen and there is no longer a need for a gentleman class ruling the vipers: all are gentlemen. Now when we read today, everyone — I mean, are you familiar with the present approach as written by the more . . . people. . . . Now they have abandoned that completely: that is visionary. That is visionary to expect that. The people are as selfish, as vulgar, as stupid and can be measured and that you want in a democracy and therefore all problems stem from the nature of that. There is a beautiful formulation of Aristotle. . . . in which he speaks of propaganda. That's it: you see, propaganda is the opposite of rationality. . . . (Most of this off-microphone and largely inaudible).

(Change of tape).

. . . knowledge — "knowledge", which the citizen as citizen has and must have. It is not acquired by instruction proper, the instruction which you get at the university or which you get even in the shop of a shoemaker. I mean from the point of view of present day run of the mill social science, it's elementary what Aristotle says because there is . . . every society rests ultimately on certain values — some also say on myths and the relation between the two things is very obscure. All right, but then science is save such non-rational . . . If that is so the basic training of the citizen, as we can say, how does there come now such legislation? It is not a comic process. It is very grave. Only Aristotle sees here a problem, you see, and what these people today do not see, and that is really the shocking thing, is that the old progressivist habits — ever greater enlightenment of the citizens — still persist. That is frequently shared by identically the same social scientists who take this — how do you say — conditioning view. In present day language the question of information vs. conditioning. Everyone admits today that you need information and this information must be true. I mean, why do the foundations give these enormous millions to the social scientists except because they believe in the value of true information. At the same time the social scientist teaches that the basic orientation does not have the character of information, but of conditioning, as they say, and the conditioning is a somewhat inhuman expression for what Aristotle calls habituation. Conditioning you can do even in an inanimate thing. Habituation, however, is to some extent possible for the higher animals, but much more so in the case of man because habituation presupposes authority and authority is . . . you know in the case of the child — authority — and if you have a dog and train him that is not authority, strictly speaking, because the moral element of authority is absent. It's only fear and hope involved. Now — good — so we must leave it at that, but you see this Hippodamus section is an extremely interesting section. And now we must turn — unfortunately we don't have much time — to the rest of the book.

The first section deals with Sparta and in Sparta — that is very clearly divided; I mention this because I have not observed this earlier. We have first the economic characteristics; economic in the Aristotelian sense — the household, and slaves in the wider sense which means here the Helots, (b) women and (c) property. And the main theme are the women who are most unsatisfactory in Sparta and he makes many remarks here about the fair sex which it is better not to read in class. And of course the question whether Aristotle is right and wrong here would lead to a dog and cat fight. . . . but the Spartan women had a very . . . Don't forget the most famous of all Greek women, Helen, came from Sparta. Yes?

"Aristotle says that it's a well known fact that martial nations or military men are controlled by their wives. Why was this a well known fact?"

(First part of answer inaudible). Aristotle says a martial people are more concerned with sex than a non-martial people — not necessarily women. He says either women or and the Spartans chose — were more in favor of women and consequently this presentation deals with women, and in addition they the men were away in wars. The women had much too much freedom and self-determination. Yes?

"The sentence I was quoting reads: 'The inevitable result, in such a constitution, is the worship of wealth, especially if — as happens with most military and martial stocks — the citizens are dominated by their wives.'"

Yes, but that is here — is this the passage where he refers to Ares and Aphrodite? Is this the passage? Well there is a reference to Ares and Aphrodite, the God of war and the God of love, and that they were brought together by the ancient myth and Aristotle thinks that myth was right. The he-man has a peculiar attraction for women. You have read that in the literature I suppose. Yes? And as we all do, and similar things so — and Aristotle leaves it open; there is the alternative of that exists. But the more interesting point which is implied in your statement — what do you mean — why a hen-pecked people — you know, hen-pecked men — why do they become, via their wives, lovers of wealth? That's the point. That doesn't make sense to you. Why? Because you think there is no difference in this respect between men and women: some are profligate, some are stingy and some are in between.

"I see: he's making an exception that there is a difference here between men and women as far as the desire for wealth is concerned."

Yes: not necessarily for wealth, but for things which money can buy. I mean, you must have seen in some pictures a woman who wanted to have a hat and it was perhaps an ugly hat, but

she was attracted by it and no reasons taken from economics or morality or religion or aesthetics could comfort and she was just lying down on a couch and strangling — however you call that — because she didn't get the hat. Now men very rarely are — I mean, that is this school of literature to which I refer — men usually do not get so excited about a hat, if you know what I mean. And that applies to everyone. To bring it back to the perfectly appropriate level of literature where it belongs — don't forget that in Plato's Republic, Book VIII, where he discussed the perfect polis, or the perfect man, how is the son corrupted? By the mother. You see this point: you know that in the mechanics of desire for external goods the principle to keep up with the Joneses is said to play a great role. Have you heard of that? Good. Now it seems, according to that old fashioned school of writers, that women are more impressed by the keep up with the Joneses principle than the men. Now of course this needs many qualifications and no lady in this room participates of these alleged vices we all know well. But that is what Aristotle thought about it. Now — but to speak more seriously — the older view of the difference of the two sexes and the moral difference of the sexes was based on this principle: that the so-called biological function or the different function of the two sexes is bound to tell on any level, however high. And therefore the desires, the perspectives, and what have you, of women, are bound to be affected. Not that women are less intelligent than men: you know all — we have the many I.Q.'s which refute that. But that the power of intelligence, especially in practical matters, over against a certain kind of passion, was thought to be smaller in the case of women. I mean, for example, the example of the hat. I mean reason speaks against that hat. Passion speaks for that hat. Now in the case of men, passion can be better controlled in these matters. That is what Aristotle means. Aristotle knew many greedy men; that is not the point, but it is also not wealth as wealth but the things which wealth, money and all can buy.

Now then he turns to the political institutions and discusses the Ephors, the Council of the Elders, the Kings, the common meals — because that is a political institution — and finally the admirals. Sparta got a navy very late and therefore that new institution of the admiralty created a special difficulty. There is one point which was mentioned by Mr. [unclear] in his paper and I was surprised that he did not make some gloss on that — what Aristotle says about running for office, a very timely subject now. Can you repeat this statement?

"To have a regime that required a person actively to seek office is to encourage ambition and therefore crime."

Yes, certainly a moral degeneracy. Do you know where the word ambition comes from? From the Latin word ambitus, to walk along. . . . so the word ambition is derived from . . . But what do you say? Is this not an absurd principle of Aristotle? Is it not like a Victorian old lady?

"No. I think it's very obvious that ideally the office should seek the man; it never does."

Yes, but if it never does Aristotle would be unrealistic --

"As a standard of a best regime, why it would in fact be --"

Yes, but then you see, we must not use the standard of a best regime as a kind of box into which we put all unintelligible -- we must make them sound intelligible.

"It's perfectly intelligible -- as you can see in a city like Chicago just about any misuse of ambition for houses and offices as you can in"

Yes, but the question is the alternative: the prohibition against not wholly unreasonable.

"No, it would not be wholly unreasonable."

Under what conditions?

Another student: "He doesn't make it. He says the man who's best suited should have the office if he wants it or if he doesn't want it."

First student: "He praises the system in Carthage for the system of indirect elections."

I don't know what you mean by indirect. You mean by raising your hand?

"No -- substantially non-democratic, but selection by lot would be -- has no relation to merit. I suppose you have to have a small community where people know each other --"

If people know each other it would be closer, but do you people have any experience of your own where you see and that is not done?

"Surely any organization we're in, you're likely to worry how to get the best person elected because there very often you will not want the office."

Well, take it where I see everywhere: the people who are the best fitted don't want to become generally -- without any publicity and that is so. Now let us generalize from that. While the statement doesn't make sense if you take a modern large society, it makes sense in smaller societies; in smaller societies

of a certain level, because we must assume that a department has a higher level than most. -- the great. . . . So, now if that is so then we have already some help for the understanding. Perhaps these large societies — tremendously large societies — are by their nature prevented from developing a kind of excellence which was not impossible in smaller societies. And then we have to accept that "realistically" and seek for another locus of excellence if it is true that a respectable society cannot be respectable without having some prohibitions, legal or non-legal, for all human actions. That's the way in which I think one should read Aristotle. Good.

"Doesn't Aristotle criticize Pluto on this point? He doesn't approve of the idea of the rulers not being active in the job -- that they not seek office and don't want it."

(First part of answer inaudible). If one does not regard — (Inaudible). . . . So, in other words, Aristotle is not unrealistic. He only took into consideration a different kind of society and this different kind of society is not condemned by the fact that it does no longer exist as political society. It teaches us something about our political society which is of importance at least for a proper analysis, whatever the practical prospects may be. Now there are a few more points and I take up here — I limit myself to the most important points.

Mr. Norton noted the fact that Carthage is not a Greek city — I mean the three cities which are praised by Aristotle are Sparta, Crete — well, Crete is of course not a city but cities in Crete — and Carthage. Carthage was a Phoenecian city, not a Greek city, and this dispenses once and for all of the phrase occurring in so many text books, the Greek city-state. It is the city. That the city happened to be more common among Greeks than among non-Greeks is an accident. The polis is a natural form of human association according to Aristotle for the reasons which he has indicated in Book I and which will partly occur later. And Carthage is as good as — I mean, is defective, but it is not more defective than Sparta. I do not want to go into certain subtleties there. But now when one reads Aristotle's criticism of these three famous regimes one sometimes has the impression Aristotle is ironical because what is good of these three things? He hardly leaves anything. Now — but Aristotle — there may be some irony here, but it is not such a simple irony. What is the principle in the light of which Aristotle says that these three are the best of those which actually exist? Now Mr. Norton said the mixed regime. That Aristotle doesn't say and even if he said it you would have to know the reason why mixed regimes , Aristotle gives a very simple statement of the principle in 1272b, 29 to 33. Well that is at the beginning of the section on Carthage after he has made this statement, that these three regimes are close to one another and differ from

the others considerably. The Cretan, Spartan, and the third of those, that of the Carthaginians. Now will you read that? 1272b29 -- whoever has that.

"It is a proof of a well-ordered constitution that Carthage, with her large populace, should steadily keep to the same political system; she has had no civil dissensions worth mentioning, nor any attempt at a tyranny."

Let us stop here. These are the criteria. Now the first point, no rebellion, no civil wars, no such bloody dissensions. The first criterion is stability and the second criterion is no tyranny. Now let us translate the latter by a positive formula: stability and freedom. These are the two criteria. What is the use of a free regime which is absolutely unstable? What is the use of a regime which is 100% stable but in which you can't breathe without permission by the authorities? In other words, it's really common-sensical, the criteria: stability and freedom. Needless to say that Aristotle does not understand by freedom that high degree of license without which we couldn't live a single day. That's not a matter — well, we come to that later. But it has something in common with what we would mean by freedom. These are the common sensical criteria: stability and freedom. And he says that is the preserve of these three. Now before we jump off and say how absurd, let us consider the most famous example which comes to our minds and with which Aristotle was familiar. What about Athens? Was it not a free city, freer than Sparta and surely than Crete? What about stability? How many changes of the Athenian constitution within one generation? Read only Aristotle's own account in his so-called Constitution of Athens. So Athens would not be an example. There were not others — yes?

"I wanted to — I'm interrupting but I wanted to raise this — how does he reconcile Cretinist, Cretan emphasizes civil dissensions and the complete breakdown of the system only as an island — because it's an island — "

That is quite true but still it is so. You can say this: Crete as described by him reminds of the Middle Ages — in the later part of the Middle Ages, and also of Poland. . . . Notice the high degree of lawlessness and so, but it was still the regime as such not. You see, there is a difference. For example, take this, a contemporary example. You have these constant changes of governments in Italy and you have it in France. Still — that is very bad and the causes of that are worse —

"They don't have stability, but still he says, in so many words, it seems to suffer from time to time from tyranny and faction — "

But that is not technically precise. In other words, certain organs of that regime took very great liberties but the regime

as such wasn't disturbed. Now if someone would say there are other Greek cities — for example — which Aristotle knew, which were better than these regarding the two criteria of stability and freedom — for example, that island of Peirus which is praised so highly by Thucydides — Aristotle has a very simple and commonsensical reason. He speaks only of the most famous ones. Whether there was a wonderful island somewhere is irrelevant. This is of course not unimportant from other points of view but when we speak politically about big problems we legitimately disregard that. So that the procedure for Aristotle is really sensible. Now this point — stability — must be interpreted and then you see that he must mean quite the same thing that we mean. He means especially by that no popular unrest. The demos, the common people, is tolerably satisfied. That is the practical meaning of stability. In other words, and now I bring out the anti-democratic element, the proper subordination of the demes. Now they must be reasonably docile. Therefore there is another expression for what Aristotle means — I mean the standard which in all these critical analyses — that he would appeal to every politically experienced man — well, don't you want these two things, stability and freedom? That's my criterion. The fuller elaboration leads indeed into that best regime which, if fully elaborated, will no longer be the box. . . . There is one more passage which I think we should read and that is in 1273a, 25 to the beginning of b. That is this great question of wealth and some of you smiled when Mr. Norton gave his report that Aristotle seems to do some there, because Aristotle insisted all the time, in his critique of Carthage especially, that people must be elected with a view to virtue or merit and not with a view to wealth. And now the unfortunate trouble is that these things are not so easily separable because certain virtues cannot be practiced except by wealthy people. For example, munificence. Who can make big gifts to the city — a beautiful temple. . . . while a poor man. And also there is the other practical danger — the treasury. It is unfortunately so that the inclination to embezzle or — there are perhaps nicer words for that — to relieve themselves of a momentary need by some loan which they will pay back the next first when they will get again — and it is greater for a needy man than for a wealthy man. And therefore it was even in Athens a practice — even in democratic Athens you elected wealthy people for treasurers, just as you elected notoriously brave men for generals. That was the end of — you didn't elect these officials by lot. Now what is that? Do you have that passage? 1273a25 — paragraph 9 on page 85. Do you have it? Read it.

f, means
"If election on the ground of means is characteristic of oligarchy and election by merit of aristocracy. . . ."

That is crucial; I mean that I must briefly explain. The democratic principle simply is to elect anybody without any

regard to any other fact except that he is a citizen. That's clear. That — and the technical form of getting that is election by lot because then you cannot consider anything but the fact that he is a citizen. If you consider merit — without any regard now to the difference between genuine and spurious merit — but if you consider merit in principle as we are supposed to do in the modern democracy, that is an aristocratic principle. And if you consider wealth as wealth, that is an oligarchic principle. Is this clear? That is what Aristotle here presupposes.

"If election on the ground of means is characteristic of oligarchy and election by merit of aristocracy, the system on which the Carthaginian constitution is formed would seem to be something different from either. Both grounds are taken into consideration in the elections of magistrates at Carthage, especially in those of the highest — the kings and the generals. This deviation from the pure principle of aristocracy must be regarded as an error. . . ."

You see here that is another point which Aristotle presupposes as something which every sensible man would grant him, just as every sensible man would grant him that you need both stability and freedom; and the other sensible principle concerns the rulers. Who should rule? Of course, the men fittest to rule, most fit to rule the best men. In this sense, aristocracy, Aristotle doesn't argue that. He thought that everyone who is not blinded by prejudice or doesn't have an axe to grind will admit that.

"This deviation from the pure principle of aristocracy must be regarded as an error of the original law-giver. It is one of his initial and greatest duties to see to it that the most meritorious are in a position to enjoy leisure time — not only when they are in office, but even when they are not — and to refrain from occupations which are unworthy of their gifts. In any case — and even admitting that it may be right to take means too into consideration, in order to secure men of leisure — we may still criticize the Carthaginian practice of making the highest of offices (those of the kings and the generals) open to simple purchase. A rule of this nature puts riches in a more honorable position than merit, and imbues the whole of the state with a spirit of avarice. The values attached to things by the heads of the state will necessarily determine the opinion of the rest of the citizens; and a constitution in which merit does not receive the highest place of honour is one in which aristocracy cannot have a secure existence."

All rights let us stop here. Now do you see the point which I -- in other words, that the most meritorious men, the most fit men -- because you need not only cleverness and proficiency. That is not enough. You need also some moral qualities: at least justice and fairness and some other moral qualities. So then the virtuous men should rule. Virtuous doesn't mean -- how shall I say -- weak-headed decent fellows as some modern men are likely to understand that because weak-headedness is, of course, a vice, a defect. Intelligence and moral virtue. But now the difficulty -- so we will elect such people. Yes, but how will we -- such a man might be a poor man: Socrates. So what do we do? Well, you know what we do. We pay them salaries. If they are Presidents, or we pay them salaries even if they are representatives of the people and, in our sense, Congressmen. Yes, but does this not bring in a kind -- a slightly disreputable element, that it becomes a job for gaining a livelihood and not a public trust? Is there not a certain element of indelicacy? So one -- Aristotle says therefore one should try to do that those who are most promising to become fit men, fit for rule -- that they should live in such a position that they should have some competence independently of their office so that there is no necessity for them in any way to run for office in order to live. There are other reasons why Aristotle says so; for example, because leisure is absolutely necessary for developing the mind and leisure is not possible without some competence. And of course you can get leisure through foundations, as we all know and I know, but first of all that's a more recent development, and I have seen some cases where students were very glad if they had a couple of thousand dollars for themselves and did not have to be dependent on foundations. You know: that can have all kinds of difficulties. So, in other words, Aristotle -- what he has in mind, and that is crucial for the whole book: the ruling people, this rational stratum, the gentlemen or however you call them, must be men of independent means. And here a great difficulty arises. Whether a fellow is wealthy or not can very easily be seen, generally speaking, but whether he is virtuous and wise is not so easily seen, at least not by everybody. You must have some degree of intelligence to recognize virtue and wisdom, a higher degree of intelligence than to see that he is wealthy because even the greatest fool can know if he is wealthy if he has access to the banking account of that man and -- or to his tax sheet; you know? That's not the difficulty. And therefore a difficulty arises: will the rulers not be in fact wealthy men? That we know; whether they are virtuous men we do not know. Now Aristotle makes therefore some qualifications to make the clarity. In the first place, he distinguishes between various kinds of wealth. Which kind of wealth is most conducive to intelligent public-spiritedness? And his sole answer is a certain kind of gentleman farmers are better than merchants and industrial people. Then he takes another point which is more important: education. Even if these

people were originally nothing but lackey fellows and they were sons of wealthy fathers, if the education of this ruling stratum is proper at the end of this educational process they will have acquired some fitness to rule which those who have not become educated this way will surely miss. Well, we will comment on that later. The Aristotelian argument -- I mean, Aristotle starts from certain elementary which we do no longer know because of that radical change in the conditions of men: modern life. The tacit premise of Aristotle everywhere -- not only of Aristotle, but of everyone up to a certain time is scarcity. It is impossible to have a society in which all members of the society are properly educated -- physically impossible -- and hence the question arises: how to get -- how to select in the fairest way those who should get the highest education and the problem in Plato's Republic too. In practice, I mean if we disregard that visionary solution of the Republic -- in practice, it will not work without a certain arbitrariness, without a certain injustice, if you please. That is true; that is the problem. That is one reason why the human problem cannot be solved entirely by political means; because this cannot be helped, this basic difficulty.

Now one last point: in his survey at the end of the book, Aristotle speaks of a number of men who were either legislators for a given regime or even established the regime at the same time and the most important part, of course, there is the section on Solon, the Athenian legislator; and Aristotle defends him -- defends Solon against the charge that he originated, God forbid, democracy. What he did was a perfectly decent thing, Aristotle says, in which the people had that share in power without which they cannot possibly be in sympathy with the regime; the right to elect and the right to audit the magistrates after their term of office. And he gives one of those historical explanations which are so eminently sound and which, of course, doesn't stem from him: that it was the Persian War and the crucial role which the Navy acquired there under of course: an accident, and not Solon's planning, which accounted for the emergence of democracy in Athens.

I think I must leave it at that. Next time, I repeat,
Miss you read the paper, and Mr.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 6, April 14, 1960

... revolutionary constitutional change. Is this not a slightly awkward expression? I mean, wouldn't the ordinary understanding be that a revolutionary change is not a constitutional change? So it's good to think of these little things. Well, that's trivial. Now you made one point which is more important: there is no new polis, you said, where the constitution does not change. Yes, but I think that is not what Aristotle means. For example, you have a polis, say, in New England — a town — and this town migrates to California, bodily. Is it the same polis, according to Aristotle? No, I mean I think, for example, if say Middlebury becomes New Middlebury in California it is a new polis. So that — the conditions are very important and also — we will discuss that when we come to that. I didn't understand two remarks which you made. You spoke of the connection between the question, should an artisan be a citizen and the question regarding the difference between the good citizen and the good man, or the relation between good citizen and good man. What's the connection between the two questions? Aristotle raises the question, is the good citizen identical with the good man, and in this connection he raises the question should an artisan be a citizen. What's the connection?

"Well, the connection — is the good citizen a good man — you can have a polis where a man can be a good citizen and yet the polis is not a good polis; it's not according to the proper end of a polis."

(Tape break: hence part of this exchange missed).

"Well, in a good polis the artisan would not be a citizen."

"Well, he points to the fact that it's possible to make an artisan a citizen, but he can't really participate because — well Aristotle isn't explicit but I imagine because of the time and all that sort of thing, he can't really participate."

Another student: "Well, I think he says that the type of obedience or the kind of subject that the artisan has to be is not the same type of virtue as the citizen has to be in his double capacity as citizen and subject. . . ."

Yes, that is so, but it is not clear enough just as Mr. remark is not clear enough. Yes?

"I think that what Aristotle says is that only at one point does the good citizen become a good man and that's when the good citizen rules and also is able to obey."

"and he says that the mechanic isn't able to get into a human position. . . ."

That is not simple enough. It is relevant, but not clear enough.

"The good man can be a good man by following his nature and this nature may allow him to be a citizen when he is not fitted to be a citizen. He may be a good man and not a citizen as well."

You don't catch the full thought. The mechanic -- yes?

"The good man has to rule his passions all the time. . .
(rest of this answer inaudible)."

Yes, that is related to it but still the main point is very simple. Aristotle, I think, states it explicitly. The artisan cannot be a good man, but he may be a good citizen under certain conditions. That's the connection. He may be a good citizen in a democracy. That is the central point. Now the last point: you say Aristotle divides the constitution first according to number, although number is accidental as he himself points out. Why does he start from number, in your opinion, although it is accidental?

"There are several possibilities. One is that the thing that first presents itself when you, of course, look at the situation is that it is number -- in some cities that many rule. . . ."

That is good enough to begin with: yes. I mean it is not quite sufficient but it is the central point. All right. Now let us, then, turn to the third book. Next time, Mr. or Miss Furst will read it.

Now I would like to make one brief remark regarding the second book of the Politics which we discussed hitherto. Now the sections dealing with blueprints, i.e. Plato, Phaleas, Hippodamus, I think must be regarded as the key to a sensible history of political philosophy. In the history of philosophy, generally speaking, everyone still follows the outlines of the history given by Aristotle in his Metaphysics -- first book of the Metaphysics. And the reason is that Aristotle was so highly competent. Of course, he also knew many writings which have been lost, but the main point is that he was such a remarkable analyst of these philosophies. Now, on the basis of this experience it is wise to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt also regarding political philosophy, and when he says these three men of very unequal rank, Plato, Hippodamus and Phaleas, are the important people to consider as far as the question of the best regime is concerned then

we can be sure that there are no others worth while. I mean it would be -- how shall I say -- it would be unreasonable to have any other suspicion. Now in the conventional history of political philosophy that is, of course, denied. And there is especially one phenomenon which plays a great role. I believe this ghost has also made its appearance in this class on a former occasion: the so-called Sophists. You know, you must have heard of them. Well, Aristotle doesn't speak of them at all here. He does mention them at the end of the Ethics. They had something to do with politics but they were not political philosophers in any strict sense of the term because they did not raise the question of the best regime. Aristotle says the Sophists were people who practically identified political science with rhetoric, and I think we have no choice but to believe him. Now what is the idea underlying this identification or quasi-identification of political science and rhetoric. Here we recognize an element of truth in the conventional view. These Sophists seem to have taught -- all of them -- that the polis and all politically relevant things, the just and the noble things, are conventional, are merely conventional. Now if that is so it follows, contrary to the modern view, that this is something very low, very dispicable, because only what is natural has an inherent necessity and dignity. So what is merely conventional -- think of the extreme case of money -- whether you coin dollars or pound sterlings is a purely arbitrary decision. That is not respectable; a mere convenience, and no serious man would be terribly interested in that. But still you have to live with them in a city. What is the conclusion? You use these conventions for your private convenience. The others -- the fools regard them as terribly important. You, an enlightened man, do not but you have to use them. Now what is the way of using them? What is the art of using these conventions? Answer: rhetoric. You go -- for example, well, there is a certain notion of justice prevailing: merely conventional. But these conventions are enforced and so if you want to live happily in that city you have to pay some external respect to them and the external respect is that you argue on the basis of them when you are accused or when you accuse someone else, and similar questions. So that is the connection. And this is, of course, not the theoretically interesting thing in these doctrines is the assertion that all noble and just things are merely conventional. But that is only the presupposition and that in itself doesn't make a political philosophy and I would go beyond it and say that this assertion in itself is not a peculiarity of the Sophists but stems from certain pre-Socratic philosophers. The notion of Sophist as used in the last 150 years or so, roughly since Hegel, is a convenient myth and is not based on sufficient evidence, but this only in passing. So it's much wiser to take the second book of the Politics as the key to the understanding of classical political philosophy.

Now let us turn to the third book and begin at the beginning. The third book, and especially the section which we discuss today — although we may need part of the next meeting for the discussion — is the central part of the Politics. The fundamental considerations occur here. Now let us read the first sentence: "He who looks at polities," let me say, "and what each polity is and what character each of them has — for him the first thing to look at is to look regarding the polis: what a polis is." So Aristotle — you see, this is a very important statement. Aristotle makes clear here one thing. His primary theme is not the polis. He studies the polis because you cannot understand the polity without understanding the polis. The polity is the theme. Well, polity — in Greek, politeia — and that is, by the way, the title of Plato's Republic: politeia. And which I'll translate as regime, which is not a wonderful translation but is the best I know and someone will perhaps find another one on another occasion. And so I will now use the word regime and later on Aristotle will explain to us what that means. So the regime is the first thing and the polis is interesting only because we are interested in the polity. He says the question — he who wants to find out about the politics, about the regimes, and which each is somehow will know there are many regimes, i.e. many kinds of regimes, and also of what character or quality it is, which means also and most importantly the good or bad, the just or unjust ones. So, in other words, the question of the most just regime, the best regime, is really the guiding question, from which we turn to the question of the polis. But perhaps it is not a question what a polis is; everyone knows that. Why is polis a question, a problem? That he says in the next sentence: "For at present —" Do you have it? "For at present they are of different opinions. Some people say the polis has done the act, and others say no, not the polis but the oligarchy or the tyrant." Now what is — oligarchy and tyrant are forms of the regime and here we see the difference between polis and regime in practice. Someone says the polis did it, and others say no, the regime did it. Now take an example: some say Germany did it. Others say no: the Nazis did it. The distinction is immediately intelligible to you. That's what Aristotle means. Not — there is always — the polis never exists without an order, without a regime, and yet this necessary distinction is in practice always obscured necessarily. That's the problem. We will gradually recognize very familiar phenomena behind this seemingly abstruse distinction. The first who say in this case we could say the polis is identical with the regime, and others say there's a difference. At any rate the problem of the polis — the difficulty of finding out what the polis is — is connected with the problem of the regime, for the question concerns the relation of polis and regime. Who are the people who say, no — not the polis did it but the oligarchy or the tyrant did it? What kind of people are they? Let us talk as political people — I mean, and not as abstruse speculators. Who are the people who will say that? The

democrats, of course. I mean let us not fool ourselves about those nice things -- aristocracies, and so on -- but in crude practice you find tyrannies, oligarchies and democracies and perhaps, in rare cases, some one which are much better -- and aristocracies -- but that is a very subtle thing. To begin with, crudely we have these alternatives. The democrat would say that. Now we draw from this a conclusion: that the distinction between the polis and the regime is primarily a democratic distinction and we will find other examples of the same kind. The polis, we may say, has in itself a democratic bias. Aristotle admits that. He thinks that's a bad bias. That is another matter. But the polis is somehow tending to be democratic. In an earlier passage, in 1259b, 4 to 6, we have seen "for the polis tries to be --"; no, the polis "tends to be a society of equals and free." That is so and Aristotle sees -- now, but what does it mean from Aristotle's point of view? Since Aristotle rejects democracy or regards it as bad, what does this fact mean that the first clarification begins here as well as later on when he speaks of the citizen with a democratic notion. Well, that political philosophy, what Aristotle is doing, emerges in a democracy. That is not entirely an accident. In an old-fashioned stable aristocracy there is no need for political philosophy, but in the moment of conflict and tension and all kinds of decays: there political thought arises and therefore it takes its starting point from what is given first, is given immediately. But what is given is a democratic order and the clearest example is, of course, Athens. Athens is the home of political philosophy: a democracy.

Now how does he go on -- where we left off? "We also see that the whole business of the statesman and legislator is about the polis and the regime is some order of those who inhabit the polis." Now in a sense, the polis is primary because what is the statesman and legislator occupied about: with the polis, not with the regime. And furthermore that also shows the apparently secondary character of the regime. The politea, the regime, is some order of the inhabitants of the polis. First you have the inhabitants of the polis and then you have the regime. But the inhabitants of the polis in a way presuppose the polis. We shall later on see that there is some element of truth in it: that the polis comes first and the regime afterward. But this truth is not true enough, as Aristotle is going to say. Well, then Aristotle concludes that we must therefore find out what the polis is and therefore, the polis being a composite, we decompose it into its elements. And what are the elements beyond which ... which are no longer divisible? The citizens, because if you divide the citizens you come into politically irrelevant distinctions. I mean think of what happens if you are cut into parts. You are dead and a dead man is not a part, a possible element of the polis. Or if you make an intellectual division between, say, soul and body that is, in a way, also politically irrelevant because we need embodied souls as citizens. If we go beyond that we cease to speak about the political things. Yes?

"If you draw an analytical distinction between polis and regime then isn't citizen primarily a component of regime and therefore man would be primarily a component of polis?"

Sure, you can say that but let me state it differently.

How did Aristotle proceed in Book I? You remember in Book I he did, in a way, exactly the same thing what he did here: to go back from the polis to its elements. But what were the elements there?

Associations. In other words, he never goes back to the mere individual because as mere individual that would be politically unenlightened. The associations are politically enlightening: the family, the village, and what have you. But the mere individual is not. There is another reason: he could — and that is crucial, I think, and shows you the subtle procedure of Aristotle. By dividing the polis into the association he arrived at a better understanding of the polis without any reference whatever to the phenomenon of regime. By dividing the polis into the citizen and finding out immediately that the citizen is relative to the regime, the regime comes in immediately. We have a beautiful nineteenth century equivalent to that. In the nineteenth century — last half of the nineteenth century — political philosophy was frequently called theory of the state. The state: what kind of state? What kind of regime? That was not clear from the question. Now what Aristotle does in Book I: the polis, without any reference to regime, reminds externally of a theory of the state, a theory of the polis. But now he tells us that we cannot possibly speak of the polis without speaking first of the regime; and the way in which he proceeds is this: we are concerned with the regime. Somehow we know that, and you will see later on that Aristotle is dead right in what he says. We cannot talk about politics today without taking into consideration, into primary consideration, such things as democracy and communism. That is what he means. If you don't talk on political matters in the light of such distinctions you do not talk politically; you may do something else, but that's no longer politically. So that everyone knows. But then he says — yes, but then we have to go back to the condition of any possible difference of regimes; that's the political association as such: the polis. All right, but the polis is a composite so we go back to the elements of the polis: the citizen. And what do we meet again? The regime. We cannot avoid the fact that the political is the politically relevant, the politically controversial. There is the neutral. There are certain neutral things in politics. Aristotle speaks some place of them, but they are not, strictly speaking, political. They are technical, in our language. And the common usage, when people say in accusation: that is politics, they understand something of politics. Politics does have this controversial — at least, potentially controversial character, which the merely technical as technical does not have. What is your difficulty?

"I was — this may seem somewhat naive — but if this is what you said earlier about reducing the -- us opposed to its elements being associations, then why does he contrast -- it seems to me when he contrasts the good citizen with the good man he doesn't speak of the good man in the context of a lesser association. He seems to speak of good man, but isn't he returning then to -- "

What? To the village or family?

"No: to man. That's it: man out of association. Man as he stands unassociated."

Yes, but the good man as he is understood here is essentially a political being. We will see that. Let us proceed step by step. Now then -- so what is the citizen? That is our question. And then Aristotle disposes, at the beginning of 1275a, of a variety of irrelevant things. Now this is a beautiful specimen of Aristotle's precision and sobriety. Unfortunately, we cannot read it; we have to skip to the nerve of the argument. Such nice questions: for example, what is the status of a boy? A boy, the son — a future citizen. Well, a future citizen is not a citizen simply, because you have to add this qualifier: a future citizen; and also some other things into which we cannot go.

Now, then Aristotle gives first the definition of the citizen and defines him. The citizen is a man who participates in judging and in ruling. Is there any difficulty? Yes?

(Inaudible response).

Well let us go step by step. Does it make sense? I mean after all we talk about citizens all the time. Does it make sense to say the citizen is the man who participates in judging and in ruling? Yes?

"Should that sentence be changed to the man who participates either now or at some time in judging and ruling?"

That -- we will come to this difficulty later, because, after all -- now let me -- yes?

"In his discussion of this Aristotle considers the offices that each citizen must hold -- the ones who judge and rule -- and he mentions officials of the state, I think, and then he gives as an example people who sit in courts either as people on the jury or judges. Would somebody who votes also be considered as one who participates -- "

I'm trying to come to this point where we find a modern analogue. Now Aristotle first changes the and says a citizen is a man who participates in judging; and in the popular assembly. Now here you recognize modern democratic things immediately: a citizen is a man who can become a jury man and who can vote or let us say a citizen is a man who can elect and can be elected to office; both. If he only elects that's too little; he must also be entitled to be elected to office. From this we can draw the interesting conclusion, which is perfectly in the spirit of Aristotle, that a naturalized citizen, according to the law of this country, cannot become a president, as you know, and therefore he is null; he's a citizen with a qualification. A naturalized citizen is not a full-fledged citizen, 100% citizen, because he is legally prevented from being elected to the highest office. So, in other words, we recognize certain things here which we know although things have very much changed, as you know, chiefly because of the introduction of representative government. We do not think of the citizen as participating in government, in ruling, in the way that's not so evident to us as it was in olden times, where you had only direct democracies or other direct forms of government. Now is this -- so Aristotle gave a definition, then, to repeat: a citizen is a man who can participate in judging and in the assembly. Now as to your question: of course he doesn't participate literally always. He has to sleep; he has to eat. In other words, he participates whenever the assembly meets, whenever the jury meets, and since you have to arrange for some conveniences you cannot have all 1,500 or 2,000 citizens jurymen at the same time. Therefore you divide them up either according to parts of the city or according to the law cases or whatever other division may seem to be convenient. Now let us come to a passage which is rather difficult, at first glance at any rate, and that is 1275a, 33 following. Do you have that? That the best definition is more or less -- is roughly of this kind. Yes?

"Such is the general nature of the definition of citizen which will most satisfactorily cover the position of all who bear the name. Citizenship belongs to a particular class of things where (1) there are different bases on which the thing may depend, (2) these bases are of different kinds and different qualities -- one of them standing first, another second, and so on down the series. Things belonging to this particular class, when considered purely as so belonging, have no common denominator whatever -- or, if they have one, they have it only to a meagre extent. Constitutions obviously differ from one another in kind, and some of them are obviously inferior and some superior in quality; for constitutions which are defective and perverted (we shall explain later in what sense we are using the term "perverted") are necessarily inferior to those which are free from defects. It follows that the citizen under

each different kind of constitution must also necessarily be different. We may thus conclude that the citizen of our definition is particularly and especially the citizen -- "

Now, let us stop here; let us stop here. So the first point which Aristotle makes is citizen is relative to the regime. I mean, Barker always translates, as I think everyone does, constitution, which is really a misleading word and let us then simply say regime instead of that. So Aristotle really says the citizen is relative to the regime. Why does he make this terribly complicated remark, this metaphysical remark or the logical remark, however you call it, about these various kinds of things. Now first let us try to understand the content of it. There are things in which the bases, as Barker translates, the sub-strata differ in kind. Now what does this mean? A simple example is feathers of birds. Feathers have substrata: I mean the birds; and the feathers differ in kind -- the feathers of an eagle are not the feathers of a hen. There is an essential difference between them. They are feathers but the substrata differ in kind. That's one kind of thing. And then he says there are things -- there may be, regarding the bases -- there may be two relations. Either the bases have nothing in common, or they have a proper order. Now in the case of the feathers of birds you cannot speak of an order. You cannot say the feathers of an eagle are more -- to a higher degree -- feathers than the feathers of a pigeon. That's an intermediate case; Aristotle limits himself to the extreme case. Now what is the case where the substrata have nothing or hardly anything in common? A case would be the hand. You have a hand of a man; you have a hand cut off, and you have a painted hand. All three are hands somehow, but only the first is a real hand. The other is no longer a hand. The hand cut off has still the shape of a hand, but it can no longer exercise the work of a hand and therefore is not a hand unqualifiedly or absolutely as he translates. You see, what Aristotle means by absolute has nothing to do with fantastic German idealism; it means simply without qualification. That's a hand; I don't have to qualify it. But if it is wounded then it is qualified: a wounded hand or a dying hand. That's clear -- the hand cut off is no longer a hand; and the painted hand is a reflection into two dimensionality of what is really three dimensional, even in the case of a cut off hand. So they have nothing in common to speak of, and what is the case but that there are other cases in which the substrata differ in kind and the substrata have an inner order of rank; and that is here the case.

The citizen has as his substratum the regime. That must be properly understood. The citizen is always relative to the regime. He can only be understood in terms of the regime. So the substrata of citizens are regimes, but regimes are not -- the various regimes are not equal in rank as the feathers of the various species of birds: nor do they have such very simple order of rank as real hand, hand cut off, painted hand. They have an order of prior and posterior, i.e. higher, less high, lower,

lowest. In other words, the political things — that's the reason why Aristotle makes this complicated remark. The political things are more complex than things, two simple cases of hardly anything, in canon or perfect neutrality regarding rank. So this much: the citizen is relative to the regime. That in itself is easy to understand and man who is a citizen in a democracy is not necessarily a citizen in an oligarchy and so on. That's elementary. But Aristotle goes out of his way in this very precise remark to make clear — to indicate again the great complexity of political matters. We will later on come to a very simple expression familiar to all of you from every day political life of -- a practical expression of what this complexity means. But we must not rush. Now let us go on where we left off; the next sentence. Therefore, Aristotle says, the citizen as defined before is to the highest degree a citizen in a democracy. You see again what I said before. When Aristotle tries to define citizen the most natural definition, the most obvious definition, is that of the citizen in a democracy. Somehow the polis is primarily democratic, not in terms of time; the democracy is very late, as Aristotle makes clear later. But there is the simplest articulation, and it is also that from which political philosophy in fact started because it started in Athens. But this factual starting from democracy is not a mere accident. The democratic society, from Aristotle's point of view a decaying society, gives the stimulus to political reflection to a higher degree than the more old fashioned forms of regime. Yes, can you?

"Citizens living under other kinds of constitution may possibly, but do not necessarily, correspond to the definition. There are some states, for example, in which there is no popular element: such states have no regular meetings of the assembly, but only meetings specially summoned; and they renit the decision of cases to special bodies. In Sparta, for example, the Ephors take cases of contracts (not as a body, but each sitting separately); the Council of Elders take cases of homicide; and some other authority may take other cases. Much the same is also true of Carthage, where a number of bodies of magistrates have each the right to decide all cases."

Well, take the simplest example. Aristotle defines the citizen as a man who is entitled to sit in the popular assembly, but there are constitutions in which there are no popular assemblies so the definition doesn't apply. Therefore, Aristotle has to give a more general definition and that he will do in the sequel. Yes? The definition of the citizen —

"But our definition of citizenship can be amended. We have to note that in constitutions other than the democratic, members of the assembly and the courts do not hold their offices for an indeterminate period. They hold it for a limited term and it is to persons with such a tenure (whether

they be many or few) that the citizen's function of deliberating and judging (whether on all issues or only a few) is assigned in these regimes. The nature of citizenship in general emerges clearly from these considerations; and our final definitions will accordingly be: (1) 'he who enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative or judicial office attains thereby the status of a citizen of his state', and (2) 'a state, in its simplest terms, is a body of such persons adequate in number for achieving a self-sufficient existence'."

Yes, well of course he says city and not state; we don't have to go into that. So an unlimited ruling: you see that's the point; therefore the word official is so misleading. An official has a limited power to rule, either in time or in function, but there are, in every society, men who have an unlimited power. That is the Aristotelian analogue to the modern conception of sovereignty. There is somewhere a power neither limited in superiors -- of course, that exists. A given citizen may be elected to be treasurer for one year. To be treasurer is a limited form of ruling, but all these limited forms of ruling are derivative from a basic form of ruling which is not limited. That is what, in modern times, is understood by sovereignty and that is, for example, in a democracy the citizen body assembled. That is not established by someone else over some other body: that is the causa prima, the first cause for all political purposes — where you begin and from which all other power is delegated. The originating ruling: he who participates in originally ruling is the citizen. That's what Aristotle means and he makes a distinction between two kinds of ruling or two kinds of activities and we must see later on why he makes this distinction, namely: the ruling and the judging. But now he replaces ruling by deliberation. That's important. Do you see the connection? The ruling. I mean, judging is clear: you judge on the basis of given laws. You apply the laws to a given case. That's not so interesting. The fundamental thing is the ruling one. Why does Aristotle call the ruling activity the deliberating activity, a term of course which is still used in older constitutional theory in this country: the deliberative bodies. Why does Aristotle -- and that stems from Aristotle. Yes?

"Well because to deliberate indicates that your deciding choice value, choices as to which way is the best way to go."

In other words, the ruling is not surely what the police officer does when he says go this way, that way. That is absolutely derivative and uninteresting. But that goes back to a primary ruling and which empowers the policeman to do that, and this primary ruling is called, by Aristotle, deliberation. But is this not a strange expression? Let us assume that the outcome of the deliberation is a law. But it is the outcome of a deliberation. I mean, as long as it is still under deliberation it is

not yet a law. Why does Aristotle call it deliberative? How is it called today? The equivalent to that.

Student answers: "legislative."

Yes, sure, but that is a part of the deliberative, but the ordinary word used for this kind of thing today.

"Law-making process."

Yes, but then you refer -- the word which comes naturally to the mouth of everyone today, I believe you must know it: decision-making. I mean, of course, on the highest level. But Aristotle does not speak of decision; he speaks of deliberation and that's very important. Then we understand it a bit better. When you speak of decision you do not necessarily imply preceding deliberation. Decision may very well be tossing the coins, tossing the coin. For Aristotle the rational element comes out clearly by the term deliberation and deliberation naturally ends in a decision. That goes without saying: otherwise it will not be consummated. But the emphasis is on the deliberation which brings about a rational decision. This, by the way, is an interesting problem: how did the term decision acquire the tremendous importance it has in present day political science language? I don't know, but it is worth considering. I'm sure that fifty years ago the term decision-making did not enjoy that vogue which it enjoys now. It would be interesting to go into that question. I believe it has something to do with the weakening in the belief -- of the belief in reason which has taken place in the last two generations. In Germany, where I was brought up, the key political thinker who made use of it, this term, was Karl Schmitt, who later on became a leading Nazi jurist and in his doctrine the link up with certain philosophical things like and so was quite obvious. I do not know whether this did not migrate via such people like Lasswell and so into this country; I don't know. It would be worth considering that decision takes the place of deliberation.

Now then Aristotle has achieved a universal definition of the citizen: the citizen is the man, we can say, who participates in originary ruling, a ruling or governing or commanding which does not have a further source. These people in the assembly do not receive dictation from someone else as a cop on the beat and even the judges too receive dictations of the law. But then Aristotle is confronted with a minor difficulty which is very interesting. When people ordinarily speak about -- define a citizen, they don't go so high up. And let us see how Aristotle disposes of that: immediately following.

"For practical purposes, it is usual to define a citizen as 'one born of citizen parents on both sides', and not on

the father's or mother's side only; but sometimes this requirement is carried still further back, to the length of two, three, or more stages of ancestry. This popular and facile definition has induced some thinkers to raise the question, "How did the citizen of the third or fourth stage of ancestry himself come to be a citizen?"

Do you see the difficulty? I mean, for practical purposes it's good enough to say every citizen is the son of a citizen father and citizen mother, or maybe you add the grandparents on both sides; that doesn't alter the problem. But then you get into a very great difficulty. What about the first founders? They were not the sons of a citizen father and citizen mother. In other words, then all citizens are descendants from non-citizens. The first settlers were not. That shows the theoretical absurdity of the definition. Still, for practical purposes in a given society it might be all right. And he says, which they define citizen thus: politically and crudely, rashly; the text is not quite clear. The political definition is not good enough. The political is good enough for practical purposes. We have to go beyond that, which Aristotle did. And now the next point, where he shows to what this difficulty leads finally.

"Gorgias of Leontini -- perhaps partly from a sense of this difficulty and partly in irony -- said, 'As mortars are things which are made by the craftsmen who are mortar-makers, so Larissaeans are persons who are made by the "craftsmen" who are Larissaeans-makers'."

Yes, well that is a joke which is not immediately intelligible because the Greeks called natural citizens made citizens, meaning artificially made. And what Gorgias says is this: if you think that through you arrive at the conclusion that all citizens are naturalized citizens, even the indigenous ones, because it is ultimately due to an act of convention who is and who is not to be a citizen. We can leave it at that unless you would like to raise further point. We cannot read everything; let us turn to 1276a8, where he comes back to this question, some are endowed whether the city did it or not -- for example, when a democracy arises from oligarchy or tyranny. Do you have that?

"The question whether, in justice, they are citizens or not is a different matter, which is closely connected with a larger question already mentioned. The problem raised by this larger question is that of deciding when a given act can, and when it cannot, be considered to be the act of the polis. We may take as an example the case of an oligarchy or tyranny which changes into a democracy. In such a case there are some who are reluctant to fulfil public contracts -- arguing that such contracts were made by the governing tyrant, and not by the polis -- and unwilling to meet other

obligations of a similar nature. They hold the view that same constitutions exist by virtue of force, and not for the sake of the common good. This argument, however, leads us to the conclusion that when we find a democracy which exists by virtue of force we have to admit that acts done under the government of such a democracy are no more acts of the polis concerned than were acts done under the oligarchy or tyranny."

Let us stop here. Now the practical question to which he refers is familiar to you. For example, the last big case when the Soviet government at the beginning refused to pay the debts of the Tsarist government and they simply said this was not done — this debt was not incurred by the polis, by the Russian people, but by the tyrant, by the Tsarist government. I mean the question is easy to understand. So Aristotle says why — he admits there is a problem here and a very important one; not so much a practical problem — whether you should pay debts or not — but that you have to make a distinction between the polis and the regime. And now Aristotle says here but you cannot leave it at this democratic argument because a democracy may be as illegitimate, as tyrannical as an oligarchy and a tyranny. In other words, the democratic distinction between the regime and the polis is a partisan distinction and Aristotle wants to give a non-partisan distinction. That is what he's driving at. Now here we can take a look into Aristotle's way of thinking about political matters. Well, in a way we all know that problem from present day political science. The scientist cannot be a partisan. He must be neutral. Is Aristotle neutral? No: he's not neutral, nor is he a partisan. Macaulay said about Sir William Temple: Temple was not a mediator; he was merely a neutral. A neutral and a mediator are two different things. Aristotle wishes to be a mediator, an arbiter, a judge; he wants to be impartial, but to be impartial is not the same thing as to be neutral. The neutral says I don't care; the impartial man cares very much. Impartiality is the quality of the arbiter or judge, and justice is a virtue. I mean, impartiality is the same thing in a way — some aspect of justice. We can, therefore, say in a paradoxical way Aristotle is, in a way, a partisan. He is a partisan of virtue. He thinks we cannot be neutral when confronted with the distinction between virtue and vice and he is gradually paving his way toward that. Will you go on immediately where you left off.

"But the question here raised would seem to be closely allied to a question which takes us still further — "On what principles ought we to say that a polis has retained its identity, or, conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a different polis?"

Yes, now in order to understand that let us take the case of a democracy replaced by a tyranny. That happens — happened in our century and so on. What do the democrats say in such a case, who says it was not Germany that did it but the Nazis? What do they say? They say, in a way Germany has disappeared; it was completely overlaid by Nazis. Still more simply and more generally, the polis has disappeared. The polis is by the

The polis has disappeared and of course an oligarch would say when there was a democracy, the polis has disappeared and the polis has disappeared because of the disappearance of oligarchy. Now Aristotle's position among these partisans — his underlying procedure — Aristotle says no, that's exaggerated, if the democrats say the polis has disappeared when the tyrant ruled or when the oligarchs ruled. There was another polis. The partisans say the polis has disappeared. The impartial — Aristotle says the polis was transformed into another polis, and that he will develop. In other words, Aristotle is now obliged to show that the change of a regime transforms one polis into another polis, and that is very strange not only now, but was so. Was Athens a different polis with every change of its regime? Was it not always the city of Athens? Did Aristotle not write or compile what we can call a history of the regimes of Athens in which it is — just as we speak of the history of the British constitution under John, under William, and under Queen Elizabeth II. Same constitution changes: that's, in a way, the common sensical view, and that is not a modern discovery; that was familiar to Aristotle as proved by the fact that he wrote his book that was discovered about 60 years ago, The Athenian Constitution, which contains a history of the Athenian constitution. Now I will give you — I will link this up immediately to another point. In this other book, this much more popular work, The Constitution of Athens, Aristotle gives a definition of the good citizen which strikingly differs from the definition of the good citizen given here. The definition of the good citizen given here is that the good citizen is relative to the regime, so that a man who is a good citizen under a democracy is a bad citizen under an oligarchy and vice versa and so on and so on. In the Constitution — this more popular writing, he takes a much more common sensical view and says the good citizen is a man who is public spirited or just regardless of the difference of regimes. Here you see the issue. Let me use more familiar words now. The more common view and the more . . .

(Change of tape). patriot

. . . . if it simply means love for the country regardless of the regime. But on the other hand if you look more closely you see that no one is satisfied with that because if someone says, as quite a few people say, I love the United States, I love the country; therefore I want to have it communist. So it is not merely relative to the country; it is relative to the regime which

is important. This bifurcation is perhaps the secret of politics and that is why Aristotle is thus concerned. And you see also that in the more popular work he takes the more simplistic view. In here he brings it out not with all the sharpness which he had in his mind, but with sufficient sharpness. So therefore the technical form of this tremendously practical question is what is it what makes the city moral? Is it the country? Well, clearly not because the country can be inhabited by entirely different people. I mean this country was inhabited, as a matter of fact, by entirely different people, and yet no one could say this was — I mean, no one would write a history of the American constitution and give an account of the tribal organization of the Red Indians. That's not — because that was not the American constitution. So the locality, while being an indispensable condition — no political society without a locality — the locality doesn't have to be as small as that of Athens or Turkes; it may be as large as that of the United States, but the definite locality. In the moment you would have no longer a definite locality you would no longer have politics, strictly speaking. That would be a world state. Then there is no definite locality anymore — the whole globe — unless there would be human beings on other planets and there would be some interesting relations between the Earthmen and the Martians, or whoever that might be. Well, again there would be politics proper.

Now what makes the polis run? The more interesting question — could the polis not be — and that corresponds very much to our notion — could the polis not correspond to a river? Just as in the course — new generations succeed older generations just as new water flows down, there is still the same river. In other words, could not the polis have the character of something like a river bed? Could it not have? Aristotle rejects that and let us see his answer: 1276b, at the beginning.

"If a polis is a form of association, and if this form of association is an association of citizens in a polity or constitution, it would seem to follow inevitably that when the constitution suffers a change in kind, and becomes a different constitution, the polis also will cease to be the same polis, and will also change its identity. We may cite an analogy from the drama. We say that a chorus which appears at one time as a comic and at another as a tragic chorus is not continuously the same, but alters its identity — and this in spite of the fact that the members often remain the same. What is true of a chorus is also true of every other form of association, and of all other compounds generally. If the scheme of composition is different, the compound becomes a different compound. A harmony composed of the same notes will be a different harmony according as the 'mode' is Dorian or Phrygian. If this is the case, it is obvious that the criterion to which we must chiefly look in determining the identity of the state is the criterion of the constitution."

Let us stop here. You see Mr. it says chiefly. That's the most interesting consideration; it is not the sole consideration. In other words, if the same locality is inhabited by an entirely different tribe, which tribe number one, and has the same kind of regime it's a new polis because the identity of the matter — I mean the polis remains one if both its matter and its form remain the same. If the matter is changed radically — yes?

"Would you say the United States is a different nation when Maine is cut up and part goes to Canada and is purchased, new land from this . . . ?"

Well, that is a somewhat complicated question because, after all, the United States existed before that and the question is whether it was extended somewhat.

"Well, what I'm saying is does the matter have to remain the same. You see that the matter changes —."

Well, as in all such matters, they are questions of degree. I mean, in other words, if say the whole of Central America were added that would make it a different country, but the addition of Maine . . . you know, that depends — because the kind of thing which — the kind of human beings who preponderated prior to the coming of Maine — that's the same as afterward; therefore it's not important. One must not be petty — you know — although it is necessary to think of this kind of thing.

"In . . . England when the British pass a Reform Bill in the nineteenth century, therefore the regime is changed considerably and yet a person who is in favor of it can be very loyal. . . . (remainder of question inaudible)."

Yes, but the question — of which change of the regime you are speaking now?

"Well after the Reform Bill of 1832."

Yes, but the question is really, I mean, whether the changes which Britain underwent after the seventeenth century were — I mean there was now the democratization you know, which — well let me say that the big change — the two revolutions that were real big changes — seventeenth century: 1640 and 1689. That was the great change by virtue of which a certain kind of Parliament became the controlling force instead of that tug of war between Parliament and King which preceded it. Then you got two big changes and one was 1832 and the other was about 1911 or so. I mean, by then Britain became really a democracy. Previously it was a qualified democracy. From Aristotle's point of view he would say that

by these three changes, Britain changed its character fundamentally. Sure. But not small ones. For example, changes you had in this country, I believe, are infinitesimal compared to such changes where there was never a question of a hereditary nobility here. You know? And the property qualifications have been given — I understand they were very small and therefore there was not such a fundamental change. I mean, and the addition of women, of course — whether that is a politically important change is a very long question. You know — whether it is not simply a duplication of the previous division of votes to different groups. That's a long question. It differs in France; I suppose today it is different. but I believe, as far as I know, not in this country. Surely there are all kinds of transitional things. Aristotle will speak of that. I mean, he distinguishes among four kinds of democracies. The types are clearly distinguished but there are always transitional forms and that's infinite. Now here what was his point? That the polis is one chiefly with a view to the regime. Now if — that lays out very formalistic, not to say legalistic — but you see immediately that it is not so if I use now an un-Aristotelian word to describe what Aristotle means. He will bring it out later in his language. In order — a city is one with a view to its spirit. If its spirit changes that is the most important change which a city can undergo. If the spirit is feudal and then turns into commercial, that's the greatest change — or changes of the same nature. But we have to know a bit more about regime than we know now. Let us read now only the immediately following point where you left off — and this question: whether it is just to say — to pay or not to pay — when the polis changes into a different regime is a different question. You remember that was the practical question on which Aristotle started — to which he referred — that when a change of regime takes place people sometimes say we don't have to pay the debts of the previous regime because not the polis incurs the debt but the oligarchs or the tyrant. And Aristotle returns you to the question but doesn't answer it, and says that is another matter. Now I read the statement. . . . in which he drew the conclusion that Aristotle doesn't answer the question because he cannot answer the question, and why is he not able to answer the question? Because of his erroneous notion that the unity of the polis resides essentially in the regime. In other words,

starts from the common notion, especially today but also in older times, that the constitution of a -- that the country, or say society — only society is a less political expression for what we also mean by country. May I state this in general: if you try to understand any classic text about politics, if you substitute in reading it for polis the country then you are much closer than any other point of view. The country — which has a much more political connotation as you know. No one would say, right or wrong, my society. Society is an un-political concept. So what is — I think that is — in other words, says Aristotle cannot account for continuity because of his assertion the regime changes. That is not the point. Aristotle has a perfect answer to that question although he doesn't give it here,

nor explicitly elsewhere, but it is trivial. Every man of common sense can answer it. What would you say? What is a fair decision if the regime is changed and there are debts? What one should do? What would a fair judge assign?

"Payment."

No, not always. If the fellow borrowed that money in order to have which tormented the citizens: no. Because if a fellow is a criminal in the first place. . . . no, but the simple distinction would be if these expenses were made regardless of the motives for the lasting benefit of the city. For example, building hospitals, bridges, and so on and the citizens enjoy it after the change of the regime, it would seem to be fair that they pay for it; otherwise not. I was told that this is exactly the position taken by present day international law, which shows that that is not completely deprived of reason. Now here Aristotle turns then to the question which. . . . of the good man and the good citizen. But the subject was already implied in whatever he said. The good citizen depends on the regime. A good citizen of Nazi Germany is not a good citizen of Adenauer Germany because the good citizen in Nazi Germany was loyal — fully loyal to the Nazi regime, and then he could not be a good citizen to the Adenauer regime unless he changed his mind completely. Therefore the good citizen is relative to the regime. But the good man is not relative. The good man is defined, you can say, by the nature of man: the man who has perfected his human qualities properly. And from this it follows, and that is the great problem of loyalty, that the good man can be loyal only to the good regime. That is the problem of loyalty in the simplest form. I mean, I'm speaking now — I mean loyalty not merely in the sense that one doesn't commit high treason and so on, but in the sense of full dedication: identification, I believe they say now. Now what is the precise answer of Aristotle to the question. Aristotle does not say they are distinguished, the good man and the good citizen, but they may coincide under certain conditions and what are those conditions? Under what conditions is the good man identical with the good citizen?

"The good man and the good citizen are identical in the good regime where the good man is a citizen, or rules."

Is in a ruling function — when he is ruling. The good citizen in a good regime, where he is ruling, is a good man. If his rulership is dormant he is not simply identical with the good man. Yes?

"Must we identify the rulers as the sovereign power rather than, say, a division of functions?"

Yes, that surely would come into it, that they could do that, but it is not as basic as the deliberative function. Now there are — let us turn to 1277b, shortly after the beginning. Well, we must — only the points. Aristotle — for Aristotle this is crucial — the difference between ruler and ruled because a good man in his qualities as a good man becomes actual only in ruling, as certain important qualities belonging to the good man as good man are dormant if he does not actually rule. That is what Aristotle has in mind. Therefore, the distinction between ruler and ruled is important and as is his wont he opens the issue broadly, beyond what is immediately necessary, and he raises this question: does ruling require in all cases that one has — is ruling in all cases acquired by being ruled? Are there not forms of ruling which we can acquire without having been ruled? The simplest case is that of the ruling of slaves. The master rules slaves. Must he have been a slave? Obviously not. That would even disqualify him from being a master, according to Aristotle, and in this connection he makes a little point which is revealing. Do you have it? 1277b. Now the actions of the ruler —

"The occupations pursued by men who are subject to rule of the sort just mentioned need never be studied by the good man, or by the statesman, or by the good citizen — except occasionally and in order to satisfy some personal need, in which case there ceases to be any question of the relation of master and servant."

Now which very remote facts does Aristotle have in mind? Which menial functions may cease to be menial if they are done only for one's own use? Shaving — from Aristotle's point of view, to shave, to do a personal service to the body of someone else is menial, but if you do it to yourself it is not menial, or any other thing of this kind. This is only a passing point which I thought we should mention. A bit later on, where we left off — yes, now the general principle, Aristotle makes clear, for free men is that they acquire the art of ruling free men by having been ruled as free men. And he gives the example: in order to become a ruler of cavalry you have to have been a ruled cavalryman first and so on and so on. Do you have that? Immediately afterward: there has been an officer, a lower officer before you can become a higher officer, and therefore it is well said that one cannot rule well; it is impossible to rule well if one has not been ruled well, you may supply. Yes? Paragraph 15.

"Ruler and ruled have indeed different excellences; but the fact remains that the good citizen must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as for being ruled, and the excellence of a citizen may be defined as consisting in 'a knowledge of rule over free men from both points of view'. A good man, like a good citizen, will need

knowledge from both points of view. Accordingly, on the assumption that the temperance and justice required for being a subject in a free state have their special quality, the excellence of the good man (e.g. his justice) will not be one sort of excellence. It will include different sorts -- "

In other words, the problem with which Aristotle is concerned is this: there is a good man, identical or not identical with the good citizen. Now first we know that only in the case of the good regime can there be any possible identity, but secondly he says that is not sufficient because the good -- there are citizens -- good citizens in the good regime, both ruling -- in a ruling and in a ruled function, and yet it is the ruling function which is that of the good man as good man. But if on the other hand we see now you cannot be a ruling good citizen without being again, at the next term, a ruled good citizen. That is the question. Yes?

"... one sort which fits him to act as a ruler, and one which fits him to act as a subject. We may note that the temperance and courage of a man differ from those of a woman in much the same sort of way. A man would be thought to be cowardly if his courage were only the same as that of a courageous woman; and conversely a woman would be thought to be forward if her modesty were no greater than that which becomes a good man. The function of the man in the household is different from that of the woman: it is the function of the one to acquire, and of the other to keep and store."

Let us stop here. Do you see that? Aristotle says don't get confused. Let us take a simple example where a duality of the same virtue appears in two different persons: modesty or temperance. A man is temperate; a woman is temperate, and yet the temperance in the one case differs from the temperance in the other case. Now Aristotle says that may happen within the same person, something similar, that in his ruling capacity his virtue may differ from his virtue in the ruled capacity and now he will say in what it precisely consists.

"Prudence" is the only form of goodness which is peculiar to the ruler."

So, in other words, the examples hitherto were uninteresting -- of temperance and justice. Prudence is the point. The prudence of the ruler is different from the prudence of the ruled, so much so that we may say, as Aristotle is going to say, that what corresponds to the prudence of the ruler in the ruled is not prudence, properly speaking. Read on.

"The other forms must, it would seem, belong equally to rulers and subjects. The form of goodness peculiar to subjects

cannot be "prudence", and may be defined as "right opinion". The ruled may be compared to flute-makers: rulers are like flute-players who use what the flute-makers make."

Here Aristotle takes again two different persons to make it clear. Now what's the difference between the flute-maker and the flute-player? The flute-player is a commander, the commanding man, and he tells the flute-maker what to make. He tells him, i.e. the flute-maker does not have knowledge of his own of the end served. He is told only what he has to know for making it. So the ruled is less knowing than the ruler. That applies to political things. As ruled I am given the results of the deliberation. As ruler I deliberate. There is a connection between this passage and the passage which we read last time and which created so much excitement when Aristotle says laws owe their force only to habituation, where habituation means you are told as a child. Well, you may be given some reasons but you do not necessarily possess your whole reasoning as the legislator himself must possess it. Therefore you — it is not reasoning but habituation which makes you obey the law. Yes? Now let us stop here perhaps. Later on he makes clear — that was brought out in the paper — that not everyone who may be somehow a citizen and even a good citizen — not everyone who may be a good citizen necessarily can possess the virtue of man, as he says in 1278, 20 to 21, "for it is not possible to do the actions, to perform the actions of virtue if one leads the life of a menial." It's not possible. I mean, we must not — Aristotle's notion of virtue or morality is not the notion with which we are most familiar. That appears clearly from such passages. Now do we have a watch? Yes, but I must say a few words; otherwise we have much too much next time.

Definition of the *Politaea*

Now, then after this long preparation Aristotle comes to the definition of the *politaea*, or rather — yes, well we can say to the definition of the politaea. There are two elements here connected. One is brought out here. The other one is mentioned much later, in the fourth book. But both — it is good to see both together from the beginning; and the first is, the *regim* has to do with the ruling offices. The ruling offices means not the particular appointed officials. That is also part, but that's not the important part. The ruling offices means the participation in deliberation and judgment by the whole polis; the political functions proper. This is one consideration. The other consideration is supplied by Aristotle's remark later on that a regime is a way of life. So this shows immediately, therefore, Aristotle — the so-called constitutions are not legal or merely legal arrangements. The legal is for Aristotle absolutely derivative and therefore I avoid the word constitution, because constitution is a legal document or something of this kind. Aristotle has something much more fundamental in mind. The law's pre-suppose a legislator, and the first question is the legislator

cannot be himself -- be appointed by a law. There must be something; which is ultimately no longer legal but factual, which doesn't mean that it is illegal or so, but it is factual. In every society we find, in the language of the present day, such a thing as stratification. People who are looked up to and people who are not looked up to -- everywhere. But there are various kinds of being looked up to. I heard once from a student of Chinese things that the Chinese travelers and geographers when they came to a country the first question . . . they raised was how do they bow to their king. How do they greet their king? That was a very wise question. They took it for granted that people bow to something. That is clear and therefore the only question was how to bow but the first question still in a more reflective approach would be to whom do people bow. Now in this country you sometimes have the impression that the people looked up to are certain actors and actresses in Hollywood. That is true but -- that is by no means unimportant, these so-called social things, but they are not fundamental from Aristotle's point of view because ultimately we come to something -- to some people who are looked up to in the way that they rule openly in broad daylight and not in this way -- if you don't look up to Cary Grant, Bette Davis, that's your private business. But you have to look up to -- not even to President Eisenhower for that matter -- but you have to look up to the Constitution. That's not left to your arbitrary will. But the Constitution, of course, ultimately leads back to something which is called the people who have established the Constitution.

So, now for Aristotle this notion of the people, which means all, doesn't exist. There is either one, or the few, or the many; a rule of all is a very complicated problem. That is by no -- and when he makes a division to which Mr. referred, there is a division not in one, few or all, but one, few, many. And what Aristotle has in mind is this: let us assume the people who are looked up to in a non-arbitrary way, as we look up to Cary Grant, are, for example, such people as the merchants, the great merchants or they may be war lords or they may be squires or there may be the common man. That also exists. There may be also combinations of these things and that is more difficult to analyze but in principle the same thing. There is always some kind, some human type which is looked up to and that is what Aristotle means by the regime. The regime is only that by human type. Therefore the simple classification according to numbers -- one, few, many -- is, as Aristotle in his wisdom says, accidental. That is, as we would say in a bad un-Aristotelian language, form and not the substance of it. And Aristotle proves this very nicely by saying well, if you say the few -- rule of a few is oligarchy and rule of the many is democracy; but we also think of the rich and the poor, and then we get this interesting possibility but which isn't a possibility: that the few would be poor and

the many would be rich. It's a purely academic question. It so happens that the rich are few and the poor are many. That is the distinction, the standard distinction. Now, Aristotle makes this formal distinction in terms of one, few, many, only for reasons of exhaustiveness: to assure himself that he covered the ground. This is an exhaustive distinction: one, few, many. Rich and poor would not be, at first glance, an exhaustive distinction. Now, it is clear -- now if you go into details more and would, for example, say what kind of rich are the squires or are the industrialists; or in the case of the poor, are they peasants or are they workers or are they artisans, then you would get the notion of how this can truly designate a way of life and not a merely legal arrangement. That is, the question of the regime is a question of the way of life as it finds its expression in ruling and being ruled. And that is not an accidental consideration because these various human types or ways of life tend by themselves to predominate. They tend to -- they desire to put their stamp on society as a whole. And one way of -- and that leads to all kinds of questions and the key question, of course, is which is the desirable type. And that's the question of the best regime which Aristotle tries to answer. You can also say well, you never get the desirable type or are not likely to get it. What is the best combination of types that would be more practical? That is underlying the notion of the mixed regime or the mixed life. But you can never divorce the merely political from this moral element, however you call it, which means the constitution as a way of life.

Only one point I would like to mention for those who are interested in this kind of thing. In order to get his classification of the regimes Aristotle says we must know first two things. First, what is the end of political association -- purpose of political association; and second, what are the forms of rule. Now the purposes are three. First, man is by nature a social being, a political being, which means he likes living together for its own sake. That's one point. In other words, without any regard to interest -- that he gets benefits or conveniences from it, man is by nature a social being. Secondly, the common good or the common benefit; and thirdly, mere living, i.e., protection or security. The latter is, of course, the Hobbian or Lockean notion. Well, one might mention in passing a nice difference. Aristotle, in analyzing why men love to live, speaks of a natural sweetness of mere living. Hobbes speaks of the terror of death. So, in other words, not that life is something wonderful but death is so terrible that we run away from death to life, however bad. For Aristotle there is an indication that living itself has an innate -- a natural sweetness. The main point is the common good, however, is the chief consideration. And that is the central, literally the central, according to the

famous rule, Mr. . Now -- and then Aristotle says the kinds of rule and they are divided into two classes: despotic rule, which means the rule of slaves for the benefit of the master, and this obviously cannot be a good political rule because political rule is rule over free men. And then he speaks -- the other kind of rule which he mentions explicitly is economic rule, i.e. the rule of the father over the children or of the husband over the wife, which is a rule for the benefit of the ruled. But then the situation seems to be very one-sided. The rulers rule for the benefit of the ruled and do they not have any benefit for themselves like parents who live entirely for their children without expectation of being rewarded? Is this -- can this be simply applied to political rule? How does Aristotle get out of that? Do you remember, Mr. ? Yes?

(Inaudible response).

Yes, well that's the ~~gymnastic~~ teacher. He is the ruler of the pupils getting the training and he does it entirely for the pupils, but absolutely nothing prevents him from joining in the gymnastic exercises, so he gets the benefit from it accidentally and that is, according to Aristotle, the natural relation. He means, of course, this: that in a republican society the ruler now will be the ruled next year and vice versa and so there is really the common benefit. So one would then have to make a distinction between two kinds of rule, politically possible rule, in which (a) the ruler is purely beneficent; no benefit deriving to him, or mutual benefit. And we can say the first would be patriarchal, monarchical rule and the second would be republican rule in various forms. From this we understand partly why Aristotle has a certain preference for kingship, because there is a higher degree of beneficence involved if the ruler is like a father thinking only of his ruled, and not someone who derives benefit as in a republican society where he would be the ruled next year. And the distinction of these six classes is crucial for the whole later development of political science and I don't think I have to write it on the blackboard because you all must know it by now -- the six regimes which Aristotle distinguishes, but we will get much more -- hear much more about it later on.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 7, April 19, 1961

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Hertz, that was a very paper. The questions which you raised regarding the difficulties of Aristotelian argument is a very important one if one wants to understand the book. A very common view, if I remember well, is that the Politics were lectures and -- as most of the Aristotelian works which we have -- and lectures are not necessarily built up in such a severe way as a book can be built up, but the more I read Aristotle, especially the Politics, the more I'm sure that this was a book and not just lectures. Therefore the only hypothesis compatible with Aristotle's intelligence and ability is that he proceeded the way he did deliberately and that these windings are part of -- are essential to the argument as he understands it. Now, of course you are dependent on Barker: not only the translation, but also Barker's division of the subject matter into chapters, and as I saw from your presentation that is not necessarily helpful. You did not -- I mean, the effect has nothing to do with the grade I'm going to give you -- the defect of your paper can be stated very simply as follows. Aristotle's argument in the assignment of today leads up to a view which is very attractive to us: namely, that what we now call democracy is the only sound solution. Aristotle doesn't use the word democracy here, but what he means, in effect, is something as what we understand by democracy. The whole citizen body -- I mean, the poor too -- form the deliberative and judicial assembly. That corresponds today to the right to vote and the right to sit on juries. But the executive offices are in the hands of qualified people, and there are certain guarantees in one way or another -- Aristotle doesn't say which here -- that not -- to quote the remark of President Eisenhower some time ago -- governmental office is not a right but a privilege, whereas voting is a right and not a privilege. So, in other words, the whole citizen body -- foreigners and slaves excluded naturally -- elects the governmental officers and the governmental officers really rule; are not merely obeying an imperative mandate of the electorate. Now -- and this. . . .

(Interruption because of discovery that tape was running at $7\frac{1}{2}$ ips.)

. . . he turns to an entirely different argument in which some elements of the democratic argument still occur naturally, but the argument culminates in the justification of absolute monarchy. That is the strange happening in book III. You have two peaks: one, what corresponds, let us say to modern republicanism in ancient form, and the other is absolute monarchy. Why? And the chapter divisions as Barker makes them -- I don't say that he is wrong in making them; he follows a certain articulation of Aristotle's argument -- but one would have to divide this whole bulk into two chief parts: one, the argument for a quasi-democratic

republic, and (b) an argument for absolute monarchy. Now, what we would expect — the simple procedure, the clear procedure would be that Aristotle, after completing the democratic argument, would now say what powerful reasons speak against democracy, and therefore we have to look for an alternative. That he doesn't do. Why he doesn't do it — that's a long question. That is a very long question and whether — I will make a suggestion which is perhaps not intelligible to most of you but I will nevertheless make it. It would sound absolutely ridiculous; I know that, but nevertheless I will say it: that there is a certain kinship between Aristotle and Jane Austin. You know Jane Austin and Jane Austin's marvelous quality never to speak about the seamy side of life as everything is decent. Now Aristotle has also a certain love for the decencies of life and the unfortunate indecent elements are played down and perhaps Aristotle's procedure has something to do with that. Now if we want to understand, and not merely to be edified, although it is practically very important that we are edified but it is also important that we understand, we have to dig a bit deeper and see — try to recognize these difficulties — these abysses, so to say, which Aristotle doesn't think it wise to report. Aristotle's Politics is not a theoretical book simply. Aristotle's book is practical, just as his Ethics trying to make people good citizens or good statesmen. The theoretical difficulty involved — the abysses — that is not his purpose to set forth. And one can easily read the Politics without — or for that matter the Ethics — without being aware of these abysses. For example, this discussion of the good man and the good citizen can be read, and it is wholly enjoyable and edifying, but that this has something to do with the harsh problem of loyalty as we know it today — that doesn't appear immediately. You have to think about that. And so it is — perhaps we can find something out while going over that. Yes, I think I leave it at these remarks regarding your paper and we turn to the text.

Book III, as I repeatedly said, is the most important book of the Politics and I'm by no means certain that we can finish the discussion, even our very preliminary discussion, today. We might be compelled to devote next meeting still to the third book and therefore we would have to add another meeting at the end and it would mean a postponement of all papers, but this does not mean that you should not have ready your papers at the assigned time because I don't know. I only reserve the right.

Now, let us — what we must understand before we go on are certain crucial points from last time and that the crucial point is the distinction between the polis, the political society, and the regime. No polis without a regime, nor a regime without a polis. That's clear. But nevertheless they must be distinguished. Now let us take a simple example. What is the polis, first? Well, we know a certain association which is, in the modern sense

of the term, sovereign towards the outside, toward other cities. It is of fairly small size, but not so small as not to enable its members to develop their faculties fully. You know that. But that does not -- is not sufficiently illuminating. I suggested that we, in order to understand the human meaning of the *polis*, we translate *polis* not by city nor still less, of course, by state and still less by city-state; city-state is only a silly attempt to solve the problem by consuming it because if you don't know what a state is, how can we know what a city-state is. So -- but my country. Country is the "national" equivalent to what *polis* means in Greece and therefore it is not the same as society because when we speak of country we don't mean the same as society. It may be terribly difficult to articulate the difference, but we all understand it and permit me to repeat my example. No one would say, right or wrong, my society, whereas it makes sense to say right or wrong, my country. So that -- we must understand that. The word which is used by the Greeks as well as by the Romans as well as by the Continentals, unless in the Anglo-Saxon countries -- *polis* is frequently used synonymously with the Greek word patria which is in Latin, patria, and in English translation, fatherland, which is in very common use on the European continent, disliked by some more subtle people because of its crude patriotic implications, but it is a political reality, of course, of the first order. We cannot be squeamish on these matters. The Anglo-Saxon equivalent is country; sure. Now that is -- the country, let us say, corresponds to the *polis* and everyone is supposed to love the country, to devote himself to it, to die for it if need be. Let us take an example from private life to make this clear: parents and children. They are supposed to love their children and in many cases they do it without being told -- the natural love -- just as in many cases people love their country without being told. That is clear and simple, but it becomes complicated. Let us assume the parents have a child on whom they dote but that's a good for nothing. That creates a problem. So this situation would be simpler if the child were a good child, but a child is not necessarily a good child and therefore there can be a conflict in the parents between their love for their child and their loathing of the child because it is not a good child. Apply this to the country, to the political society. There can be a cleavage between the simple love of patriotism and the dissatisfaction with the character of the country. That's the distinction between the *polis* and the regime. The regime may or -- the *polis* is neutral, we can say, to the distinction between good and bad. That is not literally true but let us say this for -- in itself the *polis* is neutral. The regime cannot be neutral and there must be a regime. The city must have a quality of good or bad or medium or best and worst and whatever it may be on the rainbow, but if it is not good a problem is created and now this is not thought out by Aristotle. The experience in our century shows it all the time. The people

who escape from behind the Iron Curtain and many other examples would show that these Poles love Poland but they loathe the Polish regime. Now in practice, of course, it means they abandon Poland; they escape from it. That's the situation; only it existed and it was, of course, very familiar to Aristotle because the difference of regimes played a very great role in Greece. You can have periods which are perhaps more happy, perhaps not, in which there is everywhere the same regime, so if you are dissatisfied you don't know where to go. That can happen. But there are also times in which there are different regimes in different countries and that is the situation today and was in Aristotle's time. But you wanted to say something.

"I didn't understand your analogy — what part of the -- let's see, we have a parent-child and a polis and what else?"

Parent to child equal to citizen to country or fatherland. Pardon?

"In that order?"

For making clear this point, yes. I mean, is the problem not clear in itself?

Another student: "May I offer the analogy of the case of the grown man with an elderly authoritarian father slipping into his [] and then at least he's in the nominal formal relation."

Yes, man to son and father equal to?

"Citizen to Nazi regime."

Could be: yes. Well, but I think there is really no -- but the basic point is clear: that you have a love for a being. The being may be an individual; it may be a society: love for a being. And this love for the being is in itself indifferent, literally. Parents can love their children even if they are terrible and even if they know that they are terrible. That's their suffering. And yet they have necessarily the wish that the children be good, be not terrible. It's a simple thing. That is the analogue on the private level of the difference between polis and regime and one can say that the distinction between the polis and the regime which is very obvious once you think of it is nevertheless the mystery of politics. All deeper difficulties stem from that. If the political situation were that of a simple member of a tribe to his tribe no problem would arise except that consisting in the difference between love of -- between egoism and dedication to the common good. That would still exist there but the much more subtle difference is due to the difference of regimes which in this form requires a much more developed society, a political

society. Now -- we will have to come back to this problem on a somewhat different level. Aristotle's thesis, then, was that the authoritative thing is the regime. The polis owes its character to the regime. The polis is -- or if we may use a convenient expression from Aristotle's ontology -- the polis is, in itself, the matter. The regime is the form and the form is that which gives a character to a thing. And the example of Aristotle which was read last time is really very illuminating. You have fifteen fellows; they are the same individuals but now they are used -- they play in a tragic chorus and a week later they play in a comic chorus. The individuals are the same; the meaning of the association is completely altered: in the first case, a tragic chorus, and the second case, a comic chorus. That is an illustration; as all illustrations, an imperfect one, but still in its limits enlightening of the difference of regimes. Just as the same individuals in a different arrangement and for a different purpose are once members of that chorus and then of another, they can be once members of one regime and then members of another regime. The individuals -- and it is not merely that the individuals don't remain unaltered by that. The different function, the different purpose, affects them. Their activities -- the activities of these individuals -- differs when they are members of a comic chorus than when they are members of a tragic chorus, just as the activities of the individuals changes if they are members of a democracy or if they are members of a communist regime or Marxist regime or what have you. So these are not far-fetched things. These are things which we immediately recognize in spite of the profound changes in present day society. Now once it is understood that the authoritative thing, the thing by which we take our bearings is the regime, the regime becomes then the key subject of political science as it does in Aristotle. By the way, it is really the trivial thing which you all know. The exciting theme today, political theme, on which the exciting character of all other themes, political themes, depends is the struggle between liberal democracy and communism. Everyone knows that. Yes, but if you try to express this in general terms you have to say the difference between two regimes. It is not the difference between a country of the size of Russia and of the size of the United States or of this racial blend in Russia and that racial blend in the West or what have you. The crucial point is that this is communism and this is liberal democracy. These are two forms of regime for which Aristotle, in a way, did not provide because Aristotle thought only of simpler regimes and it would be our task by an analysis which we would have to make to use the Aristotelian basic analysis of the basic regimes for a proper analysis of what the difference between liberal democracy and communism is.

But to come back to Aristotle, we have to find out -- we have to get a survey of all possible regimes. That would be at

least the most desirable way if we could have it. Aristotle believes he has it and the disjunctions from which he starts are those. The rulers are either one, or the few or the many. And the other consideration is good or bad, meaning directed toward the common good or only toward the good of the ruling group. And so we get this scheme which has been -- hasn't had a terrific history: I mean the basis of all traditional distinctions. (Writing on blackboard). Now, good and bad. One, few, many. And then we get kingship and tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, polity and democracy: Aristotle's scheme, and it is understood that the sequence of goodness is this: you know, the opposite of the best is the worst and therefore democracy is better than oligarchy and tyranny but still bad enough from Aristotle's point of view. The scheme was already sketched in Plato's Statesman but not in this -- almost identical, but not quite identical, and then it was repeated with a slightly different terminology, more attractive to our ears, namely this by Polybius, the Greek historian of Rome, in the second century B.C. Polybius has it and simply called this -- what Aristotle called polity -- democracy and called that oakocracy, mob rule, what Aristotle called democracy; fundamentally the same thing. So that is, in a way, the key system of coordinates of the traditional orientation and I think one should at least mention that. But Aristotle doesn't leave it at this external orientation because he was the opposite of a so-called formalist. He is always concerned with the substance of the thing. And the point is this: he takes the examples of oligarchy and democracy and he says well, rule of the few and rule of the many is not very helpful. The few who rule the oligarchy are the rich and the many are the poor and once you look at that it becomes immediately interesting and ceases to be "abstract" because what do you know when you hear the words few and many? And then you know it's rich and poor; yet you understand that is politically important. The formal scheme is used merely in order to guarantee exhaustiveness, but -- and that he does -- but it is of no use beyond that. In other words, the distinction in the light of numbers deals merely with accidents, as Aristotle calls it. It is accidental that the few are rich and the many are poor, but the reason why this is politically interesting is not the fewness or manyness in itself, but wealth and poverty.

Now, after having made clear these points Aristotle immediately goes over to, in 1279b to 1280a, to a more detailed discussion of two of these regimes and that seems to be one of these, how shall I say, of these irrational, disorderly things which Aristotle does. Instead of beginning at the beginning: kingship first, he begins with oligarchy and democracy, apparently because -- no, he doesn't say anything. But we have seen one thing already at the beginning of Book III: that when Aristotle tried to define the citizen he gave first the democratic definition -- you remember. And even earlier he stated the general problem

in terms in which the democrats would state it: not the polis did it but the oligarchs did it or the tyrant did it, which is the democratic argument. And I tried to show that this is connected with a certain democratic proclivity of the polis which Aristotle assumes and of which we shall hear later and which also leads him now to concentrate, for the time being, on the difference between oligarchy and democracy. And in a way for us today enlightened or corrupted by the so-called tough realism of present day political science Aristotle would have been much better advised to begin altogether with oligarchy and democracy. Now let us see how this works out.

That in every political society which is not very primitive there are the rich and the poor is, I think, generally granted and such heroes of political realism like Machiavelli repeated that statement with great force. So let us then say this: the most natural inclination of civil society is either to be ruled by the rich or to be ruled by the poor. In the first case it is oligarchy and the second case, it is democracy. Now Aristotle, being a sober man and not a partisan says well, both parties. . . have a point and that proves, of course, that none of them is simply right and so we have to seek for an intermediate solution, as we would say today, a compromise. Yes, but Aristotle says a compromise is not necessarily a solution of the problem. You know -- that you combine the advantages of both with avoiding the disadvantages of both. That is not a -- because if you get that which truly combines the advantages and avoids the disadvantages you get not a mere compromise. You get something better and that is what Aristotle calls a mean. So the mean is not located here, but here. (Writes on blackboard). That is crucial for Aristotle. In other words, the mean is not on the line but -- good. Now Aristotle said -- that is, to begin with, a purely speculative remark, but then Aristotle recognizes in this consideration a fact, a political fact. There is a regime which has this character, which is in between oligarchy and democracy and yet superior to both and that is what he calls polity. It's a pity; I had to remove the other schemes. . . . kingship, aristocracy, polity; tyranny, oligarchy, democracy. Now we have now disposed of oligarchy and democracy. . . Now we have recognized polity.

Now what is the principle of polity? Very simple. You don't have simple rule of the rich; you don't have rule of the poor, by a very simple device which you all know although it is no longer in use: a relatively small property qualification. How's that? You don't have to be rich to be a full-fledged citizen. You must have some . And on the other hand you cannot be simply poor because otherwise you wouldn't have that . Now how does this work out in practice? You make it a rule that only -- you don't indicate the property qualification in terms of dollars

and cents or whatever the Greek equivalent might have been, but you say only those can be citizens who can do a certain service to the polis which only people of some property can do and this service means infantry, but the real infantry — Hoplites — men using heavy arms and equipping themselves with it. So the rule of the — polity is therefore identical with the preponderance of the military power of the city because the Hoplites were regarded as the queen of battles. So you have the rule of the Hoplites — I mean of course then also of the older ones who had been Hoplites; that doesn't affect the principle. And now you see — make a strange observation. On the lowest level you had rich and poor, morally indifferent qualities. I mean, Aristotle did not believe that the rich are the rational and industrious part of the society and the poor are the lazy and irrational, as John Locke tried to believe. Aristotle saw that is morally irrelevant because wealth can be acquired also by unjust means and — as you know. But here we have now a premium on a moral quality: to be the defenders of the polis. In other words, military virtue and that is a virtue, an important virtue. That is not the highest virtue and therefore if we are wise, Aristotle suggests, let us look whether we cannot find another mean between democracy and oligarchy which is also as a mean higher than — but still higher than polity. That is aristocracy.

In an aristocracy there would be men — that is the general idea — who are compelled, you can say, by their social function not only to be the embodiment of military virtue but of all other virtue. That's the scheme. Now this we have also taken care of aristocracy. The monarchic forms remain. What shall we do with them? We have to treat them separately and that is, in a way, what Aristotle does in the Politics. In other words, Aristotle's Politics as a whole bears witness to the fact that the polis is fundamentally republican — republican not in the sense of the G.C.P. but in opposition to monarchist, and therefore you can say the great question mark is what about monarchy? Tyranny is relatively uninteresting because that means something lousy, if I may say so and that is simply a bad form, but what about kingship? That becomes, in a way, the great theoretical problem and therefore it is treated right in the third book as you will see. Generally speaking, the Politics — I mean there is one book, Book V, dealing with the so-called revolutions, in which all regimes are discussed, whether they are monarchical or republican. But otherwise the Politics is a republican book and has only the end of the third book devoted to kingship. That we must keep in mind.

Now then. Aristotle begins, then, the more serious investigation, the more substantive investigation with the investigation of oligarchy and democracy. Oligarchy misses what democracy has got. Democracy misses what oligarchy has got. That's obvious, but that is not the full story. They both miss the same thing and that shows that they are on the same level, inferior to something higher; that the mean, in other words, must be higher than

the two extremes. What is the decisive thing? Both miss the fact that the polis exists for the sake of the good life. If the polis were to exist only for the sake of living together democracy would be sufficient. If the polis existed for the sake of the protection of property, the oligarchs would be right. But in fact the polis exists for the sake of the good life. Now the good life means here -- always in Aristotle here -- the noble life. Good life does not mean to wallow in ice cream and other luxuries but to do noble deeds. The polis is not for the sake of mutual defense only. Then each one would count as everyone else -- nor for the mutual exchange of goods and services. That is not sufficient. Now let us read this passage; it is in 1280a, towards the end of that. Mr. Weinstein, you are such a supreme reader; won't you read?

"Article 6; page 118. But the end of the state is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of life. If mere life were the end, there might be a state of slaves, or even a state of animals; but in the world as we know it any such state is impossible, because slaves and animals do not share in true felicity and free choice. Similarly, it is not the end of the state to provide an alliance for mutual defence against all injury, or to ease exchange and promote economic intercourse. If that had been the end, the Etruscans and the Carthaginians would be in the position of belonging to a single state;"

In other words, two independent cities who have some arrangement for the exchange of goods and services would by this very fact be a polis. Yes?

"and the same would be true of all peoples who have commercial treaties with one another. It is true that such peoples have agreements about imports and exports; treaties to ensure just conduct in the course of trade; and written terms of alliance for mutual defence. On the other hand they have no common offices of state to deal with these matters: each, on the contrary, has its own offices, confined to itself. Neither of the parties concerns itself to ensure a proper quality of character among the members of the other; neither of them seeks to ensure that all who are included in the scope of the treaties shall be free from injustice and from any form of vice; and neither of them goes beyond the aim of preventing its own members from committing injustice in the course of trade against the members of the other."

Yes, in the course of trade; that is an addition of Barker. Yes, it's very bad because in order to --

Should I leave out the brackets?

Yes, I think it's better.

"But it is the cardinal issue of goodness or badness in the life of the polis which always engages the attention of any state that concerns itself to secure a system of good laws well obeyed. The conclusion which clearly follows is that any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere alliance, which only differs in space from other forms of alliance where the members live at a distance from one another."

In other words, it is an alliance of people living together and not an alliance of people living in distant areas. Yes?

"Otherwise, too, law becomes a mere covenant -- or (in the phrase of the Sophist Lycophron) "a guarantor of men's rights against one another" -- instead of being, as it should be, a rule of life such as will make the members of a polis good and just."

Yes, let us stop here. Now the word which Barker translates by goodness is arete, which is ordinarily translated by virtue, though I can't blame Barker for trying to avoid virtue because the word has become ridiculous, if I may say so. But if you want -- but goodness is also a bit misleading. If you want to avoid -- I use virtue as a translation without any hesitation and brave the difficulty but if one does not want to do that then one should say excellence, which is a much better translation. Now let us stop here; that is a crucial passage. The polis does not exist for the sake of mutual defense and mutual exchange of goods and services, but also, and above all, for the sake of human excellence. Aristotle sketches here an alternative view. You omitted the reference to the Sophist Lycophron. That is in Aristotle. He had different views. He said the city exists merely for the sake of defense or for the exchange of goods and services and therefore the law is a covenant, a contract. He implied the whole polis is a contract. The people made a contract with one another for the defense -- for their mutual defense and for the exchange of goods and services. Aristotle rejects that. Now he makes another point which is more interesting. These other people -- not only theoreticians like Lycophron, but many practical people, many citizens understand the polis in this way, and they admit, of course, the necessity of justice. I mean, if the basic moral or political fact is a contract then you have, of course, to perform the stipulations of the contract. You have to keep the contract and that is justice. So in such a polis the people are concerned with everyone's performing his duties, i.e. with everyone's acting justly. That's obvious. Aristotle does not deny that.

But he says that acting justly is one thing and being just is something very different and in such a contractual city people are not concerned with the citizen's being just. Do you understand the difference? Well, if you understand it, explain it to us. What is the difference between a man who acts justly and is not just and the man who is just?

"Well, I would think that the difference implied is that there's a difference between the way a man behaves when with others and the way the man actually is."

Yes, that is, but can you? Yes, well let me -- yes?

"Well a person who was acting justly might just do so because of the consequences. . . . (rest of answer inaudible)."

Sure. For example, fear of punishment or concern with being elected next time. So you must have a good record. But the just man would be a man who loves justice. Even if it is disadvantageous to him to act justly he would still do it. Yes?

"I was trying to think or trying to determine when you asked me that question what the difference in the consequences for the community would be with a person -- between a person who acts just and a person who is just and that's what I couldn't really see."

Yes, but does it not make, individually, a difference whether the fellow acts justly, never cheats on taxes or in any other respect merely because -- either of the reward and punishment or because it's terribly inconvenient also to be a crook. I mean look at it realistically. You have to think much more about all trivial things to keep out of the clutches of justice and become dependent on shysters. . . . elaborate it; you see it is highly undesirable to be a criminal, but someone else might -- and the other man who loves justice and justice is only a part of virtue; he loves virtue. So, for example, it has also to do with -- look at the gangsters. We all have very good access to that through movies and TV and our own imagination. But I gather that when they have a lost, then what do they do with it? Do they take a course in the Basic Program of the University of Chicago downtown? I don't think so. But they go to places where they drink and have real orgies. So, in other words, that kind of life seems -- this kind of injustice seems to go together with intemperance. And also I have been given to understand that they are not men who have any delicacy of feeling. In other words -- now let us then try to summarize it. A society which is concerned with a certain moral tone of all its members within the limits of the possible is one thing. Another which insists only on the bare minimum demands which must be complied with if there is to be any exchange of goods and services: that's quite different. That's the point. Now let us -- we draw now another conclusion, referring

back to something we discussed on an earlier occasion. I mean, that Aristotle is, as we know, a man living in Greece who knows absolutely nothing of thermo-nuclear bombs and so on and so on and therefore can be of no help to us. He didn't know anything of modern society. In a way that is absolutely true, but in another way it is not true because the view which Aristotle sketches here and rejects is a modern view. In ancient times it existed, as is shown by what Aristotle says, but in modern times it became theoretically victorious. Do you recognize a modern theoretician who said the end of society for the sake of commodious living or comfortable self-preservation and the civil society has no other function but to make this living together possible?

"Well, Bentham said it."

Yes, Bentham is one, but there are some greater names. Pardon?

"Locke."

Locke, surely, and Hobbes, naturally. So, in other words, Aristotle understood the principle of Locke without ever having read it, and there are certain niceties in Locke which are very important which he did not know and therefore one has to re-consider Aristotle's argument and say whether it still stands up against Locke, fully understood as Locke himself meant it. I mention here only one point. Let us take Aristotle's moral doctrine. Can we reduce to a somewhat difficult equation -- because it is not simply an equation and I don't know a good mathematical expression of that -- but I present it as a simple equation. $H = V$ -- meaning happiness is identical with virtue. Well, this is not quite so simple. Aristotle makes very well clear in the first book of the Ethics especially, but substantially that is what he means. We cannot become happy except by being virtuous. Whether virtue is in all cases sufficient is a hard question. There is the case of Friar of Grey, who was supposed to be a virtuous man, and you know his terrible fate. That creates a problem. But still, basically happiness is virtue. Now what do the opponents -- the modern opponents of Aristotle say? What do they say? Locke -- let us leave it at Locke. What does Locke say about happiness?

"He talks of pursuing it but he doesn't talk about finding it."

Yes, that is one point, but the more important point, I believe, is that he says happiness, in our jargon of today, happiness is entirely subjective. For Aristotle, happiness is not subjective. Genuine happiness consists in virtue. If someone says I find my happiness in stamp collecting, Aristotle would

say you are a very thoughtless man; otherwise you would not find your happiness in stamp collecting although you might enjoy stamp collecting, but from Hobbes' point of view it is possible to say this man becomes happy through stamp collecting. At any rate, happiness is entirely subjective. How can you have a political science on that basis? If the end of man differs from individual to individual. You all know it from today; you can't have it in a way because of -- you can have it only in a very reduced way: the value-free social science. That was not -- Locke didn't believe that. Locke said in spite of the subjectivity of happiness there is something objective, universally valid, applying to all men. I give you a simple example. You cannot be happy if you are not alive. You cannot pursue your happiness, at least in most cases, as most of you understand it, if you are prevented from circulation. So you must also have the freedom of circulation: freedom, and there are some other things. So there are certain -- while happiness is radically subjective the basic conditions of that happiness are objective. They are the same for all. And these basic conditions of happiness are the aim of political society. And here we come to the point which was raised by -- I forgot your name -- pursuit of happiness. Surely, if you don't have the right to pursue happiness you cannot become happy. You may understand by happiness what you want, but you must have the right to pursue that happiness, however you might understand happiness. Therefore life, liberty, pursuit of happiness are the universally valid conditions of human happiness -- conditions of happiness, and they can be and must be secured by civil society. That's the position of the Declaration of Independence; basically Locke. Yes, but what is the consequence of that? I would like to add only one little point as a kind of comment on this famous formula of the Declaration. I believe that Jefferson meant by happiness -- and not only Jefferson but some other people to -- happiness, really how you understand it, i.e. including also the happiness in some other world. Now the pursuit of happiness in some other world is popularly known as religion and therefore I believe that Jefferson meant by it also the freedom of religion, which was, as you know, one of his major pre-occupations. But this only in passing. Let us return to that. Now we have this situation: civil society has the function of guaranteeing life, liberty and pursuit of happiness to everyone. Civil society does not have the function to guarantee happiness. That is a welfare state and the framers of the Constitution or of the Declaration of Independence were not welfare-statist as we all know and we hear every day now. So the actual pursuit of happiness as distinguished from the right to pursue it is everyone's private business. Now obviously happiness is more important than the conditions of happiness. What is the use of your life and liberty and the right to pursue happiness if you are miserable? On the other hand, if you are happy you

have life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the bargain. So we have now a distinction on the basis of this, strictly speaking, liberal doctrine because I believe we should not define liberal according to the passions of each political situation but in a more principled way, and that is, I think, the liberal view: that society is founded for the purpose of safeguarding certain basic rights of man. Whether you call them natural rights or not is a secondary question here. Now -- so to repeat -- happiness is no longer an affair of the state. That's an affair for every individual. Yes, but this happiness if you look at it more concretely is not one which the individual achieves in isolation. For example, you know you have -- you know this from the literature -- that sometimes people cannot find happiness if they do not have another human being to share in happiness; popularly, marriage. And there are also other things called friendship; and there is also the other thing -- the man who is concerned -- who finds his happiness in becoming rich -- he cannot do that in isolation. He needs employees; he needs business partners and so on and so on. So we have, then, not merely isolated individuals actually pursuing their happiness but individuals co-operating with one another, in a way not regulated by the state. Do you see what I'm driving at? Now what is the name for that -- for the individuals -- pardon? Yes, that's the legal expression but as the thing which comes out of it.

"Society."

Society. So, in other words, the liberal concept absolutely stands or falls by this distinction between state and society with the understanding, although that is not always clear, that society is higher because the state guarantees only the conditions of happiness. The happiness itself can only be found in society and therefore from this point of view it follows necessarily that the political is more basic but also less interesting. The interest is social, not political. Now this, of course, is in constant conflict with the basic facts of human life because when we look around we see that all of us, I believe, admire most not those who pursue -- who are successful in pursuing their happiness as businessmen or whatever they may be, but those who guarantee the foundations of that pursuit: the esteem for the Founding Fathers in this country or at also Lincoln, for example, is by far superior to that esteem in which any other individual is held. In other words, we still know, in a way, that the real McCoy is not the social but the political but, on the other hand, we also have this situation: that from another point of view the social appears to be superior. You see that I wanted to show was this: that it is possible to give an analysis of this stratum of modern thought, as only one stratum, on the basis of Aristotle, and therefore perhaps to go on and raise the question, who is right, Locke or Aristotle. But that would surely go beyond our present

possibilities.

(Change of tone).

... and therefore friendship is necessary. Friendship produces -- I mean, is the condition for living together, but friendship is more than that. Friendship is a kind of union and friendship is essentially a union in something higher than self-interest. You can also speak of business friendships. Aristotle himself tells us in his analysis of friendship in the Ethics but that is surely not genuine friendship because that is a conditional form of friendship. As soon as it is no longer lucrative the friendship stops. Now let us go on, where you left off.

"A polis is constituted by the association of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing existence; and such an existence, on our definition, consists in a life of true felicity and goodness."

Yes, our definition -- that alone gives it a terribly academic character. You know definition. As we assert, Aristotle says.

"It is therefore for the sake of good actions, and not for the sake of social life, that political associations must be considered to exist."

Let us stop here. He doesn't say good actions but noble actions. Good actions is ambiguous. The noble actions and noble actions means -- what's the relation of noble action to virtue? Simply this: noble actions are the exercise of virtue. Virtue is itself a habit which may be dormant. If it is exercised it issues -- it shows itself in noble action. The polis exists for the common pursuit of excellence. That's the Aristotelian view. From this, therefore, there is a decisive consequence regarding the regime. The most excellent men are those who have the highest right to rule. If the polis is an association for the common pursuit of excellence, then the most excellent men are the natural rulers. That is the Aristotelian argument. Go on where you left off.

"Those who contribute most to an association of this character have a greater share in the polis than those who are equal to them (or even greater) in free birth and descent, but unequal in civic excellence, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in excellence."

Now let us stop here. In other words, all kinds of people raise claims to rule on various grounds. A man says I'm a free

man. I was born here and my parents were here before and so on. That's one thing. The others say I'm rich. Who is paying the taxes? There was an analogue of the taxes: who takes care of the ships, of the navy -- built the navy and built the temples? The rich: they are the benefactors of the city, more than any poor man can be. . . . And Aristotle says no, the highest claim is that of the men of excellence even if they are inferior in freedom and in birth; meaning, in nobility of descent. But still it is understood and implied here: the others too have some claim and that is what Aristotle -- what the great problem for Aristotle is. On the first level of the argument there can be no question. The men of excellence have the natural right to rule. Why can we not leave it at that? That would be elegant and of mathematical clarity. Why can't we leave it at that? Why must we give some right to the other claims too?

"Because the fact that they have some money implies that they also make a contribution to the . . . of the society."

That is very nice of you to put it this way. One can express it another way. Now let us see what you have to say.

"They . . . without excellent people."

Yes, well still all right. Let the excellent rule the non-excellent.

(Inaudible response).

Oh, that is not so -- well, all right; then we cannot perhaps not have a polis.

"They also have a certain amount of power which they -- "

Now you are talking: so they make themselves felt and that is the point and we will see further developments of that later on. A bit later -- where you left off. A bit later; its probably a new paragraph.

"A difficulty arises when we turn to consider what body of persons should be sovereign in the polis: the people at large; the wealthy; the better sort of men; the one man who is best of all; the tyrant. But all these alternatives appear to involve unpleasant results: indeed, how can it be otherwise? What if the poor, on the ground of their being a majority, proceed to divide among themselves the possessions of the wealthy -- will not this be unjust? 'No, by heaven' (a democrat may reply); 'it has been justly decreed so by the sovereign.'"

Now let us stop here. Well, the democrat might reply is Barker's addition; Aristotle doesn't say that. Yes, but I'm sorry: I have the text here. Yes, sure. Aristotle simply says what

the democrat replies without saying that the democrat replies it. You understand that from the context, and he doesn't say "by heaven." He says, "by Zeus." Not as a democrat, by the way, but as a political man. You see here, and shortly afterward there is another sermon by Zeus. These are the only sermons occurring in the Aristotelian writings. It's very interesting. They occur in Aristotle's imitation of political debate. You see, when Aristotle speaks about the nature of frogs or about the essence of motion and he argues all the time; that is always disputative or dialectical. But he never swears. I mean, as if we would now, in arguing about Aristotle, someone would say that is all so, by God. That wouldn't carry any weight. But in political discussions these things come up because -- why do they carry weight in political debates or in quasi-political debates, whereas they do not carry any weight in theoretical debates? Why do they do that?

(Inaudible response).

Yes, but still, who cares for emotions? Why are the emotions legitimately regarded as strengthening the cause of the argument? I mean, if someone gives a mathematical demonstration and would swear. I mean that would be wholly impertinent. But if in a political debate sermons, oaths, or equivalents of them are credulous. How come? I mean, they are a kind of argument. How come? Perhaps they show how strongly people feel about it and the strength of the feeling is, of course, a political fact. I mean, if people have an attitude, as they say today, that can be very luke-warm and of no political importance but it can also be of great political power and that is indicated, for example, by the use of powerful language. So here Aristotle gave a sketch of the democratic argument and refutes it at the same time as he had done before in a different form. The democrats say the demos has reached this decision and the demos is sovereign, but that doesn't mean a thing. The decision may be wholly unjust. It is obvious. I mean, whatever you may think about majority decisions they cannot -- the majority principle does not guarantee the justice of the majority decisions. The majority principle may be a sound rule of thumb but it can never be more because there is no guarantee that the majority as a majority will be right or just. That is clear. And you see also the swearing: the partisan, excited man and this indicates again what Aristotle is. Aristotle is the arbiter, the calm arbiter between excited people. That is his function. Now then he gives in the sequel -- in this case we cannot go into all that -- the argument, to repeat, is decided in favor of the men of excellents, men of virtue, the better sort as they were called in former times. Yes, but still can we leave it at the sole rule of the better sort? Would this not lead to the consequence that the majority is dis-franchised, therefore dissatisfied and therefore will be inclined to put down the rule

of the better sort? Furthermore, if there is an inherent right of the better sort to rule in their own right, then we arrive at the conclusion that the best individual has a still higher right than the better sort and he should be the sole ruler. People are aware of that and therefore they say, you know, you put the question wrong. No human being should rule. The law should rule, a demand which always makes a great impression, but Aristotle thinks it is wholly insufficient and why? Why can we not say rule of laws? Yes?

"The law itself may be interpreted in terms of all democratic interests. In other words, be inclined one way or the other."

That's true, but not sufficient.

"Well, the laws could be good or bad. . . ."

The right is not in all situations but the right is just between what you said. It is not the mere administration of the law; it's the giving of the laws. The question who is the ruler means ultimately who is the law-giver, and the laws will not be politically neutral. They will be democratic laws, oligarchic laws, . . . and therefore the recourse to the rule of laws is theoretically wholly inadequate and therefore the regime is the crucial consideration. You cannot leave it at the laws. The laws are derivative from the law-giver and the law-giver, in modern language, is the sovereign and the sovereign differs in an oligarchy or democracy, tyranny — what have you? And therefore the real political question is who ought to be the sovereign? Who ought to be the law-giver? The question of the laws, very important, is however only a secondary question. Now then Aristotle argues and gives the argument in favor of the rule of the multitude; we can say the democratic argument. The main point: collective wisdom is superior to the wisdom of any individual. Let us look -- there is one passage which is particularly interesting in 1281b. Why don't you read paragraph 3?

"Article 3, bottom of page 123. This is the reason why the Many are also better judges of music and the writings of poets; some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all. The thing which makes a good man differ from a unit in the crowd -- as it is also the thing which is generally said to make a beautiful person differ from one who is not beautiful, or an artistic representation differ from ordinary reality -- is that elements which are elsewhere scattered and separate are here combined in a unity. For if you take the elements separately, you may say of an artistic representation that it is surpassed by the eyes of this person or by some other feature of that. It is not

clear, however, that this combination of qualities, which we have made the ground of distinction between the many and the few best, is true of all popular bodies and all large masses of men."

Now let us stop here. The which he makes here: surely an individual may be by far superior in wisdom to all others and his wisdom may be superior to the collective wisdom, but only in parts, in partial matters, i.e. these outstanding individuals are so-called experts but what we understand by political wisdom is not wisdom of experts. That is a part of the democratic argument which Aristotle does not fully adopt -- by no means -- which he rather reports and analyzes and which he regards as useful up to a point. The conclusion which we draw then is that there -- Aristotle does not accept the argument in favor of the multitude, even here. Some multitudes, civilized multitudes, may have this character and the practical solution as it was stated by Mr. Herst in his paper: it is a perfectly defensible view to say that multitudes of a certain caliber are capable to form the popular assembly and there to give the laws and to deliberate generally and also to act as jurymen. But they must not be elected to the highest offices. What this in practice would mean, I believe, is this: the laws would be prepared by a council and this council would not be -- I mean that would also be an aristocratic institution, and so that the right of the multitude would be rather to ratify or not ratify the laws, but they would have no influence on the legislation itself. Then Aristotle goes on in this argument and raises the question, can the multitude, judge; for example, a physician is to be elected and must you not be a physician to judge of a physician? Must you not be a political scientist to judge of political scientists? Now the multitude consists of non-knowers, admittedly. How can we get out of that circle? The Aristotelian solution is the classic solution. In many cases you are even a better judge if you are not an expert, on this ground: because the experts are meant to serve the non-experts and only the non-experts can decide whether they serve well. Simple case: a shoemaker is an expert; the non-shoemakers are not experts in shoes, but the decisive judgment on the work of the shoemaker is the judgment of the non-expert, of the wearer of the shoes. The shoemakers may all say that is the most magnificent shoemaker we have ever seen; he produces shoes in no time and out of the most unpromising material, and what have you. But if the buyers of these shoes say we can't wear the shoes, they are right and not only from a democratic point of view, but obvious. Pardon?

"Does Aristotle assent to this?"

Yes, sure.

"Then he would be accepting a subjective evaluation."

How is this a subjective evaluation, but when you can't walk in the shoes?

"If he accepts the principle that excellence is to be determined by the wearer . . ."

Not in every respect. For example, let us take a man who is completely unable to appreciate these things. For example, regarding shoes, every wearer of shoes can judge and every man, or at least almost every man to be exact, can be a wearer of shoes. But if it is a matter of poetry, for example, every man can listen to poetry, but is everyone equally able to judge of a poetic work? It's a different case. The cruder the things, the more general is the judgment and political matters are partly very crude and therefore everyone can be the judge, but other things are not very crude in politics and therefore the different.

"Political matters, you say, are essentially -- "

No: many political matters are crude.

(Inaudible response).

Yes, sure. That is the limit of popular competence according to Aristotle, because most people would say that if we get the right kind of shoes, metaphorically understood, which we can wear conveniently -- that's all we want from the government. But the government must do more to be truly government. Quite a few people would be dissatisfied with a government which would do not more than that. Take another example, also from everyday life: not everyone is hurt -- not everyone's eyes are hurt if he sees fantastic advertisements on billboards on the highways. Not everyone is hurt by the atrocious singing commercials on the TV, and if then you will say since people like it -- and people might even -- the majority of people might even like perhaps so-called obscene things, obscene literature -- would this be -- or to take a simple example. How come that the spitting is abolished, say, and is forbidden in subways, for example? Is this simply due to the popular will as such? I really doubt it. If at a certain point physicians had not entered and had had a decisive say which did not impose too great a hardship on the consumers, it might never have gone through, and so on. So that is not the only -- but Aristotle here gives -- but your question is in one point -- is very pertinent because it gives us an inkling why Aristotle does not leave it at the democratic argument. He presents here an argument for democracy which seems to be fool-proof and yet without an apparent reason he goes on to an argument which leads to absolute monarchy and he doesn't give us a reason. We have to discover the reason for ourselves. You got one point there in what you said. Now let us see. We have to

read at the beginning of 1282b there is one point. 1282b.

"But the discussion of the first of these difficulties leads to one conclusion above all others. Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronouncement. But what rightly constituted laws ought to be is a matter that is not yet clear; and here we are still confronted by the difficulty stated at the end of the previous chapter — that law itself may have a bias in favour of one class or another. Equally with the constitutions to which they belong laws must be good or bad, just or unjust. The one clear fact is that laws must be constituted in accordance with constitutions; and if this is the case, it follows that laws which are in accordance with right constitutions must necessarily be just, and laws which are in accordance with wrong or perverted constitutions must be unjust."

That is a more emphatic statement regarding the derivative character of laws. Laws, just as the citizen, are relative to the regime. The fundamental fact is the regime and therefore if the regime is fundamentally wrong the laws must be wrong too, except accidentally, and vice versa. Now that is one reason why one should not speak of constitutions because when you speak of constitutions now, especially in this country, you mean a law, the fundamental law of the land. For Aristotle the regime is not a law. It is a factual order of the society in regard to rules which necessarily will find a legal expression, but the legal expression is absolutely derivative from the fundamental fact. And there is another point regarding the regime which I should have mentioned last time, but there was so much material that I could not possibly go into everything. There is this phrase occurring which is translated generally and I think also by Barker that what is the constitution? Answer: the constitution is the government. Yes, but what does that mean? I mean, does it make sense to say the constitution is the government? In this country you would of course say the constitution — the government is by virtue of the constitution the legitimate government. They are two different things. What does Aristotle mean? Now in the first place he doesn't speak of government. The word which he uses is polituma. Now this word is grammatically a form exactly like another word, strateuma, which means army. Polituma is something like an army. It is the body, the citizen body. The regime is the citizen body. Now what does that mean? In every city you have many humans — many human beings, but not all human beings living in a city form a part of the citizen body.

For example, not children and not resident aliens and so on. So, therefore, in every city the question arises, who forms a part of the citizen body? And this citizen body can have very different structures. For example, you can have a structure which has this character (writing on blackboard) and so on. (Several words inaudible). Or you can have it in this form . . . in other words, really stratified. And then it can be a number of things but in the most desirable case the stratification, the social stratification, would correspond to the natural stratification, if I may use the old-fashioned language, so that those who deserve to be higher are in fact higher. That would be aristocracy and the other things would be somehow in between. That is the point. The difficulty arises in a strict monarchy where the only one who has the right to deliberate, give laws, to judge, would be one man, and all others -- no one would be a citizen and it would be rather absurd to say that the absolute king or the tyrant is the only citizen. No: men are not so foolish. They use other expressions than as you know from the British. They say we don't speak of citizens. We speak of subjects. That is the simple semantic solution to this difficulty. Therefore, this remark only confirms what I said before. Aristotle's concern is chiefly, not to say exclusively, with republics with societies in which you have a citizen body in control and that is the regime.

Now one more word and then we are through. Let us read the beginning of the next paragraph or chapter, where we left off. No: immediately where we left off.

"In all arts and sciences the end in view is some good. In the most sovereign of all the arts and sciences -- and this is the art and science of politics -- the end in view is the greatest good and the good which is most pursued."

Let us stop here. That is truly a new beginning. I mean that is the way in which Aristotle begins book two. I mean not individual books or parts of a book, but whole books: a real incision; something entirely new. What is happening? The issue: who should rule -- has been settled apparently in favor of democracy, properly qualified as I said before. But then there is here a new beginning and this beginning speaks emphatically of the sciences and arts. Shortly afterward there are two references to philosophy. Somehow, in a way which we must try to understand, the picture of politics is -- the overall view of politics -- is decisively affected by our reminding ourselves of the fact of science. Science doesn't mean quite the same thing as it means now but there is, of course, a kinship between these two notions. I exaggerate greatly in order to make things clear. The quasi-democratic solution would be sufficient if there were no science. That forces us to re-consider the whole issue. We can say this:

science or arts, the distinction is here not important — the difference between science and arts, on the one hand, and political things such as laws, in particular, on the other — that is one of the fundamental themes of Aristotle. We have come across it when we discussed Hippodamus' proposal in the second book — you know, in favor of inventions, where Aristotle says in the case of laws and sciences and the case of laws differ. That is one fundamental theme and the other fundamental theme is that which we have discussed to some extent today and last times the difference between the polis and the regime. And we will reach a deeper stratum of the understanding of Aristotle when we see that there is a connection between these two fundamental themes. The distinction between polis and regime, on the one hand, and the distinction between science and laws, science and political things, on the other hand. So next time we will take this up. Mr. Gray will have his paper ready at the peril that he might not read it next time and the same applies also to Mr. Warden.

- law and the arts, (progress)
- polis and regime

Science & Law
Polis & Regime

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 8, April 21, 1960

(Tape begins with inaudible question from student).

Yes, that is the question which you raised at the end of the last meeting. Now let us first see the distinction between laws and decrees. That is very simple. A decree corresponds to what we can call a measure. I mean a measure -- for example, the declaration of war; anything of this kind -- something which is -- a decision which is made now and not with the intention of permanence. A law is meant to be a permanent solution. Therefore decrees have something in common with judicial decisions, where this individual is condemned on the basis of law. So all decrees presuppose the laws. Very simply, a declaration of war presupposes that it is made by the competent authorities and that is determined not by decree. Yes, but the laws presuppose themselves the regime. The laws presuppose a legislator and the legislator as the origin of all laws is ultimately not limited by law. You know what the modern doctrine of sovereignty says. Because he who can make laws can unmake them and since he has to -- one cannot possibly draw a line on which subject he may or may not make laws; the unforeseeable changes in circumstances. Therefore he must be considered to be omni-competent. I mean Aristotle -- of course the ancients never developed the doctrine of sovereignty; that's interesting enough, that they didn't. But something of this kind is implied.

So we come back to the legislator. Now the legislator differs from regime to regime. In a democracy it's the citizen body. In a monarchy it's the king; and all intermediate possibilities. What is behind the regime? Politically, socially, nothing. It's the ultimate fact. Once you go beyond the regime you come into a kind of chaos where there is not yet any social order, or there is a sub-political order: individual families or clans but not yet a civil society. But is the regime not subject to any higher thing? To which Aristotle would say yes, it is, as is shown by the fact that we are compelled to distinguish between good and bad regimes. Therefore there are criteria in the light of which we can make that distinction. But do these criteria have the character of law? Answer: no. In other words, there is no natural law, strictly speaking, in Aristotle. For Aristotle there is something corresponding to the natural law but it is not natural law, and that is, we can say, the natural order of ends, of human ends. There is a natural order of higher and lower among them and that is a natural order, not an order depending in any way on human arbitrariness, but this is not the same as a natural law. Well, there are various reasons which one could give. A natural law would presuppose a legislator of the natural law and

that could only be God. Now the Aristotelian God is not a legislating God in any sense. God does not rule, Aristotle says occasionally, by issuing commands — commands including laws. He rules by being what he is, by being the end of everything else, not by legislating. That's one reason which is not altogether negligible. But there are other reasons. Aristotle speaks of natural right in the Ethics. Now let me state this whole issue as far as it is possible within the compass of a few remarks.

The Aristotelian statements on natural law or natural right occur in two writings of his. One is the Rhetoric and the other is the Nicomachean Ethics. Now in the Rhetoric Aristotle does not present his own teaching, but he presents those principles to which orators refer in debates, political, judicial or whatever they may be, and there an appeal to a higher law, to a natural law, was common in Greece and Aristotle therefore presents this way of arguing as he would any other, but that does not present the Aristotelian teaching. In the Ethics there is a remark where Aristotle surely speaks in his own name, but this is one page and perhaps the most obscure page in the whole Ethics. So one does — it is very hard to interpret it and the Thomistic interpretation, which is the most well known in the West, is not fully borne out by what Aristotle says because Aristotle says all right is changeable. And Thomas Aquinas says yes, that means that all right is changeable except the principles of right; they are unchangeable. Aristotle does not say that and therefore we have an alternative interpretation which was set forth by — especially by Averroes, an Arabic philosopher of the 12th century, and he is — lived about one century prior to Thomas and the whole Thomistic doctrine is a kind of Christian reply to the Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle. Now Averroes understands Aristotle to mean that there is no natural right. There are certain general rules regarding which all political societies agree. They all forbid murder; they all forbid high treason and so on and so on. But that is not, strictly speaking, natural right, according to Averroes. Averroes' doctrine, by the way, became known to the Christian world in this manner: through Marcellus of Padua, Marcellus, who lived in the 13th — who wrote around 1324 or so, that is to say, about two generations after Thomas — Marcellus of Padua. And he presents this alternative interpretation of Aristotle more clearly, in greater detail than Averroes does. So what the conclusion which one must draw is this: it is very hard to find out what Aristotle understands by natural right. Aristotle, contrary — I mean Averroes is wrong to that extent — that Aristotle speaks explicitly of natural right whereas Averroes says there is not natural right. At least there is a difficulty here. That is, more or less, what we know about it. Everything else is interpretation, which means also there is no longer a literary support.

Now what does Aristotle understand by natural right if we disregard this single reference in which there is not a single

example; not a single example given and so how can you know what Aristotle ? Then we have put in the Politics as a whole and there we would have to see what does he say about natural? And there we see: well, there are natural slaves; there is a certain natural order of superiority of the parents compared with the children; there is a certain superiority of the husband over the wife; a natural superiority of those who are by nature better over those who are by nature inferior. These are -- that is the concept. But there is something else: the Aristotelian teaching regarding justice as a whole. Aristotle makes a distinction between, let us say, commutative justice and distributive justice. Commutation -- well, the simple case is buying and selling. From Aristotle's point of view there exists something which has come to be called the just or fair price. The just or fair price is not the market price. The market price may be very unfair, for example, in a period of famine, you know, where people pay exorbitantly much for a piece of bread. There is, according to Aristotle, a fair price which is -- can perhaps be stated to be a composite of the value of the raw material and of the labor involved in producing the thing and you know that in scholasticism, the whole Catholic tradition, that played a very great role. And that is also -- only one form of the fair price are fair wages. Fair wages are not the wages which you can get at the moment but fair wages are which really correspond to the quality and character of the service performed and so on. And commutative justice is, for Aristotle, the same -- basically the same as what we could call retributive justice. For example, if someone hurts another human being in a given way then the hurted must get the same in value, in pain in this case, in loss, more generally stated, as the painee, if you can say that. So, in other words, the principle of commutative or retributive justice is simple arithmetic equality. Gain must be equal to loss. The shoemaker gives away the pair of shoes -- loss. What he must get back -- the gain -- must be equal to it. Distributive justice is more complicated. In distributive justice you have to consider not only the things exchanged -- I mean for example, you hit someone over the head, there is an exchange of blows -- take this in this wide sense. But there is a kind of justice where you have to consider also the persons and where, therefore, there is not a simple equality but what Aristotle calls a proportionate or geometric equality. The simplest case here would be one which does occur in business relations: for example, two men share a business and have unequal shares in it from the very beginning. Then gain or loss must be distributed not by two equally, but proportionately. If one has four shares to begin with, the other one, the gain or loss must be shared in the proportion of four to one. But the main place of distributive justice is public office or public honors. They cannot be distributed equally, that one gets as much as everyone else, but you have to consider the quality of the individuals involved. If someone is better he must get more, not money but public honor, authority and so. Now these are principles -- that you can say is the concrete meaning of natural right for Aristotle because these principles of

justice are not, according to Aristotle, dependent on the human legislator. On the contrary, the human legislator has to take his bearings by them. That's all very nice, but what about the statement in the section on natural right that all right is changeable? All right; hence also natural right. That ordinary civil right is changeable, everyone admits that. There is no problem. But how can these principles of justice be changed? That's the question. Well, one can say they are not always applicable. There are situations in which people are compelled to establish a democracy, i.e. a regime in which distributive justice proper is not practiced; where all have equally access to office regardless of merits. What happens here? The principles of justice — in this situation — yes, that is the crucial point I believe. In this situation you do not merely make a concession of expediency to justice. In such a situation this concession itself is just. There is no conflict here in such a case than is truly necessary between expediency and justice, but justice itself is modified, and therefore while there is a natural right this natural right is changeable. Natural right, properly and simply understood, is not always applicable, and if it is not applicable then you are unjust by insisting on it because it cannot work. Something of this kind is, I believe, what Aristotle understood by natural right. Do you see that? So it remains, in a way, the criterion. It is the best order, but it is not — it cannot be unchangeable in character. Yes?

"Would law necessarily have to be the consequence of conscious act? I'm thinking that perhaps the nature of reality would dictate that which would be conformable to that nature in that respect. That would be a law."

Yes: can you give me a single example so that I understand what you mean?

"Well, you might take a democracy. They would be so composed — various elements in a democracy — so that certain laws conformable to that democracy would be dictated by the very nature of democracy; in other words, its essence."

Yes, but then you get into other troubles as we will see at least next time: that there are various kinds of democracy.

"Well each kind would dictate its own laws."

Yes, but the moment you go into that you will come to the question of subdivision of the kinds and it will become infinite. There is no use for that. One must, I think, leave it at saying that from Aristotle's point of view there is no natural law. There is something else and that is reasonable decision. That is what you mean. But this really — for example, taking an individual of this sub-title of democracy and you can perhaps say

something which applies to all individuals of this sub-title. But this would be rational provisions for that sub-type. It could not properly be called natural law because there is no -- in the first place, there is no natural tendency toward it which is also important, whereas even in the case of commutative justice -- I mean in many cases the exchangers, but in all cases an unbiased spectator would say that is fair and there is a certain sense of revolt, of indignation, if that doesn't happen. But the main point, I think, is simply to make this clear: there is no -- you see, I must mention another thing. The Greek word for law is nomos. Now the most fundamental thought in Greek philosophy is expressed by this distinction: nomos, physis; law, nature. The term natural law is, to begin with, a wooden idol. You know, what is by nature is not by convention and vice versa, and that is, of course, a very bold expression which was used by Plato in the Timaeus, for example. Today we are accustomed to it -- natural law -- also from modern science and so on, but that was, to begin with, a very bold and paradoxical combination. Another example of this paradoxical character is given by Lucretius, the Roman-Epicurean poet, in his poem On The Nature of Things. He calls the natural laws, in the sense of Newton let us say, the compacts of nature, reminding us of the original meaning of law that it is a human arrangement agreed upon by humans. That was a very bold thought. It later on became -- there was a school which developed after Aristotle and about which people say very much, much more than the texts warrant, and perhaps the multitude of the talk stands in inverse proportion to what we know about it and these were the so-called Stoics. You see we have no Stoic texts: that's the trouble. The Stoic texts we have are all very late: certain things in Cicero and especially Seneca. The early Stoics, the founders of the school -- we have only very sketchy fragments of theirs. But there is no question that the Stoics used the term the natural law as a matter of course. What it means with them is a very difficult question. The term is, however, constantly used by them. Now is this sufficient as an answer? Was there -- someone else raised a question at the end of the meeting last time. Yes?

"I believe that Aristotle says that the end of the state is virtue or excellence. Now, you said that the modern notion is that the state . . . secure the conditions for promoting this end. . . . (part of this question inaudible)."

That has nothing to do with that. Thomas follows Aristotle substantially in the political teaching with certain interesting variations. Thomas is more monarchistic than Aristotle is and some other kinds of things. But Thomas makes a distinction which is, of course, wholly alien to Aristotle, between the felicity of this life and the true felicity in the other life. But when they speak about felicity politically they mean the felicity of this life and therefore agree. This other difference comes in

only -- not within politics proper. -- it comes in only when the question of the relation of the civil society and the church is concerned. There naturally: there is no place for a church in Aristotle. It does not come in here. The felicity of the other life in Thomas Aquinas, which means the beatific vision, corresponds to the contemplative felicity, the felicity of the philosopher, in Aristotle. But this felicity of the philosophers, felicity of contemplation, is as much trans-political in Aristotle as it is in Thomas. Therefore, we can disregard the difference here. Mr. Faulkner.

"Couldn't it be argued however that Thomas thinks that every man is capable of that felicity and that in fact he is bound or obliged to prepare himself in this life by preparing his soul and his soul is prepared on the instruction of the church and not according to the instruction of -- "

I do not know what present day Catholic theologians say about that because I believe that democracy also affects, has affected the Catholic teaching to some extent. For Thomas the decisive point is this -- I mean, the decisive consideration. What is the status -- are men, by nature, equal or not? What does Thomas answer to that? Even prior to the Fall, and wholly independent of the Fall, would men have been unequal; all the more as a consequence of the Fall. Whatever the equality of all men before God may mean it has no political meaning. Just as Thomas has no objection to the institution of slavery. No, I think it is intelligible that present day Thomists try to give an interpretation of Thomas which is rather democratic. But on the other hand we must make a distinction. No, but I think this is true. But if we want to understand Thomas we have to study Thomas and cannot take present day democratic interpretations as substitutes for Thomas. That seems to me elementary and that we have to do. I mean, for example, my colleague Yves Simon, of the Committee on Social Thought, who is a very conscientious scholar, gave once the story of this in his book, The Principles of Democratic Government but he makes it clear that Thomas was not a democrat. He only showed how a democratic teaching could emerge from Thomas. That's an entirely different proposition. Thomas himself was not a democrat.

Now there is -- perhaps we take up one point with a view to the question raised first. We will return to that later -- to that passage. That occurs in the fourth book. Let us turn to -- in the fourth book -- 1289b. You have no book; that is really disgraceful. Yes, I wish -- you are such a good reader. 1289b; there is a brief polemic. The context is this: the various kinds of polities, of regimes are here spoken again. Someone has -- of the earlier ones -- has spoken about these things but not -- yes?

"One of our predecessors has already advanced the same view; but he used a different principle. On his principle all constitutions could have a good as well as a bad form: oligarchy, for example, could be good as well as bad; and going on this principle he ranked the good form of democracy as the worst of all the good forms of constitution, and the bad form of it as the best of all the bad."

Now this someone was no less a man than Plato and why he doesn't mention him here is not quite clear. Plato does this in the Statesman, 303a to b. So in other words, Plato said one kind of oligarchy can be better than another kind and Aristotle says that's impossible to say that -- seems to be mere semantic but we will see that it's something very serious. Now?

"In our opinion these two constitutions, in any of their forms, are wholly on the side of error. It cannot properly be said that one form of oligarchy is better than another; it can only be said that one is not so bad as another."

Yes, in other words what Aristotle means is this: take two sick people. You can't say the other is healthier than the other. Strictly speaking, you can only say he is less sick than the other. None of them is healthy. Yes?

"But we may dismiss for the present this issue of the grading of constitutions in an order of merit. We have, first, to distinguish and enumerate the varieties of each type of constitution, on the assumption that democracy and oligarchy have each several different forms. Secondly, we have to examine what type of constitution --- short of the ideal --- is the most generally acceptable, and the most to be preferred; and here we must also examine whether, besides this general type, there is any other constitution to be found, of a more aristocratic and well-constructed character but suitable, none the less, for adoption in most states. Thirdly, and in regard to constitutions generally, we have to inquire which constitution is desirable for which sort of civic body. It is possible, for instance, that democracy rather than oligarchy may be necessary for one sort of civic body, and oligarchy rather than democracy for another."

Let us stop here. That's the point I meant. Aristotle has first engaged in a seemingly semantic discussion with Plato. Can you speak of a defective regime -- say democracy -- and say this democracy is better than that oligarchy? And Aristotle says no: you can't speak of bad things, that one is better than the other. You can only say it's less bad than the other. And now he says for some people democracy may be necessary or for other people oligarchy may be necessary. Now, but if it is necessary you can't change that. You have to adopt it. But now let us

look at the other point: what is a defective regime in general? A regime directed toward the benefit of a section and not toward the common benefit. But such a regime — the badness of such a regime is identical with its injustice. So certain, in themselves, unjust regimes may be necessary. Generally stated, natural right is changeable. Natural right is clear as to what is better or inferior but that is not sufficient for action. What is intrinsically good may be impossible under given circumstances. Aristotle was the opposite of a doctrinaire. That I should have brought up next time but I — since we had to discuss the Aristotelian teaching regarding natural right I thought it might be better to mention it now. Now let us return to the third book and I must repeat what we — if you will turn to 1282b, in this neighborhood, I'll tell you the precise passage very soon.

We have seen — after Aristotle has made the distinction between the various regimes he has come up with a disputation among the various claims to rule and this culminated in a qualified approval of democracy, a regime in which all citizens participate in the assembly and in jury duties but in which only a certain elite is in fact eligible for office. The mechanics of that will be brought out very clearly in the fourth book. We can dispense with that now. But then in 1282bii, he makes a new beginning and a very radical beginning by speaking of all the sciences and arts, and he even refers in the immediate sequel twice to philosophy. Why then does Aristotle reopen the question, the whole question? And this reopening culminates in a plea for absolute monarchy. I suggest this tentative answer: hitherto we have completely disregarded science or philosophy. That's the same for Aristotle. And that means our discussion was too narrow. If we take science or philosophy into consideration we will have to revise the result of the previous discussion. Now let me see. Will you read a bit later on where he says this subject has a difficulty and calls for political philosophy. Do you have that? About ten lines after.

"But here there arises a question which must not be overlooked. Equals and unequal — yes; but equals and unequal in what? This is a question which raises difficulties, and involves us in philosophical speculation on politics. It is possible to argue that offices and honours ought to be distributed unequally on the basis of superiority in any respect whatsoever — even though there were similarity, and no shadow of any difference, in every other respect; and it may be urged, in favour of this argument, that where people differ from one another there must be a difference in what is just and proportionate to their merits. If this argument were accepted, the mere fact of a better complexion, or greater height, or any other such advantage, would establish a claim for a greater share of political rights to be given to its possessor. But is not the argument obviously wrong?"

You know what Aristotle means. He says men are unequal, and while it is a rule of justice to treat equals equally it is also a rule of justice to treat unequals unequally. The only question is which equalities are relevant. For example, you can say beauty is -- some men are beautiful and others are less beautiful and you can say the beautiful should have the greatest share. You know there are -- sometimes they look at candidates from the point of view of their beauty, and to which Aristotle -- or size -- Aristotle's answer says the error is obvious. Why is the error obvious? What would you say?

(Inaudible response).

In other words, beauty is politically irrelevant and size and so on. That's it, and therefore that is not a kind -- there is not a party of the beautiful and a party of the ugly. The ugly would perhaps have a nicer name for themselves. But that never happens and that shows it's politically irrelevant and we have gradually to find what is the politically relevant things on the basis of which people can reasonably claim to have preferred treatment. But Aristotle does not proceed this way here. How does he go on? Let us read, he says the error is obvious and how does he prove that the error is obvious?

"To be clear that it is, we have only to study the analogy of the other arts and sciences."

You see, Aristotle does not refer to the *Politics*. He refers to the other arts and sciences, in agreement with his beginning with the arts and sciences. Now what does he say?

"If you were dealing with a number of flute-players who were equal in their art, you would not assign them flutes on the principle that the better born should have a greater amount. Nobody will play the better for being better born; and it is to those who are better at the job that the better supply of tools should be given. If our point is not yet plain, it can be made so if we push it still further."

Yes, it should be clear by now. Well, Aristotle knows that in political matters people can be of hard hearing. Yes?

"Let us suppose a man who is superior to others in flute-playing, but far inferior in birth and beauty. Birth and beauty may be greater goods than ability to play the flute, and those who possess them may, upon balance, surpass the flute-player more in these qualities than he surpasses them in his flute-playing; but the fact remains that he is the man who ought to get the better supply of flutes. Superiority in a quality such as birth -- or for that matter wealth -- ought to contribute something to the performance of that

function; and here these qualities contribute nothing to such performance."

Yes: well, we have learned this: that wealth and noble birth are as such irrelevant in the arts and sciences. Are they irrelevant in politics? Pardon?

"He seems to say no in the last sentence."

You mean he seems to say yes. They ought to be irrelevant in politics.

"They do contribute something to the performance of the function."

I say that they do, but still he spoke only of sciences and arts and there they are irrelevant. Therefore he suggests, prior to any other -- apart from any further considerations -- since the political art is also an art, wealth and noble birth and beauty should be irrelevant in politics too. Yes?

"Doesn't he go on to suggest that there may be a relationship between all -- (rest of question inaudible)"

Yes, sure. Aristotle was not a babe in the woods, but still why does he go out of his way, as it were, to suggest to us for a moment the irrelevancy? Now I put this question to you: did this subject come up before?

"Citizenship."

In which form?

"His definition: he says that citizenship is not determined by geographical location or by birth ... "

Yes, but still there he said in an oligarchy this is determined by wealth and in a democracy it is determined by birth, by origin, by being a free-born citizen. No, no; but something else. Where did this question of politics and the arts or sciences come up before?

"When he spoke about Hippodamus of Miletus and whether the character of law -- drawing the analogy from the arts and sciences -- was relevant in discussing whether law should be changed or not, he said that the analogy drawn from the arts was false."

Why?

"Because the law is based only on habit, whereas the arts can be improved within themselves."

The arts are transmitted by instruction proper -- the arts and sciences. Laws are not. Now I overstate it now to make it clear. The arts and sciences are essentially rational. The laws are not, but the laws are the medium of all political life, however derivative they may be. Therefore the political as political is, to put it mildly, of qualified rationality. That is one of the key themes of Aristotle. A key theme is not necessarily a theme which is discussed on every page. A key theme is a theme which comes up at the crucial moments. There was another key theme which we discussed last time and the time before and that is the distinction between the polis and the regime and I will now try to show how these two key themes are related to one another.

You remember what I said last time about the bifurcation: love of something, say love of the country, love of the children: love of one's own is the general name. We love what is our own, but we also love what is good. The unity of the two is very simple. We want that our own be good, but unfortunately our own is not always good and there a difficulty arises. What should we prefer more? One's own and the good. In politics it is very clear. Think of a decent German under the Nazis. He loves Germany and he hates the regime. Which should be authoritative for him? The country or the abhorrence of the regime? Great question. That's the complicated of which I spoke before. One way in which Aristotle articulates that problem is the distinction between the good man and the good citizen. The good man: that means the man possessing qualities which must be always the same everywhere, but the good citizen is relative to the regime and good man and good citizen can coincide only in a decent regime, because in an indecent regime the good citizen is he who is loyal to the indecent regime in its indecency. He can therefore be not the good man. One couldn't state it more simply and clearly. Now, if we are a bit strict and not easily satisfied we must admit with Aristotle that the coincidence of the good man and the good citizen is not -- is rare. What do you have in such a situation, when there is a cleavage between the good citizen and the good man? Let us say, for simplicity's sake, the good regime is the rational regime. If you have a bad regime you have an irrational regime. That's one thing, but there is another point. Even in a good regime, as Aristotle makes clear, not all men who are even good citizens are there necessarily good men. They may be loyal to the regime because it suits them fine without truly understanding its principles, so non-rationality plays a very great role even in a good regime; all the more in bad regimes. Whereas the arts and sciences are always rational. I mean, well, if someone is a bungler, then he is -- he doesn't possess the art of the shoemaker. That's clear; but to the extent to which he possesses the art of the shoemaker he is rational in his activity. The arts and sciences are rational. The polis can never be perfectly rational, not even in the best case, and

therefore the two issues are really akin. Or one can also state it differently. So that some one or a group of men rules it is never sufficient that he be more virtuous or more rational than the others. He also must have power. Well, there is no necessary connection between virtue and power. Therefore, in every political arrangement there is not only in the best case rule of reason over unreason. You cannot speak of the unreasonable character of the leather which the shoemaker uses. That is non-rational. But the ruler has to do with irrational ruled people. It is also necessary to dilute reason and that is necessary in every regime, even in the best regime. Therefore, the law regulating laws, or any other political arrangement, differs radically from the law ruling sciences and arts. In other words, that is only -- but Aristotle reminds us of this problem of science, rationality in the highest form. We cannot -- we must not forget that. That may be politically very unimportant in most cases but it is very important to know that lest we understand politics and the polis in terms of a rational society, a rational association, properly understood, and then we have false expectations from politics, and we will not make all kinds of theoretical and practical errors. And therefore it is very important; in the case of flute-playing or shoemaking or mathematicians or anything else everyone would regard it as wholly irrelevant whether that man is a free born or a slave, whether he is rich or whether he is poor. But politically it is very important. Even mere physical strength is of course of the utmost importance politically and it comes out simply in the form of the claim of mere numbers. That must be considered. So that is -- Aristotle reopens the whole political issue after having drawn our attention to the radical disproportion between the intellectual pursuits proper, and politics, so that we understand the political things better. Now, we cannot possibly read everything; a little bit further on where he speaks -- paragraph 7.

in

"This is impossible. It is therefore clear that/matters political there is no good reason for basing a claim to the exercise of authority on any and every kind of superiority. Some may be swift and others slow; but this is no reason why the one should have more, and the other less. It is in athletic contests that the superiority of the swift receives its reward. Claims to political rights must be based on the ground of contribution to the elements which constitute the being of the state. There is thus good ground for the claims to honour and office which are made by persons of good descent, free birth, or wealth."

You see, science about the wise or the wise men. Starting from the political as such these are the three groups of men whose claims come up first.

"Those who hold office must necessarily be free men and tax-payers: a state could not be composed entirely of men without means, any more than it could be composed entirely of slaves. But we must add that if wealth and free birth are necessary elements, the temper of justice and a martial habit are also necessary. These too are elements which must be present if men are to live together in a state. The one difference is that the first two elements are necessary to the simple existence of a state, and the last two for its good life."

Do you see here how "realistic" Aristotle is? You can have a society in which virtuous men, properly understood, and wise men, are not there. But you cannot have a society without free men and men of some property and so on, so that -- yes. Now then Aristotle, in the sequel, takes up the discussion and states the case for each of the three. We cannot -- we do not have to repeat that because we have parallels of it before. Let us turn toward the end of 1283a, where there begins a new point. If all were in one city: I mean the good and the rich and the men of noble birth. Yes, the beginning of 1283b.

"Let us suppose these rival claimants -- for example, the good, the wealthy and well-born, and some sort of general body of citizens -- all living together in a single state. Will they fall to disputing which of them is to govern, or will they agree? This issue is not a matter of dispute in any of the constitutions mentioned in our previous classification. These constitutions differ in virtue of different groups being sovereign: one of them is distinguished by sovereignty being vested in the wealthy; another by its being vested in the good; and so with each of the rest. But the question we are discussing is different. It is a question of determining who is to govern when the claims of different groups are simultaneously present. Suppose, for example, that the good are exceedingly few in number:"

Now let us stop here for one moment. Now what does Aristotle mean? In every actual society the question is settled who governs: what is the ruling group or the combination of ruling groups; so therefore in any given society that is no question. But we -- people like Aristotle -- must open it. Why? But that is a theoretical question. The theoretical question, we can say, is that which is not necessarily raised by the actual politician and legislator, but which is necessarily raised by the teacher of legislators because the teacher of legislators is not limited to the conditions existing here or there but to all possible conditions -- he must be open to all possible conditions. The situation which Aristotle describes exists, of course, potentially everywhere, but it becomes actual only in situations approaching

civil war. There you have an established regime which is called into question and therefore the question which Aristotle raises is fundamentally the hottest I'm aware of, because it is everywhere a regime is settled, a constitution is established. But the theoretical question never can take the constitution for granted and must go back behind it. Now let us go on.

"Suppose, for example, that the good are exceedingly few in number: how are we to settle their claim? Must we only have regard to the fact that they are few for the function they have to discharge; and must we therefore inquire whether they will be able to manage a state, or numerous enough to compose one?"

You see here already the thing which you know anyway. Rule of the virtuous, at first glance the only reasonable proposition, is a problem. It is not a problem in the arts or sciences, because there it is clear that those good at the job are to be preferred regardless of any other consideration, but not in the polis. Now why is this so? We can perhaps put here the main reasons together. Why is --- starting from the ordinary facts of life, why is the claim based on virtue or knowledge, rather, not the only politically relevant claim, whereas the claim to be a physician or a shoemaker always presupposes something here?

". . . power considerations. . . . The good have the power of knowledge; the many have the power of numbers."

Yes, but that is linked up with something else and one should perhaps put it on the proper basis. For the arts and sciences expertise is required. No expertise is required for being a citizen: number one, and therefore this other consideration comes in. But there is something else to which Aristotle refers later in this book, and what is the difference -- let us take a physician. A physician is also your ruler in a way. He tells you to do this or to do that, but of course you are free to comply with his advice or not. You are free to do it perhaps at the peril of your life but that is your business. Still, in the moment you have the feeling that the physician does this because he gets money from a drug firm, from a drug manufacturer, cut. So, in other words, you assume that the physician's self-interest is perfectly taken care of by his getting an honorarium, a fixed honorarium for giving you the best advice. Therefore you trust him. But if there were any danger of his having some ulterior motive going beyond the honorarium you would not trust him. Now let us apply this to the political matters. The government has a much broader sphere than any expert has. Health and life are important things, but still that is not the whole of our interest. The government somehow has our whole fate in its hands: the sovereign; and secondly, and that is an equally important consideration, there is no question of a limited self-interest as in the case of the physician. You must not think in terms of government officials including the President of the United

States. You must really think of the ruling body, whoever they may be. They are necessarily self-interested in a way going much beyond the self-interest of the honest physician. That is the reason why one cannot leave it at the consideration of the rule of the virtuous; and secondly, the point which you brought up rightly: the importance of mere force. No expert as expert can apply force and the government, by definition, can apply force. Now let us turn a little bit at the end in 1283b, towards the end.

(Change of tape: tape resumes during reading of paragraph 10, page 134).

" . . . collectively if not individually -- from being better, or richer, than the Few. This last reflection enables us to take another step, and to meet a difficulty which is sometimes raised and discussed. The difficulty is this. Suppose that the Many are actually better, taken as a whole, than the Few: what, in that case, is the proper policy for a lawgiver who wishes to enact right laws to the best of his power? Should he direct his legislation to the benefit of the better sort, or should he direct it to that of the majority? We may reply that what is 'right' should be understood as what is "equally right"; and what is "equally right" is what is for the benefit of the whole state and for the common good of its citizens. Citizens, in the common sense of that term, are all who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn. In the particular sense of the term, they vary from constitution to constitution; and under an ideal constitution they must be those who are able and willing to rule and be ruled with a view to attaining a way of life according to goodness."

Now let us stop here. Well, he doesn't say, of course, ideal, but the best regime. But that I have said before. Now the correct -- the right, as he says; the correct would be a better translation -- is the equal. That is -- the politically correct is the equal, meaning that which refers to the advantage of all citizens. That's trivial, but because of its triviality is not enlightening because who is a citizen? The citizen is relative to the regime and therefore we are -- we are where we were again. And in the best regime only the good man would be a citizen. We are back where we were. What is the meaning of this back and forth movement? Now Aristotle -- yes? Before we go on, that was the difficulty which bothered you last time in your paper Mr. Herst. How would you account for that? Let us not forget where we were. We had a discussion of all these things before culminating in a qualified democracy. Then an entirely new beginning where science came in and the strange fact that science and arts are wholly -- the qualifications of the men of science and of the art are wholly immune to any politically relevant consideration like free born or slave, rich or poor and so on and

so on. And now we come back to the old aristocratic argument. What is it all about? Well, Aristotle is leading up to a new suggestion and he reminds us again and again of one basic consideration: the evidence of the aristocratic argument that the best men should rule and the weakness of that argument. We have to keep this constantly in mind if we want to understand that. Now if we follow the evidence of the aristocratic argument what happens? The immediate sequel.

"If there is one person so pre-eminently superior in goodness that there can be no comparison between the goodness and political capacity which he shows and what is shown by the rest, such a person, or such persons, can no longer be treated as part of a state. Being so greatly superior to others in goodness and political capacity, they will suffer injustice if they are treated as worthy only of an equal share; for a person of this order may very well be like a god among men. This being the case, it is clear that law generally is necessarily limited to those who are equal in birth and capacity."

Yes, let us stop here for one moment. Now if virtue as such is entitled to rule then if one virtuous man or a few virtuous men are endowed with political power -- otherwise they are of no help -- and are in both respects superior to all others they are no longer parts of the polis, which means they can no longer be regarded as subject to the whole. The implication: the polis seems to stand or fall by a certain equality or mediocrity. Yes: that's a fact. But it also tends toward excellence and that is a great problem -- how to reconcile the two things. I don't know whether you have read Mr. Jaffa's book, Harry V. Jaffa's book, The Crisis of the House Divided. There he presents this issue in the terms in which Lincoln stated them: the genius in a democracy. We need non-mediocre men. That comes up all the time, and yet there is a certain difficulty in that. They are so big that the roof -- that they don't find place within the roof. Now Aristotle developed this point with perfect frankness and says from this an atrocious measure becomes intelligible, a measure familiar to Athens especially: the ostracism. You know what the ostracism was: the banishment of a citizen, not banished, necessarily on a crime; it could be based on the fact that he was disturbing by his excellence civic equality. The mechanism can very well be this: that he becomes so popular that this popularity becomes a greater political power than the democratic mechanisms. That can happen, and therefore Aristotle says -- while he deplores that in a way, but it is consistent of the Athenian democracy to use this seemingly so unjust measure that it expels its best men because by their very goodness they endanger the regime. Now let us turn to 1284b7 -- the problem is universal and applies to all regimes.

"The difficulty which we are discussing is one which is common to all forms of government, the right as well as the wrong; and if wrong or perverted forms adopt this policy of levelling with a view to their own particular interest, something the same is also true of forms which look to the common good. This rule of proportion may also be observed in the arts and sciences generally."

Yes: in the other arts and sciences. You see he comes back to that theme constantly in this book. That is, we must enlarge our view and consider not merely the political things but also the non-political or trans-political things in order to understand better the political things. Yes? Go on.

"A painter would not permit a foot which exceeded the bounds of symmetry, however beautiful it might be, to appear in a figure on his canvas. A shipwright would not tolerate a stern, or any other part of a ship, which was out of proportion. A choirmaster would not admit to a choir a singer with a greater compass and a finer voice than any of the other members. In view of this general rule, a policy of levelling need not prevent a monarch who practises it from being in harmony with his state -- provided that his government is otherwise beneficial; and thus the argument in favour of ostracism possesses a kind of political justice in relation to any of the recognized forms of pre-eminence."

Now let us stop here. So there is something rational in this seeming irrationality of insisting on a mediocrity which doesn't work but the better solution, Aristotle says, in the immediate sequel, would of course be to give the government to such an outstanding man and to make him the sole ruler in the city. If he surpasses all his fellow citizens as a God surpasses men he should be treated as a God. This is the transition to the discussion of kingship in the sequel. So kingship comes in here via the question of the man of supreme excellence and the question of supreme excellence comes in in the context of the consideration of the arts and sciences. I take this to mean -- this is Aristotle's way of discussing the problem of the philosopher-king. There is no philosopher-king in Aristotle, but there is a kind of political reflection of the philosopher-king: the man of supreme political intelligence and supreme political virtue. Is this not a case which must be taken into consideration? Aristotle's silence about the philosophers is very important. The philosophers -- that philosophy is trans-political is absolutely essential from Aristotle's point of view and that is perhaps the most important information, negative information, the Politics contains: that philosophy is trans-political. Philosophy is trans-political, fundamentally for the Platonic reasons, but first Mr. Herst had a point.

(Inaudible question).

Yes, that he says here. Well, the qualifications to that will come later in the discussion of kingship, but that is -- Aristotle goes -- I mean Aristotle is not, how shall I say, a school-master where every sentence is susceptible of being quoted out of the context. That's a movement of thought where you cannot arbitrarily stop. You have to follow the whole thing and he is not afraid of arriving at very paradoxical conclusions within the process of thought. Now here, then, there begins a political discussion -- the discussion of kingship and that is the only discussion of kingship we have in the book because later on, in Book V, he discusses the destruction and preservation of all regimes and therefore, also of kingship. But in the other books: in Books IV, VI, VII and VIII -- they are strictly republican for the reason I have given before. There is only one point here which we should mention, near the beginning of the discussion of kingship. That is probably the next chapter.

"It will perhaps be well. . . ."

You see the undogmatic tone of Aristotle: perhaps it will be well. We could also proceed differently and of course Aristotle doesn't toss coins. He has his reasons, but it is not hard and fast. Yes?

". . . to make a transition, and to proceed to consider kingship. Government by a king is, in our view, one of the right constitutions. The question we have to consider is whether this form of government is expedient for states or territories which are to be properly governed. . . ."

Let us stop here. For a city or a country. That is given in the first idea regarding kingship. Do you see the point? City or country. Really a nodicum of ordinary historical knowledge is sufficient to answer that question. Well, why don't you speak up -- those who --

"Kings rule over vast tracts."

Yes. The city is essentially a republican community. Larger territories are ordinarily ruled by Kings. We have forgotten that, but it is a very short time ago that it was still a very hot issue. Do you remember that? From American discussions? Pardon?

"That was the whole point about America, wasn't it? Whether such a large country could be republican."

The Federalist Papers still discuss it -- discuss the question, can a large territory be a republic. The first time that you had a republic which was not a so-called city-state was this country because you can't count the few years of the French Revolution where France was a republic -- you know -- because that

failed. The American experiment, which remained an experiment at least until Lincoln's time as Lincoln knew very well. America gave the first proof that there can be a large state which is republican. But if it is true that the polis is the highest form of political or social organization as Aristotle maintains this implies already a certain question mark regarding kingship. You will find another argument later. What's your difficulty?

"In which sense is the polis a republic?"

A fundamentally urban society, which of course --

"You're using it as a kind of city --"

Yes, sure it's a city.

" -- only not a state at all, but simply a city."

That's very important. Otherwise this is a village society. You can have such a tribe living in villages and forming a political unity. That existed in Western Greece. Aristotle gives some examples. That's not a polis, properly speaking. People must live an urban life, which doesn't mean that all citizens must be city-dwellers. They must have their land -- you know the peasants or farmers, however you call them, and they are citizens, but the center and the part which sets the tone to the whole association is the city. That is clear. That is essential for Aristotle. Yes, but is there any other point regarding this? Yes?

"Is Aristotle saying here, or is he implying, that a city should be republican and a country should be a kingship or is he -- "

That he does not develop but I think he would say there is a natural tendency of the larger territory to be monachically ruled and of the smaller society, which is surveyable -- that's a word which he used -- which is well surveyable. In other words, where there is -- the details would be roughly this. You can have freedom only if there is a high degree of mutual trust and trust, in order to be well founded, must be based on acquaintance and acquaintance requires living together. You do not have to know, as I stated on a former occasion, every other fellow citizen but it is enough that you live together with people who live together with these other people and so there is this community. And you can easily recognize the problems of our very large societies and especially our very large metropolitan areas in these reflections. You know: we see now the difficulty. We try to get this degree of familiarity by TV, for example, where you see the Presidential candidate whom you are not likely to have seen in earlier times. The question is, is TV acquaintance, true

acquaintance?

"... it may be that modern large-scale democracy itself the problem of genius in a way that small democracy couldn't. It seems to me that precisely because you're acquainted with the man's overbearing virtue that you can't tolerate his presence and you ostracize him -- it seems in our society that there may be a tendency to elect him to kingship, which is essentially, in a way, what our Presidency is and thus give him a place which is possible only because it was just pointed out -- only large societies can have kings."

Yes, but I heard something about a two term law, you know, to prevent the development of kingship and there are some other reasons which I think would make monarchy impossible. You see that monarchies cannot so easily be established; they need also some other paraphernalia, something like a hereditary nobility -- something strictly forbidden by the United States Constitution, and so on.

"Well, I was here talking I think metaphorically that -- in a larger society where you don't have to communicate with these people and be overwhelmed by them you can give them more easily roles to play than you can in a smaller -- "

Yes, well these are reflections which are partly developed, as you know, in The Federalist Papers. The Federalist Papers are an argument on a republican basis against the older republican theory. They try to show on the republican basis that a country of the size of the thirteen colonies can be a republic, and therefore all the other considerations which came in. You know there was a very great problem. In recollection, in crude historical recollection, it looked this way: the monarchies had succeeded in pacifying very large territories and without civil war to speak of. Think of France, prior to the French Revolution, and some other examples of this kind and so on. But what about the republics, the city-states of antiquity? The most glorious of them: Athens; constant political unrest, change of regimes, and what have you. And even in Rome, the terrible tides between the Patricians and Plebeians. You understand that. And therefore one argument of Madison, as you know, is this: that precisely by the largeness you avoid certain great inconveniences coming from closeness and nearness. You neutralize the violent dissensions within a small community by having a large society in which they are cancelled out by other violent dissensions which are local, so none of them takes on national or federal character. Now the kinds of kingship -- Aristotle distinguishes five of them of which I enumerate. One is of no very great interest: that is not hardly more than hereditary and perpetual generalship. That's the Spartans' king. Then you have among the barbarians a kingship which is despotic or tyrannical rule but according

to law and hereditary, meaning there is a traditional customary law which the king cannot infringe upon. The third among the ancient Greeks, which is in effect as Aristotle says elective tyranny, i.e. the ruler has a perfect discretion but he is elected. So he is — whereas the official definition is, as we shall see, rule without laws and over unwilling subjects, here you have a tyranny which is rule without laws but over willing subjects. That runs counter to the Jane Austinian definition which Aristotle gives where — you know what I mean by Jane Austin. And fourth, the kingship of the heroic types, where the kings were benefactors of the multitudes or leaders in war and founders, whatever there may be — therefore, that were men of excellence. The Spartan kingship is only a relic of that. After the kings were stripped of these many privileges they remained only generals and something like priests. And then finally, the overall kingship, panbasileia, with which Aristotle alone is concerned. Only this universal kingship is, from Aristotle's point of view, worthy of serious consideration. Now in this context the question arises, what is best: the rule of the best men or rule by the best laws? Let us turn to 1286a.

"Our inquiry will naturally start from the general problem, 'Is it more expedient to be ruled by the one best man, or by the best laws?'"

We cannot go into the details. Yes, always you can decide — read the next point.

"Those who hold that kingship is expedient argue that law can only lay down general rules; it cannot issue commands to deal with various different conjunctures; and the rule of the letter of law is therefore a folly in any and every art. In Egypt it is permissible for doctors to alter the rules of treatment after the first four days, though a doctor who alters them earlier does so at his own risk. If we follow this line, it is clear that a constitution based on the letter and rules of law is not the best constitution, in the same way and for the same reason."

Now let us stop here for one moment. You see the analogy of the arts, or of the sciences, would decide in favor of the rule of a man — of personal rule. You see how this whole thing goes through. Arts and sciences — that is somehow linked up with the issue of full monarchy this way: the most knowing man should rule, i.e. he should not be hampered by anything. The thought is perfectly reasonable. A wise man limited by laws: that means you limit wisdom, but wisdom can only be limited by non-wisdom so if you want to have wisdom the absolute rule of the wise man would, of course, be preferable. Let us turn to 1286b, almost immediately after the beginning, where he first

says that many will make a revolt -- might make a revolt.

"Another objection may, however, be urged -- that a body of men will be subject to faction, from which the one man will be free. It is perhaps an answer to this objection that the body may be of good character equally with the one man. If we call by the name of aristocracy a government vested in a number of persons who are all good men, and by the name of kingship a government vested in a single person, we may say that aristocracy is better for states than kingship -- provided only that a body of men who are all equally good can be actually found. Perhaps the reason why kingship was formerly common was because it was rare to find a number of men of outstanding goodness -- all the more as states were then thinly populated. A further reason why kings were appointed was that they were benefactors -- which it is the duty of all good men to be. Later there arose a number of persons of equal goodness; and they, refusing to tolerate the rule of a single person, desired to have something they could share in common, and so established a constitution. Later still, they deteriorated -- "

The constitution means here one special regime which is called polity. You know: the rule of Hoplites. I explained this last time: a democracy with a property qualification.

"Later still, they deteriorated in character: they enriched themselves from the public property; and it is to some such origin -- the honour in which wealth now began to be held -- that we may reasonably ascribe the rise of oligarchy. At a still later stage, there was a change from oligarchies to tyrannies, and then from tyrannies to democracy. The reason was that the numbers of the government, greedy for the gains which office conferred, limited it to a narrower and narrower circle; and by this policy they strengthened the masses until they rose in rebellion and established democracies. Nowadays, when states have become still larger, we may almost say that it is hardly even possible for any other form of constitution to exist."

Except democracy. Well, this historical survey is, first of all, in general agreement with what actually happened in Greece. You know? The tyrants came, in Athens for example, in between the rule of the old families and the emerging of democracy, but that is not our point here. The crucial point is first this: kingship belongs to the olden times. When a man of very -- when this situation was not too rare: to find a single man of outstanding qualities, but with the development of civilization that became the exception. There were always a plurality of -- I mean, more than one --- and therefore kingship lost its basis. Today

it is so that democracy is — Aristotle — today, meaning in his day — democracy is almost inevitable. Aristotle knows that; you see he's not — he is open to the facts, but he does not — he refuses to ride on the wave of the future. The fact that democracy was victorious does not prove to him that democracy is best. For him, the proper medium for a city is an aristocracy. And he makes here quite clear that an aristocracy is also, in a way, old-fashioned. He says so. Now that leads to — so in other words the good political period, the period more favorable to the best political arrangements, was in the past, and what does this mean? Does Aristotle have a reactionary, retrograde, however you call it, philosophy of history? What about the life of the mind? Because a real reactionary would say also the thought of the past was superior to the thought of the present. What does Aristotle think about the thought or the highest thought of the present and the past? Well? Yes?

(Inaudible response).

Yes, that is true. It's perfectly true, but we can state it more simply. What is the peak of philosophy according to Aristotle? (Inaudible response). Very good. So, in other words, the present. So you have, then, this relation: the peak of the polis does not coincide with the peak of thought. There is no simple harmony between political life and intellectual life. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

No, he has no occasion. You see here he addresses primarily gentlemen, men willing and able for political activity including that of legislators. He does not primarily address philosophers. That's a practical book in spite of the fact that it also addresses philosophers, but not them primarily. The clearest statement as to this point which Mr. Steinrager brought out is the first book of the Metaphysics where you have a survey of all earlier thought and which is, on the whole, a history of progress from the primitive and crude beginnings prior such a man as Plato to Aristotle. So, but to come back to the point: the peak of the polis is not identical with the peak of thought. That is the same problem we have discussed in other forms today and sometime before: the law governing the political and social arrangements is not the law governing the intellectual life of man. The alternative — in order to understand that we have to consider the alternative. The alternative is that they are strictly parallel, so that intellectual progress is as such social progress and vice versa. That is a famous doctrine of the seventeenth, eighteenth century and still of some power in our own age. That was not the older view. There were people who believed that, as our friend Hippodamus, you remember, in the second book, who

had such a notion, but apparently only implicitly: that laws as well as arts are equally progressive and ought to be progressive. That was not the view of the classical philosophers. The whole notion that reason, science, enlightenment is a very important if not the most important social bond, was wholly alien to the classics. It became very powerful in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, where the notion of enlightened self-interest was developed from -- beginning from such people as Hobbes and Locke and culminating, in a way, in utilitarianism and where there was implied of course there is a perfect harmony between society and enlightenment, between society and science and philosophy. And in our present society this is no longer explicitly stated, very frequently at least, but it is tacitly presupposed. The emphasis may be more today on technology than on science or philosophy but since technology is so obviously dependent on science it amounts to the same thing. What is the time? I will mention only one point and let us look at the end of Book III.

"These issues determined, we must next attempt to treat of the best form of constitution, asking ourselves, 'Under what conditions does it tend to arise, and how can it be established?' In order to make a proper inquiry into this subject it is necessary to begin by determining the nature of the most desirable mode of life,

Yes, now this last sentence of Book III is identical with the beginning of Book VII and thus it has led to all kinds of speculations and people have even changed the order of the books. Barker has preserved the traditional order, the manuscript order. And so people have made Books VII and VIII, Books IV and V respectively and so on. Now what happened was apparently this: I do not believe that it is due to -- that it is due to an accident entirely. I think Aristotle planned it that way. He had first had the discussion of all regimes, in general. Then we have a discussion of kingship and a very brief discussion of monarchy, which we have not read. Then we come -- four regimes remain: polity, democracy, oligarchy and tyranny. So Aristotle goes on in Book IV into these other regimes, up to Book VI. In Books VII and VIII he gives the details of the best regime which is -- which you may call an aristocracy, you may call a polity. That is a moot question. But this could also follow here. It is really possible to go on from here directly, but that Aristotle took this roundabout way about the less satisfactory regimes is, of course, not entirely an accident because we learn something by looking at the superior regimes of how to establish the best possible regime as Aristotle saw it, and that is not a kingship, but a republic and a republic which is -- which you may call either an aristocracy or a polity. It would be better, I think, to call it an aristocracy. Now in this last part of

Book III which we haven't read where is one thought which I think I should point out. Aristotle describes first kingship and then aristocracy and then also a regime which — well, let us leave it at that: kingship and aristocracy. And then he raises a question, under what conditions is a kingship possible, under what conditions is an aristocracy possible, and that leads to be broader question, under what condition is any of the desirable regimes possible. What was your point?

"I was going to say that the way the translation is in this last sentence we just read — he asks under what conditions does it tend to arise, almost as though the conditions themselves bring it about and man's action is merely to establish them."

Now let me see. To which passage — did you mean the passage which we just read? Yes — tend is not good. Under what condition — I will now first give a literal translation which seems to confirm what you say. In what way it comes into being by nature, would be a very literal translation, but what does Aristotle mean by that in the light of the context? What are the conditions under which it is by — naturally fit to arise? He doesn't mean that it will necessarily arise. That would

each of these regimes has specific condition. A multitude of this kind is fit for kingly rule. A monarchy (sic) of that kind is fit for aristocratic rule and a multitude of that kind is fit for present day constitutional rule. We use the usual bad translation. So there is no regime which is universally possible. Every regime presupposes specific conditions and therefore what is simply best is by no means everywhere and always possible. That is absolutely crucial for Aristotle. There is not — in other words, something may be intrinsically best and absolutely impossible in the circumstances. In order to understand that we have to look forward to certain modern doctrines. Take, for example, Thomas Paine, who really elaborates something suggested by Rousseau at this point. What does Paine say? There is only one regime which is decent, let me say, and this of course must be somehow established sooner or later everywhere. But it would be safer to put — discuss Paine's thought as follows: there is only one regime which is legitimate. All others are illegitimate, despotic, or what have you, and that one legitimate regime is therefore universally necessary. That doesn't exist in Aristotle. For Aristotle it is essential that there is a variety of regimes fit for different places and for different types. This notion of the legitimate regime which is universally legitimate is a consequence of the natural law doctrines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which, one can say, transform the Thomistic natural law doctrine into a political natural law doctrine and claim the same unchangeability for the political natural law which Thomas Aquinas

had claimed for the non-political natural law and one must emphasize this point because in the literature you frequently find rejection of earlier political philosophy on this ground: that earlier political thought tried to find solutions valid for all times and places. These people remembered only people like, to some extent, Hobbes, Rousseau and Paine and simply had no knowledge of what political philosophy or political science meant originally, where no such -- one can express Aristotle's thought as follows. There is one and only one regime which is intrinsically the best, but this is not possible always and everywhere and since, in order to be legitimate, a regime must be possible the best regime cannot be legitimate everywhere.. The legitimate regime is something very different from the best regime. Legitimacy in this sense is necessarily variable. Natural right is changeable and yet bestness, if I may say so, is unchangeable. Human perfection has always the same meaning regardless of whether men are or can be always aware of it. They may not be able to be aware of it because of very bad -- very harsh life which they have to lead and where they cannot think much beyond the immediate necessities of life. That is true. That exists. That does not affect the fact that the best human life, the perfection of human life, is intrinsically the same always. But the same is not true of the regime -- of legitimacy, because what is not possible cannot possibly be legitimate, and yet it can nevertheless remain the best in the light of which you can diagnose the defects of the society in which you live and yet see there is no possibility of a radical change in that direction. Yes?

(Inaudible question).

Because the modern social scientists deny that there is one naturally best. The modern social scientists deny any natural hierarchy; any. They admit conventional hierarchies which are apparent everywhere. But they deny that there is an order of -- well, you know that. I mean, that is not limited to the social scientists in the narrower sense but in Dewey, John Dewey -- the same view. There are n human activities and even n kinds of human activities. None can claim to be intrinsically superior to the others. Haven't you heard of that view? That's the opposite of what Aristotle says. For Aristotle there is an order of the human activities. The activities which require only -- or almost only -- the body and the activity of the body are by nature inferior to those which are activities of the mind and there is even a hierarchy among them. . . . In other words, when you use this schematic distinction which is so unenlightening -- absolutism; relativism -- Aristotle is neither a relativist in this sense nor an absolutist as the relativists understand absolutism. But if one is not afraid of bad words I would say Aristotle is of course an absolutist in that sense. He is only a qualified absolutist; qualified by common sense. So we have then indeed

used up the whole meeting for the rest of the third book and next time we will have a paper — two papers on the fourth book. You read the paper. There will be no problem next time. And the other gentleman, you are Mr. what? Lander. But Mr. Gray will read it. Good.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 9, April 26, 1960

• . . . you did not express at any point a dissatisfaction with Aristotle on either theoretical or political grounds.

"I expressed one dissatisfaction, I think: the relationship between laws and regimes. . . ."

But that was not -- that's true; I made a note of that point. But that I didn't regard as a criticism and I don't encourage -- I don't wish to encourage dissatisfaction, except that it is inevitable, even if Aristotle is 100% right that there are difficulties which would present themselves most simply in the form of objections. He says something; he doesn't give a reason. Why? That's an objection. This point which you make I took notice of, but Aristotle has disposed of this objection already. We have not discussed it in class, I believe, but some of you may remember. Do you remember a case where Aristotle spoke of something which is a legal question and not a political question, meaning by that, it is a question which is neutral to the difference of regimes. Yes -- Mr. Herst?

"When he referred to the Spartan kingship -- "

Exactly. Can you -- ?

"It was when he discussed monarchy by discussing the extremes: the Spartan kingship, which was a kind of hereditary generalship, and the absolute monarchy. And he said that we could dismiss the Spartan kingship primarily because whether or not a man is hereditary ordinarily is a legal question and not . . . fundamental to the regime. You have a hereditary commandier, in other words, in a polis."

In a democracy, oligarchy and so on. That is the best example indeed. Thank you. So Aristotle knew that: that there are things which are politically neutral. And it was also implied when he discussed the question of whether debts ought to be paid after the revolution. You remember that? A revolution has taken place and is the post-revolutionary government under an obligation to pay the debts incurred by the, let us assume, tyrannical pre-revolutionary government? Aristotle didn't answer that question, but he said it is a legal question. Well, what he meant by it is also there is a certain neutrality because if the debts were incurred in the interest of the polis as a whole, say for building hospitals, then it is only fair that the city, the post-revolutionary government pays for it because that is a lasting improvement which was made possible by that abominable tyrant but here he was accidentally beneficial. But if he did it in order to pay his bodyguard, his secret police, however you call

it, then no, because then the foreign creditors simply were themselves crooks by hiding a crook. So here also that is politically neutral. There are certain things which are politically neutral and Aristotle is of course not blind to it but his point is that the important and interesting things are the politically non-neutral things. The, let us say, question of a merely technical or, in particular, the merely economic character would as such not be politically exciting, let me say. And the great issues are always political and even on the basis of Marxism, for example, the class struggle is, of course, a political phenomenon and the revolution is a political phenomenon. The things about which people can get excited about all kinds of things, even about famine, for example, and surely that can happen under any regime but the question is how they will take the famine — depends very much on how they conceive of the responsibility of the government. Trotsky gives this good example: there were hunger strikes in Russia, in the big cities especially, in 1917 — '16, '17 — and so on. But the actual deprivations were much smaller than those which took place in '18, '19 and '20, after the Bolshevik victory. Now let us take the facts as stated by Trotsky and not question them. Why did the famine of 1919 not lead to a revolution, whereas the famine of 1917 prepared the revolution? Because of a different attitude of the populace towards the government — toward the Czarist government on the one hand and this combination of Bolsheviks and Social Revolutionaries after the revolution. So the political is the authoritative and it is that where people, in principle, potentially, but necessarily disagree.

The political is essentially controversial. It doesn't have to be actually controversial at a given time but it has this in itself. The derogatory meaning of political: you see, when someone says Adamsky is political or Daley is political — that's politicking. Yes, what does that mean? It's controversial. It has also to do with the question of persons, but persons who are interested in becoming rulers. The derogatory meaning of politics is connected with the essentially controversial character of political things and that, of course, is also the reason why the political is more exciting. Where all men all agree all the time, that is absolutely unexciting. It would be a good thing if someone would sit down one day and take up, say from present American usage, the variety of meanings of politics and political and simply first get a complete list and then try to understand the inner unity and how both the positive and the negative judgment on politics are really based on ultimately the same phenomenon and to see whether this is in any way different from what Aristotle knew about the subject. I believe the basic phenomenon is the same in spite of the tremendous differences in all externals.

There were two points, Mr. Gray, where I disapprove of your expressions. You said, when you spoke of the various things for

example, a man can be at the same time a soldier and a farmer and a juryman and what not. But, you said, a man cannot be at the same time rich and poor. That is incompatible. And in this connection you used the expression logically distinct. Logically distinct is, of course, also the juryman from the soldier, even if it is the same person. So that is -- the word logic is terribly misused in our time. Sometimes people say, this leads to the logical conclusion, where they simply mean to the conclusion, or do they mean to say, to the necessary conclusion, following from the premise. But that I believe would be clearer to say so, necessary than logically. And the other expression which I didn't like was, you said, the true aristocracy in contradistinction to the so-called aristocracy is an ideal type. What did you mean by that?

"A type of which there's no existing form."

Yes, but the word ideal type is now used as a technical term within social science and since it never existed before we have to comply with usage. You know? Now what is an ideal type? You must know. You are a specialist in social science.

"Well, ideal type is really taken from Parsons' translation of Max Weber, I think."

So it is taken from Max Weber and --

"And it means well, I suppose in a way it means a kind of taxonomic type. That is, it's a way of classifying things, whether examples of these things or not, in such a way that you're able to understand the differences in their, sort of fundamental nature, character; for example, the ideal type of capitalist society or the ideal type of feudal society. It's a kind of abstraction from what you think you know about particular social phenomena."

And this need never have existed in this form. All right; let us go back. It means -- the ideal type is a construct, the construct of the scientist, in order to facilitate studies. Now this, of course, goes back to -- a construct which does not claim to mirror, to imitate, to reproduce what is. And this is naturally not an invention of Max Weber, but has its model in natural science. For example, in optics: the perfectly black body, in theoretical optics, doesn't exist, but it is -- by using it you can analyze optical phenomena. And this still goes back, in a way, to Galileo's famous first experiments and the analysis connected with that. Now if one states it radically one can say this -- one will have to say this. This kind of ideals are things which are impossible in the nature of things. They cannot be, but they are marvelously helpful for understanding what is. You see, from Aristotle's point of view that was the height of absurdity, that the impossible should be the best key to reality. But

it works somehow, at least in the natural sciences, and that is the problem which — is the great problem with which not we, perhaps, but some George should deal. George I mean in accordance with the saying Let George Do It. But that is surely the point. So ideal type is a wholly inappropriate term in any pre-modern things. Now but — the word ideal, as I say, doesn't exist in Plato or in Aristotle. I believe it was coined — the adjective ideal was coined in the seventeenth century, if I remember well, in connection with certain speculations about paintings and so ideal beauty and so. So it is never used there. But the word which Barker and the others translate by ideal means according to wish or prayer, and there is, of course, implied in that it is not necessarily actual. Otherwise it would not be as such the object of wish or prayer. This is true but — wish or prayer does not mean, however, the wish or prayer of anyone in his

but it means the wish or prayer of a sensible man.

It is essential to the best regime, from Plato's and Aristotle's point of view, that it is not necessarily actual and that is meant by that. But it could be. Plato and Aristotle go out of their way, for example Plato in the Republic, to say you must show the possibility. If the possibility is not proven by the fact that your blueprint is free from contradictions, that is the least — that is only a negative condition. You must show it from the nature of things, the nature of man, the nature of civil society: that it is possible. So these were the only two points I have to add to your paper. Let us turn to a discussion of the text.

Books I, II, III dealt with the highest matters. Books IV to VI are the most technical books of the work, and at the end of the Politics Books VII and VIII deal again with the highest matters. So we have to — but Aristotle gives the reason why it is necessary to go into the humdrum affairs of politics and not to leave it at those broad and exciting questions he has dealt with hitherto. And he does this first at the beginning where we — let us begin to read — let's read the beginning of Book IV.

"There is a rule which applies to all the practical arts and sciences. . . ."

Practical is an addition — in all the arts and the sciences. Practical is implied by Aristotle but we must distinguish between — you know, we must leave it at what he says.

". . . when they have come to cover the whole of a subject, and are no longer engaged in investigating it bit by bit. Each of them severally has to consider the different methods appropriate to the different categories of its subject. For instance, the art of physical training has to consider (1) which type of training is appropriate to which type of physique; (2) which is the ideal type of training — i.e. the training best for a physique of the best endowment and the best equipment (for the ideal type of training must be one which is suitable for such a physique); and (3) which is the type of training that can be generally applied to

the majority of physiques — for that too is one of the problems to be solved by the art of physical training. Nor is this all. (4) There may be men who want to have physical training, but do not want to attain the standard of skill and condition which is needed for competitions; and here the trainer and the gymnastic master have still another duty — to impart the degree of capacity which is all that such men want. What is true of the art of physical training is obviously no less true of medicine, or of shipbuilding, tailoring, and all the other arts."

Now let us stop here. Aristotle begins again — you remember, in the third book we had a large number of references to all the sciences and arts, although we had been warned in Book II that there is a radical difference between the political things, on the one hand, and the arts and sciences, on the other. Here Aristotle returns to the arts and sciences and assumes a simple parallelism and which must be true to some extent. Otherwise he wouldn't do it. And Aristotle takes his model of political science from the other arts and sciences, but it is very characteristic which arts and sciences he takes. He does not take mathematics or anything of this kind. He takes, as Barker brings out in his translation by the word practical or productive but as Aristotle doesn't say explicitly. He wants us to find that out. He takes the practical arts or sciences. Now he says at the beginning — he says of those which are comprehensive, which are complete and deal with a whole genus and not merely with a part. What he means is, for example, this: there could be a man who makes only women's shoes or perhaps he makes only shoes for limping men. That is possible. That is not a complete art because the true shoemaker, the perfect shoemaker who knows the art of shoemaking would deal with all kinds of shoes, only what Aristotle implies is that it is possible, to some extent, to possess an art partly and partially. But there is something artificial about it. It's incomplete. Now what then do we find in these arts? For example — he takes the example of the gymnastic trainer; you could as well take the shoemaker. Which shoe is useful for which man, for which kind of man, and which is the best shoe? But what does this mean — the best shoe? Can there be the best shoe? Aristotle explains. To him who is by nature best equipped, that is to say, who is — has the most — the best size of his feet which can have — and no defects of any kind, and in addition is sufficiently wealthy to pay for the best shoes. This would be the best shoe. And then, which is most suitable to most? The shoe is really a bad example because of the great adversity: I admit that, but I only want to prevent us — to limit ourselves too narrowly to the examples explicitly chosen by Aristotle. And then someone may, however, for some whim — although he could afford the best gymnastic trainer, let me say — to have a very special training in a limited way, for some reason or other. The gymnastic trainer must be able to supervise and direct him in that too. So this is — the complete master of an art has

these variety of activities. The same must be applied to the political science. Political science must have this corresponding variety, namely -- what is the consequence of that in political science -- but I ask you to keep this in mind. The model for political science is not a theoretical science: mathematics, physics or so, but the practical arts. Crucially important. Not -- because political science is a practical science and therefore it has its model, to some extent, in the other practical sciences. It cannot have its models in purely theoretical science where these distinctions either don't apply or are even meaningless. Yes?

"It follows that the study of politics [which belongs to the practical arts and sciences] must be equally comprehensive. First, it has to consider which is the best constitution, and what qualities a constitution must have to come closest to the ideal when there are no external factors to hinder its doing so. Secondly, politics has to consider which sort of constitution suits which sort of civic body. The attainment of the best constitution is likely to be impossible for the general run of states; and the good law-giver and the true statesman must therefore have their eyes open not only to what is the absolute best, but also to what is the best in relation to actual conditions. Thirdly, politics has also to consider the sort of constitution which depends upon an assumption."

The Greek word for assumption is hypothesis and that -- in other words, there is something which you may or may not accept, whereas the ordinary things you have to accept: namely, the given conditions. But here we have a special assumption. What is that?

"It says the assumption of a lesser standard of civic attainment than the absolute."

Yes, let us forget -- let us read Aristotle instead of Barrer.

"In other words, the student of politics must also be able to study a given constitution, just as it stands and simply with a view to explaining how it may have arisen and how it may be made to enjoy the longest possible life. The sort of case which we have in mind is one where a state has neither the ideally best constitution (or even the elementary conditions needed for it) nor the best constitution possible under the actual conditions, but has only a constitution of an inferior type. Fourthly, and in addition to all these functions, politics has also to provide a knowledge of the type of constitution which is best suited to states in general."

Let us stop here. So do you see? Politics, to repeat -- the political science follows the model of all the practical arts. It is concerned with the best polity. It is concerned what is best for most, i.e. for those who are not capable -- who are prevented from getting the best simply. It is concerned with what is best in the circumstances, and it is concerned with what people happen to desire, we can say. They just have a certain regime. They could have a better one, but for some reasons -- perhaps for reasons of inertia -- they want to preserve it and you must also tell them how to do that. You see, that is -- this is the general plan of political science as Aristotle understands it. One can say -- I mean in the discussions you find frequently the distinction between the idealist Plato and the realist Aristotle. These are modern words which conceal the issue as much as they reveal it but there is an element of truth in it. But if we would state it more precisely one would say that -- have to say this: Aristotle regards as the most important question what is the best regime, just as Plato does. But Aristotle is somewhat more concerned than Plato with the non-best regimes and how to keep them, how to preserve them, how to improve on them. Aristotle's realism, in other words, has nothing whatever to do with a value-free political science. Aristotle is perfectly willing to give people advice who have a very inferior regime as to how they can preserve it. And even he as a teacher of political science must be in a position to do so, but he does it with his eyes open. In other words, he gives these people the advice of how they can preserve an imperfect regime as an imperfect regime. I once compared the difference between present day social science -- its basic idea, I mean, and Aristotle's as follows: the value-free study of political institutions would, from Aristotle's point of view, appear like a museum of shoes made by apprentices. All kinds of imperfect proverbs of the political art are assembled for inspection and just as such a museum is a wholly crazy idea -- which doesn't -- I don't -- tomorrow morning you may read in the newspaper that some millionaire established such a museum -- that will not refute what I say, but in itself it is a crazy idea. That would be the Aristotelian view of a purely theoretical study of the variety of institutions without any regard to better or worse and I hope I have made clear that Aristotle's so-called realism and his openness to all political phenomena is not only compatible with evaluation but is based on the evaluation because it presupposes -- Aristotle would say if you want to give a realistic account of a given regime and can't say -- you cannot say what and to what extent -- what and in what way it is good or bad, you don't understand anything of it. Think of someone who knows everything about socialized medicine, except in what respects it is good and in what respects is bad. He knows nothing. So you have the value judgments which are enlightening, which are the only sources of light in human matters. Now let us see. Then Aristotle makes clear that this concern with the variety of political phenomena and the variety of defective political

phenomena is his specialty in the way that — in this sense: that he is the one who introduces as a theme — he does this in the sequel. Will you go on?

"Fourthly, and in addition to all these functions, politics has also to provide a knowledge of the type of constitution which is best suited to states in general. Most of the writers who treat of politics — good as they may be in other respects — fail when they come to deal with matters of practical utility. We have not only to study the ideally best constitution. We have also to study the type of constitution which is practicable. . . ."

I mean, why Barker adds ideally best to the perfectly sufficient the best, I don't know, because — I simply don't know. No light is thrown — no light whatever is thrown on what Aristotle means by best if you add ideally best. You confuse it only. But Barker is a very good translator otherwise. So I mean don't think that I take — that's not meant as a criticism of Barker but as a criticism of present day habits. Yes?

" — and with it, and equally, the type which is easiest to work and most suitable to states generally. As things are, writers fall into two different classes. Some confine their investigations to the extreme of perfection, which requires a large equipment. The rest, addressing themselves rather to an attainable form, still banish from view the general range of existing constitutions, and simply extol the Spartan or some other one constitution. The sort of constitutional system which ought to be proposed is one which men can be easily induced, and will be readily able, to graft onto the system they already have. It is as difficult a matter to reform an old constitution as it is to construct a new one: as hard to unlearn a lesson as it was to learn it initially. The true statesman, therefore, must not confine himself to the matters we have just mentioned: he must also be able, as we said previously, to help any existing constitution."

Let us stop here. Aristotle gives the thought now a slightly different turn. The previous political thinkers were concerned much more with regimes to be established than with the operation of regimes. Aristotle does not say that the question of establishment, of founding, is unimportant. It is for him also the most important question, as we shall see later. But, on the other hand, we must not neglect that other problem of how to preserve and to improve an established regime. You see, I think we can draw an interesting conclusion from that on present day political science. The question of foundations has, so to speak, disappeared in spite of Gunn and other places where we see foundations. But generally speaking political science is concerned with the

working and changes of established regimes. The question of foundations is, however, a very important question as some of our slightly older teachers still know. Do you see to whom I refer by this allusion? How was the question of foundations -- when was it still discussed and how? Do you know -- well, which is the latest thinker whom you know who discussed it very manifestly? Of whom you know by your own knowledge.

"Harold Laski."

You think so? Where?

"When he was describing pluralism -- "

Yes, but is this not rather how to develop the existing democracy into something better? No. I didn't think about him.

"Leonard White."

You mean in this country. Pardon? Oh no, I'm sorry. You are very right to laugh because my expression was much too cliched to be sensible, but I didn't hear what you said.

"Leonard White worked on the Federalists -- "

Yes. That is the interesting thing because this country which is as a political being of very recent origin, but the foundation is remembered: Founding Fathers. You cannot speak of the Founding Fathers of England or France or Germany or Italy. That is true -- America was -- that is an amazing thing. The foundation of a political society and of a large and very powerful political society is very near in time to us in this country, but not elsewhere. But you know that -- still, but there is -- now let us go one step further. The Federalist Papers were concerned with foundations in a very practical way, but I was thinking of such people like Locke, for example. The whole -- all these men who talked about the state of nature and the social contract, the transition into civil society. That was the question of foundation. They did not discuss it in terms of the foundations; namely, for example, of the qualities required of the founder. They were more concerned with the question how to distinguish between a just foundation by contract and an unjust foundation by force. But still the question of the foundation was ~~there~~ very much alive. But the general tendency in the nineteenth and twentieth century has been to replace the question of the foundation and of the origins by the thought of the continuous tradition -- you know -- and even in the analysis of affairs in this country you may know that there are people who say that the American revolution was not a revolution. I suppose you have heard that, which in former ages would have been regarded as manifest nonsense. Because certain British institutions and important British institutions were preserved in the change but it was surely a break

with the past. You cannot abolish a hereditary nobility without effecting a revolution, to say nothing of the king. But to come back to Aristotle's point the question of preservation and improvement of existing regimes is also very important. That is the new point of Aristotle, you can say. That the foundation and the establishment is important, everyone sees, and that was reflected in popular notions. The founder was a kind of — was a heroic being, a mythical being and no statesman, however great, not even Pericles, could become the object of such dedication and devotion as Athenaeus, the founder of Athens. But, on the other hand, is it simply true that people have completely neglected the question of the improvement of established regimes prior to Aristotle. I mean I'm not speaking now of practitioners who, of course, they're always concerned also with that, but theoreticians. Do you know of any discussion of improvement as distinguished from foundation, prior to Aristotle?

"Xenophon's On Tyranny."

Yes, and also his Ways and Means. Ways and Means deals with an improvement of the Athenian democracy — explicit theoretical discussion. Sure, but still Xenophon did it in application to particular cases. He did not do it in the universality in which Aristotle does this. Now let us go on where we left off because that is the key passage regarding — on the other hand, we don't have — we have had this already. In the sequel Aristotle goes —

"He cannot do so unless he knows how many different kinds of constitutions there are."

Yes. Is this not evident, that if you want to have a comprehensive knowledge of both founding and improving and preserving of regimes you must know all the kinds of regimes. Otherwise your knowledge would not be universal. Yes?

"As things are, we find people believing that there is only one sort of democracy or oligarchy. This is an error. To avoid that error, we must keep in mind the different varieties of each constitution; we must be aware of their number, and of the number of different ways in which they are constituted. Making the same effort of discrimination, the student of politics should also learn to distinguish the laws which are absolutely best from those which are appropriate to each constitution."

Now Aristotle enlarges now or specifies on what he has said before. These three pages are the statements of Aristotle on what political science is about. We have seen that: the best regime; which regime suits whom; and what to do in order to preserve a given regime even if it is not the best for all the people concerned. And now Aristotle adds another point, which is by

no means irrelevant. Yes?

"We use the phrase, 'appropriate to each constitution'"

Yes -- no I'm sorry, you have read that already. The other point being laws. The student of political science cannot limit himself to the study of the regimes. He must also study the laws -- laws in the widest sense; constitutions are included -- that is not distinguished here. Yes?

"Laws, as distinct from the frame of the constitution, are the rules by which the magistrates should exercise their powers, and should watch and check transgressors. It follows on this conception of the relation between laws and constitutions that we must always bear in mind the varieties of each constitution, and the number of those varieties, also in order to be able to enact the laws appropriate to each. If we assume that there is not a single form of democracy, or a single form of oligarchy, but a number of varieties of either, the same laws cannot possibly be equally beneficial to all oligarchies or to all democracies."

Yes -- you omitted something. No, no. There is one point which is especially important.

"A constitution may be defined as. . . ."

Before -- one must make the laws with a view to the regimes and in fact all make their laws with a view to the regimes. So that is not merely an advice given by Aristotle, but that is -- the general fact: nowhere do people lay down laws except with a view to the regimes, disregarding as uninteresting that there are politically neutral laws. We know that. We have disposed of that. But they make never the regimes with a view to the laws. The regime is the fundamental fact; not the law. For a regime is -- yes?

"Laws are made to suit constitutions and not constitutions made to suit laws. The reason is this. A constitution may be defined as 'an organization of offices in a state, by which the method of their distribution is fixed, the sovereign authority is determined, and the nature of the end to be pursued by the association and all its members is prescribed'."

You see how important -- I mean, to begin with, it could seem as a simply legal understanding of constitution, when he says in which way the ruling offices are to be distributed. For example, the executive should be one man. The legislative body should consist of two parts and the judiciary should have this and this character. But it also says -- and that is the difference between Aristotle and the present day notion of constitution

-- the regime also says who is or what is the authoritative, meaning the authoritative element. Now where do we find that in the American constitution? The other you find throughout: what is said first. But where do you find the statement -- in the American constitution the statement of what is the authoritative element.

"What about the first sentence of the Preamble?"

Absolutely. That seems trivial, but that's decisive; namely, and that is no longer necessarily to be stated in any document but that exists anyway. And also when Aristotle speaks of the ruling offices, how they are to be distributed, you must not forget that according to Aristotle what corresponds to the present day right to votes namely, the seat in the popular assembly, is, of course, an office and what an office -- a live law office. And now we come to the thirds what is the end of each association? That means whatever the political association in question may be. What about that? Where is that -- that also occurs in Preambles. Doesn't that? Yes. But Aristotle has also in mind something which is not necessarily expressed in any Preamble because either people are not very eloquent or they may not be perfectly frank. You know, you may have seen some of these European constitutions which came up after the First World war where all kinds of promises were made which were practically meaningless and all this kind of thing. That was politically meaningless. So the end would appear in the actual life of the community or more precisely, if you understand what the authoritative element is you have already understood the end. But how can you say you have understood the end when you know the authoritative element is the people? How can you understand the end from that? What does Aristotle say? He answers -- he is constantly concerned with this simple question: why does the indication of the authoritative element or, as we say, the sovereign, tell us the most important thing about the end pursued by the society as a whole?

"Well, any society is formed to pursue the good of some -- some good and if you know the authoritative person or group in the society then its their good which the society is formed to pursue."

Yes, very good. But can you link it up with the immediate discussion here as you have heard it? The question was how does the people in the Preamble of the Constitution tell us anything about the end?

"Well, it's for the good of all the people and not just --"

That's not Aristotle's way. Aristotle would say people is an ambiguous term. There are many sorts of people. The *demos* can be of this kind or of that kind or of that kind and therefore we have to go into the details. You have to spell out what kind

Mind

of people — in what form the people is articulated — then we know. For example, where there is a preponderance of the urban population over the rural, or vice versa, and all this kind of thing. Once we understand that we have understood the end. But the end is — and for this reason the so-called constitution, to use this very inadequate translation, the constitution is a way of life. A constitution is not — in the modern sense — is not a way of life. It is a legal document or perhaps it is — are the arrangements, the basic arrangements regarding the government. How can this be a way of life. If the government does not merely mean the present administration — that is not very characteristic — but the kinds of administrations which predominate throughout as long as a regime lasts and if we know that they are, after all, elected — they are not — therefore it goes down to the people and we must look at the people in its articulation and which part is higher in rank than the other. How present day social science, political science, is of course in its way aware of it. I mean, for example, the reflection on stratifications of society; the notion of opinion leaders. They all refer to the non-democratic elements which are essential to the working of a modern democracy and they give you the details and out of that you can probably reach an understanding first, how sovereignty is articulated, since it surely doesn't rest in one man or one body of men in a country like the United States, and then you can also see what the objective is. Or since there is a great variety of objectives, which kind of objective has the right of way in a pinch. You know, in very leisurely times where there are no real issues anything can — the outcome of a boxing match can create much more excitement than any political affair proper. So the end — the fact that every authoritative part, whichever it may be, has necessarily an overall objective, an end, links up the two definitions of regime as an order of ruling offices and regime as a way of life. It is both at the same time. Yes?

"In Aristotle's terms would the Declaration of Independence be more of a constitution of the United States, a so-called constitution?"

No. I mean it would only — no, it would be — I think it would be much too general for that. It would only — the Declaration of Independence would only be, how shall I say, a possible Preamble to a constitution, but you know you must not forget, the Declaration of Independence does not even settle the issue of monarchy versus republic. Are you aware of that?

"I think you're right, yes."

It's much too general.

"Yet it establishes ends in"

Yes, sure, but still, but what these things mean — life, liberty and pursuit of happiness — what they mean operatively depends very much: what kind of people are authoritative in society? I refer to this fact and I don't hesitate to repeat that: in such a society as ours things are infinitely more complex than Aristotle understood them. The theoretical expression of that is the distinction between state and society. People may be socially prominent, by which I mean not only Social Register but also, for example, as physicists or so — non-politically prominent — and the politically prominent may be entirely different people. Aristotle, by the way, is not wholly unaware of this possibility of bifurcation, but he would say the normal case is that the socially prominent are the politically prominent. Only the distinction between public and private as we have it in modern times permits the radical distinction between the politically prominent and the socially prominent. I discussed this — no, I didn't do it in this class. One could show this — the theoretical argument is extremely simple and I will state it in a few words. For Aristotle the end of man in the light of which all these — even the technicalities — are presented, is virtue, human excellence; and human excellence is identical or almost identical with happiness, according to Aristotle. That means it is a function of civil society to make its members or those of its members who are capable of it virtuous and therewith happy. The modern liberal state is based on the premise that happiness is not identical with virtue or more precisely that happiness is absolutely subjective. My happiness consists in what makes me happy and that may differ from individual to individual and even within the same individual from one day to another. Happiness is out of the question. Therefore you cannot base — you cannot say that the function of civil society consists in making men virtuous or happy, but you can't leave it at simple thoughtless acceptance of whichever regime might have been established. You must find principles. How can you do that? The answer: while happiness is absolutely subjective, the conditions of happiness are objective, meaning this: however you might understand happiness you must live to be happy. Furthermore, you must have the possibility of circulation. You know? I mean — i.e., liberty. You must have some say precisely because your notion of happiness differs from mine or from any other. No one can impose it upon you. That is liberty: the right to determine — define happiness as you want it. And of course you must have the right to pursue happiness. That is an objective condition. However you understand happiness, you want happiness as you understand it. You must have the right to pursue it. Formally you have the Declaration of Independence. So you build a society dedicated to the guarantee of life, liberty, happiness, of each. The actual happiness must be found by each himself. That's no longer a public

affair. That means two things at the same time. Since what we crave is not the pursuit of happiness but the enjoyment, the possession of happiness, the true fulfillment is beyond politics and therefore — now this pursuit — these individuals pursuing either in isolation or in associations their happiness as they understand it is called Society with a capital S, in contra-distinction to the state. The state guarantees only the conditions of that. So from this point of view society is higher than the state because — for the same reason — because enjoyment of happiness is higher than the pursuit of happiness. But on the other hand happiness is hopelessly subjective and the conditions of happiness — life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness — are objective. They are universally valid, however you understand happiness. The state or the government does retain a higher dignity because somehow what is universally valid is more respected than what is considered to be a mere idiosyncrasy of an individual or of many individuals. And Aristotle doesn't know that situation at all. That's the difference. Now from this distinction between state and society it necessarily follows that people — that the social hierarchy does not have to be the political hierarchy. An external sign is that the job of the politician or statesman may be despised, once you have this distinction, and people may take their bearings much more by Ann Sothern than by Mamie Eisenhower or take any other example you like. You know, in other words, the White House is not necessarily what the Court was and still is, in a way, in England. You know? Where the two stratifications converge. The seat — the authoritative, even regarding manners — that the authority regarding manners and the authority regarding political actions coincide. That was the older — today they have become, in a modern democracy, completely separated, and one must point that out because that is one of the blocks between us and Aristotle which make it difficult for us to understand it. But, on the other hand, Aristotle brings out the importance of the political element with such a power that it is practically indispensable for us to study Aristotle — that we do not fall into that pitfall that is so common — that we say, well, the political organization — that is just one of the parts of the people in which society expresses itself. You know? It is much more than that and that — Aristotle is very helpful, I think, in bringing that out. Some other reasons too, but this is one which is fairly visible. Yes?

(Change of tape).

• • • we don't have to read this. Aristotle makes here the -- yes?

"• • • Aristotle's classification of the various types of regimes — he wants more precision in the way we're going to study this subject. It seems to me that in doing this he's really going beyond common sense. Is he not? He's going beyond what people sort of stand around the courthouse and talk about. Right? In this sense he seems to

— he's doing something which is very much akin to modern social science. It is creating a technical language."

But he doesn't do that. I mean, you must say when he says the first -- there is nothing technical about first, second, third and fourth.

"Well, there is something that goes beyond common sense. It is a more precise way. It's really a matter of degree. Is it not?

No, I would say that Aristotelian exactness and the prevalent notion of exactness are different in kind. Therefore, I make this remark: that Aristotle understands by exactness the greatest attention to the important detail and exactness has in itself nothing to do with universally valid laws nor with numerical things. That may come in -- may be important in given situations but it is not necessary. Exactness means to look closely at the thing as it is, in its fullness. You see, one could say that modern social science -- I mean, there are always exceptions but the general tendency is a kind of formalism which is incompatible with genuine exactness as Aristotle admits; namely, attentiveness to the specific. But I will show -- I will answer your question as well as I can, as completely as I can. Aristotle makes here this . Aristotle is of course of some complexity but it is not a complexity which is not susceptible of being unraveled. He wants to have this overall survey of regimes because we have to know that; otherwise we don't know whether we do not arbitrarily limit ourselves to part of what is politically important, and therefore he needs a principle guaranteeing exhaustiveness and that is numerical or quasi-numerical: one, few, many, and good and bad. You remember: so you get the six regimes. But Aristotle makes it clear immediately that the merely numerical distinction -- the few and the many -- is accidental; meaning, it is a necessary accident if you will, but it doesn't give you the substance of that. When you hear the few and are a babe in the woods -- never looked at political things -- you might -- God knows what you could think of the few. Perhaps there are also few very low officials maybe. There are perhaps only five or ten in a whole country. They are also few and fewness as fewness doesn't mean anything. The few are the rich. The many are the poor. Then some substance comes in. You remember. And then he goes even beyond that and what he does in Book IV is to some extent what I said on a former occasion. He starts from what everyone admits with any inkling of politics in a city, but I think not only in a city, and that is that there are two groups to which you cannot possibly belong at the same time and they have a certain antagonism which may be latent for a long time but which is nevertheless an antagonism. And they are the rich and the poor. I think you see traces of it even today if you

book it up. Good. So that we can take as a start. The rich and the poor and if the rich rules it's oligarchy and if the poor rule, democracy. Simple. And then he tries to show how you -- that both are unsatisfactory for certain reasons and therefore he tries to find a mean. That is what we call the polity. I mentioned that. And a higher mean, aristocracy. We come to that later. Good. But let us return to the surface, in Athens: a struggle between the demagogues who want to milk the rich and the rich who say that is simple robbery. Whether that robbery is done by a decision in the assembly or by highwaymen makes no difference. . . . You know this kind of thing. You sometimes hear of that even today. So that really must have sense. How does Aristotle -- I mean this is common sense, political common sense. How do we arrive -- reach a higher level? Aristotle reaches a higher level by listening a bit more, a bit longer, to what common sense says here. Now what does he hear? People do not merely talk of rich. That

they never say. The rich say about someone in his but that is not how people talk. They use much nicer phrases. We deserve it. We are the fighting force of the country and the rich would of course say but we pay the taxes or they

of that in ancient times. But then there is something else where the difference between the oligarchs and democrats becomes relatively unimportant. There is a war and the war must be won because it may very well be a war where the loss means enslavement of the whole city. There are such situations. So they all have to stand together or hang together. Then, which is general? Of course the general who can win; a competent general, a courageous man, resourceful and what the other qualities are. Similar qualities, praiseworthy qualities, are needed also in other fields; for example, judges. Everyone can be accused of a murder, rich or poor, and he would like to be confronted if he is innocent -- would like to have an honest and impartial judge. And there is a general interest -- no sophistication to speak of is required in order to see that it is generally creditable to have honest and impartial judges rather than corrupt and partial judges. Another set of qualities. And so on and so on. So you get a certain notion which can be summarized old-fashionedly but still in

as follows: the polis needs virtue and especially the men who have ruling offices should be virtuous men. Now that I think is something which is said and believed -- you say, decent men; you say, responsible men, I don't care, but you mean that same thing. Everyone admits that. At least no one can publicly say the opposite without ruining himself politically. That's enough. And because that's a clear indication -- the denial is incompatible with politics, with political life. Then, however, we see occasionally this: we have, say, a Presidential candidate or a Senatorial candidate, it doesn't make any difference, who is very good. I mean, he will choose the right -- will have a wise policy, generally speaking. You can trust

him. He will be wise. And then there are some people I wouldn't trust. Not because he would make an unwise policy, but because his only reason is that this policy pays politically for him. Do you see my point? That -- the somewhat subtle distinction -- whether someone is merely a shrewd calculator who sees that a certain external decency is indispensable and someone where you really trust him and say he wouldn't be a crook even if criminals would pay. That may not be quite as popular as the first point, but you cannot say that is a very far-fetched thing. Quite a few people understand that: the man who's really honest. So once you become aware of that distinction between the practically sufficient appearance of honesty and genuine honesty -- if you try to articulate that you will come to this view: there is a virtue which is mercenary because it pays and then there is also such a thing as genuine virtue. That's not a philosophic reflection. I mean, when you say -- it's always intelligible to say he will do the right thing because it is right. I mean that may be a very insufficient expression on analysis but it is something intelligible. We regard something -- regard right as more important than any other consideration. People understand that. Now Aristotle says here this distinction between genuine virtue and mercenary virtue is the decisive distinction. If virtue is so important we must look at virtue with particular care and then we must attach accordingly the greatest importance to genuine virtue. Then you have -- from this it follows necessarily, without any logical slip, that the only politically good regime would be one in which genuinely virtuous men ruled. I think the argument of Plato and Aristotle regarding this point is unbeatable as long as we talk politically, to say nothing of other considerations, but then other considerations come in. We have very powerful considerations which we have alluded to last time: the importance of number, the importance of wealth, and the incredible fact that the greatest political wisdom, the greatest statesmanship can go together with a very low grade of private morality. It's distressing that sometimes the most virtuous and respectable men are not the politically wisest men in society and vice versa. I don't know whether you know the book by Cooper on Talleyrand; that is very instructive from this point of view. Talleyrand led a very dissolute life. I mean, women and also money, quite a terrible thing. But, I mean if the facts as presented by Cooper -- who is not a complete novice in political matters as you know show that Talleyrand was the most far-sighted statesman which France possessed from the French Revolution beginning until say, 1840 roughly and he adhered always to this policy; did his best in order to get it through; his advice was usually disregarded and it was always -- the disregard was always punished politically. So he really was vindicated in his policy. That happens. That creates a complication. What will you do in such a case? That's one of the difficulties. There are many others and therefore the aristocracy, which as the first goal

is the most sensible suggestion proves to be not so sensible because it doesn't make sufficient allowance for the complicated character of human affairs. Then you have to worry. But you see there is not a single point in this whole argument which is not immediately intelligible to anyone, say, older than 20 years who has taken any interest at any time in political matters.

No science; ordinary political . That is what Aristotle does. That in order -- for example, you say democracy. Switzerland is a democracy; United States are a democracy. They have different constitutions and you can compare that and so. And you can also travel in the United States and travel in Switzerland and just look at things -- how things are done. There is a rather different spirit. Switzerland is perhaps the most Victorian country -- you know what the word Victorian means -- in existence. And United States are no longer a Victorian country. Both are democracies but there are somehow different democracies and since the difference does not concern merely a pure technicality, how they choose their dog-catchers here or there, but something of importance for the whole spirit of the society it is an essential difference and therefore let us try to establish by observation, perhaps even by counting if that can be useful in a certain field, what the difference is. That's what Aristotle does and Aristotle would say if the electorate is 90% rural, and if the electorate, on the other hand, is 40% rural, gives the democracy a different shape. I believe the students of American history, to which I do not belong, could give you empirical evidence from this country that this is true and there is nothing -- you are perfectly right; Aristotle, as well as any other man theoretically dealing with politics must transcend the horizon of the citizen and even of the first rate statesman. That is true. But the question is how he transcends it. I mean I could give you -- I have been reading with, in former years, Winston Churchill , for example, of whom I happen to be a great admirer. But it is -- and Churchill is an eminently reflective man, as you know, and thoughtful man. But whenever the questions -- and a political scientist can learn from him for his concrete work immensely many things in all fields, really -- but when he comes to questions of principle, the highest questions, he states them with a great force as he always does with things but so that I believe everyone of us when reading them would immediately see -- that is in a very general way plausible but we would see so many objections. These cannot be the principles ultimately. Churchill didn't take that step. He couldn't take that step as a statesman, I would say, because then things would become so complex. Then he would have to do something which he, at a certain time in his life, refused to do.

Now, I will try to state what I mean -- I repeat only what I said in the first meeting but it will now be a bit clearer I hope. Here is the citizen or statesman; I don't make a distinction and here are the things at which he looks: the political

things. (Last remarks accompanied by writing on blackboard). What Aristotle does is to look beyond that wall but in the same direction. He leaves this untouched. He doesn't say your distinction between democracy and oligarchy is . He says it is not sufficiently precise, so we have to make it more precise, and he proves it to them by appealing to things which they know from their political experience. The position of the social scientist in the modern sense, and I repeat again, not every present day political scientist is a social scientist in the modern sense — you know, because fortunately there is a kind of inertia which has also its good things — that a certain tradition is preserved although no longer 100% believed in — I mean, I could mention names out of the profession to illustrate it but that would be most improper and therefore — so, the social scientist in the modern sense stands here and he looks at that from the outside. Therefore, he cannot accept the concepts which the citizen and statesman uses and which Aristotle merely refines. He has to coin new concepts in order to understand it and all the famous terminology of social science by which some people succeed in stating the most elementary things which every child knows in a language which only initiates or inmates of those institutions — no, initiates reminded me of inmates: I apologize — understand. In other words, the question of the terminology is not an accidental thing with which we may take issue on so-called aesthetic grounds. That would be really irrelevant. The main point is that the starting point is different. They, as it were, try to talk about political matters as if they did not know much more about them than they do. I mean, in the most radical form which you find not in present day social scientists, but that you have to study the philosophic tradition behind it — it really means the whole enterprise is based on a universal doubt, as Descartes, at the beginning of this whole thing, said. We doubt all our primary awareness of the world — universal doubt — jump out of that hole and begin absolutely at the beginning. Now the beginning as now understood is of course — I mean — the sense data. You do no longer — I mean, if you are very strict you can't speak of a human being but you have to understand what does it mean. You have certain sense data and they are interpreted as a human being or maybe as a table, maybe as a dog, and you would have to understand the legitimacy of this interpretation really truly to give an account of why you can speak of humans. But to say it more simply, political science may be — or social science may be methodically sophisticated in an incredible way. Its basis is always common sense and it makes an arbitrary distinction between the kind of common sense it rejects and the kind of common sense it preserves. The simple example is this: no one was ever told in any social science course — excuse this universal statement based on no empirical evidence — no one was ever told in any social scientific course how to tell a human being from a being which is not human. Never! And

yet all social science investigations presuppose, of course, that everyone knows how to do it. I mean — think of — you are supposed to find out what is thought about, say, the election. Well you naturally ask human beings and not stones and you know how to distinguish them. How did they learn to distinguish that? Not in any classroom; in a very mysterious way — admittedly mysterious way but if that mysterious way of distinguishing between human beings and non-human beings didn't exist human life would be impossible. Anything we do would be impossible and however difficult it may be to give a rational or philosophic account of that, if we do not trust it we are absolutely lost. You do not agree with me.

(Inaudible response).

Oh, I'm sorry — I mean, which form, may I ask?

"In terms of human society being able to have certain ends whereas animal society is not."

Ah ha — and in other words — and a bee might have no end.

"Well they do, perhaps, in terms of preserving life and probably perhaps certain others, but not in terms of having the integrated lives — "

But is this observation truly the basis of our, in fact, distinguishing in every day life between human beings and non-human beings? That was an attempt to make clear what the essential difference between man and non-man is, but I must also tell you that whoever the teacher was who made that the predominant view in the social sciences is that there is no essential difference between men and brutes, only a difference of degrees, and I make allowance for this kind of thing. I say there is, fortunately, a considerable amount of old-fashioned simple common sense surviving. That's clear. Therefore much useful work is done in the social sciences. I'm only concerned with the fundamental methodologically conscious approach to social matters which is now most vocal. Yes?

"May I go back to the beginning — the last question that was connected with . . . social science and Aristotle. . . . you said that according to Aristotle it was impossible to give a realistic account of existing regimes without . . . and your analogy was socialized medicine. Well, I can see clearly how you could say — show the effects and consequences of socialized medicine without saying whether a particular political system should adopt socialized medicine and the same thing would apply to different regimes."

Yes, but what are the effects? I mean, would you not eventually, at the end of your long inquiry, give a listing — and these you have in your mind — these are the advantages; those are the disadvantages of socialized medicine. If you would not be able to distinguish between the two, one could say you had collected a large number of materials regarding socialized medicine but, strictly speaking, you know nothing about it. If you don't know whether — I mean, you look at it — any social problem has this character: what speaks in favor of it, what speaks against it; what are the advantages and what are the disadvantages. And to come back to what Aristotle means it is impossible to give a realistic description of a regime without having some notion — maybe dim or hasty — of its good and its bad qualities. It's impossible. And not going into the subtle question which I don't want to take up that you of course never mention every individual feature. That's infinite, innumerable, impossible. You select and what you select is already valued by considerations of advantages and disadvantages. I'm not speaking of that. But you cannot do it — for example, if you say — if you give a description of a particularly ugly man and avoiding carefully every term which conveys praise of man. That is — the reader who understands this social science statement will, of course, recognize that this is a description of a very ugly man and he will be amused by the circumlocutory language which you used. You cannot — I mean if you take a subject matter which by its nature calls for being judged, by which I do not mean moral condemnation necessarily, but you can be very cool and detached — judged in terms of good or better or bad — you don't give a realistic description. The extreme case: try to give a description of a concentration camp or of a Soviet labor camp in perfectly neutral terms; obviously impossible, and I mean, all methodological refinement cannot dispose of the simple fact that human phenomena have this quality of being judgeable. It amounts, in effect, that you speak about things, about states, without calling them states and that's unrealistic. An entirely different question is — someone, for example — I could easily see a man — take, for example, labor camp and say of course there are all kinds of belligerencies going on there. They have to, but they are justified by a broader consideration. That is not value-free. That is only a somewhat broader value consideration. This is a deplorable thing. We have to do it for a very good thing: value judgement. Without these remarks the whole thing is — how shall I say — the most stupid, red-tarish bureaucrat couldn't do worse. To speak about human things means to speak of better and worse. That there are — in given cases you can just say there are so and so many people in this room. It's a purely arithmetic statement. There is no so-called value judgement. . . . but when you say, on the other hand, — the line is not easy to draw — for example, if you say this man is six feet high and another one is four feet high, an adult, you can say, purely numerical, but you can't help saying that's a tall man and that's a particularly short man and that has important human implications as you

probably know and so there are a few other things too. That is — I think whenever — in very limited areas, for very limited purposes one can avoid that and I would surely not advise to make value judgements by hook and by crook because in many cases a prudent man would abstain from value judgement because of the complexity of the situation, but the complexity of the situation consists not in the difficulty of making value judgements but in the difficulty of reconciling antagonistic value judgements on the same subject. Take the simple case of a war. In some cases it is really difficult to say from a political, not merely legal point of view, who is just in beginning the war and who is not. But not because value judgments are impossible; they are very much possible, but they are — the question is so complex that an over-all value judgement is impossible here. You can only say — there is a very beautiful example of that in David Hume, who is an uncontested authority for the people of your persuasion although he, of course, believed in value judgements as you know, and even his description of The Jar of The Roses. That is a magnificent statement about a situation in which an impartial judge would be absolutely unable to settle the question. The case for the House of York — I mean I do not know to what extent the facts of Hume are correct. That I am not able to judge, but I'm speaking only of his statement, such as cases at least thinkable. The case for the House of York was this. The case for the House of Lancaster is. . . . Impossible to decide, but based, on both sides, on value judgements. This was right; this was wrong; and this was to the common good, and so on and so on. Yes?

" . . . I think I'll ask one more about common sense because it seems to me that Aristotle really — the thing which Aristotle is trying to describe and the science of politics which this thing involves is based upon common sense and a particular use of common sense. It seems to me that modern social scientists — and I'm using it as you're using it, that is, a small hard core of people who radically — "

Yes, but the only ones who talk explicitly about the methodological problem.

True. We'll take most of these people who are probably philosophers who really make this explicit. But it seems to me that modern science and modern social science is an extension of common sense and it seems to me that what you're doing is — you're saying that you've had a quantum leap between common sense as Aristotle is using it and science. To me it seems to be a long continuum of development of making more and more precise certain sorts of ideas and bringing in new ideas and making those precise. These scientific ideas become matters of common sense. There's a kind of feedback upon this. Therefore, I'm saying that common sense is more and more refined in the way that Aristotle was trying to refine it by science. So I'm really questioning whether there's this kind of quantum leap. Therefore, on this basis I think you can justify the position of the

social scientists: not the extremists, but the ordinary run of the mill social scientists."

Yes, but the ordinary social scientists -- I mean, the common sense social scientist or especially political scientist whom I know somewhat better -- that is a very simple and unproblematic thing. One might disagree in a detail, but in principle that is perfectly above board and no question. But still this question of common sense which you raise is an absolutely legitimate and important one. It is a very crude expression which is permissible and even necessary at the beginning of any discussion. Now how can I explain it -- well in the first place the term common sense stems from Aristotle and in Aristotle it has a very limited meaning. We have -- say, we have a sense of touch. That is one sense. Then we have the sense of -- we have the sense of touch and we have the sense of sight, for example, and all the other senses. Now when I see -- when I sense that honey is yellow and sweet, two heterogeneous senses, that cannot be the sense of sight alone. It cannot be the sense of taste alone. Somewhere the senses converge. That's the common sense and when Aristotle tries to show us, for example, that awareness of distances, of size, presupposes the cooperation of a variety of senses -- that's the common sense in Aristotelian meaning. I do not know how common sense took on the meaning which it has now. It must have taken it on at least at the end of the eighteenth century when there came a Scotch school of common sense where it has this meaning. . . . But what do we mean, disregarding the history of the term -- what do we mean by it now? Now that's the whole story. The science -- let us not fool ourselves about it; it's not social science, not even biology but physics, theoretical physics. Now what is the thing in terms -- this here -- in terms of theoretical physics? And you have perhaps read in writers like Whitehead description of how this would have to be described in terms of physics. The thing as thing wouldn't be there. The thing, as understood by the theoretical physicist, is no longer the thing as we see it, touch it, and mean it and use it. You see, what you say -- that is a very -- is in a way our fundamental problem -- to which you allude. Up to the eighteenth century inclusively -- the greatest document of that -- the last great document of that is Kant -- is the view that modern science is the perfection of our natural understanding of the world, i.e., that Newton was only more consistent than we are in ordinary life. We talk about causation all the time. . . . But the coherent composition in the term of a cosmological system was achieved by Newton. To come back, the scientific understanding of the world is the perfection of the natural understanding of the world. But then certain things happened, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century and in our century, which made that doubtful; namely, all Newtonian things can still be expressed fundamentally in terms of what we know primarily in ordinary life. I mean, not the laws but -- the laws are to be expressed mathematically but there is a clear way to that. But if you take the

thesis of the theory of relativity: the space-time continuum, the essential difference between space and time loses its significance. Then it is no longer possible to assign something knowable from ordinary human experience to these concepts. Now the term which they use is this: they say now these definitions are all operational. They do no longer indicate what the thing is, but you use them in your reckonings and they lead you to results which are sound, as is shown by the fact that common sense experience tells you that, say, a bridge built according to that prescription is a bridge and doesn't collapse and to say nothing of rockets. But another way of putting it is that these expressions -- the fundamental concepts -- have the character of symbols. I mean, when I speak of tree as tree then you can say the word is a symbol. Sure, but the symbol can always be -- the coin or rather the bank note -- that can always be cashed. And someone -- well, what do you mean by tree? Here, for example. But this is also a tree and then someone will -- oh, that's a tree even if he cannot give any definition of it but he has a certain sufficient clarity on the basis of sense perception. That's no longer possible of the fundamental concepts of post-classical physics and therefore it was -- I mean, and this is perhaps the most important theoretical development of the last hundred odd years -- it came -- the people became aware of that, that modern science is not simply the perfection of our natural understanding of the world, but a specific modification of it. In what that modification consists is a very difficult problem and there are very few thinkers who have been concerned with it, but somehow it is underlying -- of course the great difference between logical positivism of today and Mill's innocent empiricism is that, Mill did not know that, whereas the logical positivists know it in their way. You know, that is their merit: that they know that there is something which can no longer be understood simply by ascent from ordinary understanding. What the logical positivists do is that they try, and I think that is putting the cart before the horse -- that they try to give an account of common sense understanding in terms of this derivative understanding active in modern science. I believe that as far as I know these things, and these things I only know second hand, this kind of understanding which becomes obvious in present day physics was implied already from the very beginning but it did not come to a clear break but at a very advanced state at a later time. So therefore these things one has to take also into consideration and I think in some ways the social sciences are more obviously revealing than the natural sciences because of the particularly glaring contrast between the methodology if applied to social matters and the social matters themselves, and the fact that in the natural sciences the checks are cashed -- you know -- I mean, if they work -- and in the social sciences we are told we will gradually get a social science as scientific and as effective as natural science is a check which has never been cashed; it's a mere promissory note.

without any packing in the bank and it will never be cashed. It is a wild goose chase. That is the reason for our differing. Of course one would have to go into details and I remember I had once a discussion here in a seminar. A colleague of mine, a very good friend of mine, who has a great liking for your kind of people but we are nevertheless friends — I put to him this question: can you give me a single relevant fact which has been discovered by scientific political science? And he gave me two of which I remember only one, but I assure you that is not a selective memory; they were of the same caliber and that doesn't make any difference. At the beginning of the Second World War people in Washington believed you could not station Negro soldiers in the South. I believe it was that. And then a social scientist in Washington had the bright idea of making an investigation in the South and he saw that these officers in Washington simply had forgotten that certain changes had taken in the South and what would have been impossible perhaps fifty years ago or thirty years ago was probably possible now. Now — to which I can only say this: that is a mere accident that this was done by a social scientist. A journalist could have had this — or any politically experienced man could have had this notion and the particular forms there are — the testing by Joseph Alsop or someone else is, in principle, as good as that. I mean, if that is — the discoveries of the natural scientists are really breakthroughs. The dimensions of reality come to sight which formerly had not been there. But you cannot call this a breakthrough. I don't know what someone else would say of really startling changes and I mean changes which are not merely ideas fashionable for five or ten years like that of these people who made The Authoritarian Personality studies — you must have heard of that; about twenty years ago that was the fashion, that you must make personality studies and there is a democratic personality and then an autocratic one — I don't know, I forgot — or the totalitarian personality. And the examples which I heard were really disgustingly stupid. They were based on a simple freezing of certain extreme "liberal" views and it was only discussed in the form of political propaganda. So, in other words, a father who was somewhat stern to his naughty child was branded as an autocratic personality; they had never heard of very stern democrats who had been very stern fathers and this kind of thing. Today that's forgotten. . . . now, but fifteen years ago that was looked up as a great breakthrough. That I wouldn't count; this kind of thing I wouldn't count. And whether such things as Freud can be called a specific social science breakthrough is another question but even if one grants it it is really — there are quite a few problems and you know the attempts to apply it politically are not something to boast of. But then the examples would not be very appropriate.

I'm sorry — we did not finish our — we cannot go into everything. I would like to mention only two points of special importance in today's assignment. Mr. Gray referred to that. The

interesting case -- the interesting complication: that the regime is of type alpha and the way of life is of type beta. You remember? That is a remark you had. I mean, you have a democratic regime but you have an oligarchic manners and style of life. Well, you have a good contemporary example in England of course, where the power of the pre-democratic tradition is still sufficiently powerful to affect the life of the country in various ways. So, I mean Aristotle provided for this kind of thing and if he did not provide for other kinds of complications the question is whether he could not have been aware of them, then it would be grave, or whether he just did not happen to think of them and then it would not be interesting -- not fundamentally interesting. The other point which is much more important concerns Aristotle's reflections on the so-called economic basis of the various regimes. He discussed it especially when he speaks of the democracies and there is a different -- I mean, if the rural population prevails, if the petty merchants play a great role and so on and so on. And it would be of some importance to understand that in its relation to the Marxist view. In other words, in a way Aristotle also says the economic things are basic but they are not the most important, whereas from Marx's point of view they are both basic and decisive and one would have to give some thought of it. I throw this out as a question. Perhaps some of you who read your papers in the sequel and come across this subject would give it some thought. And then there is another point which we may take up on a proper occasion and that is this: Aristotle treats democracy and oligarchy as common forms of regimes and the more sophisticated ones are rather exceptional and the really good ones, the true aristocracy -- because what he calls here aristocracies are only so-called aristocracies -- and, by the way, what he means by aristocracy here is extremely simple to say: when in electing officials the consideration of virtue enters, an aristocratic element enters and that is of course -- and the technical form is simply this: if you have election by lot that's the simply democratic method. No consideration for persons; anyone can come up. But if you choose by raising the hands, as the Greeks said, meaning, you look at the candidate; you know for whom you choose; then you are likely also to consider his merits. Therefore, election by raising the hands is, in principle, an aristocratic method. Therefore, what we understand by democracy today, where it is taken for granted that merit should be considered and where, therefore, there is no election by lot to speak of, is of course not quite simply aristocratic. But the point at which I was driving is this: the best polity is very rare. Aristotle doesn't give a single example of it ever having been actual and this creates the difficulty. Is not what is natural, what is according to nature, the normal? For example, it is according to nature that we have five fingers. Most people have five fingers. . . but how come that in these matters, in political matters, that which is most natural is the exception and the unnatural, the pathological, the rule? This question we must keep in mind but we cannot go into that. Next time we will discuss the end of Book IV.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 10, April 28, 1960

... are some real issues which we have to consider. Later on, if I may say so, your self-confidence seems to have gained control over the other element and therefore it was less satisfactory. Now what you say — you see, when he speaks of the various democracies and oligarchies and how magistrates' seats and so on have to be distributed you have, of course, to consider the earlier remarks about these various kinds of democracies and oligarchies where you might have found a solution to some of your riddles. Incidentally, when you refer to these constitutional tricks, as the translators say; the Greek word is Sophism — you didn't say anything; about Aristotle's general judgement on such tricks or did I overhear it completely?

"Well, he appears to deplore them, by calling them shams."

Yes, he says — and what is the reason — he gives a reason; he does not merely express a preference; he gives the reason. That have we found out: Because people are not so dumb in the long-run to listen merely to the declarations, but they will also see in what kind of actions their measures — these things issue. In other words, a certain measure can be presented as most conducive to the poor and then the poor, after a few years, see they are worse off than before, the playing collapses. I thought you should have mentioned it because — I don't know you, Mr. Snowiss — but I thought this is something which is in agreement with our general present day views and you should have given credit to Aristotle for that, at least. But, good — now I will take up a few other points you made. You said something — what you said about a kind of Jeffersonian democracy is not altogether wrong, by no means, but still Aristotle, I think, is a bit more restricted than Jefferson was. Now, then when you come to this regime — to this common regime which is commonly best you say the goal is stability or equilibrium and you rightly don't see why this should be the most preferable from the point of view of stability, in particular, because the Persian empire was in its way very stable. We have seen on an earlier occasion that Aristotle has two criteria which to him are equally important: stability and?

"The Good Life?"

Yes, well we are now talking as practical men in Books IV to VI. You know? What is the other crude political criterion apart from stability? That came up in the second book, as you may remember. Does anyone remember? Perhaps one of you who has read the paper on the corresponding part of the second book. I forgot which.

"Freedom."

Freedom. So, in other words, stability and freedom, and perhaps Aristotle is right that from the point of view of -- because in a democracy there is a danger of unfreedom for the rich and in an oligarchy there is a danger of unfreedom for the poor. Perhaps in this middle regime everyone is free. I suggest this only. Now then you spoke of the status seekers. I know the phenomenon. I do not know the book, but I suppose what I know -- the phenomenon is enough for present purposes. But the question is what -- I mean, surely the status seekers are, I believe, something similar to social climbers. Now they are very unpleasant people. I fully agree with you there, but I can't see how Aristotle makes, in any way, a case for status seekers by making a case for the middle class. Now let us look at the two criteria which we have. Are status seekers or social climbers -- the kind of men who are born to be revolutionaries, traveling with a loaf of bread and a gun in their suitcases as Molotov, as you may remember, did? No -- they are peaceful people; they are not revolutionary. They try to make the best of the established order. They are harmless people, politically. They may be morally most unattractive or aesthetically, as you say, but they are not. -- and what about -- are they given to special lawlessness? Generally speaking, I think these climbers know that to commit any crime is not very good for raising one's status. Think what happened to Mr. Accordio with his tax declarations and then you see how unwise that is. Yes: you have seen him, I'm sure. But then you refer to something which comes a bit closer to the root of your difficulty. No social mobility, I noted down, is what Aristotle presupposes. In other words, Aristotle doesn't make allowance for what?

"Social change; not very great social change."

What does this mean? Try to express it in the simple language of Aristotle. What does social change mean? That the rich become poor or the poor become rich or what?

"Well, I suppose it would imply social mobility."

Yes, so, but I think Aristotle did make allowance -- he discusses all the time -- in the oligarchic institutions, for example, where everyone who owns now so and so much becomes by this very fact a member of the sovereign. So there is mobility there. Aristotle was not in favor of social mobility, if you want to -- that is true. But he knew the fact. And there is another point which -- Aristotle doesn't seem to allow that there are cultured people in the lower orders. What does this really mean? I mean, what does this -- don't forget there was no -- all the great blessings you have in this country from grade school and high school were absent from Athens. There was no compulsory education. Education, in this sense, was limited to people who could pay for that. That there could be extremely bright people in the

lower order — among the poor was of course known, but by virtue of that they would, even if remaining poor, no longer belong simply to the poor. We have a beautiful example: Socrates was, according to Athenian standards, a poor man. That is to say, he would have had to work to earn his living but somehow he didn't do that and the reason was because there were quite a few wealthy men who took care of him, as foundations take now care of — good — but he remained legally, so to speak, a poor man. And of course no one in speaking of the poor in Athens and their claims would have thought of people like Socrates as a typical representative of that. The poor — what Aristotle means by the poor are the people without any distinction, and he takes this in a very broad and therefore crude and realistic way. For example, if such a man — wealth is a certain distinction. In other words, non-distinction means you to be nothing but a free citizen, an Athenian citizen, free man. That — everyone is that. I mean, except the resident aliens; that's — of course, but they don't count politically anyway. So there are various ways of distinctions. There are also ways of the opposite of distinctions, but they are, politically, absolutely irrelevant; namely, the criminals or those who have been exiled, which is a form of — that he is a presumptive criminal. So the distinctions are the most crude: wealth — that you see immediately; I mean, not quite because there are also fakes, but generally speaking if you live long in a city you know whether this fellow is really wealthy or whether he only dresses up for the occasion to create the impression of being wealthy. Then there are the people who — descending from the old families. They may not be very wealthy; they may even have become rather poor, but still the respect for the past of Athens — engendered of the great men of the past of Athens and therefore of their descendants — gives them some distinction. Perhaps also certain habits they have preserved; even their economic detail. Then there are the men of culture, as they say: it's a different form of distinction. They are not — the difficulty which you have arises from this fact. You have the simple distinction of the whole citizen body from the crudest but therefore also most visible point of view, and these are the rich, the poor, and the middle class. And what is now called economics; this economic consideration is the basis of the whole discussion of the middle class. Now how they are related — how this crude — Aristotle now makes the point that these people, the rich, the middle class, and the poor — that these people who have less distinction, much less distinction from the point of view of wealth, may very well have more distinction than both the rich and the poor from another point of view. I mean, that is not in itself an absurd thought. I will give you the very simple reasons: because — have you ever heard of playboys? Good. Now the sons of rich people have a greater chance of becoming playboys than people who are not so very rich. On the other hand, you also — that was surely true prior to the existence of universal education — a poor boy — it was much harder for a poor boy to get a medium of culture than for people who were reasonably well off. The rich man's sons could have a proclivity to

the playboy and therefore wouldn't acquire a serious culture. The poor people's sons were too poor. Therefore very crudely speaking — but politically speaking means crudely speaking — the chances are that the middle class might be the most solid class in society, as always is. And I am familiar that people are very critical of the middle class, which is now called the bourgeois, although the bourgeoisie in the strict Marxist sense is, of course, the ruling class and not the middle class, but then they are called the petty bourgeoisie — that — I would like to know what you have against the middle class. I mean, you may have very good reasons against it but I would like to know them if possible.

"I have against them? Nothing against the middle class."

Then what does your criticism — I see, you think Aristotle hasn't argued out his point very much.

"Aristotle's contents: a middle class regime would be distinctly -- apparently, would be distinctly inferior, insofar as this last point is concerned: culture,

Yes, but that overlaps. You could have — they are two different considerations. One the one hand there is a consideration — well, let me begin at the beginning. For Aristotle or for the Greeks all political rights were understood as privileges. You must have a special virtue, in quotation, for claiming rights. Defects or sufferings are no party to political rights. That's important. You know that many arguments in favor of democracy were based on the fact that the people who need the greatest protection, because they are exploited and so on — they should, for this reason, have political rights. They had tough people — the ancients. A defect doesn't give you any right, and a defect makes you an object of compassion but it doesn't give you a right. So you must have some excellence, some virtue. Now one excellence, which was not very difficult to have, but still it was an excellence; not everyone had it — was to be a free-born Athenian citizen. That was very common. Wealth was a rarer thing because, as Aristotle says — you remember — it so happens that the rich are few. Culture, as Barker says, or education was another claim to distinction; origin from an illustrious family, another claim. All these various claims have to be considered, especially for someone like Aristotle who does not write for this or that political society but for all political societies. There are always some societies in which some of these elements are important. He has to consider them together and then he has to raise the question, how can we reach a solution which satisfies those claims based on some excellences and yet makes possible a non-chaotic, stable and free society. That is the problem. There is one point which I think — which interests me particularly in which — I don't remember the wording but that

you said amounted to this: Aristotle allows us to analyse something when it exists, say an oligarchy or democracy, but he does not allow us to speak a priori -- the word occurred. As I understand you to mean, you can't predict on the basis of Aristotle. He does not give us any indices allowing us to predict. That is true -- it is absolutely true because Aristotle thinks political science is not a predictive science. The question is: is this a defect or is this a virtue? Now why is Aristotle's political science not predictive? One can use a very simple word for that. Aristotle was sure that chance plays a very great power in human affairs, so that you can speak of proclivities, of likelihoods and this kind of thing, and you must not forget that a 99% probability is still only a probability. Therefore, that doesn't make such a -- because the practical statesman, of course, has to allow for that one per cent. Think of a general -- because this little improbable march through which the enemy cannot go except -- they won't do that -- they go there and win. And similar things apply to political matters. But this word chance; what does it mean? Aristotle was very wise in using that, I believe, and he gave it a very profound analysis of it in the second book of his Physics, but let us try to understand in our non-sensical way what chance means in these matters. Aristotle indicates what a wise policy is, and that is the proper order for an oligarchy which wants to remain and if it does that it will not last, so to speak. But it is not a prediction. Why? Political stupidities, very great political stupidities, where one could be sure -- wise man -- that they would lead to ruin, can be cancelled by still greater stupidities of the enemy. This simple consideration shows that you cannot predict. In other words, you cannot ever know the degree of stupidity. I mean, if all men were always wise there would be, perhaps, some possibility of prediction, but people are not always wise. You cannot know who will be wise at a given moment. I mean not only one individual; it may also be a body of men. But, on the other hand, an unwise policy which should lead to ruin may lead to victory because of the greater stupidity of the enemy. That is one example of what is meant by chance: the difficult task would be to link it up with the general analysis of chance which Aristotle gives in the Physics, which I can't do now. Yes?

"I'm still not clear on the point you made here. I thought that prediction in any science, particularly in social science, is always viewed as a statement of probabilities and not as a statement of absolute necessity."

Yes, but then the question arises: to what extent are these predictions of value in grave matters? And whether, therefore, the whole notion of prediction is not -- I mean, within certain limits you have to make -- in a way we have to make predictions all the time. As you know, whenever a man makes a decision to

spend the summer, say, in Michigan he makes a tacit prediction that we will be alive, if you call it that way. That is, of course, not a prediction proper. It is an implied hope, rather. So we always make anticipations about the future. Now these anticipations may be more well founded, less well founded and so on and so on. For example, if someone makes holiday plans and based on the premise by that time he will have won the Irish Sweepstakes, that is rather foolish to do, whereas if he assumes he will have the same poor salary he has now that is much more sensible. Granted that, but still that is not -- whenever we have -- in all political matters when it comes down to it a prediction which has a high degree of probability is not a prediction, properly speaking. I mean think of the issue now: what is Khrushchev going to do about the German question? There are some facts are known, some leaks with his conversation with DeGaulle etc. etc. and one can say -- make -- have expectations, but who can dare to say I know that. You see, and even if the -- say, there are fifteen reasons in favor of Khrushchev's behaving in spite of certain speeches he made, and only one against it, you cannot be absolutely sure that this one may not become terribly important in the interim -- three days before the summit meeting.

"Well, first of all, I happen to be in close . . . I think the basic premise of what your saying is that when the situation is ambiguous, in a way, that people can't control. I agree with this, but I also agree that when you talk about individuals like Khrushchev or say. . . individual, this kind of predictive analysis is very limited, but I'd just like to make two points. In the first place, it seems to me since everybody. . . with any sophistication, I think, that prediction -- that no one makes that absolute prediction except if he's a madman or a fool, it doesn't seem to me that this really answers the kind of -- "

Yes, but that was the point raised here: that Aristotle does not predict, that under these and these conditions -- no, that he would even admit. Given these and these conditions oligarchy type one would turn into oligarchy two. That he would do. So you -- the question is really more addressed to Mr. Snowies than to me. What did you mean? What did you expect from Aristotle by his lacking a priori knowledge?

"Well, he went through this rather long quality-quantity scheme and I was complaining that utility of the scheme was missing. I mean, insofar as its predictive -- "

Of course it's not. The utility of the schemes which Aristotle gives here, as well as of the one given in Book III, is to guarantee exhaustiveness. These are the alternatives. These and these are the possible combinations. That's all he does. The deliberative faculty, proper, must belong either to all or to some in a republic -- we disregard monarchy -- and then it

may extend to all matters and it may extend only to some matters and, furthermore, if there is to be a preparatory council, election — which, as you know — everyone who prepares an agenda has some influence on the outcome of the deliberations — then the election to this preliminary council, however you call it, can be done by lot or it can be done by raising the hands; meaning, by lot anyone has a chance; by raising the hands he must be, in some way or another, an outstanding man; I mean, a man who has the confidence and the respect of his fellow citizens. You are dissatisfied? Naturally, because I didn't speak about that anymore. Mr. Snowiss, can you give —

"I wasn't referring to what you just -- it was just the scheme of — he starts off this section by saying he's going to associate certain types of regimes with certain types of social structure. You implied we can use the term social structure — "

Yes, all right.

"Then he goes on and discusses quality and quantity distinction, but then, as I said, at the end of treating this, when you have a certain type of regime — oligarchy — only then can you know that you have a certain type of social structure from the criteria that he sets down: quality and quantity. You can then know that a certain type of regime will issue from a certain type of social structure."

All right. What does this — I mean, if I can -- I don't understand you but I try. What does this mean? You have a certain social structure, say, a preponderance of a certain type of wealthy people, such and such a distribution of the common people; you know, this whole thing. Of course you cannot predict what regime there will be. They may have a regime which doesn't fit them because of old traditions which still linger on or because of some special inaptitude, because of a great aversion to change which may have very good reasons when we consider: all kinds of things. That is a point I wanted to take up: the difference between Marxist concern with social, economic structure and Aristotle's concern. For Aristotle there is no such simple relation as it appears to be, at least, in the ordinary . . . Marxist view. That doesn't follow. A given society may have the wrong kind of regime and for some reason that may last. For example, there may be great crises of wars and this kind of thing so that they cannot afford a change. These things happen. Now let us turn to a coherent discussion and we may have a better occasion. We may -- I forgot your name -- we may have a better occasion to take up your comment. Well, let us begin at the beginning of our assignment today: 1295a, where Aristotle indicates the subject. 1295a5: what the best regime and what the best life is for most cities and for most human beings -- do you have that?

"We have now to consider what is the best constitution and the best way of life for the majority of states and men. In doing so we shall not employ a standard of excellence above the reach of ordinary men, or a standard of education requiring exceptional endowments and equipment, or the standard of a constitution which attains an ideal height. We shall only be concerned with the sort of life which most men are able to share and the sort of constitution which it is possible for most states to enjoy."

Yes, well this declaration of intention is not new. Aristotle had said that at the beginning: that just as the gymnastic trainer may -- will teach not only how the best equipped men can become most outstanding champions, but will also train the average man in a kind of average kind. The same applies to the politician. Aristotle, after having given a complete survey of the other kinds of regimes -- the various kinds of democracies, oligarchies and so on -- he turns to this other great question. Now let us read the immediate sequel.

"The 'aristocracies', so called, of which we have just been treating -- "

In other words, this is not the aristocracy, strictly so called, but certain kinds of regimes in which some importance is attached to merit as merit, but also to wealth as wealth, and these are the so-called aristocracies. Yes?

". . . either lie, at one extreme, beyond the reach of most states, or they approach, at the other, so closely to the constitution called "polity" that they need not be considered separately and must be treated as identical with it. The issues we have just raised can all be decided in the light of one body of fundamental principles. If we adopt as true the statements made in the *Eudemus* -- (1) that a truly happy life is a life of goodness lived in freedom from impediments, and (2) that goodness consists in a mean -- it follows that the best way of life is one which consists in a mean, and a mean of the kind attainable by every individual. Further, the same criterion which determines whether the citizen-body have a good or bad way of life must also apply to the constitution; for a constitution is the way of life of a citizen-body."

Yes: let us stop here. That is unscrupulously unilateral. The regime is some way of life of the city. Now what does this mean? First, the last sentence. The *polis* is the way of life of the city. Therefore, both the city and the regime can possess virtue and vice. Why? Because a way of life, which means of course here a human way of life is either virtuous or vicious or something in between, and therefore the regime can be either

virtuous and vicious. And what about -- why can't the polis be virtuous or vicious? Because the polis receives its character, its moral character, from the regime. The thought implied in this sentence: the regime is the way of life, of course turns up in various ways, although not in this simple formula, at all times. I have here a passage from Burke's speech on conciliation with America: "My hold of the colonies is a close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges and equal protection. These are ties which though light as air are as strong as links of iron. Until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural dignity freedom they can have from none but you. This is a commodity of price of which you have the monopoly" and so on. These things -- the privileged freedom -- these things -- "your letters of office, your instructions, your suspending clauses, your navigation act, these things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to these instruments. It is the spirit of the English constitution which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites,

every part of the empire even down to the minutest number." What Aristotle says has something to do with that. There was a Greek writer prior to Aristotle: Isocrates, orator, who said the regime is the soul of the city, which is only -- Aristotle could also have said that: that which animates a city, which gives it direction, which establishes its specific end that it pursues; that is the regime. But the difficulty -- the real difficulty is before, as Mr. Snowiss has very well realized. The sought for commonwealth now is not the best regime. We have seen the best regime, the most divine regime is kingship and then aristocracy, strictly so called -- that was sketched -- only sketched -- towards the end of Book III. Let us forget about it, and Aristotle has given us some reason why we should forget about it. In these more advanced times -- advanced chronologically -- these things are not likely to come. Let us look for what is the best in the developed cities of our age, i.e. Aristotle's age: this sought for commonly best. Now Aristotle makes now one point, referring explicitly to his Ethics. If it has been well said in the Ethics that the happy life is the unimpeded life according to virtue and that virtue is in the middle, is mean-ness, then it is necessary that the mean life, the middle life is the best. But that is immediately specified here. Aristotle alters the thesis of the Ethics decisively. Aristotle speaks of such a mean, such a virtue, as everyone can achieve. Virtue in the strict sense -- that -- I mean, Aristotle makes this very clear in the Ethics -- the mean -- here are the extremes (writing on blackboard) -- the mean is not mediocrity. The mean is the peak because, as I said on a former occasion, if you avoid the defects of the faulty extremes and combine the advantages of the extremes you must have a principle different from that of the extremes and that principle is a higher one. That applies even to the regime he's discussing now but it does not take it in the strictest view in which it is not feasible for everyone to become virtuous, which is a common form of virtue which you can reasonably expect from

large bodies of men. That — in other words it's a deliberate deviation from the highest. The whole argument of the Politics is very complex and perhaps today's assignment is particularly difficult from this point of view. The argument of Aristotle goes from the discussion of the most desirable regime in Book III, via this which we discuss today — the middle class regime — to a best polity described in Books VII and VIII, and we must gradually understand that movement.

Now the solution, then, which Aristotle suggests is the rule of the middle class. Middle class is understood, to begin with, in an absolutely external sense. That is Aristotle's peculiar wisdom and subtlety: that he is not contemptuous of the obvious. The most obvious is the fact that in every society you have rich and poor people — he has said this more than once — and you also have people in the middle and the general notion of the mean is not entirely irrelevant here. Just as we have seen on a higher level of reflection that virtue is a mean there is perhaps some virtue in mean — in the middle as such, even from an external point of view. Now how does he show — that is developed in the sequel ("In all states. . . .") No, no, no, wait. We cannot read everything. We must skip that, but here is the great step we have to consider. Aristotle brings this up in connection with the question, a regime which can be common to all cities and that regime is the regime of the middle class. Does he not presuppose that there is a middle class in existence everywhere? Now forget modern notions of bourgeoisie and trade and commerce and industry — just people, whatever their source of livelihood may be; it can, of course, be farming as well as everything else. Is it true that there is everywhere a middle class? At any rate that's the great problem because if there is not everywhere a middle class or the middle class is so weak as to be politically irrelevant, then you cannot have this most common regime everywhere, but Aristotle still doesn't talk nonsense. He says if there is to be a best regime which is possible in every city that can only be if there is a sufficiently strong middle class there. The middle class — Aristotle makes this clear — but it is in the middle — what is the virtue of being in the middle? Aristotle never talks abstract: that he speaks of means in all fields. He thinks of the mean with which we are here concerned. People — human beings sandwiched in between the rich and the poor. Sandwiched in: that means limited. They are more limited by an outside social force than the two others. Being hemmed in they are more likely to listen to reason. He refers twice in this context that they are most likely to listen — in other words, they are least likely to get what they want by force, and therefore they are most likely to listen to reason. More generally stated, they are most apt for virtue, which doesn't mean that there cannot be rich people who are virtuous and poor people who are virtuous. But the greatest aptitude, generally or sociologically speaking, rests there. Now we read in b25 where he says

the polis desires to consist of equals. Do you have that?

"A state aims at being, as far as it can be, a society composed of equals and peers; and the middle class, more than any other, has this sort of composition. It follows that a state which is based on the middle class is bound to be the best constituted in respect of the elements of which, on our view, a state is naturally composed."

Yes, let us stop here. Now what does this mean? The polis in itself is a society of equals and similars, Aristotle says. This is what the polis by nature tends to be. What does that mean? Now what -- I mean, let us look at the facts before we try to understand this seemingly abstruse statement. What is a polis, from the most external descriptive point of view? A society consisting of free, male adults -- the addition of women through suffrage is only a secondary thing which Aristotle approved and didn't think -- a polis is a society of free, male adults. Yes, but what -- a trade union is the same thing. But they are free, male adults who help one another toward security all around, but more than that. That would be mere life; toward the good life. Good life can be understood in a strict sense -- an exacting sense -- and in a looser sense. Here Aristotle, of course, is thinking only of the looser sense. This cooperation of the free male adults is a kind of equality. There is no a priori reason why there should be inequality among them because they all are supposed to do that. But then we are confronted with an obvious difficulty. Not all citizens are, in fact, equal. You see here also, incidentally, why Aristotle's first definition of the polis or of the citizen was given in terms of democracy and why democracy and oligarchy, two forms of republican government. . . .(inaudible due to airplane). Not all citizens are, in fact, equal. There is great inequality and, again, what is the greatest or gravest inequality which meets the unarmed eye: that of the rich and the poor. You remember the strong emphasis of Aristotle on that. So where does the middle class come in? That must be understood from this point of view. The city wants to be a society of equals. It is, in fact, a society of unequals. How can we get the maximum of equality in spite of this great inequality? Answer: through the preponderance of the middle class. The middle class are as such equal among themselves. I mean, we don't have to use very fine instruments for that and you can, of course, say the poor are equal among themselves and the rich are -- you can say that. But the middle class mediates between the two radically unequal and therefore radically opposed parts of the community. Thus it establishes -- the middle class is a group of equals which equalizes the city. That is -- Aristotle may be absolutely wrong, but this is what he means. Practically speaking, the middle class has something in common with the rich: property; fear of confiscation. It has something in common with the poor: they are not rich; they are familiar with the possibility of want, somehow. That links them with the poor. That is the point -- you

wanted to say something before and I simply forgot to call on you.

"In the polity, does the middle class have a monopoly of arms? I mean, I ask this question in terms of -- are there real limits on what the middle class can do?"

Yes, it all -- Aristotle knows that. I mean, anticipating the later developments or rather answering the question I raised before, there is not everywhere a middle class which can be helpful. You may have a very powerful oligarchy and a very powerless demos: early Middle Ages. What can you have? Only an oligarchy. The knights, the cavalry -- in the Middle Ages, which Aristotle did not know, and in the Greek Middle Ages, of which Aristotle knew. Then you have a situation in which you have a very powerful demos and a couple of wealthy families -- relics of olden times or perhaps some wealthy merchants; whatever they may be. There, the powerful demos -- I mean, who is numerically superior, who defends the city and so on and so on, and whose collective wealth by far surpasses the wealth of these few people -- they will have a democracy and the utmost that can be expected -- that they might, for reasons of mere "expediency," refrain from confiscating property because they might say -- because they all are themselves some property owners -- you know that even the poor does not mean paupers of course. The paupers had always no political -- had never political importance -- the paupers as paupers. Even Marx's proletariat is of course not -- are not paupers. They are paupers, perhaps, in extreme states of unemployment. You know? Then they approach it and then they don't take it like paupers. So paupers -- that is true to say -- I mean, in the sad story and some sad commentary on the compassion of the human race, but paupers never played any political role, and so that a poor -- say small farmers, for example, and they have a certain interest in laws of inheritance -- you know. They may have confiscatory taxes which milk the rich; sure, they would have no objection, but under certain conditions it could be shown to them that if they milk the rich and they move out to another city -- flight of capital -- that this will do them some harm and so they even may refrain from. . . . This is a democracy, nevertheless. There it would be -- in both cases it would be impossible. So the best regime which is most commonly possible is not universally possible. That must be clear. Was this an answer to your question? Good. Yes?

"My question stems from a concern with whether Aristotle's sufficiently established whether the -- whether power will be less likely to corrupt the middle class than it would in any other of the classes. For example, I can think of historical instances where the middle class has shown itself quite willing -- a developing middle class -- quite willing to hang on to power and has shown itself highly autocratic; in the early years of French history, for example."

When?

"Well, take the July Monarchy and toward the end of the July Monarchy."

Yes, but I must disappoint you because the July Monarchy was in fact — and that was the objection to that by thoughtful men like Tocqueville — was the rule of the rich. It was — I mean, they replaced — you can say the bourgeoisie provided you say the rich bourgeoisie. That was the rule of the rich; the bankers played a decisive role and the more moderate people like Tocqueville were, for this reason, in opposition to this bourgeois king Louis Philippe. They tried to get, you can say, some more middle class rule in '48 but that became impossible because the poor, the proletariat, came in and created great complications which frightened the French peasants for their property and so for their protection they turned to Napoleon III and there was no middle class rule then either. The Third Republic could perhaps be called that way. You know? Established after 1870, and this was relatively stable. I mean, you cannot define the stability of a regime in terms of the stability of the given administration. I mean, it is surely a defect, this constant turning out of ministers, but France was an amazingly stable country nevertheless. You know? And the French constitution was destroyed as you know, by Hitler's —

"It seems to me in these years that France was stable, but also you can call it the stability of stagnancy."

Pardon? (Inaudible remarks from students). But one point: regarding the problem of stagnancy — you see, what does stagnancy mean? What does it mean? Lifelessness, deaths — that is, of course, bad but if it means no great social change that is not necessarily a defect. From Aristotle's point of view it was not a defect at all for one deeper reason which is one of the great differences between our orientation and Aristotle's. We are much more sanguine than earlier men were. We have much greater hope from change. Somehow the old belief that change is likely to be change for the better, i.e. progress, still lingers on. Aristotle had the view that change is more likely to be change for the worse than change for the better. You remember the discussion in Book II: you may get a better law but you also destroy a certain habituation and therefore you endanger the habits. So stagnancy as you call it — that simply wouldn't exist. I mean, death of civic spirit; but that cannot be called — that is corruption; that's not stagnancy. Stability was regarded as the most important consideration. Yes?

"In connection with Mr. Bartholomew's point, it seems to me that if Aristotle's arguing that the middle class forms the most virtuous and also the most stable — stabilizing — then one would have, it seems to me, to ask about this proposition in the light of many historical examples, as

you've been doing. But it seems to me that there are plenty of historical examples where the middle class support of a regime is neither stabilizing, nor is it virtuous. Perhaps this example that you gave would not -- "

Yes, will you give an example so that I can see what you are driving at.

"How about the Nazi party? Here we have, it seems to me, a preponderance of petty bourgeois -- of course we have to qualify what we mean by this a great deal -- but I think that the elite in this case was like the elites in many of the sort of indigenous revolutions going on now. That is, it was a middle class movement and it was a nationalist movement."

In the first -- well, I mean if one leaves it at middle class one would have to say a middle class in the process of complete disintegration, a dispossessed middle class, and that these people can become vicious applies, of course, to all. I mean, not only do I think of the effect of the inflation, but I believe if one looks more closely at the famous overt happenings -- which were the classes who supported Hitler most powerfully in the -- built him up -- you know, later on everyone was caught. I mean, in other words, if you look at the election records which I only remember dimly but the I believe I remember well enough. There was surely substantial support from the rich -- beginning days -- there was the first class of people who became very powerful, were the Protestant peasants of Northern Germany. That is generally not -- I mean, the vague word petty bourgeoisie doesn't mean that. They were partly very wealthy -- extremely wealthy land owners in the Northwestern part of Germany. There was where the terror began in Germany. Then there was a considerable -- yes, surely the white collar workers played a considerable role. You know, people who -- you can, if you want to use that -- you can say people who wanted absolutely to distinguish themselves from the manual workers. You know, as it were, the non-commissioned officers of industry and commerce who tried to act the part of officers. You can put it this way. Yes, but that didn't exist here for Aristotle.

"No I meant that this sort of movement, this kind of nationalist movement which is a middle class nationalist movement is very complicated -- "

Very -- that's the word.

-- and I'm saying this as I re-state Aristotle's proposition. I'm saying that Aristotle failed to make an important qualification of this proposition; that is, that this stabilizing effect... of the middle class only holds under conditions of a fairly stable economy or an expanding economy.

If you have a contracting economy it seems then the middle class doesn't act in this stabilizing and virtuous way."

I fully agree with you, but I would say we cannot leave it at this remark and there will be other criticisms of individual statements of Aristotle which we are bound to make with equal justice. We have to push these individual criticisms back to the principle and the principle can be stated very simply as follows: Aristotle did not know modern society, this society which is sometimes -- where such words as nationalism, capitalism, as ideology, you know? It simply doesn't exist in Aristotle's horizon and the great task which we would have in order truly to appropriate the sound things in Aristotle would be to analyze these modern phenomena which we take for granted -- to understand their inner genesis. You know what I mean? I will describe it -- I think -- well, remember such things as Marx's analysis of Das Kapital. What does he do? He doesn't begin with the Kapital in the way the Wall Street Journal would speak about these matters. He goes back to the origins. The origin is something, as he puts it, like commodities and then he says yes, but what is a commodity. A commodity is not the beginning. The beginning is things we need for our warmth -- true or fancied -- it doesn't make any difference. Yes, but when he tries to develop that -- how out of our primary needs, without any distinction between true and fancied, exchange emerges -- because you got something which I don't have and vice versa; we exchange it -- and out of that, money. There is Aristotle, as he himself admits. Now -- so, in other words, then the question arises -- yes, but modern capital is not simply money. After all, in the older societies commerce was rather marginal, the chief economic activity being agriculture. Yes, but this enormous complication and with infinite consequences which affect us every day we cannot understand if we do not begin from scratch. Scratch is not pre-historic man of whom we know infinitely little between everyone. Scratch is the only coherent attempt made to give a detailed analysis of a pre-modern, pre-capitalist society and that was done by Aristotle. I mean, Plato gave this analysis in his way, which means it's not very easily accessible because then you have to study a Platonic dialogue and where most of the things are not settled. Aristotle's book is infinitely straightforward compared with Plato, at any rate. And here we have that. So what I'm driving at is this: the Greek city-state -- you have heard this expression -- that is so unintelligible. When we look at Aristotle himself he didn't say he's analyzing the Greek city-state; he is analyzing the city and the city is for him the natural association of men on the highest level, the natural association sufficient for a truly human life -- necessary and sufficient for a truly human life. And this society is characterized by the fact, it is natural, because it corresponds to men's natural capacities. I gave this example: a society in which there must be a considerable amount of acquaintance, personal acquaintance, among the members, which

states definite limits: you cannot know millions. You can know, directly or through others, thousands: a few thousand. Also that it is really taken in in one view; there's a beautiful which I cannot better translate by this long English translation --

-- world can well be taken in in one view. We will come across that in the seventh book. You don't -- I mean , which was a village compared to Chicago was, for Aristotle, unbearably big because, as Aristotle put it, when the enemies were in in one part, the other part didn't know anything of it. What of connection and coherence. . . . the modern man has succeeded to an amazing degree where you find compensations for that. After all, we see our presidential candidates. Everyone can see them on the TV, but the question is, is this the same thing as when you have -- everyone, so to speak, has gone to school with them. I exaggerate a bit. It makes a great difference. The things which people say about Vice President Nixon -- you know, some people think very highly of him, some think less highly of him -- are ultimately matters of guess for people like ourselves. The facts which we know are not conclusive. If we would know him intimately we could say which of those interpretations is true, as would be of some importance, perhaps, for our voting. But giving another example, the problem of the metropolitan area -- you know this great problem -- where large aggregates as large aggregates -- they are too big. Something has to be done about it, but it is surely a social ill of the greatest order, an indirect indication that Aristotle did not talk nonsense when he spoke of size.

(Change of tape).

• • • society cannot be taken in in one view and therefore they turn, for example, to small societies -- face to face groupings and what have you. That seems to me the hopeless beginning because these face to face societies are already molded -- they are already what they are -- by the political society, by the regime within which they take place. The natural model I would still make -- or to be more cautious -- the most convenient model at our disposal is Aristotle's analysis of society. Such -- for example, the distinction between state and society remains a mere datum which we take for granted and then we may give beautiful definitions on the basis of all these assumptions. If we do not go back to that simpler situation which antedates the split, the distinction of state and society -- again, I have tried to give a sketch of that when I spoke of the difference between Locke and Aristotle on a former occasion. That's the only reason why I'm so interested in that. I would like to understand and I think as social scientists it is our duty to try to understand. Aristotle truly starts from scratch. That he is a genius of the first order and does not write for the meanest capacities who, in addition, would like to read as they run, is unfortunate, but on the other hand, it's also fortunate because he compels us to think.

And in Aristotle one can say all relevant fundamental considerations are in. I mentioned on a former occasion -- and there may be future occasions -- the great problem -- well, modern society as we know it is unthinkable without technology in a very emphatic sense and the fact that you say there was also some technology of primitive people doesn't help you any to understand this kind of technology. But this technology -- what that is is very hard to say -- very hard to say what we mean by that word. It is of some help to realize that what we understand by technology is not possible without science. We know that not all technology is based on science. Many inventions are made by non-scientists, but on the other hand many inventions would be absolutely impossible without science. So that requires science. Science has here a social importance which it did not have at all in former times. Even such a master of science as Aristotle did not believe that it is possible or desirable that science should have such a significance. Aristotle may have been wrong; surely he may have been wrong but by understanding the reasons why he took this stand, why he made these remarks for example: slow change of laws and most slow change in the arts and all this kind of thing, we become, perhaps, better analysts of our problems. I mean, I'm sure that real thought about that would shed some light immediately on the problem of higher education, for example, which is, to a large extent, an education in science, and what its limitations are. Connected with that, the last point I would like to make is this. There are no ideologies here. When Aristotle presents a position of the rich and the poor there is no -- I mean that is one of the commonest errors of interpretation. There is no ideology. The rich say -- are straightforward; they say directly what they think. This is an erroneous thought, according to Aristotle. They say the wealthy contribute much more to political society than the poor; therefore, they ought to have to say much more and they give some other reasons: a wealthy man is less likely to embezzle than a debtor and this kind of thing -- straightforward political arguments. They don't mean more than they say and no amount of psychoanalysis or social analysis, what have you, can add anything of relevance to that. There is no doctrine of the whole, of the historical process -- nothing of this. I would venture to say this -- and I would also -- let me limit myself to this point: I think that these ideologies, as we call it -- call them -- I mean as we have them today -- are modifications of what the Enlightenment meant. In the great Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th century people thought that spreading the philosophic truth about man and society is the most important thing for improving society. That out of this grew the habit of relying on such general theories for justifying or rationalizing political actions. Whether that may have still further pre-history in the religious tradition of the West -- that's a long and difficult question -- but certainly in Aristotle that doesn't exist. Aristotle is sure that the true understanding of society is linked up with the true understanding of the whole. That is the truth of the statement which Mr. [unclear] at the beginning: that there is some connection, to put it mildly, between

Aristotle's Politics and his Physica and Metaphysica, surely. But the theoretical errors — say Plato's, say Parmenides or Heraclitus and so — they do not include a different political orientation. You know? Just as a difference — take today — between two nuclear physicists may be, politically, utterly irrelevant of course, and the same is true of the difference between philosophers. That — we must really liberate ourselves from this notion. The attempt is frequently made, especially by Marxists and crypto-Marxists but also by others, to find a kind of correlation, say between Plato's and Aristotle's political philosophy and his metaphysics and a supposed political philosophy, say of Heraclitus or Thales maybe, to his metaphysics. That is a mere postulation without any shred of evidence. In other words the concept of ideology — all these concepts which have grown out naturally — I mean, i.e. without any malice or forethought — out of the modern development — such concepts as ideologies and so — must be reconsidered. They become catch-alls which are no longer helpful for analysis. It's, of course, infinitely more convenient to use them without thinking and all that but we are not tempted to do so. There are certain concepts in which it does not make such a great difference. I also would admit that; I'm not a fanatic, but still to the extent to which we here in such a class are concerned with the theoretical problems we have to pay attention to that. Let me state it generally. All typically modern concepts are derivative from the classical concepts and one cannot understand these modern concepts without having understood those concepts out of which these modern concepts were developed. Therefore, especially Aristotle, not because I have any family connections with Aristotle but because Aristotle is simply the most explicit and meticulous analyst of these things whom we have. Yes?

"Well, I can't really answer everything you said, but I really think your position is closer to the modern view than you might think in many ways. I don't think the modern view simply rejects everything the classical people have said --"

I know, but this, you see — I know that. But you must not forget — I mean, really, I'm a friend of peace and not of war but I must say that this sensible attitude which is humanly so likeable is theoretically dangerous because these tough guys who say that's just bunk compel us to take this possibility seriously. The others, in their niceness and decentness, bury the problem. We praise them for their peaceableness; we must blame them for their burial.

"Well, I just wanted to say one more thing and that was that it seems to me that in really analyzing the classical notions of political things and political foundations this is a useful way of beginning and I think in order to understand our modern concepts, this is useful in the way that you put it but it seems to me when you first began this course on the first day you said that what you were doing was — I don't know how you put it but that Aristotle, in a sense, can replace modern social science. The study of Aristotle. . . .

And today, now, it seems to me, you modify this view to say something a little bit different."

Very good. Is this not necessary? Have you ever taught? Have you ever done any teaching? I mean, in a college or graduate school.

"No --"

Yes, but perhaps that — I don't know how it is if you teach the three R's — that may be — but —

"Yes, I can see what you mean: this is a useful pedagogic device."

Yes, more than that. You see, I would put it this way. Not only do children in grade school chew the gum so they don't listen. You know, they do much more than that. This sweeping and unqualified statement must be qualified, but it would be indefensible and would be mere rhetoric if it were not true. Now I will try to show you by — now let me put it this way. I forget the exact wording, but let me assume I said that Aristotle provides us with the framework for understanding social matters. I repeat that. That is the framework and here is an entirely different framework — that's the typical s.s. framework — social science. I mean, I know that there are various subdivisions but they have something . . . in common. Now, what I say is this — and the true representatives of that say that's bunk. Now, what is the difference which I say now? Indeed, I still believe that's bad — is really bad, inadequate — but it grapples with something with which Aristotle did not grapple. . . . and that is modern society. Now modern society rests on certain fundamental concepts. Allow me to put it in this crude way — certain fundamental premises, and they are here (writing on blackboard). I don't know whether you are helped by that pictorial representation; I am. . . . Now what I say is this: this, here, which Aristotle did not know can only be understood as a radical modification of the Aristotelian. So the fundamental framework is the Aristotelian framework. That is what I honestly think and what I, how shall I say, vaguely said at the beginning. That is really what I did and I think — now — I give you one example now, which is not — probably not good enough, but I have to speak of that because we have certain time limitations and we have to think of them. Now in this section, which is very important and very difficult — Aristotle devotes the last part of it to — it's always a question of the variety of polities, but as a whole, and therefore he wants also to find out, naturally, being a political scientist, the specific political institutions characteristic of each of the various regimes and that he does in an almost mathematical way. The text is in very bad shape and that creates — in this particular section — and that creates great

difficulties and has created them for some centuries. Now what is the main point which Aristotle makes? He says there are three elements which we must presuppose in every political society and this is the deliberative element, the magistrates, and the judiciary. Does this remind you of something?

"The modern breakdown of government into judicial, executive and legislative."

So, in other words, this is the point which still survives. We still seem to be compelled to make this distinction, but if we want to understand our distinction -- because even if someone questions it today, you know, and says that's all still . . . old stuff, it is bound to -- the substitute for it can only be understood as being the substitute for that. The least you'd have to do would be to go back, say, to the text of the American Constitution for example, but that is older. That's Aristotle. Therefore we have to raise the question, what is the difference between Aristotle's teaching on this subject -- briefly, the tri-partition -- and the modern teaching. How would you proceed, by the way, technically in the simplest way to clarify that. I mean, Aristotle you know. We have seen -- the end of Book I -- that's easy. But what about the modern view? What would you do?

"Begin with Montesquieu?"

That is already very high. I would begin with the text of the United States Constitution. All right; but then I go back to the Federalist Papers and then the Federalist Papers tell me to read Montesquieu. I don't have to have any knowledge of my own: as simple as that. Good. Now -- and Montesquieu gave this description in a famous chapter, being a description of what? Of the English constitution. This is the famous chapter six of Book XI of The Spirit of Laws. This, in its turn, is modelled, and that is already a part of scholarship -- that one knows that -- but on a very widespread scholarship -- on an ancient piece which, in a way, is closer to Montesquieu and nearer to the Federalist Papers than is Aristotle and this is the historian, Greek historian of Rome, in particular: Polybius who devoted his sixth book to a description of the constitution of Rome. That is a text which you could read easily -- four hours -- assuming that you have to read quite a few papers of the Federalist Papers. That is all you need to understand, but you have to read them. Now let us see -- go step by step. What is the most striking difference between the Aristotelian teaching and the teaching embodied in the United States Constitution? You have the three elements. That is important. They are preserved, but they are modified. How are they modified?

"The Aristotelian is the magistrate -- "

Yes, the magistrates, the ruling officers.

"Well, again, it's difficult to tell exactly what -- if this means the executive -- "

That is good. That is very good, what you say. That's the beginning. What do you think?

"The difference which I noted -- which struck me anyway -- was that it seemed in Aristotle that both the deliberative and the magistracy branch could initiate or had something to say about legislation."

Who has to say something about legislation?

"Both the magistrates and the deliberators."

Only -- well, the magistrates only in a secondary way. Let me begin at the -- the most simple beginning would be this. Now, first point: Aristotle makes one additional point which is important. You have three elements. Which is the most important from Aristotle, the highest, the most authoritative from Aristotle's point of view. Mr. Snowiss?

"The deliberative."

The deliberative. What is the equivalent of the deliberative?

"Well, our Supreme Court."

No: I mean, let us forget about all complications. What is the authoritative part according to the United States Constitution.

"The people."

Yes, no that is here but --

" -- or the legislators."

The legislative; the first thing you have to know is the substitution of legislative for deliberative. Great step, because deliberative includes such things, of course, also as war and peace which in this country happen to be also delegated to the legislative although the legislative has, as such, nothing to do with war and peace. That's a matter of individual measures: should one declare war to Japan after Pearl Harbor. That's not a legal question; it's a great political question. I read to you a passage from a man who is quite famous and has something to do with the American Constitution called John Locke. Paragraph three, i.e. right at the beginning of the Second Treatise Of Civil Government. "Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death" and so on and so on. Locke identifies political power with legislative power. Why he does that

is a long question, but that would surely be -- Aristotle never does that, nor does Hobbes do that. Locke does it. Now once we understand that I believe we can understand also the other change from the magistracies to executive. What does the executive execute? The laws. So whereas magistracy, while it is also dependent on laws, must not have this emphasis on the execution of laws and that this is a difference you can see from this simple example. When General Eisenhower invaded the European continent in 1944 he obeyed an order of the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, and he acted on the basis of a law empowering to do so. But somehow -- then General Eisenhower's command to General Patton and the other one -- that aren't legal measures. They -- I mean, I don't say they are illegal but they aren't measures of law. You see; I mean, while it is within the framework of the law it cannot reasonably be understood as an execution of law as you could understand an arrest of a speeding driver as, obviously, an execution of law. I do not now go into the question, which position is broader -- more comprehensive -- or narrower. I only try to show how one must go about establishing these differences in principle.

Now let us turn to Polybius. Polybius has nothing to do with that, but Polybius also described a mixed regime and he does this at much greater detail than Aristotle does anything and a mixed regime, i.e. one in which there is a monarchic, or quasi-monarchic, an aristocratic and a popular element. The monarchic element in Rome -- or in England: king -- no, in Rome -- the Consuls; the aristocratic element, the Senate; and the popular assemblies are the popular element. The same is done by Montesquieu: the King, the Courts and the Commons, but what's the difference? Montesquieu combines the Aristotelian distinction between the three powers with the notion of the mixed regime. Polybius does not do that and that is, first of all, a brute fact but what does it mean? Polybius' key theme, you can say, is that of checks and balances. That is not Montesquieu; that's Polybius. The checks and balances alone will prevent misuse of power: simple idea and just as it is in Montesquieu and is in the American constitution, but one thing is absolutely striking. In Polybius there is no principle underlying the division of power. Polybius, as it were, says I take the whole political power and divide it into three jugs so that it is nowhere -- channels also -- so that it is nowhere too big and this separation will prevent the overbearing. There is no principle given although there is, perhaps, something implied -- that you would not make the Senate the commander in chief of the armies. How can you have a body of men, of hundreds of men -- sure. But there is no principle stated. In Montesquieu there is a principle stated. The power must be divided -- the sum total of political power must be divided into legislative, executive, and judiciary. In Aristotle you have a distinction of powers; no separation of powers. In Polybius you have a separation of the sum total of power into more or less three equal parts without a principle. In Montesquieu, you have

Mixed regime

Separation of powers based on a distinguishing principle

a separation into these three Aristotelian powers because there is a principle involved. Now what is that principle? Once again simple: since the whole thing is stated for political purposes with sufficient clarity in Books XI and XII of The Spirit of Laws still the thing is to do these two books — to read these two books. I believe that won't take more than half an hour for a general familiarity. What is the key point? The security of the individual. The security of the individual exists if the legislator, the judge, and the executor are different individuals, different legal persons. The legislator may do his worst; I mean, he may have a very iniquitous law. But the executive has to have his own — in other words, he obeys a law; he does not necessarily add an animus of his own to the wickedness of the legislator. The same applies to the judge. The division of power is the only guarantee for the security of the individual. Now in Polybius — Polybius thought of freedom in general. Surely there would be no oppression, but the precise notion of security of the individual is not the overriding concern of Polybius, as little as it is the overriding concern of Aristotle. Therefore, Montesquieu's discussion of the division of powers — separation of powers — is linked up with the discussion, especially, of penal law because a penal law affects the security of the individual to the extent to which he is menaced by the government to the highest degree. So the key point would then be the security of the individual as the overriding concern. Then we take one further step. The primacy of the security of the individual — this has found a very precise expression in modern times, with which you are all familiar, and that is the rights of man, the natural rights of each. It is — I mean, Montesquieu is an extremely shrewd and broad thinker and he sees the problem inherent in that notion very well. I will only give you one indication which is amusing but also instructive. He says that Sir William Petty — you know, in a way the founder of political economy — had figured out the value of a human being. Being an economist everything has a value; even we too must have a value. Montesquieu has no objection to that, except this: how did he figure out the value of a human being? He looked at what a human being was fetching at the slave market in Algiers. To which Montesquieu, that wise French magistrate, replies: that may be the value of an Englishman. There are countries in which a human being has a much smaller value. In some countries the value of a human being is even approaching zero. And in some countries it may be less than zero; he's thinking of very overpopulated countries who have endemic famine. Now then of course you can easily see how this affects the issue of the rights of man. What is the value of the right of life if life has no value? In other words, he says that the natural right doctrine, as usually stated, is open to all kinds of great difficulties. But still, nevertheless, the natural right principles are the beginning — not the external, but the inner beginning of his whole argument. So we

have then that. Then we would have to go into the question, what does this notion of natural right mean? What does it imply? And this notion of natural right as the right which is a legitimate claim of an individual, not a law, not a duty. That is really a concept which is hardly older than Hobbes and clearly developed with awareness of the consequences only by Hobbes. Yes, but there is another notion and that was the natural law or natural right in the sense in which the Greeks understood it. Surely, we have to understand that first in order to see what such people like Hobbes and Locke did to it. You cannot understand Hobbes or Locke if you do not know -- in the case of Locke, every child knows that, I think, although not all scholars -- that he quotes Hooker. You know? Richard Hooker; but he also modifies him without emphasising this fact particularly, and therefore you have to understand Hooker, to read Hooker, to see what, precisely, Locke is trying to slip in. And, generally speaking -- that is only one example from many that the basic modern concepts -- I mean, by basic I mean not those which were basic in the seventeenth century but even those which are basic now -- cannot be articulated, properly understood, unless we go back to the point where a direct analysis of political phenomena with full clarity about what one was doing was done, and that means, for practical purposes, always Aristotle. Yes?

"I'd just like to add one footnote. . . . it seems to me that in certain of the latest modern thought, at least in one school, there's been a kind of return to Aristotle. . . ."

No, I know of -- I mean I may not know what you say, but I have observed that change.

"Yes. It seems to me that, for example, in a book which is not here in the library yet, but has just been published, a book on the politics of developing areas -- in the introduction to this the man, in analyzing various kinds of political systems, produces something that's very close to Aristotle when he says that the separation of powers, or he calls it functions, are these three: the rule-making, the rule-enforcing and the rule-adjudicating, which -- in a way he's returning to Aristotle's view of making the functions and powers distinct but not separate. He says that even the American Constitution -- the idea of separateness is illusory to some extent -- so in this sense it seems to be that he's returning to a more classic kind of notion which is almost like Aristotle's and not like Polybius' or Montesquieu's or Locke's."

Yes, but that is -- I believe you and I know similar things but they are not quite the same as what I meant. What I meant was -- could be compatible with a perfect rejection of the Aristotelian concept, if I may say so -- I exaggerate a bit -- and

using an entirely different scheme, provided the scheme, or the fundamental concepts or categories, however you may call them, have been clarified on the basis of such a starting from Aristotle. I see no other practical way to do that. That is — I mean, is an experience of many years. Now I suppose it's very late. We omitted many, many important things; only one point I would like to add as a transition to our further discussion — that I think Mr. Snowics is right. That common regime which is most commonly practicable is the polity. I believe that too — polity, i.e. the polity being a kind of qualified democracy. I think that is correct. The difficulty is only this: that Aristotle found hardly any actual example of that. You remember? That question we have to discuss because that, I think, was the true beginning of modern political philosophy: the observation that the best regime as Plato and Aristotle understood it, even in this very sober way in which it is meant here in the fourth book, is hardly ever actual. Perhaps it has never been actual. Does this not show that there is something wrong regarding the whole orientation of the classics? That was the step which Machiavelli took which can be presented without any reference to nasty things and simply this consideration. If the whole political experience of mankind does not offer us a single example of the best regime, on which every level will take it, how can you say the best regime is the regime according to nature, which is a very attractive argument as far as it goes and it goes very far and — because you have to consider not only Machiavelli, but also the men who improved on Machiavelli after him. The only justification for Plato and Aristotle which one can offer is this: did the abandonment of the idea of the best regime not lead political thought into still greater difficulties? That is the only decent way, I think, in which one can elaborate that. I'm sorry for having kept you so long.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 11: May 3, 1960

. . . . not only in the conclusion a sense of the difficulty and I also liked particularly what you said about making a distinction which is not made by Aristotle explicitly between the avoidable and the unavoidable changes, and which implies of course — which is connected with the question, although not identical with it, which we discussed on a former occasion: whether prediction is possible or not. You were aware of that. Well, the approach of Aristotle is, of course, entirely different than the present day approach. I will take this up later on. There is one point which you mentioned which seems to be . . . to begin with. Aristotle says that all believe in proportionate equality and we have heard that in a democracy all believe in arithmetic equality. Now how can you reconcile that?

"Well, in a democracy everybody believes that they are equal. Therefore they should get an equal share. . . ."

Is that proportionate?

"If they're all equal, I mean -- "

If they all are . . . equal so that one can be exchanged with the other, then they all should get the same shares in political power or anything else, but chiefly political power. How can you reconcile that, or is the principle of proportionate equality also recognized in democracy as Aristotle understood it?

"If you can apply proportionate equality to a group of equal people, then you will give them all equal rights. . . so that they are compatible. If you assume that all the people are equal and then you merely apply proportionate equality this is the same as numerical equality -- if they're equal. In other words, he says they're equal."

Now, let us see where democracy, as Aristotle understands it, admits visibly a proportional equality which is not identical with numerical equality. I mean, where the difference appears; in that case the difference wouldn't appear -- the case mentioned by you. In that case proportional equality would coincide with numerical equality. Let us take simple cases. You must not forget that Aristotle's political teaching takes for granted private property and therefore also property owners. Some had small properties; some had large properties; some had no property and there is also exchange: shoemakers and farmers, or what have you, and physicians. Now in all these cases the people take for granted that there should be proportionate equality. For example, what a porter does: a man who only carries burdens, who does nothing else, and a physician. That the physician should get for his work more than the carrier of burdens: no one questions that.

So we have a large sphere, although it may not be politically important, but still a large sphere in which everyone takes it for granted. Now, furthermore, let us look at the physicians themselves. From the point of view of proportionate equality you could say that the first rate physician should be rewarded differently than a bungler but that doesn't work so easily, as you know. So, in other words, there we have to be satisfied with a rough kind of equality. As Aristotle puts it in this section of today, in a different context, the few are demos -- a society of equals among themselves. Now in which respect . . . the demos is also a few, just as the few -- the physicians -- are, in a way, a demos: collective of equals. The reverse is also true. How can you show that? In other words -- yes?

(Inaudible response).

No; I mean, which inequality is taken for granted by democracy as Aristotle understands it? Which political -- now these inequalities of which I spoke hitherto -- the economic inequalities -- are not, as such, political inequalities, at least not those I mentioned. Now, but which inequality is taken for granted by democracy?

"Natural inequality between slaves and free born."

Yes. You don't have to say -- you don't have to add natural, but nevertheless it is good to do that because to the extent to which we can speak of a theory of ancient democracy, of which we have very little traces -- there is a remark, for example, in the eighth book of Plato's Republic when he presents the democracy and then the democrat says no naturally free man would stand for any other regime except democracy. To that extent you are right. So, in other words -- but returning to the simpler level, of course there are resident aliens, there are slaves, there are children, there are criminals of various degrees who are also unequal. So a certain inequality -- if proportionate equality means some form of inequality, some form of inequality is built in in democracy as the classics understood it -- I mean also, the peoples understood it. That should be clear. And now the question is then more precisely this: is the inequality regarding wealth, for example, politically as important as the rich say? That's the issue between the democrats and the oligarchs. But that the inequalities are politically important and that the right order is one which makes proper allowance for the politically relevant inequalities is admitted on all sides. This much on this point.

Now you said, and you have a perfect justification for that, in -- I suppose through Barker -- and that is what you said at the beginning: the subject matter of the book is revolution. You are aware of it and since you are aware of it you might be

able to tell us what the embarrassing thing is in this respect.

(Inaudible response).

I see: you have only a very vague sense. That's all right. Now I don't think that I can dispose of the vagueness. What one would have to do is really to make a survey study of the concept of revolution which presupposes a history of the term revolution and everyone of you is in a position to begin that study by looking at the Oxford Dictionary -- the article, revolution -- where you will see quite a few things. But that is by no means sufficient. One has also to go back to other parts. Now I would like to make one remark. Aristotle uses two terms in this discussion. One is stasis, which I believe does not exist in any -- is not

English word. I would translate this simply by rising, a rising: standing up. That's one thing. (Yes: my S's are not very good but you got it). Now the other term is change of regime. The two things are not identical. There may be a rising -- not every rising leads to a change of regime. Aristotle gives some examples. There may be a rising -- for example, what you have in Korea now might very well be directed only against Phee's administration and not meant to be a change of the regime proper. This is an unpopular magistrate or general or what have you. On the other hand, not every change of regime comes about by a rising. Can you give us an example from Aristotle?

(Inaudible response).

No that led to a rising, but if you had, for example, a change, slow change so that the number, in proportion, of the poor becomes much larger and then a certain moment on the basis of the established election laws, a change of regime. So not every change of regime comes about by a rising, and yet there is some connection, obviously, and everyone senses that. Let us make it clear in the simplest way what the connection is -- in the most superficial way, to begin with. Where do you see -- there is a connection and that connection entitles the translators to speak of revolutions because today we mean by a revolution, not universally but ordinarily in political talk, a combination of a rising and a change of regime. It is not true? French Revolution; the English Revolutions; the Russian Revolution; the American Revolution -- let's not forget that -- was also a rising and a change of regime in spite of what some so-called conservative writers today assert who believe that the transformation of a monarchy into a republic and the abolition of any equivalent to a House of Lords, properly so called: hereditary nobility, is trivial. Now -- so what is the connection between the two since they are manifestly different things? Well, shall I answer it? The biggest rising leads to a change of regime. If there is only some minor change -- someone is thrown out, some individual, and nothing else is changed, that is not a big thing. But the biggest rising leads to a change of regime and, on the other hand, the biggest changes of regimes are brought about by risings.

Now that is very vulgarly and popularly expressed but sometimes it is good to do so. The coincidence of the two is -- we may compare to the violent death of a regime. A regime may also die without violence. It may simply decay, but the violent death is the most spectacular political happening and the most incisive and therefore, so to say, when each of the two elements, the rising and the change of regime, are in its fullest force then we have that coincidence or both which is now known by a revolution. But a revolution is not a term which occurs in classical antiquity altogether. Revolution originally -- the primary meaning -- I don't think that the term revolution occurs in classical Latin at all, but it has a Greek and in Greece -- in Greek the term occurs. That would be called anacyclosis. That would be in Latin revolution. Now that means turning around -- a revolution -- the work of Copernicus has a title, On The Revolution of the Celestial Orbs. Revolution is this kind of thing, but it may also be clipping; that doesn't make any difference. You come back to the same point. Polybius, to whom I referred before last time, in his account of the various regimes and how they change into one another speaks of the revolution of the regimes but he means by that not the change from one regime into another but this movement. You begin, say, with kingship. That decays into tyranny. Then there comes aristocracy; then oligarchy. Then you have democracy. Then you get mob rule. Then you get tyranny and then you begin to come again, in revolution to tyranny, to kingship, and then it goes again. That is the revolution according to Polybius. Yes?

"I was going to ask: is there ever any concept of a linear change. I mean starting from kingship, going to tyranny, then going back . . . to kingship?"

Yes, but how do you come from -- I mean if you have this: say the simple : kingship -- tyranny, or it may be complicated but still, and then how do you get back except by a cycle? That is the scheme presented by Plato in the book -- the Republic, but that presupposes what Plato doesn't state: this movement back. And Plato speaks of a cycle in another work in a different context in his dialogue, Statesman. So I think that is for us already the implication of Plato's teaching. Yes, but what is the difference; when we speak of revolutions today, we, of course, also have in mind successful risings which lead to a change of regime. But that is not quite what we mean by it. And therefore from our grandiose point of view the examples which Aristotle gives must seem very petty; I mean, very dry and boring and the narrations of whether this regime is changed in this little way or in this big way and so. But we have to look at our concept of revolution. What is the basis of our -- I mean, what is the empirical basis for our present day concept of revolution?

"Well, I think that the modern concept of revolution also

includes to a greater extent an economic change in society."

Yes, that is a part of, surely, the Marxist doctrine. But still, precisely, the Marxist doctrine makes also a distinction between political revolutions and social revolutions. It makes a distinction, and Aristotle is, as such, here concerned only with political revolutions as such although he allows for the significance of so-called economic things.

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, I think that is crucial. You know, we have these three great facts: the English Revolutions -- the two of them, 1640 and 1688, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution. And the other ones are simply a kind of illustrations to these three. And our concept of revolution is abstracted from that modern experience. And here you have, indeed, a linear development. I mean, it becomes, according to the claims, at any rate, ever more democratic: the claims, whatever the reality may be. Then you get into difficulties. Then there were so-called Fascist Revolutions in our century but since they were obviously in the inverse direction can they be called revolutions? That leads to certain difficulties and that depends -- if you make the distinction you make a value judgment and therefore -- you make a value judgment. So there is a right kind of change; they are revolutions. The wrong kind are counter-revolutions or whatever have you, but then the question is, what about the standard? Furthermore, there is also implied a certain sense of direction of the whole movement; so a kind of prediction regarding the future which is also implied and which is -- which Aristotle does not assume. Yes?

"I'd just like to say that I don't think always the concept of revolution necessarily implies a value judgment. Why couldn't it be defined in these terms . . . say, violent and sudden change in a regime which brought about a radical and massive shift of power from one segment of society to another?"

In other words, you would always include the element of violence, necessarily. Yes?

" . . . Might you say that the American Revolution was a massive political change from one center of authority to another center of authority -- but Burke's view on it -- I mean, it was a natural thing and in this sense . . ." (These remarks partly inaudible).

Yes, but you must not forget Burke wrote his -- Burke's statements on revolution were surely affected -- I mean, the most famous -- by the French Revolution, and especially in connection with the French Revolution he made the distinction between the

revolution of 1789 following, in France, and that of 1688-89 in England and this distinction was then applied to the difference between the American Revolution and the French Revolution. Burke thought that the American colonies were fundamentally in the right against the stupidity of the British government does not in itself mean that he didn't say it was -- that he denied it was a revolution. It was a justified revolution. Later on, in opposition to the French Revolution, he developed more of a doctrine regarding revolutions and said, one could say perhaps, this: defensible changes, sound changes and indefensible and unsound changes. And from this point of view he put together 1688 and 1776. He did not speak of 1640, following. And you must not forget that is so much linked up with the discussion of that time. That would not be immediately sufficient for building up a clear theory of — as to what constitutes revolution. But you also wanted to say something?

"Well, I was going to say that revolution seems to me to have two connotations for Mr. Bartholomew: one, sudden change, and two, violence. You have both of those things connected with the way he uses revolution. However, if we also use it in a more diffuse way to cover such things as industrial revolution — "

Scientific revolution --

" -- scientific revolution and all kinds of social revolutions and even things which are strictly political like indigenous revolution, which we speak of today -- indigenous revolutions in under-developed countries, which aren't, strictly speaking, really very sudden or really very violent in many cases, so in this sense we've diluted the meaning a great deal, it seems to me, from the original conception."

Yes, and our general inclination to like big words of this kind -- other big words we dislike, like virtue -- but this kind of words we like. That's quite true. But to come back to the main point which was indicated in the discussion: I think the characteristic difference between the modern concept of revolution and the Aristotelian concept is that the modern concept is connected with a philosophy of history. That I believe we would always be able to discern -- not whether we are confronted with an isolated definition which may be wholly unrelated -- but when we allow the man to have his full say on the matter. Aristotle's doctrine of revolution has nothing whatever to do with a philosophy of history and that is not -- is interesting enough because he was somehow aware of the fact that there was, very broadly speaking, a development. Early kingship; early nobility -- let's call it aristocracy -- the nobles; then you get tyranny. . . then you had something like oligarchy, slowly shifting into democracy and that, then became into, let us say, dictatorship, Cæsarist or however you might call that. You know, I'm taking Roman ex-

perience, which Aristotle couldn't know, and there is, of course -- something of this kind applies also to modern times. I mean, to the developments in the early Middle Ages, very roughly speaking, and so one could speculate on the basis of this. Is there not such a law of societies -- let's say development -- a law of this kind of thing. Aristotle had sufficient materials to develop that, but he didn't do that. At the end of the fifth book he has a criticism of Plato's simple scheme and there he gives some of the reasons; we will discuss that next time. But now I would limit myself to only -- to one point. What is the difference -- the precise difference between Aristotle's approach and the modern approach? By modern approach I mean that which is characteristically modern. I do not deny that there are men in modern times who look also at changes of regimes and risings in this perspective. I would say this: Aristotle looks at such risings and changes strictly politically, in the way in which they come to sight to politically acting men as such. For example, whatever Marxists or also non-Marxists might say about the tremendous differences between the present Russian regime and the Tsarist regime, there is a very important point which is, of course, identical and that is security measures employed by Khrushchev or whoever is specially in charge of that and by the ministers of the Tsars. The preservation of the regime -- who will win: whether they will preserve that regime, whether the regime will be destroyed, is impossible to predict, or whether it will undergo slow changes which will bring about a different regime in the course of generations, it's impossible to predict. You know that from today. No one would dare -- no responsible man would dare to build his policy regarding Russia on the premise that this regime will have changed within fifty years into a so-called more liberalized version. I mean, you may hope that -- you may count with that possibility. You may say, we must act in such a way as not to prevent such a development, perhaps. But to take it as a basis would be a criminal folly. And so really no one knows. That is the situation with which we are politically concerned: that no one knows. And therefore the question arises, from the point of view of every regime, how to preserve it and what are the peculiar dangers to which this peculiar regime is exposed. Now since there are other types of regime, meaning not only this country but democratic regime and this sub-division, perhaps, of a democratic regime, to some extent you are able to generalize and that is what Aristotle is doing here.

One can also state the Aristotelian view popularly as follows. There is no revolution, there was never a revolution, there will never be a revolution in which you can say the fate of mankind is at stake. He never says that, but that is the tacit indication. It's a much more practical, and to some extent even technical problem than it is in the light of the modern notions. One would doubtless have to go into that much more fully than we have done here. I mention one point with reference to what Mr. Steintrager said. Now when Aristotle begins his discussion

and he says -- makes first a universal statement. The cause of risings is "justice," by which he means, as would become clear from the context, what people believe to be just. Therefore, we can say, certain opinions. Now when Thomas Hobbes took up this issue many centuries later in his great works and when he speaks of the things -- I forgot now what the chapter headings are -- the things which weaken a commonwealth or something of this kind, in the Leviathan for example, he puts the greatest emphasis on opinions and he gives the list of opinions -- ten or twelve, I don't know how many -- which induce people -- which weaken a commonwealth which lead to a change of regime. You see, for Hobbes the opinions play a much greater role than for Aristotle; much greater role. And that is the pre-history of what happened later because if opinions are the danger, false opinions, true opinions are the salvation and therefore the chief political task is to instill the citizens with the right kind of opinions. Aristotle assumes tacitly -- in some cases we have seen it comes out explicitly -- that opinions are by no means the only important point. I mean many of the examples recorded by Miss O'Neil would show that in case you haven't read the part. Now first of all, do you have -- is there any point you would like to bring up regarding this very general problem on which I can only touch here -- the question regarding revolution is one of these key concepts of social science in which all the problems are buried if one does not begin to think about it. Yes?

"What about the relationship in Aristotle between revolution and economic disagreement and say, that in Marx or in modern thinkers?"

Yes, what does this mean -- economic -- I mean, what -- Aristotle speaks of that, but he used a different name for that. I mean, Aristotle knew that the difference between the rich and the poor is of the utmost importance. I think that we have seen often enough. The question is only, from a Marxist point of view, what's wrong with that? why would Marx say that this is an inadequate analysis; it is much too rough?

"Well, Aristotle doesn't see any economic attachment --"

Pardon?

"He doesn't see an attachment here which will inevitably bring about a revolution."

No. Aristotle regards it as possible, as a modern bourgeois would, that the two parts can live in harmony. If the rich are sensible people and the poor are also tolerably sensible then they can live in harmony. That is what Aristotle surely believed, and even today some of the passages which Miss O'Neil mentioned show this simple minded view. And of course he doesn't say that they must live in harmony. They must -- that will not come about automatically. I mean, if not the proper effort is made on both sides it won't work. The proper effort can be facilitated by common dangers, for example, which is not something nice. Dangers

are not nice -- but which can be very helpful; salutary. Now, but the main point is that Marx would simply say what kind of rich. The feudal lords were rich. The big industrialists or bankers in the bourgeois society are rich. That is entirely different kind of wealth and therefore would also have an entirely different kind of poverty at the opposite pole, and therefore the fate of these societies will be entirely different. The feudal opposition of rich and poor allowed for the possibility of a class emerging which could become again a ruling class. You know the famous story: the serfs running away from their lords into cities, towns, and becoming free men there, becoming burghers, and that is the origin of the bourgeoisie, and at a certain moment this new class, originally simply a part -- a fragment -- of the poor, became the rich, a new kind of rich, and the rulers. But in the last case, in the case of the bourgeois, the poor are a class which can never wish to become a ruling class proper. A ruling class presupposes, of course, always a ruled class. So, in other words, the question is however whether Aristotle is really, apart from the Marxist hopes and expectations, speaking merely analytically. Aristotle does not make these distinctions. You remember, in the case of the demos he does make the distinctions between whether the demos consists chiefly of peasants or chiefly of urban people or what kind. I mean, for example, there may be -- the poorest part of a commonwealth may be, numerically, very strong. I mean, say, the people -- the unskilled workers without any landed property may become numerically very strong. That is what Aristotle calls extreme democracy. That would give the democracy an entirely different complexion. Up to this point Aristotle is precise enough. He was, perhaps, not precise enough in his distinctions of the various kinds of wealthy people, although he refers to that when he speaks of the difference between Sparta, a surely non-commercial city, and Carthage, a surely commercial city. But still these refinements which are necessary from Aristotle's own point of view are, for this very reason, not in contradiction with his point of view. That is simply something which -- in other words, Aristotle should -- Aristotle's polis is perfectly compatible with a greater breakdown of the various kinds of rule of the rich than he has given. It would be an interesting question why he did not take the trouble, whereas he did take the trouble in the case of democracy. That would be an interesting question. There is no difficulty, in principle, I believe. Mr. Faulkner?

"Do I understand the difference between Aristotle and Mr. Dennis to consist in this: that Aristotle's criterion for a revolution is a qualitative change and Dennis' is a quantitative: a sudden and violent change -- "

No. I don't think so. What would you say is the difference?

Mr. Dennis: Well, I really don't know how to meet this objection. I really hadn't thought of it in this way, but

it seems to me that by violence -- you use violence as a kind of qualitative -- "

Yes, sure. And sudden is also.

"And sudden. . . . it doesn't seem to me. . . ."

No, but you had something -- still, there was a difference and it would be useful if you would bring it out in a very general way. What do you think is, how shall I say, either too little or too much in Aristotle's overall notion?

"What do I think is too little or too much? Well, it seems to me he envisions a kind of evolutionary revolution, in a sense. That is, things are gradual and still revolutionary."

No, I think really -- let me try to -- I don't believe this is a very important problem. What you have in mind is a rising connected -- leading up to a change of the regime. And Aristotle, of course, is very much concerned with that. But Aristotle says, as you, I trust, would admit, there may be risings of a very limited character just to get rid of one individual and then, on the other hand, there may be changes of regime which are not risings. Take, for example, the monarchy. The last dies. Technically, some foreign prince would be an heir but the people feel we'd rather get along without monarchy than to have a foreign prince and they decide, peacefully, let us have now a council of the greatest men of the commonwealth instead of the king. No violence whatever. And then it would become then a somewhat verbal question. Yes, but for this reason, it is avoided by Aristotle's terminology -- that he does not speak of revolution.

"Well, there was one thing though. It seems to me that Aristotle doesn't really take account of or at least underrates the possibility of revolution imposed externally; that is, either from war or -- "

Oh, he speaks of it.

"Well, I know. I think he underrates it at least."

No, no, no. He could not because that was a common fact during the Peloponnesian War especially -- that wherever the Athenians were strong they established democracies and wherever the Spartans were strong they established oligarchies. He referred to that. No, no. He could not have overlooked that. Yes?

"But perhaps the point is that he doesn't make clear why there should be this. . . . I mean, Aristotle is quite clear

that tyranny, or let's say a democracy and an oligarchy, cannot live side by side. In other words, there's no peaceful co-existence for Aristotle. There is almost a necessity which will lead them to clash head on and one will have to impose its principle on the other."

Where — where does he — I mean in one sense he says much more. There are — as incompatible as that the same man has and does not have cancer. I mean, if you have a democracy somewhere you can't have a tyranny at the same place and the same time. That's impossible. But that there should be a tyranny in city A and a democracy in city B — he takes for granted this can be done. I mean he doesn't say a word that the duty of democracy is to establish democracies everywhere. He may say it might be a wise policy, but — he may have thought so — but we have no evidence of that. No. That is really not an issue. I mean, in other words, the domestic problems, problems of the regime, may be based on foreign policy considerations or may issue in such considerations and they may not. It all depends. He doesn't make any statement of that.

"Well, it seems to me that later in the fifth book he states emphatically that it is obvious that constitutions with opposite principles will clash. I mean two polises, poli or whatever it is — "

Poli. Say cities.

"All right — two cities, let's say, side by side, are going — if you can look at one and say that its regime is that of an oligarchy and look at another and say its regime is that of a tyranny you can then say there will be war between these two — "

I mean, I don't remember that passage. I have not read the last part now, but I doubt very much that Aristotle says such a thing in universality. What he does say is that tyrants are compelled to engage in an expansionist foreign policy in order to take off the steam at home. That's another matter. But regarding democracy or the other regimes, he does not say whether they are constitutionally compelled either to be aggressive or non-aggressive in the foreign field. That depends on circumstances. The ordinary view in classical times was that the democracy of the type of Athens is inevitably aggressive. Aristotle does not say so. You know, think of the expansionist — Athens — through a very simple reason. These payments for attendance at the law courts and so come from the Athenian empire, so they had to keep it and, if possible, to enlarge it. But that leads us away from the fundamental issue. Now, we have to turn now to the text, but Mr. Weinstein, I forgot you.

"Well, there was only a side point. Miss O'Neill mentioned the movement from mercenary armies to demagogues and it struck me that this has gone on much further since Aristotle's time and perhaps Cromwell's new model army was the turning point when the armies are not attached personally as to Caesar and Phillip, but as with Castro they grew up partly to the man, but principally to the ideology."

Let me put it this way and I think we will find some evidence for that. The "idealist," the man dedicated to a cause, with whom we are so familiar in all countries -- at least, in all Western countries and there are also others -- was, for classical thought, a very great problem. And you can say that such a work like Plato's Republic is nothing except an analysis of political idealism. That was a very strange -- I mean, the just man they knew: the law abiding man, the just man and so. That they knew, but the political idealist, as we call it, is a very great problem. What Plato does in his Republic. There he -- Socrates is confronted with two young political idealists, as we would call them in our language, Glaucon and Adeimantus, believers in justice in such a way that they want to re-model the city according to justice. If they -- we know something of what happened. There were quite a few young boys, youngsters of this kind who loathed the Athenian democracy as a disgrace and out of idealism, as we would say, they tried to restore that. Plato, when he was 20, had similar feelings and then a revolution took place -- the famous tyrants. And then Plato says -- you can read it in the seventh letter -- when he looked back from them to that terrible democracy, that terrible democracy looked, in retrospect, like the Golden Age. So Plato was cured when he was 20 or so and Glaucon and Adeimantus are cured in the Republic in our sight so we can observe the process. Socrates makes every allowance in his critique of the democracy in the eighth book. He states the case against democracy in an absolutely fantastic way. You remember the story that the very dookies don't obey anymore in a democracy. And then -- but in this process they are led to see the full problem of "political idealism." We have some trace of that here. Now I suggest that we -- I mean, that one would have to understand -- that this strange thing which many people today say is simply a secularized version of religious feelings of mission -- expansion and so -- secularization, they say -- but that is also a word which would need a long commentary and a long analysis to become intelligible. Now let us read at the end of 1301a where he speaks -- where he says that -- well, people rise out of some notions of justice but most justly of all -- 1301a, end -- but most justly of all would rise those who are outstanding as regards virtue. The end of 1301a. Let me try to do that until you find it. Most justly of all would those rise who are outstanding in regard to virtue, but these men do it least of all. They have the greatest justification because almost everywhere those who are not truly virtuous are in control and they should rule, ac-

cording to natural right, but these men who have the greatest right avail themselves least of that right. And now he gives the reason why. Do you have it now?

"... for they and they only can reasonably be regarded as enjoying an absolute superiority. There is also some justification for those who, possessing an advantage of birth. . . ."

No, that he doesn't say. There are some who, being superior by descent, do not -- are not satisfied with equality because of that inequality; namely, the inequality regarding virtue. Yes? For men of noble birth are thought to be those who possess virtue of the ancestors and wealth. The implication is that the men of noble birth -- they fight for rule and make risings. They do not have the justification because their forefathers might have been men of virtue, but whether they are men of virtue is an open question. Now why do the men of virtue, in contradistinction to the idealists, not make risings? Let us read that -- take this up first. In 1304a, end.

"Revolutions also occur when the sections of the state which are usually regarded as antagonists -- for example, the rich and the common people -- are equally balanced, with little or nothing to turn the scale. . . ."

Yes, in other words, an equilibrium, a so-called equilibrium, necessarily leads to clash. There must be some cushion between them: the middle class.

"... for where either side has a clear preponderance, the other will be unwilling to risk a struggle with the side which is obviously. . . ."

No, I must have made a mistake.

"This is the reason. . . ."

No, no. That's not the point. Yes, no go on. It is the right place.

"This is the reason why men of pre-eminent merit do not, as a rule, attempt to stir up seditions: they are only a few against many."

So that seems to be a perfectly good reason. Being men of virtue they are men of sense and therefore they know quite well that they couldn't win except with the help of people without sense and then there would be a mess of a different complexion, but still a mess. Now go on because the other point is relevant also.

"Such, on a general view, are the springs and causes of sedition and change in all constitutions. We may add that political revolutions are sometimes achieved by force, and sometimes by fraud. Force may either be used initially or at a later stage. Fraud, too, may be used at two different stages. Sometimes it is used in the initial stage. In this way a change may be made at the moment with general assent; but those who have made it then proceed to keep control of affairs in the teeth of all opposition. This was the case with the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens: they first defrauded the people by an assurance that the Persian King would provide money for the war against Sparta, and after this act of fraud they attempted to keep the constitution permanently under their control. Sometimes, however, an initial act of persuasion is followed up afterwards by a similar policy, and control is thus kept with general consent."

Yes, now let us stop here. In other words, what I suggest is this: one could perhaps also consider this as an additional reason which, however, Aristotle characteristically does not give as the reason: that men of virtue would not use force or fraud and therefore two major means of effecting a change of regime are not at their disposal. But it is very characteristic that Aristotle does not say that. Now let us return to 1301b and a few points only. Aristotle makes first a distinction in his usual way between various kinds of changes. There may be a rising which is political; meaning, where change of regime is intended or only where a change of personnel is intended. For example, if you'd look at the difference between Malenkov's -- Malenkov and Lenin -- you have a clear difference although one could, perhaps, say that Malenkov also stood for a different policy and not only -- you know -- for his own power. . . . Then another kind of change, which is not radical, is if it is only a question of more or less democratic. Say, if you have a change in an American state from strictly representative democracy to a somewhat more direct democracy that would be an example and vice versa of course too. Then there may be changes directed not against the regime, but only against a certain office which is low. Good. But then, after this first initial distinction, Aristotle turns to a general discussion of such changes of regime and the first thing he has to do, since he spoke of the just -- a notion of just as the guiding motive -- then he has to explain that. Miss O'Neill stated that clearly enough. We do not have to stop at that. We turn now to 1302ab. That may very well be the beginning of a chapter in Barker. Yes?

(Change of tape. Tape resumes during the reading of 1302a; in Barker, the top of page 207).

". . . to start political disturbance and mutual dissension."

Yes, now let us stop here first. In other words, three things have to be distinguished: what state of mind that one — but the word mind does not occur in the Greek — you could also say what mood — you don't have — in what — I don't know how to translate that; is there anyone who knows Greek? It is a very general word.

(Inaudible response).

Yes, but they could also put the emphasis on the mental things in particular. In what —

(Inaudible attempt to translate).

Yes; something of this kind. And the second is -- that must be more literally translated -- for the sake of what. And the third: which are the origins, the initiating origins of political confusions and of risings of one against the other. Aristotle refers here . . . to different kinds of causes. You may recall that Aristotle distinguished various kinds of causes. The simple example: the shoemaker making a shoe. There is in the first place necessary the material, say leather. That's the material cause. Then there is necessary the maker; in this case, the shoemaker — the maker or that which begins the motion, which begins the change; the origin of the change is in the shocmaker. And then there must be some vision of the thing to be produced: that's the form. He must have this form in his mind. And fourth, there must be a purpose of the thing to be produced and that's the end; the end or the final cause. Now Aristotle speaks here only of three of these causes, omitting the material cause because that is not interesting here. That would be man in general and would be of no interest. Now let us take first the first point.

"The principal and general cause of an attitude of mind which disposes men towards change is the cause of which we have just spoken. There are some who stir up sedition because their minds are filled by a passion for equality, which arises from their thinking that they have the worst of the bargain in spite of being the equals of those who have got the advantage. There are others who do it because their minds are filled with a passion for inequality (i.e. superiority), which arises from their conceiving that they get no advantage over others (but only an equal amount, or even a smaller amount) although they are really more than equal to others. (Either of these passions may have some justification; and either may be without any.) Thus inferiors become revolutionaries in order to be equals, and equals in order to be superiors. This is the state of mind which creates sedition."

Yes. So, in other words, the state of mind is an opinion regarding justice backed up by a zeal, that is to say. The word

passion never occurs here but something of this kind is, of course, present. That is the form; the formal cause: that which characterizes the revolutionary, as you would say. The revolutionary is a man who is filled with a certain notion of injustice or justice and that characterizes him; that gives him his character. But this is not yet -- that doesn't tell us for the sake of what he is doing it nor does it tell us what the beginning of the motion is -- beginning of this change is. These things come up later. Now let us go on.

"The objects which are at stake are profit and honour. They are also their opposites -- loss and disgrace; for the authors of political sedition may be simply seeking to avert some disgrace, or a fine, from themselves or their friends."

Yes. The end for the sake of which is honor and gain. Aristotle means -- of course, doesn't mean that they must be both present: honor and/or gain. That is for the sake of which these people characterized by a certain notion of justice and by a dedication to that act. Now what is the beginning of the motion? These men have this end and they have a certain character. What is the beginning of the action? What is the beginning of the change? Does it not -- I mean, is this not enough for answering the question of the beginning of the change? Well? Fardon?

(Inaudible response).

Well, I just wanted to remind you of the famous distinction between motive and opportunity. You know: a man may have a motive for committing a murder and yet lacking opportunity and then he would be an extreme fool if he would commit the murder. But the other thing is needed. What is the beginning of his action is opportunity, the occasion. Yes, but that is, of course, not -- that is only in order to make it initially intelligible. The passage is very difficult. Let us now turn to the sequel and read this with particular care.

"The occasions and...."

No, no. The causes and initiating beginnings of the motions.

"The causes. . . ."

They are technical Aristotelian terms which are used.

"The causes and origins of disturbances -- causes which encourage the attitude of mind, and lead to the pursuit of the objects, which have just been mentioned -- may be counted, from one point of view, as seven, but from another as more than that number. Two of those causes (profit and honour)

are identical with two of the objects which have just been mentioned; but when considered as causes they act in a different way. As objects, profit and honour provoke dissension because (as we have just noted) men want to get them themselves: as causes, they lead to dissension because men see other persons getting a larger share — some justly and some unjustly — than they themselves get."

Yes, now let us see. Do you understand that? Do you -- I think that is -- do you understand that? I mean, all these revolutionaries do what they do for the sake of honor and/or gain. Honor does not mean, of course -- honor means, in Aristotle, what they now call power, by which I mean honor doesn't mean to have a badge -- you know, and this kind of thing, and that people talk about a man. That is not a concern of serious men. On the other hand, Aristotle does not speak of power in the way in which is done now because, for example, you can have power by being the wire puller. No one knows of you and you, in some smoke filled room, perhaps only with one other fellow who is your front man -- you pull all wires. That is not -- honor means, of course, recognition and we have a good example in our age of this old political motive in the figure of Winston Churchill, where I think the term honor in that full sense where it shifts insensibly into glory is much more visibly a motive than power in this -- in our sense. The word power comes into the foreground only in Hobbes; not in the earlier -- the earlier writers always speak on such occasions of honor and glory and that has very much to do with a kind of prose which has become characteristic of modern thought. Power seems to be much more business like. You need power -- I mean, smaller or lesser power -- for mere survival. Honor or glory are not in that sense necessary for mere living. They have a different status. Now, at any rate -- so these motives are, then, there but how -- let us limit ourselves to the motive of honor. All revolutionaries act for the sake of honor -- in order to acquire honor -- but now honor is said also to be the origin of the action, of the revolutionary action. How can this be understood?

"Well, there's a Presidency in operation and Kennedy is impelled to seek that honor, but a man like -- "

But you don't say that he is a potential revolutionary. Are you so much opposed to him to say that?

(Inaudible remark).

I see. In other words, what you would suggest is this: a man may have this desire for honor, but this desire would remain dormant without the occasion. The occasion is what appears to him and others a mal-distribution of honors. Is that what you mean? So that honor would -- honor in the form of mal-distribution

of honor is the occasion whereas honor is the end. I mean, he would desire honor regardless of the mal-distribution of honors, but he has no chance of success if there is not some mal-distribution of honors, at least one which he believes to exist, in order to get started. Is that what you meant?

(Inaudible response).

Yes, but in this case Aristotle does not mean envy. What is in his mind -- Aristotle doesn't make psychoanalysis -- what is in the mind of the man is the awareness, the opinion that honors are mal-distributed and this opinion is shared by others. Otherwise it would be hopeless. That gives him an opportunity to begin, but the effect for the sake of which he is engaging in this dangerous enterprise is honor. Yes?

"... are you saying that honor is being used more or less ... the way we use power, in this context? We use power in two ways. We use it as a quality of a state -- a sort of position -- and also we use it as a means by which we do certain things. That is more like the physical sense of power in energy. Now it seems to me that if you mean power here you mean it in the first sense -- "

No, then we would have to go into a more -- there is also the meaning of legal power, which doesn't have any of the connotations which you mean. But what I thought of was simply when you speak of a power hungry man; he wants to acquire power. Power is an object of desire. Is this not frequently used today in this sense?

"Right, but you don't know which one it refers to. I mean you might be talking about something which you can, more or less, make equivalent, or at least on the same level with wealth and prestige. That is, an office might have wealth and prestige. It might have power."

Yes, but still, power in itself means the ability to hurt and to help. Is that what is meant by it?

"Well, that's one thing: yes."

Yes, but it is interesting, while the Greeks were familiar with that -- the expression occurs very frequently -- that is not such a primary -- such a thing they refer to easily as a great native of politically active men. That they call honor and this word -- I mean, honor not in the sense in which we speak of a man of honor, but it means something else. But therefore, say honor-glory. . . . Power may seem to be something very solid, but is not as such resplendent. I try to express it in sensual terms: how it appears to the senses. Now, and I think that is in itself a very interesting point: that the word honor-glory has almost disappeared from our political vocabulary. Churchill is a remarkable exception but he was, as Laczi put it, an anachronism and that's one sign of the anachronistic character of Churchill.

But -- whereas power comes to us naturally. I mean, of course, power -- that's a long question because of the old ambiguities of power corresponding to the Latin potestas, which means official, legal power, and potentia, which means, so to say, the physical power.

"I think we use prestige -- "

Yes, but prestige has, of course, always a derogatory meaning. I mean, whatever the social scientist may say, if you say a man is concerned with prestige you say something very bad about him, but if you say he's concerned with honor and glory you do not necessarily say something bad about him. Of these things you cannot get rid by the process of methodical purification or sterilization, as would be a better expression. Now, so -- and then Aristotle gives some other motives. I mean, it is clear what gain means. Gain means, of course, greater wealth; and honor means insolence also, but insolence acts as a motive in which way? No -- fearing the insolence of those who rule. People do not start revolutions out of insolence, generally speaking, but they are induced to start a rising by insolence shown by the rulers, fear, superiority, contempt and so on and so on. We don't have to go into that. Another point: then Aristotle mentions some things which have nothing to do with the previous consideration. That was the question raised by Miss O'Neill at the end of her paper. Is said thought of justice or injustice in the minds of the revolutionaries, as we would say, essential according to Aristotle? That was your question. Now let us take this -- in the other cases it is rather clear. For example, if we take the case of the fear of these people who do it out of fear, one could at least argue that the people who fear to be condemned have some notion that they ought not to be condemned. I mean, in other words, that they are of the opinion that even if they are legally condemned to death the law is wrong. But let us take another case which seems to be entirely outside of the sphere of morality, in 1303a25. All right -- read this --

"Heterogeneity of stocks may lead to sedition -- at any rate until they have had time to assimilate. A state cannot be constituted from any chance body of persons, or in any chance period of time. Most of the states which have admitted persons of another stock, either at the time of their foundation or later, have been troubled by sedition. There are many instances."

Yes: you omit them. Only later on after he mentions the Sybarites, he says --

"At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with the other settlers who had joined them in its colonization; and demanding special

privileges, on the ground that they were the owners of the territory, they were driven out of the colony."

You see here the claim would of course present itself as a just claim. And I think you can also see it just by looking around -- that in all cases where differences of stock or any other differences come in these differences present themselves as reasons for rightful superiority of one part to the other. That simply enters. Very few people are so cynical as to say I don't have the slightest shadow of right and yet I want to have this and this, say, discriminatory measure. They will always adduce -- try to adduce reasons and quite a few necessarily believe in the truth of it. I mean, that is partly a very sad story but that is an important fact. Without this notion it doesn't work. The whole element of indignation which enters is inseparable from some notions of right. We deserve to be treated differently or better, you deserve to be treated worse. That enters necessarily. I think to that extent the notion of justice comes in. Whether it is true in all cases remains to be seen. Now later on -- a bit later in bl2, after he has given the example of Athens and the Peiraeus. Do you have that?

"Taking our analogy from war, where the dividing line of a ditch, however small it may be, makes a regiment scatter in crossing, we may say that every difference is apt to create a division. The greatest division is perhaps that between virtue and vice; then there is the division between wealth and poverty; and there are also other divisions, some greater and some smaller, arising from other differences. Among those last we may count the division caused by difference of territory."

In other words, so there are differences among human beings, necessarily. Now the differences -- not all differences have this character. For example, the difference between men and women does not ordinarily lead to a league of men versus a league of women, but the politically indistinct differences are those which potentially generate hatred. Taxis is a word of — difference engenders hatred, only this difference — is meant here by Aristotle. But hatred has, in itself, nothing to do with right and wrong, with the sense of right and wrong. But it becomes politically effective, I think -- that is what Aristotle means -- only when it undergoes this modification by virtue of which the hatred appears as rightful hatred. Not in all cases: there are so-called cynics who are in no way affected by that, but this is not the typical case of what we may call the revolutionary. Now, of which case did you think, Miss O'Neil, in particular where one doesn't see any notion of right and wrong, however wrong the notion may be?

(Inaudible response).

Well, here it's quite obvious. You have this story — this poem about the heiress and what was this? Do you remember it? The bridegroom wanted to fetch the bride and they didn't give it to him. He was, of course, terribly insulted, but to feel insulted means to feel that a wrong has been done. You see, in Plato's Republic you find a division of the parts of the soul into three. The first let us call reason or calculation. The lowest he calls desire and the center one he calls, in beautiful English translation, spiritedness. The Greek word is. Now this spiritedness — that is a very complex phenomenon and one very powerful indication of it, very common indication of it, is anger. Now in anger, according to Aristotle, there is always a notion, in the case of man, at any rate, of injustice. Take the simple case: you hurt yourself at a chair or a table and you hit back. What is implied? The chair should not have done that — and still more so in the case of anger at human beings. Well, at any rate, this middle thing, this very usual and commonplace phenomenon which Plato calls spiritedness has this in itself and moreover — one could also put it this way. In order that there be a revolution or a rising there has to be some anger. If people are just easy going, or maybe suffering; people can suffer and yet be easy going, but if they do not acquire anger, develop anger against fellow citizens. Yes? That's necessary. But in this very anger some notion of being dealt with unjustly is implied and ordinarily will become explicit. In the political discussions, when they argue it out before it comes to the fighting they will, of course, speak of right and wrong all the time and that is never, or hardly ever, mere

. I mean, to that extent, I believe, it would go through. I do not know — well, for example, take this: the example of the city consisting of two geographically somewhat different parts. If the two parts of the city — the one on the right bank of the river and the other on the left bank — find it very inconvenient — this arrangement — and think it is much better for each to form a city by itself there wouldn't be any rising. There would be an amiable agreement that they form independent cities and they have to take care of their common business — you know, debts or what have you, in a decent way. There would be no rising. So that the violence could enter there would have to be some opposition to that proposal or some opposition to the specific terms of the proposal; say, that the people of the right bank would say: no, the debts must be paid by the old city on the left bank, and this kind of thing. That, I think, is what Aristotle means. Yes, well this point — that was brought up in a certain connection — I don't know — regarding when Aristotle makes the remark about the destruction of democracies by demagogues, he inserts a reflection on the difference between the present day demagogues and the demagogues of the past. In the past the demagogues became tyrants. Today, meaning in Aristotle's time, they do no longer become tyrants and that has something to do with the fact that in the older times no one could acquire political leadership

if he was not, at the same time, a military leader and therefore a man capable to lead armed men and that was it. Today they are no longer capable to do that and the typical weapon of the demagogue is not arms but speech. Some one of you had a certain difficulty -- no? Is this not intelligible? Aristotle makes the qualification, by the way: he says very rarely, because in the case of Cleon in the Peloponnesian War you had someone, Cleon, who in a very surprising way proved to be militarily successful although perhaps by some plagiarism from some military man that he did that. I don't believe that this raises a question of principle. Next time we will, then, have a discussion of Book --
Mr. Grant, Michael Grant.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 12, May 5, 1961

... You say Aristotle is — in a way — you didn't say this as criticism but just as an observation which we must make. On the one hand he regards tyranny as a polity and on the other hand he says it is not a polity. What's your explanation?

"Well, in part there is one example and that is that one factor involved in a polity or a regime is distribution of office. . . and certainly this can't be the case in a tyranny, but it mainly stems from the fact that the end of a regime which identifies it as such is the good and the virtuous life, and certainly — "

Or the common good.

"Or the common good; yes. And certainly a tyrant rules only for himself."

Yes, that is so. That is one — a difficulty goes with the whole group of which Aristotle was, of course, aware and he solved it himself on a certain occasion somewhere in Book III when he raises the question, what is the citizen. And, for example someone by a very illegitimate rebellion — certain people who were not citizens before became citizens. Are they citizens, is the question, to which Aristotle says they may be illegitimately citizens or, in Greek, they may be unjustly citizens but they are citizens, and he refers to the general — the other aspect: people may rule unjustly, i.e. their ruling may be illegitimate, but they rule nevertheless. In other words, Aristotle was a man of common sense and therefore this ambiguity was — or take the other example, the famous discussion especially in the Middle Ages: is an unjust law a law? According to the more favored view in the Middle Ages an unjust law is not a law, but that's not Aristotle's opinion. We couldn't speak of unjust and bad laws if we didn't say they are laws. They're bad laws, just as a bad chair is nevertheless a chair. It's a, how shall I say, a . How do you say it in English? A chair which is not genuinely — doesn't fulfill the function of a chair. It has somehow missed the mark, but it is visible that the mark at which it aimed was to be a chair. So, in other words, the ambiguity is perfectly defensible. To the extent to which it does not fulfill the natural function tyranny is not a regime, but to the extent to which the crude fact of ruling exists it is a regime. Yes?

"I think that this is the only place in which he says rather flatly it leaves something which is not a regime at all. Elsewhere he says -- he uses the perversion and the unnatural but it has, at least, the character of it."

Yes, but that — I mean what he — do you remember the context, the example which he gives. The remark about the regime becomes fully clear from the example. You remember what — the example he uses? You take a nose. Now you have — well, there is a certain natural nose which is — not only fulfills its function but is beautiful. Now — be perfectly normal as a statuary of Athena or Apollo would fit in a nose. And now you see other slight modifications — a little bit of a snub nose and a little bit of an eagle's nose. Now think of the many beautiful girls with a snub nose who are even beautified by that. So minor variations are irrelevant, but when you go beyond that and make a nose which would be super snub then it becomes aggregate. And it is even imaginable that from a certain stage on it becomes useless as a nose where it can no longer fulfill the function of smelling. And then — in other words, if you go on and on in making such improvements because you think a snub nose is particularly nice and then you say a hundred per cent snub nose must be still nicer. Think of a man who is in love with a snub nosed girl and would then make a theory of it. Then he would reach the conclusion: the perfectly snub nosed girl — that would be just a caricature. In the end it would cease to be a nose. Now what is the analogy in political matters? You have a democracy and you say, government of the people, for the people, by the people, and the more it is government by the people the more democratic it is and then you would say, well, government by representatives is only an imperfect form of government by the people. You know the famous arguments by the Marxists, by Sorel and by so many others. And so you say all right, let us have as many referenda, as many public opinion polls as possible and so on and so on. And then you get — that is all more democratic in the sense that this is more snub nosed. And so finally you get something which leads to the breakdown of democracy. So that ceases to be a regime, and if you follow that, which in practice is less impossible — as a completed snub nosed nose, it is no longer a nose. If you follow the logic of it you would reach a system which is no longer a system. I think that's what he means, and the argument is, of course, of some importance. You see — in other words, when you are following the logic of democracy regardless you destroy democracy. Not everyone knows that so we should keep this in mind.

Now you made a number of observations; for example, you recognized what Aristotle says about education, political education, as the phenomenon now called political socialization. I'm sure there is a kinship, but let us try and see whether there is not also a difference. What does it mean, I mean if you disregard the high falootin things and come down to the brass tacks. What does political socialization mean? Take the babies, which may be born conservative or liberal according to the famous verse. Still, he doesn't know it so something has to be done about it. How does he become an actual conservative. . . .

(Inaudible response).

That would not necessarily do. There have been very wealthy Whigs -- i very poor Tories.

"No -- well the concept of political socialization here -- I attempted in the sentence just after I made that -- "

No, no, it was a very helpful remark, but let us follow it up.

"Well, as I was going to say, I attempted to say in the sentence after that, the modern concept differs essentially in that I think it is mainly directed in terms -- it doesn't reach the personal life as much as does Aristotle's teachings on the effects of education -- "

But still there is something in common. Let us try to get that out.

"Yes: the inculcation of an attitude -- "

Yes, but how does it take place? I mean --

"Teaching through -- "

Well, teaching -- what kind of teaching do you give a five year old child -- I mean, do you say let us read the Constitution together or what do you do?

"Obviously not. . . ."

Exactly -- by what? On what? Pardon? (Inaudible remark). That is too complicated. (Inaudible exchange). How does it go? How do you do this terrific thing? How do you do it? Do you take a . . . or what? You tell him. The telling doesn't have to be done -- that is true -- by articulate words. It may be done by intonation. But still. . . . Yes, but what does this telling mean? I mean that is not generally telling. For example, you tell him this is a tree. That is not quite the same kind of telling. What do you do?

"It's in part the teaching of a moral code extended to -- "

You tell him, this is -- I mean, I give you one example. You say this is not nice. You can say it with all the intonations you please or only shaking your head if shaking the heads means, in your society, disapproval, or in other societies it means the opposite. Yes, but what is the point? There are certain things which the child -- for example, you do not have to tell the child to have hunger. I mean, you may have to tell him how to satisfy hunger, in the case of a human being -- not in the case of a puppy -- that is another matter. But there are certain things which are mediated, you can say -- which children learn only by a certain kind of mediation, but there must be some natural incentives

-- let us use the old fashioned language -- a convention is introduced in the mind of the child and he's molded by this convention. But there must be a natural peg in the child on which you can hold the convention. What is that? I suppose the old story: love, a desire for being praised and abhorance of being blamed. You can also use the various gradations; there is honor, there is glory, but simply to be liked or to be disliked. That is the way in which it takes place and that, I think, is also what the people mean today. For example, the people who would bring up a child as a conservative, to use this absolutely indistinctions conservative and liberals. . . . by praising, say, a liberal senator and blaming a conservative -- making nasty remarks when a conservative president appears on the TV and smiling gratifiedly when you see a liberal senator. This kind of thing gradually -- after a short while the child will have accepted it. . . . I mean this thing exists; there is no question, but the question is whether that is what Aristotle is concerned with.

(Largely inaudible remark).

Yes, sure; also actions, but still the child -- a small child would not necessarily understand that in a given case the parents act on the principle, be particularly considerate when dealing with underdogs. Somehow the word has to be introduced sooner or later. You can also have other expressions of that. So without language I think it is impossible, but is that what Aristotle has in mind or is it a special kind of political socialization which he has in mind? Well, spoke now of the example of conservative or liberal. . . . is this the problem of Aristotle here? What does he speak about in his own terms? He doesn't speak of political socialization because -- I tell you why he doesn't do it -- because he would say socialization is not necessarily adult. Every human being -- every baby in the cradle is already, somehow, socialized by the peculiar -- not only because it needs its mother's breast and other kinds of care but the peculiar helplessness which the human baby has compared with other young animals shows that he is meant to be for social life. It's connected with that. So socialization takes care of itself, but a specific -- in other words, he is social to begin with. He is undeveloped in every respect and therefore also in his sociality. That is nothing new. What does Aristotle speak about?

"I suppose the -- then maybe he's speaking of the inculcation of actions and attitudes. . . ."

Do me a favor. How does Aristotle call it?

"Spirit, and totally, influence."

He has a very common word which we use all the time, a very simple word: education. He speaks of education. So number one. All right; he can say if you bring up a child to be a conservative, it's also an education, but what kind of education? Does Aristotle mean the education to a conservative, a liberal, a radical or whatever there exists on the rainbow? Does he speak of that? Because we must recognize the present day analogue to what Aristotle means. . . I'm amazed -- I mean, otherwise you understood the main lines very well. An education towards the regime, not towards the party. So, in other words, the education to democracy when democracy is established, to oligarchy when the oligarchy is established. That's the point, and Aristotle would say an education towards a special party is politically most undesirable because it aggravates the divisive things which exist anyway. Whether Aristotle is right or wrong in that matter would depend on a very close study of the goodness and badness of parties into which we cannot -- Aristotle had the old fashioned view that parties are a disease of the body politic, and a view which lasted a very long time. In the Federalist Papers you still find the traces of the older view. Parties are, perhaps, inevitable but they are not good whereas the prevalent view today is that it's something good. It's a very long question and the fact that it seems to be practically decided for the western countries since the nineteenth century surely, of course, doesn't prove that it will always be so decided and still less does it give us a sound theory of parties. For that purpose one would have to make quite a few reflections and think about that. When that came up for the first time -- that someone spoke in an approving manner of parties and not merely as a kind of inevitable pestilence -- I mean in the older literature you can distinguish between those who say it is an avoidable pestilence and those who say it is an inevitable pestilence, but the present day view is that they are no pestilence at all but are an essential part of the working of a free society and one would have to go into that very difficult question which is usually not raised because people take the given, the now given, for granted. They absolutize it and that is called objective science. Now if you would go back, where would you start Mr. . . I mean if you would try to clarify that -- go back behind the conventions of the present day and dig deeper into the problem. How would you proceed?

"How would I proceed -- you mean, as a method, or where would I look -- at which specific people?"

Yes -- because a method -- if it is not spelled out into a researchable project -- is of very little use.

"I think my method would be to go back and examine what has been said about parties in the past and probably back to people like Burke. . . who first began to talk of parties as parties. Most of the literature talking about parties before that conceived them more in terms of factions . . ."

Yes, sure. In other words, pestilence.

"And certainly, I think the modern view of parties begins about that time and from then on you get a kind of incorporation of the party into the parliamentary system and with the legitimization of the parliamentary system you also get a legitimization of the party system."

Yes, and you would have to consider, for example, that the European distinction between conservatives and liberals was really based on an overall view of liberal society: that it is a society which requires both progress and order and therefore there should be representatives of the two elements, progress and order; conservative and liberal.

"There is another point too one can make and that is that parties themselves even from the relatively recent time they can be spoken of as parties changed their character -- that is, their empirical character, so that they're not exactly the same sort of thing anymore. This again forces one to reconsider whether they're good or bad in the terms that were first put because since they're a different kind of phenomenon they have to be reconsidered -- "

Well, I would like to draw your attention, at least of some of you, to a statement which I regard particularly informative. It is indeed -- unfortunately not written by a political scientist or a specialist, an academic specialist in parties, but a practical specialist in parties; namely, Winston Churchill, who, as you know, switched parties more than once and that did not detract entirely from his political successes, as you know. Now he discusses it in his Marlboro, when he speaks of the situation as it existed under William or Orange at the beginning and where it was absolutely an open question whether one should not have a national cabinet rather than -- meaning both Whigs and Tories -- rather than as the fanatical Whigs wanted, a pure Whig party. The fanatical Tories wanted to have a pure Tory party. And Churchill discusses that with an amazing open-mindedness and does not reject it as a pipe-dream, but the decision was taken at that time, more or less. Except in times of great crisis you had party government. One would also, I believe, consider one point which, as far as I know, is not considered in the literature and that is this. If you take the clearer example of the continental European or even altogether European parties with clearly different principles. So this party system is then based on the view that in a society there ought to be a variety of subordinate principles -- not the highest principles. Otherwise there would be no possible consensus. But of very important subordinate principles such a variety is good. That is the premise of a very powerful view on parties. That is -- this view, I believe, did not arise in a political context proper, but was prepared by some-

thing earlier which you all knew and I think people don't usually think of when they speak of the problem of parties, and that is religious tolerance. Religious tolerance means exactly that the people can have entirely different principles of very great importance but which are, politically speaking, subordinate to the concern of peace, however you call it. And that -- I think that one should study how far the notion of religious tolerance as a theory of religious tolerance as it came to be developed in the 16th, 17th century, is not a kind of hidden background for these political religions, if I may say so, which are the parties. Yes?

"Well, I think this last point you made is supported in a fairly prominent article on parties by a man named Leslie Lipsen who, in analyzing British parties -- the evolution of British parties -- makes this very point: that these two parties, at least in the nineteenth century, were based upon this kind of . . . religious issue which underlies, even until very late. . . ."

Yes; the only question -- sure, I didn't know that; I'm very glad. But I think what I would want in addition is to see whether there is no linkage theoretically between the theory of parties in the earlier formative stages and the theory of toleration as developed in the 16th, 17th centuries. Yes?

"In reference to Aristotle, I wonder if his emphasis on the polis and the form of government in which most citizens are familiar with their rulers. . . it occurs to me that in a situation that he tries to describe parties would play a role and a pernicious role that would be very different from a situation where you aren't familiar with the rulers, in which the party system, including the two party system, may be primarily a method of institutionalizing a certain kind of familiarity on the part of some of the citizens to the ruler."

Yes, that could all be, but I think that was not the original legitimization of parties and in addition you have, of course, parties and very passionately opposed parties in large societies -- much larger than a city. Think of the and that went through the whole western world and and that was not exactly non-violent for some time.

"Well. . . if you take parties where they work best rather than where they work worst, for instance, say in a place like France; if you take them in a place like Great Britain this element may, at least when you analyze what they do today, may be very important."

Yes, there is no question, but still the difficulty, I think, would arise immediately when one would go into the deeper stratum of the theoretical concept of the party. I mean, surely that something works is for practical reasons sufficient at the time but you always -- even for practical reasons you have to go beyond that because what is working means it has worked from then till now. Some thoughts about the future are inevitable if you want to -- and therefore, in order to get the necessary perspective, you have to go back to other situations in which the system did not exist and hence, not work.

"Yes, the only point I would make is that for this reason it's terribly important to go back to Aristotle because the Aristotelian conception of familiarity, as you describe it is -- I raised it for its theoretical rather than its practical significance and I think in terms of -- if one wanted to reconstruct or to construct a theory of parties today one might very well have to go back to that concept, which I think might very well explain, say, the success of Britain. . . ."

Yes, but the question is this -- you mean because of the local constituencies or the fact that it was for a very long time a group -- a small number of big families who ruled the country. But what kind of familiarity do you mean now?

"What I'm essentially saying is that for one thing it is the party system that re-introduces, as much as it can, the Aristotelian concept of establishing familiarity by the ruled with their rulers."

Yes, sure. Well, that is the great problem of mass society in all areas. Mr. Faulkner.

"I'm just wondering if you want to continue this party discussion."

No.

"Because if you did, I had a point; if you didn't -- "

All right. Then make it.

"You mentioned religious tolerance. Couldn't one take it as a forerunner of many-principled parties? Couldn't one take it back even farther and say that the notion that opinions belong out of political control strictly, out of the realm of the state, could go right back to, perhaps, strengthen the Christian church and their theoretical ideas?"

Yes, sure. I believe -- and that has been said many times -- that the ideological character of modern politics is a kind

of heritage from the religious Western tradition. I mean, you must have heard this n times, that these things agree, in the case of communism and fascism, because — that these are political religions. But the question is whether this element of the political religion is not also present, to some extent at least, in democracy. That's what you imply.

"I didn't mean to say that; perhaps I did. Just that the notion that there is a sphere of opinion that is not the concern of us in the political writings could go back not merely to toleration of religion but even before that to the notion of — "

Yes, but that leads into a very difficult question whether, to the extent to which that is true, is there not the church itself a political entity, to use this awful word, entity. You must not forget this — such a term as the Christian — how is Christendom called traditionally? The Christian republic, the Christian commonwealth; here you have the political expression and the distinction between the political and secular according to which, from this point of view, the secular — only the secular is a political, would not be sufficient, then, from full understanding of the church, say, in the Middle Ages. That would be a very long question, but we have now to turn to some —

Now you — there is one point regarding which I have simply to apologize and that concerns the external causes of the destruction of tyranny. I simply had forgotten these ten lines last time and so I said the thing which is not and I must, therefore, eat my words. Now, clearly Aristotle says in this section, in 1312b, the beginning, that tyrants are frequently destroyed by external causes, and he refers there — perhaps we read that passage: the beginning of 1312b.

"One of the ways in which a tyranny may be destroyed — and the same is true, as we have already noted, of all other forms of government — is by external causes. Another state, with an opposite form of constitution, may be stronger than a tyranny. The conflict of opposite principles will obviously lead such a state to will the destruction of the tyranny; and where there is a will, and power behind it, there is always a way. This opposition of constitutions may take different forms."

Yes, and so on. We don't need that. In other words, by the very difference of regimes there is given a desire to destroy the different regimes. But the desire is, of course, not identical with the power to do so and therefore people don't do it but think of present day: if we could wish the Soviet government and some other regimes of the same kind would disappear. Unfortunately we can't do it; vice versa. But Aristotle makes this

universal and says that every regime has the tendency to universalize itself and since tyranny is particularly atrocious and also very rare it is, so to speak -- his hand is against everyone and everyone's hand against him and that is surely what Aristotle says. Now this leads, as Mr. Bartholomew rightly remarked, to a fundamental issue in international politics or in the doctrine regarding that. I do not know -- that is absolutely true but I do not know how you meant the latter.

"Well, what I meant was the debate on ideological imperialism. In other words, the extent to which there is a dynamic operative in a regime which leads them to wish to impose upon others their own forms."

Yes. Now, of course that is a somewhat special formulation -- ideological -- because then we presuppose there must always be an ideology, which Aristotle denies. For example, the tyrant in Aristotle doesn't have an ideology. He may have certain convenient rights but that's no ideology. No, let us forget about the ideology. Now the question is this: that the traditional view based on classical literature -- Aristotle among that -- was that any state may effect changes in any other state because that state is wicked. Traditionally expressed, if a given state commits crimes against moral law, natural law, it is legitimate for every other state to interfere with that, to stop that. That was the traditional view. Needless to say, that is not quite the same as what Aristotle says but as far as international law is concerned it amounts to the same thing. Is intervention on grounds of disapproval with the established regime legitimate? Aristotle doesn't have any doubt about it, nor does the whole tradition have any doubt. So, in other words, wars of civilization, as they have sometimes to be called, were regarded as legitimate by the tradition and such works like Thomas More's Utopia, you know, where the word "civilization" plays a very great role, simply follows the tradition. The last great statement on this effect you would find in Hugo Grotius' Laws of War and Peace, but Grotius had already defended. In the meantime, a school had emerged which held that you cannot interfere with another state -- its inner order -- unless you yourself have been hurt by it, by that state, not by its measures. In other words, if this state has done you wrong then you may -- but that you can do in any case. Now this view was developed by certain Spanish thinkers in the 16th century, Vascquez, Molina, and sometimes called the fathers of international law, and they did it for a very respectable reason. They saw what the Spaniards had done to the Indians in America and on grounds of a war of civilization against these savages, and they thought everyone would be better off if this were stopped once and for all. So that -- now later on with the development of the doctrine of sovereignty that became, of course,

axiomatic: non-intervention. There is no higher judge of any state except the state itself. Needless to say that the older tendency, which has deep roots in human nature, continued up to the present day. That goes without saying, but as far as theory is concerned I think the really -- the notion that war of civilization, as we may call it, is in itself legitimate is, generally speaking, the traditional view and I simply had completely forgotten this connection. Therefore I made that glaring error I made last time.

Now there were some other points which you mentioned. You pointed out rightly the topical character of Aristotle's analysis of tyranny. It is indeed amazing and certain things obviously have not changed at all. That is quite true, but you said -- you referred to the unheard of improvements which tyranny has made in those 2,300 years since Aristotle. But I would only -- I think you are right, but I would say that doesn't affect the truth of Aristotle at all because these are the same kind of things. I mean you have -- you may have a better -- if you have these beautiful things where you can listen in to any conversation people have in their bedroom and that makes the control -- the abolition of privacy -- still more effective, but the aim is the same: abolition of privacy.

"... I do think that if you accept the point made that Aristotle considers tyrannies unstable these new tools that tyranny has might cause us to re-evaluate -- "

That is an important point. That is, you believe, your important point. But unfortunately our experiences are too short. In the case of Mussolini and Hitler, Aristotle's prognosis proved to be correct. In the case of Soviet Russia -- well, you know after all it doesn't last yet -- I mean how long does it last now? 42 years or so. All right, so that is perfectly within the time span so we have to leave it to future generations to see whether Aristotle was -- but even surely a subordinate matter because no one can deny that something radical has changed between Aristotle and us and that might very well be one of the consequences of it.

Now then the last point where you give a fair summary -- but I think that when we -- Aristotle's critique of Plato -- but we should take that up -- perhaps, begin with that, in 1316a. Aristotle concludes the fifth book with a critical analysis of what, apparently, was the only earlier discussion of the subject of risings plus changes of regimes; namely, Plato's Republic: Book VIII and IX. Now let us read the beginning.

"We may note, in conclusion, that the subject of constitutional change is treated by Plato in the Republic; but the treatment is defective. In the first place, he fails to mention specifically the cause of the change peculiar to his own first and ideal constitution."

Yes, you see the word -- what he translates peculiar means, literally translated, proper, particular -- what is proper to that, peculiar to that. That is the point. Plato is -- that is Aristotle's concern: always with the peculiar, with the proper of a thing and not sweeping. That's the general criticism and now, why does he not do it? Well, we don't have to read that. The main point: the reason which Plato gives -- everything which comes into being perishes -- applies to every change. That doesn't help us to understand the change from the rule of philosophers to the rule of Spartan gentlemen. Is he not right? And how. We must later on see, perhaps, what Plato meant by that. And the natural number: of course that is also not a clear explanation. There is a little point which we should read a little bit later on after he speaks of the natural number and that is when he says that nature sometimes produces inferior men. Do you have that? Immediately -- four lines later, where you left off.

"This implication, in itself, is perhaps not incorrect: there may be persons who cannot possibly be educated or made into good men. (Oh: the earlier sentence). The implication here is that the reproduction of the species sometimes issues in men of poor quality, who are beyond the reach of education. . . . But why should this be a cause of change peculiar -- "

No; what did he say in this parenthetic remark? For it happens that there are some who -- regarding whom it is impossible that they can be educated and become decent men. That is a very important remark. It is not unique, but that's perhaps the clearest remark of Aristotle and that is -- let us consider that for one moment, what that means. Some people cannot be educated. Educated means here morally educated, as it almost always means in Plato and Aristotle. Some people cannot become decent (sic) because they do not have the nature for that -- required for that. What does that mean? It is a very important statement. What does it mean? Someone brought up on a former occasion the problem of natural law in Aristotle. According to the ordinary understanding of natural law, the natural law is a law which obliges all men and this implies that all men are able to comply with that; not with all -- surely there are refinements of the natural law which are not accessible to everyone, but the crudest and most massive provisions are accessible to everyone. For Aristotle that doesn't exist. Some people are simply -- and that does not refer merely to moronic people where everyone would admit it, but also for other reasons because they are not moronic at all but they have such a temper, such a mixture of the elements and so on that they cannot be controlled and cannot control themselves. I should mention this in passing in connection with this discussion: when people speak today of natural law, and for some countries, they think mainly of, according to the western tradition, of something like the *decoalogic*, the second table of the *decoalogic*:

the provision against murder, theft, and so on. That didn't play such a great role for Plato and Aristotle. Not that they were in favor of murder and theft, which God forbid, but from their point of view these were the least interesting things. Every society -- even the tyrant will somehow take care that these things be prevented. The interesting things are the higher things; namely, the proportional equality -- this consideration. Therefore, the question of natural law in the traditional way directly posed to Plato and Aristotle comes -- lies something athwart to what they were interested in, but this only in passing. Let us read on where we left off.

"But why should this be a cause of change peculiar to the ideal state depicted in the Republic, rather than one common to all states, and indeed to all things in existence? There is a further point. Can the efflux of time, which, he says, causes all things to change, explain how things which did not begin simultaneously should simultaneously undergo change?"

In other words, the fact -- the velocity of change is a very important consideration. I mean, if you have a democracy for a thousand years or for one year is practically of the utmost importance and the general principle which Plato gives doesn't explain why the one thing lasts so long and the other so short. Yes?

"Does a thing which came into existence on the day before the turn of the tide change simultaneously? Again, we may ask why the ideal state should turn into a state of the Spartan type. Constitutions change, as a rule, more readily into an opposite than into a cognate form. The same argument also applies to the other changes mentioned by Plato, when he depicts the Spartan type as changing into oligarchy, oligarchy into democracy, and democracy into tyranny. The very reverse may equally happen: democracy, for example, can change into oligarchy, and indeed it can do so more easily than it can change into monarchy. When it comes to tyrannies Plato stops: he never explains whether they do, or do not, change, nor, if they do, why they do so, or into what constitution they change. The reason of this omission is that any explanation would have been difficult. The matter cannot be settled along the lines of his argument; for on those lines a tyranny would have to change back into the first and ideal constitution, in order to maintain continuity in the revolving cycle of change."

Let us stop here. You see, Aristotle takes it for granted that Plato must have meant a cycle, as I mentioned on a former

occasion, and that would, of course, raise a most annoying question, that the best regime should somehow emerge out of the worst, out of tyranny. That's awful. Now we must try -- so the point which Aristotle simply makes can be said very simply. That is, a mere sweeping assertion contradicted by innumerable facts. It's not true that oligarchies move -- change into democracies. We have seen the opposite and so on and so on. So Aristotle is absolutely right. What could one say in defense of Plato? I suppose -- I hope there are quite a few of you who have read these most eloquent pages and does Aristotle really exhaust the issue by his sound remark, his absolutely sound remark? What did Plato mean? What Aristotle does not take into account perhaps. What would, say, a modern Plato enthusiast say in reply to those pedestrian remarks of Aristotle? Pedestrian, if true,

"Does it have anything to do with Plato not so much analyzing historical change, but . . . virtue, because it seems to me that as you move in the Republic you become less virtuous. There's a real virtue in a Spartan gentleman but it's all . . ."

Yes, but still Plato says much more: that this Spartan order -- Sparta of course not taken as this individual example, but this type of order will necessarily change into rule of the rich: oligarchy. That is what Plato says. Now, how can you -- I mean, historical change -- the word is inapplicable to both Plato and Aristotle -- simply changes of regimes. What can one say? Pardon?

"Is it that habituation isn't enough. . . . (Rest of this remains inaudible)."

Yes, but still, why should . . .

"Could one say, in a somewhat modern Marxist manner, that this stage had simply been skipped; that the cycle had been there but it had gone very rapidly?"

No. I think -- in the Marxist view these are not -- I mean, Marx says this as a matter of fact, that the feudal order changes into the bourgeois and bourgeois into the communist --

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, but that would only be complicating borderline cases. That would not be the clear development. No, no. Yes?

(Inaudible remark).

No. I am very surprised that you didn't give the answer which I think was obvious from the present day point of view. (Dr. Heimann).

"Well, he's concerned with a change in principle."

Yes, still --

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, now let me put it this way. That is also not the answer which I waited for, which I have then to give and Plato has this -- Plato connects ^{two} questions. The first is change of regimes. The second is the rank of the regimes, and Plato says the change follows the rank. The change is descent, is degeneration. But still, the ordinary answer given -- I mean, for example, by A. E. Taylor, a very well known student of Plato, is this. Aristotle -- that's a terrible empirical. Plato is an idealistic philosopher and he means of course something like ideal types and he doesn't want to tell us what is going on in the real world. That is -- you know -- and therefore the wonderfully clear character of the Platonic description compared with this very complicated matter -- this way, that way: almost everything is possible. There is only one thing wrong with this explanation and that is a lot; namely, one would have to show first that Plato regarded oligarchy, democracy, etc., -- and the best regime too -- as ideas. More radically, one would have first to show that from Plato's point of view there is an idea of the polis and I believe there is no shred of evidence whatever, so that won't work, but there is something which we can easily discern. Plato has an order of rank. That is perfectly definable, from the best regime down to tyranny. But what does this order of rank have to do with the sequence in time? Would not he -- if we look around, for example, don't we see that the imperfect, the undeveloped, precedes the developed? With what right can he assume that the whole thing begins with the best regime? Here we are. With what right can Plato assume that the movement begins with the best? There is here a clear premise which, if accepted, everything else follows. And what is that premise? No, not that is not explicitly stated and so. Under what condition does the order of rank, from the highest to the lowest, coincide with the temporal order?

"When you start with the highest."

Can't you express it in a form -- you start -- I, as an observer, start --

"When it precedes all the other forms -- as the first form in a particular city."

In the simple form of an equation: the best is the oldest, not only the first in rank. If that is true, everything follows. If the best is the oldest than the worst must be the youngest, i.e. the last. That's obvious, and the inference follows. Now this is of course -- that is the real pyramid of Plato, a premise of which Plato knew that it was wrong, but at the same time a premise of the -- an article of the deepest political importance.

because all societies somehow also assume, however progressive they may be, that the good is the old. That has always -- this equation has always a very deep appeal to men. Now if the good is the old then the best is the oldest and then everything follows, so it is perfectly "logical," but nevertheless wrong. And therefore, because it is so Plato himself makes clear that this is a mythical account. He calls it there a tragic account and you know he refers to some verses in Homer there. That doesn't exist, that we believe an ideal construction which is not meant to be empirically true but useful as a device for empirical studies. That doesn't exist there. It may have existed, to some extent, in Plato's astronomy. I do not know. But surely not there. Now this much -- and of course one would have to go into that question, whether it is proper in a political work to make use of such mythical premises. That's the issue between Plato and Aristotle and, of course, they did never discuss this question explicitly. We would have to re-construct the argument on both sides. It is much more developed by Plato in the dialogues -- his side of the matter -- before we can answer that. Yes?

"How could Aristotle take him so seriously? Why could Aristotle take his account so seriously?"

Because Aristotle always takes the obvious, the surface, very seriously even when he knows that this is only the surface, and I think that's the only sensible procedure. But, I mean, the question is whether one can leave it at that. For his purposes -- his purpose was here to show, to make manifest the truth regarding changes of regimes. What he had done and therefore he had to show that the only competitor for the same crown, Plato, did not -- said the thing which is not regarding the change of regimes. That is sufficient for his purpose. The explication -- Aristotle claims the principle that you have -- it is not sufficient to refute a theory; you have also to make intelligible how the error arose, but that you do not have to do in each case. I'm sure Aristotle had an explanation of that. In the case of the Republic he tried to trace it to the basic error, as you remember: the good is one and hence, the best is the most unified and so on. He doesn't do that here. Now there are a number of very important passages: one near where you began today, in 130c ff., which is almost the end of 130c, that one needs -- well, we can summarize; we don't have to read it. The qualities required for ruling offices -- magistracies, however you may call it. Now the three are -- which are the three?

"Loyalty, capacity, and virtue."

Yes. Loyalty means, literally, filially towards the established regime. And then the greatest ability regarding the works, the actions, the functions, of the cult in question, and third, virtue and justice in such public that which is required for the

polity. In other words, in a democracy he has to be just in the democratic sense, not in the aristocratic sense, and so on and so on. Now — and what is the general answer? What is most important? You see, Aristotle does not speak here — that's very interesting and is concealed by the translation loyalty — he does not speak of patriotism. He speaks of loyalty to the regime. Now why does he not mention that? Well, one could say that is implied. That does not enter — on the other hand, it is in no way sufficient. If he is a patriot, say in a democracy, he loves the city; but if he does not love the democracy, the democracy cannot employ. The problem is not whether he is a patriot or not. The problem is whether he's loyal to the regime, or not. Now what does he answer then? The interesting case. What is the most important? Well, that moral virtue is only then the most important if it is available in sufficient quantity. For example, in order to be a treasurer you must — it is absolutely necessary that you be honest, but this honesty is not so rare and at the same time the knowledge required for being a treasurer is, according to Aristotle, also very common. Therefore, the question in this case, you can say, honesty is the most important consideration. But in the case of a general in a tough war, you may have a general who is a first rate general but who is really an oligarch and in addition he may be an immoral man. Well, in such cases, even in the last war in all camps I think too — immoral in the wider sense of the term. But Aristotle says in this case first rate generals are so rare that we have to accept him although he is not very moral. Now this is one of the passages, I suppose, which people mean when they say in the fifth book Aristotle comes particularly close to Machiavelli — and also the section on tyranny. But what is the — let us not for one moment forget the difference between Aristotle and Machiavelli which remains always intact. What's the difference, if we take first this example? Well, Aristotle doesn't say the these things are incompatible: moral virtue and political utility. Aristotle says only in case of — you can't have all three together, which is the most urgent? That's an entirely different question. That it would be most desirable to have first rate generals who are loyal to the regime and men of great moral integrity goes without saying for him. In addition, of course, Aristotle always speaks — here, for example, in the case of the general — from the point of view of the city: which general she should prefer. He doesn't give advice to the general, of how he could promote his self-interest by unscrupulous action which is what Machiavelli, among other things, does. In addition, Aristotle notes in the sequel that moral vice can interfere with the fulfillment of the duties. He gives the example of a man who lacks temperance. Well, it's obvious that someone habitually given to drinking may have done too much. . . .

(Change of tape).

... and what Aristotle does not admit.

(Inaudible remark).

Or, in other words, moral virtue can interfere with that. That is Machiavelli: very good. Do you know an example of that where moral virtue would interfere or would have interfered successfully?

"The failure of the pious general to sail from Sicily with the enemy marching on him. . . ."

Yes, but the question is, was this piety not true piety? That would be the question. You mean . . . Yes, that's the question. He was regarded by quite a few moral Athenians as somewhat silly. So piety as he understood it is not necessarily moral virtue. Well, I give you a wholly mythical example but which says a lot and that stems from -- in this form -- from Machiavelli. The greatest commonwealth which Machiavelli believed to know was Rome and Rome was founded by a fratricide: Romulus killing his brother Remus. Machiavelli contends, on the basis of the old stories, that only by such an act of this magnitude could Rome have come into being. What Machiavelli means is universal. Every society of any political interest has such a thing built in. At some time -- it doesn't necessarily have to be the first moment -- at some time such a thing must happen if it is to become a great and prosperous society. And, of course -- I mean, if someone would say that time has a healing character -- usurpation can be justified by beneficence later on -- that doesn't do away with the fact that you began with usurpation. You know, that is just as a gangster who later on becomes respectable and gives students scholarships. He nevertheless was originally a gangster. So this question arises. Yes; but it is -- needless to say that in practice that is very difficult to prove. Machiavelli wisely chose such a mythical example because in actual fact you always have very complicated situations where a clear decision of whether an injustice was committed or not cannot be easily gotten. But I was very much impressed in reading Henry Adams' analysis of the Louisiana Purchase which he presents as a very dubious transaction. Napoleon didn't say what he sold and Jefferson bought it. and now what would this country do without the Louisiana Purchase? I mean, there are other examples. You know: the great problem. Aristotle refers to go into that at all. Yes, that we have discussed. Now we may perhaps now turn to the beginning of the discussion of monarchy in 1312a, end.

We have still, however, to treat of the causes of destruction and the forms of preservation. when the government is a monarchy. Generally what has already been said of constitutions proper is almost equally true of kingship and tyranny.

Now what will he say? I'm sorry; I didn't hear -- what has been said about it?

... constitutions proper. . .

Yes, no that is -- yes, that is different. Now Aristotle uses here the word *politeia*, which has many meanings. Now the most general meaning is regime and then it would apply, of course, to kingship as well as to any other, but in the most narrow sense it means one special regime and that is the polity -- you know, the one between oligarchy and democracy in which you have a not very high but not altogether negligible property qualification and, generally speaking, the men who are able to equip themselves with heavy arms form the citizen body. But then you have an intermediate regime which is least frequent. That you have here. (Writing on blackboard). And here *politeia* means republic, what we understand today by a republic, a non-monarchical regime. That's very interesting, that such a concept for a non-monarchical regime existed and that, of course, is in a way necessary because when Aristotle says the regime is the citizen body, what is translated here I believe the constitution is the government but what it really means is the regime is the citizen body, does not make sense if you don't have a body -- you know -- more than one. In other words, there is a certain natural kinship between the *polis* and republic, rather than one man's rule. There are quite a few passages, especially in the fifth book, where *politeia* obviously has this meaning. Yes. And now then he explains in the *second* first the difference between kings and tyrants. Generally speaking, a king is a man who takes the side of the gentlemen and a tyrant who takes the side of the common people. That's the way in which he begins. Now let us see, in the first case one little passage in 1310b toward the end when he speaks of the *civis* kings -- that kinship somehow belongs together with aristocracy. Pardon? After he spoke of *Ministratus*.

"Kingship, as we have already observed, may be classified as being in the nature of aristocracy. Like aristocracy it is based on merit. The merit on which it is based may consist in personal (or family) qualities; it may consist in benefits rendered; it may consist in a combination of both of these with capacity."

Let us stop here. You see here Aristotle makes a distinction between virtue and beneficent actions. It's not interesting? You understand that? Do you understand that? After all, is not the virtuous man identical with the beneficent man?

"Napleser. . . ."

What was that? He was?

(Incredulous response).

Yes, that is really controversial. . . . But take a less difficult case,

We discussed earlier how one can be superficially acting in a benevolent manner, but with reasons he's acting in those

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 13, May 10, 1960

. . . you raised at the end are the most important questions arising on the basis of this section could, perhaps, be dealt with. I mean, at least -- I mean, it all depends how you mean it. From Aristotle's point of view the question would be clearly the affirmative and you -- I see you wondered if Aristotle is right on that point.

"No. I think most of the questions I would answer affirmatively."

Just as he did. Yes. But then the question would be is this a major qualification of Aristotle there although surely he's right. Now you made a number of points -- one I mentioned -- where you are surely wrong, I believe. When Aristotle speaks of the demos, the people, the common people, as characterized by lack of education etc., you say this refers only to the worst kind of demos.

"Well, I did imply that."

No, I think that's universal. We come to that. But that is minor. Your reference to The Federalist Papers was very apt. Aristotle comes here very close to this hard headed approach of the Federalists. We will read that. The distinction which Barker makes between political and civil liberty -- one may doubt whether that's the best expression of that, but surely Aristotle's definition of democracy, or of freedom rather, is in need of some spelling out. Whether it is properly done by a distinction between political and civil liberty is another question. As for your characterization of the whole section: construction. That is, if I remember well, in Barker. . . . How does? Barker has headings for the individual books, doesn't he?

"Yes: he uses both construction and stability in the title of Book VI. Aristotle, in the part that I am reporting on, does not use the word stability but he does use the word construction, at one point -- "

How does he call Book VII, may I ask? What's the heading for Book VII?

"Political Ideals and Educational Principles."

Yes, I see. No, I have to take this up later: the question of the meaning of Book VII -- Book VI. Before I turn to that -- is Mr. [unclear] here? Yes; I saw your paper. It was rather late. May I first take this up for one minute because there are two points which are of some general interest. Speaking of the polity -- you remember the six regimes: kingship, aristocracy, plutocracy, timocracy, oligarchy -- you may -- one of them, the

manner are really not virtuous. . . ."

Yes, and perhaps also the other way round. Not every virtue has in itself a beneficent character, by which I do not mean that it is maleficent, but that it is indifferent in this respect. In other words, Aristotle is not a utilitarian. Virtue means the excellence of a human being and this excellence does in no way necessarily exist in beneficence. It may simply exist -- well, in a larger view it would be beneficent, but it would not show itself in particular beneficent actions, necessarily, and on the other hand the benefactor may be a very unsavory fellow. Sure; that we must never forget. Now a little bit later in 1331a near the beginning, where he says the aim of the tyrant -- do you have that -- is the pleasant.

"Tyranny, as we have often noted, is just the opposite. It has no regard to any public interest which does not also serve the tyrant's own advantage. The aim of a tyrant is his own pleasure: the aim of a king is the Good."

The noble. That really is bad. The noble. Yes?

"We can see the results which follow. A tyrant covets riches; a king covets what makes for renown. The guard of a king is a civic guard; the guard of a tyrant is a foreign guard of mercenary troops."

Let us stop here. Now how is this connected? You see Aristotle had said first -- you were somehow aware of this difficulty -- that the king and the tyrant (writing on blackboard) and the king is supported by the gentlemen and the tyrant by the common people, and here the aim is the noble and here the aim is the pleasant; and here, civic guard, and here, foreigners. Aristotle doesn't try to explain the connection. How can we ... is there a connection? Is there a connection between these elements? Well, I mean, are the common people concerned with the pleasant, whereas the gentlemen are concerned with the noble? Isn't that so, or is it more complicated?

"Gentlemen already have the pleasant."

No, no. The gentlemen are by definition concerned with the noble. That is clear, but are the common people concerned with the pleasant? Not quite. They are, generally speaking, too poor for that. They are concerned with the necessities. The tyrant is, of course, not simply a common man and therefore, as Aristotle says on a former occasion, people don't become tyrants in order not to starve or in order not to freeze to death. But still they are kind to the noble. They are concerned with the pleasure, and since the tyrant, however, in order to be a full fledged tyrant, must turn against the common people who first established him, therefore he has to take measures against them. That's the whole complicated situation, but yes, had a difficulty here with it.

do not remember now. Could you remind me?

"It was that I didn't think that this was the major motive of the -- the way I understood pleasure, pleasure and riches, I didn't think that these were the major motives of the tyrant. You consider four tyrants in the last two centuries, the two Napoleons, Mussolini, and Hitler -- no one would say these were the driving motives."

Yes, well in the case of Napoleon III profit played a very great role. He was terribly in debts and he depended absolutely on political success. Now, on the other hand, if you -- these people, after having become rulers -- the same applies also, of course, to Stalin -- lived very well. You must have read descriptions of these banquets and so on and the question -- Aristotle would say it's by no means uninteresting that these -- you know, I mean, you must have read in Churchill or in Hopkins' description of the banquets. They were quite extraordinary and apparently much more elaborate than they would get in the White House. That doesn't mean that's the motive but Aristotle would say does this way of life not throw light on what is going on. I mean, you know? After all you must not forget -- I mean . . . is a very different . . . and so on but that is also a somewhat different story, but Aristotle would say the fact that these were not men of very great temperance -- you know, they were not the first too -- is by no means irrelevant for the consideration. That's the first point. Yes, but the other point -- I grant you that these people were not -- then they could have become big business men and they could have had -- very big business men and they could also have had that. So they wanted something more. What is that, what they wanted, more than mere pleasure and money? You would you describe that?

"The power to do with the state as they will. The power to impose their own minds, desires, and will on the state, which is a form of pleasure I suppose."

No, no, no. Oh no. In other words, I mean, I would know it, for the time being, at the formulation they did that they did set of a political idealism, however misguided that may have been. What did you want, Mr. Hendrick?

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, glory. That would be the -- always the ancient view of that. Yes, but then Aristotle would say can men who strive for glory in this way which is utterly incompatible with true glory -- can "honor" be simply described as desire for glory or honor? That is the point. In other words, he would not -- Aristotle would say it is not sufficient to leave it at that, even for this individual. Subjectively, is the motive. One would have to make a discrimination. For example, the ancients -- the word which

we call ambition. translate ambition, means in Greek love of honor or and therefore -- love of honor -- and they distinguish between a noble love of honor and a base love of honor. The question is whether this -- well, we know these phenomena all the time; we observe them every day in politics and in private life. There are two kinds of motivations, fundamentally, which induce men to strive for being outstanding. This is a very ambiguous phenomenon and what Aristotle implies is that in such cases where ignoble actions are required all the time, cannot be understood in terms of a desire for honor even if the individual believes he is concerned with nothing but honor and therefore this interpretation that it is simply desire for pleasure and profit and this kind of thing. Yes?

"According to this classification, then, whereabouts would you put a man like Lenin. Would you consider him a king or a tyrant?"

No, I think according to Aristotle's description Lenin surely would have to be described as a tyrant, I believe, but perhaps not quite because in Lenin's -- that's a complicated case -- Aristotle says, you know. But I do not -- I have made this, sensed this many years ago and I can only repeat that -- that modern tyranny, as all modern phenomena, are not -- cannot simply be reduced to the phenomena which Aristotle had in mind. There is something which equally affects both the good and the bad modern things which was not present in classical politics. All the old tyrants -- that I think we can believe Aristotle and Plato -- were concerned with the promotion of their interest or of their family interests -- that amounts to the same thing. They did not have causes. As Aristotle puts it, if there -- well, there was only one cause which could arise for them and that is the good of the polis. How many of the tyrants were benefactors of their cities -- Miltiades in Athens, for example, surely -- and the tyrants have today a much better press than the ancient tyrants -- some of them -- than they had in ancient times. But Aristotle would say these fellows do it only as a means. You know, just as a certain type of politicians who would espouse, say a decent cause because it is a cause for which you are elected. And similarly we believe sometimes to have a certain sense of discernment: this fellow stands for the decent cause not only because it will bring him votes. He would even do it -- furthermore, in the like case we are absolutely sure if the opposite happened to be popular he would be in favor of that. This is the basis for that. In modern times there is always a cause, think of Cromwell to begin with, and then of Napoleon, and then of Macmillan, Hitler, Stalin, Lenin, of course, too. And to use a word which we have used in this connection more than once, the modern tyrannies are all based on ideology. There was no ideology there. There were lies. There were pretenses, naturally, but not a doctrine. And -- yes?

(Inaudible remark).

No, no, but we should really try to understand that because we are not entirely concerned with Aristotle but with Aristotle to the extent to which he can help us.

"I thought that Mr. Bartholomew's stress of what I would call psychological motive does not need to show up in Aristotle's formulation and I think Mr. Bartholomew's point was that the essence of tyranny can be the desire to dominate for the sake of domination or to impose one's will on other people for that alone. Modern psychology might say that there is a sadistic-nasochistic type of phenomenon."

Yes, I know that. Yet I must confess I have seen -- I know definitely only one case on my own observation where I saw a man doing the things he did obviously for this reason: he wanted to make people fear that he can make or break them. I mean, a case where there could be no doubt for any observer. I happened to see this in an summation, incidentally -- quite clear. I mean, whatever the merits -- it has nothing to do with the merits of the case; it was quite obvious. But I would say I think that this is, on the basis of my experience, very rare -- that it is merely there to make people feel that. In other words, I believe that the notion of power and desire for power as it is used today is in need of a much -- of a fundamental re-consideration -- and I think that someone -- for example, what we call vanity is much more frequent than this isolated, ice cold thing: let him feel the whip. I mean it may of course exist -- surely it exists on other levels but it is always something absolutely degrading. For example, a nasty non-commissioned officer who just tries to show that I'm the boss. That happens naturally, but I think the phenomenon which we call vanity -- when wants to show himself superior merely for the sake of showing himself superior -- is much more common, and that is not quite the same thing. It doesn't have this intention of hurting, or what you call sadistic element.

"Just to return on that -- I don't know if it can be decided. You could doubtless -- authority against authority in psychology. For example, Erich Fromm's discussion of the Nazi regime would stress the fact that the regime itself, or Hitler, was a kind -- he was acting in a kind of generalized sadistic manner in his authoritarianism."

Yes, but I mean you can use all these terms. The point is this: when you say modern psychology you refer to a number -- to an infinite number, perhaps, of books, articles and so on and so on which are based on certain fundamental premises, on a certain approach, and where the question is in the matrix you question the approach the results become dubious. You see, I mean, what questions were addressed to them. Now Hitler was, I think,

an unusual -- Hitler was, in a way, crazy -- I mean a very massive way -- in the sense in which Mussolini was not crazy. Mussolini nor Lenin nor even Stalin as far as one can know -- you know, whether he did not develop in the last years a disease comparable to that of Tiberius, the famous Cassarian insanity, I, for one, wouldn't dare to pronounce upon. But -- no, I mean the clear case -- surely behind -- one would have to read -- to start from scratch and look first of all on the manifest both pronouncements and actions and their own -- a glorification of cruelty belonged to the Nazi creed. That is an undeniable fact. And which, of course, meant, if you want to proceed psychologically, very different things in the case of very different men. Some people who had no natural inclination to cruelty were taught to praise cruelty and to act cruelly. On the other hand, others like Hitler himself, had a congenital desire to be cruel. But once you do that you must admit, of course, that there are also very famous liberal democrats who have this quality of cruelty.

"Yes, but they don't have the opportunities for it."

Ah ha. So, in other words, the real understanding would be -- of the Nazis, for example, would be this: what were the legitimations, justifications, of this emphatically cruel doctrine which as such has no -- on any earlier doctrine. I mean, there were many doctrines which took cruelty in their strides -- many doctrines -- but the glorification of cruelty is, of course, something different. That one would have to do and I believe that would immediately lead beyond psychology because that has then -- it becomes then a much broader problem, political and theoretically: under what condition can cruelty appear as the most important thing? I will give you one indication. There was one man who, in a way, prepared the Nazis although he never became a Nazi, called Ernst Unger. I think he is quite well known in this country too. Now Unger (?) wrote an essay on pain, which is very interesting to read -- on pain -- and he makes this assertions that in our age, mind you the limitation -- in our age the only possible virtue -- he doesn't use the word virtue but he means that -- is the capacity to stand pain. Old fashionedly expressed, the only virtue is courage. Now the question would then -- and I believe if one would start from that one could see that this has a certain -- there are certain very broad reasons why this view should emerge under these conditions, and especially in Germany. Courage as he understands it limited -- I mean, and with the emphasis on the bearing of the physical pain and therefore, of course, the greater man is he who stands the greatest pain -- can then be used also for inflicting pain on others as a kind of tool for that and so on and so on. I do not -- I mean, to assume that this has necessarily as its basis certain sexual perversions -- I don't see the necessity for that. I mean, that is, as far as I know, impossible. But what -- you admitted that this was a -- or do you think it is --

(Inaudible response).

What, then, was the difficulty which you had? Can you repeat it again?

(Inaudible response).

Well, there are, of course, many other things and I can only mention this point. You remember we had the Aristotelian distinction between the three causes of rebellions: a state of mind, the end or ends and thirdly, the opportunities or the occasions, the beginnings. The passage on tyranny contains a number of very important remarks on that subject and especially, there is a reflection on the importance of anger there, a point to which I referred before: anger. But it is also true that in the case of tyranny the situation is different from that in the case of republican changes because in the case of any monarchic regime the element of personal hatred may be --- is likely to be much more important than in the case of a republican regime. In other words, that someone wants to kill that individual without any thought of a change of regime except accidentally. That complicates matters considerably.

Now there is one more point. Mr. Rosenthal -- in your paper . . . you say in the discussion of Athens and Sparta a contrast is drawn to the treatment of Thucydides. The issue of the two cities is considered conceptually as opposed to the power of Athens and Spartan fear, which are operative in Thucydides' account of the war. Now what did you mean by that?

(Inaudible response).

Yes sure. Yes, but Aristotle doesn't speak of the causes of the war. Aristotle says only that the Athenians in the war, during the war, established democracies wherever they could and the Spartans established -- I would say -- I do not believe -- it is very hard to say that the difference between Aristotle's and Thucydides' understanding of those matters -- is very hard. I can only state my general impression that in political and moral matters I believe all these great men agree. The differences, and they are very great sometimes, concern the reasons which they have, but I think the simple -- the notion which we have from modern times that there are, say, conservatives and liberals or however they may be called at different times in different countries, or perhaps also some sub-divisions of that -- that this is represented on the highest level of literature. I believe that's one of the greatest errors we can commit if we assume that this existed in the past. Theoretical differences: very great, surely, but in moral and political matters I believe that all the great classics agree on spite of the fact, well known to me, that . . . for example, Renaissance seems to have attacked Society and Family -- I do not believe that has anything to do with -- there are some "conservatives," That may be a reason for rejecting them, it may be a reason for qualifying them but first of all, the past, I mean, of the classics. And Mr. Gramsci, Michael Scott, I don't know yet all the names, does anyone of you know him? So we will wait till time and the paper will be read by Mr. Scott.

What, then, was the difficulty which you had? Can you repeat it again?

(Inaudible response).

Well, there are, of course, many other things and I can only mention this point. You remember we had the Aristotelian distinction between the three causes of rebellion: a state of mind, the end or ends and thirdly, the opportunities or the occasions, the beginnings. The passage on tyranny contains a number of very important remarks on that subject and especially, there is a reflection on the importance of anger there; a point to which I referred before: anger. But it is also true that in the case of tyranny the situation is different from that in the case of republican changes because in the case of any monarchic regime the element of personal hatred may be -- is likely to be much more important than in the case of a republican regime. In other words, that someone wants to kill that individual without any thought of a change of regime except accidentally. That complicates matters considerably.

Now there is one more point. Mr. Rosenthal -- in your paper . . . you say in the discussion of Athens and Sparta a contrast is drawn to the treatment of Thucydides. The issue of the two cities is considered conceptually as opposed to the power of Athens and Spartan fear, which are operative in Thucydides' account of the war. Now what did you mean by that?

(Inaudible response).

Yes sure. Yes, but Aristotle doesn't speak of the causes of the war. Aristotle says only that the Athenians in the war, during the war, established despoties wherever they could and the Spartans established -- I would say -- I do not believe -- it is very hard to say just the difference between Aristotle's and Thucydides' understanding of those matters -- is very hard. I can only state my general impression that in political and moral matters I believe all three great men agree. The differences, and they are very great sometimes, concern the reasons which they have, but I think the example -- the notion which we have from modern times that there are, say, conservatives and liberals or however they may be called at different times in different countries, or perhaps also some sub-divisions of that -- that this is represented on the highest level of literature. I believe that's one of the greatest errors we can commit if we assume that this divided in the past. Theoretical differences: very great, surely, but in moral and political matters I believe that all the same situation agrees on spite of the fact, well known to me now, that Sparta, notwithstanding rumors to have attacked Socrates, etc., etc. -- I do not believe that has anything to do with -- they did not become slaves. That may be a reason for regarding them as never to a master for oppressing them but I don't think it is the only reason. As far as Greece is concerned, I think -- I think it is a good idea to let anyone of the three men -- come over some time and the paper will be read by Mr. Schles-

most stable of forms does not have special treatment and description of the causes which motivate its end." I suppose you mean of the causes -- of its final cause. "This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the polity is the most ideal of all Aristotelian constitutional forms." Well, what do you say to this proposition: that the polity is the -- I mean, say, the best -- most ideal -- I suppose you mean the best of all Aristotelian polities. Is this the view of the class? Or of other members of the class? Mr. Bartholomew.

"Well, given the conditions of Aristotle's day. I think he would have said it is the best possible in his day."

What do you say?

"I think that he used the word best. He is several times explicit. He explicitly said that he feels that the best form is monarchy."

Yes, kingship. Yes, sure, that's clear, but there is a difficulty to which Mr. Bartholomew referred although it is not exhausted by what he says. Aristotle speaks of the best which could be had by cities in general. There are still better ones which require very special conditions. Is this all right? Let us leave it at that for the time being, although that is not the end of it. Now what about the end? Does Aristotle not speak about the end, the purpose, of the polity as distinguished from the other regimes? Well, oligarchy: wealth; democracy: freedom; aristocracy: virtue. What about polity?

"Is the rule."

Pardon?

"Well, actually the end of any constitution is the rule."

Yes, but that is common to all -- but the specific end, just as the specific end of democracy is freedom. What is the specific end of the polity according to Aristotle?

"Virtue."

Not quite. Then it would be aristocracy. I noted here the passage: 1279a39, following; we don't have to read it. Well, Aristotle says -- you see, I mentioned this before -- polity is that regime in which the citizen body or the bulk of the citizen body are the heavily armed soldiers and therefore the principle is military virtue, virtue of war, and that is, according to Aristotle, the characteristic feature of the polity. But that surely does not exhaust that issue. There was one more point which I thought I should mention, on page six of your paper. Yes, this is a point where you are correct but which would -- you should have known -- after you quote of the regimes Aristotle gives

to tyrants you mention that he should be externally God-fearing -- well, this should be appear to be pious -- that's correct. Is there some content in order? I mean, I believe it is not necessary to explain why the tyrant is well served if he is regarded as pious.

"Well, Aristotle himself gives an explanation for that."

Namely?

"Namely, if people see that the tyrant is God-fearing, they will think that the Gods like him and his relationship to -- people imagine there is between the tyrant and the Gods. He prays to the God that they should be kept from attacking him."

Yes, but on the other hand, his piety would give them some guarantee that he recognizes some limitations."

"Of his goodness. That is what Aristotle says."

Yes, yes. But still -- that is very true, but there is another comment which Aristotle naturally does not make which we as readers can't help making.

"Similar to Machiavelli?"

That is also true. Yes, now but more immediately relevant. Well Aristotle makes no such remark -- demand -- in the case of any other regime and one explanation would, of course, be: it is particularly necessary in the case of tyranny. Good. Thank you very much.

Now let us turn to today's assignment. Well first we have to begin at the beginning. In order to understand the meaning of this book which is in many ways repetitive, as Mr. Jones has seen -- what is this -- how does it come that Aristotle takes up again the issue of democracy and oligarchy, chiefly? Now let us turn first to the beginning of Book V where we have a remark about the fact. Yes; read the beginning of Book V.

"We have now practically completed our discussion of the first four subjects stated in our programme; and it only remains to treat, in conclusion, of the last. Under this head we have to consider the general causes which produce changes in constitutions, and to examine their number and nature. We have also to consider the particular way in which each constitution is liable to degenerate -- i.e., to explain from what a constitution is most likely to change to what. In addition we have to suggest the relation likely to subsist the stability of constitutions, collectively and individually. And so, finally, what is the will may best be applied to secure the public welfare of a state."

Yes. Well, let us stop here. Now what information -- that is then the subject of Book V, isn't it? What corrupts regimes in general and each regime in particular and therefore what preserves regimes in general and each regime in particular. So we are through at the end of Book V at least. There seems to be no further subject. So what do -- by the way, the difficulties of the order of the Politics are so great that people have -- editors have made, in the nineteenth century, a great variety of arrangements, so when people -- sometimes when people quote according to books you have first to know according to which arrangement. This order which Barker has is the order in the manuscript and therefore the only authentic order as far as we can know. But, for example, at the end of Book III, as you may recall, where the ending -- the end of Book III is almost identical with the beginning of Book VII and therefore, some people said: well, you have to go on -- Book I, II, III, VII, VIII, and then bring in IV, V and VI. There's all kinds of other arrangements, but we cannot go into that. There is a real difficulty here. What -- the serious difficulty is what's the meaning of Book VI, following, given this statement at the beginning of Book V? Now, the remark which Barker made regarding Book VI -- how did he call it, entitle that?

"Methods of Constructing Democracies and Oligarchies with a Special View to Their Greater Stability."

Yes, that is of course -- let us say indeed, construction, establishing. That seems to be the subject, and let us turn to 1289a where we find a remark on this subject. You remember at Book IV, at the beginning of Book IV, he gives a general survey of what the subject of the political art is in analogy to the grammatic art, for example: the best simply, the best for -- the average best, and then how to preserve any given regime regardless of whether it is good or bad. Now in 1289a; will you just read the beginning?

"The sort of constitutional system which ought to be proposed is one which men can be easily induced, and will be readily able, to graft onto the system they already have. It is as difficult a matter to reform an old constitution as it is to construct a new one. . . ."

Yes: partly. Let us stop here. What Aristotle has discussed chiefly up to now is how to improve or preserve an established regime, but he has not discussed the question of how to establish it from the beginning because -- well the reason was this, as would appear from the context. People have been much too much concerned with establishing from the beginning. In the Phormio speech and Phaleas' Law, which are accessible to everyone of us, they deal with establishing regimes from the beginning, not with the question of how to preserve and how to improve. But in Book VI there is an allusion indeed to the question of establishing.

Therefore it is clear that Book VI to VIII form a unity. Book VI deals with the question of how to establish a democracy and oligarchy and Books VII to VIII with how to establish the best regime. You can say that is incomplete and it is very likely that the Politics as we have it is incomplete because there are quite a few references to things which Aristotle says he is going to do and which he does not have and that is perfectly possible: that it is incomplete. We can understand it nevertheless -- this whole situation -- by saying that democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, which we start with in Book VII and VIII, are the most important regimes. The monarchic we have dismissed for various reasons. Kingship is no longer possible. You can say, kingship cannot be established. It emerges in the olden times without special art guiding people in establishing it. And tyranny shouldn't be established; the less we say about it the better. And therefore -- the question therefore would be this: why not polity? Why not the polity? And that has to do with a certain problem inherent in the polity itself. Now what is that peculiar difficulty regarding the polity? Well, we turn, perhaps, to that later. Now first then -- now -- Aristotle turns almost abruptly to the question of democracy and oligarchy and we begin, perhaps, our study at 137a15. That is the question -- now what Aristotle says is this: let us discuss how to establish democracies and oligarchies and in the first place, democracies, and in that we have to -- must not forget one very important lesson which we have been given before; namely, that there are various kinds of democracy. Now why is there such a variety of democracies, Aristotle asks again, and what does he say? He gives two reasons.

"There are two reasons why there are several types of democracy. One has already been mentioned. /The reference is back to Book IV/. This is the difference of character between the peoples of different states."

Or the difference of the *demos*-es, if one can say that. The common people differ. He doesn't say the character. The *demos* is different in different cities. Yes?

"Here you may have a populace of farmers; there you may have one of mechanics and day-labourers. The democracies which they constitute differ; but if you add farmers to mechanics, and then add day-labourers to both, you create a new difference which is not so much one between better and worse sorts of the same thing, as one between totally different things."

Yes. What Aristotle means by that is that you can have in the same *demos* better and worse. You still have the same species. For example, take a sheep-dog. There is a species of artisans called shepherds and one is good, the other is bad. They belong to the same species. But then there is also -- for example, if you take an average sheep-dog and an average boxer, and laying to a different species. That he means here,

In other words, the difference between good and bad does not in itself create a difference of species as is shown by those examples. Yes?

"The second reason for the existence -- "

No. This is clear now that democracy necessarily differs when the demos differs. Take the most extreme poles: if the demos is a peasantry and, on the other hand, it is industrial workers there are two radically different democracies even if all the other characteristics of democracy would be the same. Even the spirit of the two democracies would differ. Now this is clear. Now we come to the next point.

"The second reason for the existence of different types of democracy is the different possible combinations of the features which characterize democracy and are supposed to be its attributes. One variety of democracy will have fewer of these attributes; a second will have more; a third will have them all. Now there is a double advantage in studying all the separate attributes of democracy. Such study not only helps in constructing some new variety which one may happen to want: it also helps the reform of existing varieties."

You see here that refers to the question discussed before: improvement and establishing or preservation and establishment, but here establishing comes first. This word, the Greek word for establishing occurs very frequently in this book and I think by the mere statistics of the usage, which I haven't made and I believe no one has made, one could establish that this is really the theme here from Book VI on. Yes?

"Men who are engaged in building a constitution will often seek to keep together all the attributes connected with the idea on which the constitution is based. But this is an error, as we have already noted in dealing with the subject of the destruction and preservation of constitutions."

Yes: let us stop here. What he means is the story of the nose. The swab nose: you remember that example -- and getting ever more snobby until it ceases to be a nose -- a democracy getting ever more democratic until it ceases to be a democracy. Now what is the second theme then? The difference of the demos: that's clear -- peasants, , industrial workers, to extreme. What is the other point which he has in mind, because it doesn't appear very clearly from how Barker translates. There is another reason, that, we can say, in the difference of democratic institutions. That's a different point of view, although there is likely to be a connection between the two. For example: direct democracy, representative democracy. They are obviously different. Corruption. And a still more qualification: no majority qualifications, whatever: difference. Suffrage for males and/or suffrage for all citizens: like a difference. Good. Let me go on --

now we come to the crucial point, to the most precise discussion of democracy which we find in the Politics. Let us read that slow. Let us read first the next sentence.

"Let us now consider the postulates, the moral temper, and the aims, of democratic constitutions."

Yes. Now it is hard to distinguish in the sequel these three elements, as if they were wholly independent from one another. The word which he says, postulates, is -- in Greek it is the word axioms. But axim doesn't mean originally what we understand by it. It means originally that of which one is thought worthy. Axios is worthy. An honor: the rank, the position. Derivatively it means that which is honored, as it were, with being the beginning of a demonstration; that which is assumed as a basis of demonstration. Now Aristotle uses synonymously with that, immediately afterward, the word hypothesis, and later on also definition, and still later, the originating principle. So Aristotle is here apparently not -- deliberately, very imprecise in his terms and that has something to do with the fact that this is, after all, a political book dealing with phenomena which are accessible to everyone, every citizen, and therefore this kind of precision is not required. But I don't know whether that suffices as explanation. Now let us turn then, what the hypothesis of the democratic regime is.

"The underlying idea of the democratic -- "

Yes. That is hypothesis.

"The hypothesis of the democratic type of constitution is liberty. Reader leaves out one sentence in parenthesis in Becker -- apparently under the impression this is not Aristotle's. Liberty has more than one form. One of its forms consists in the interchange -- "

No. That is not good. Let me try to translate the immediate sequel. "For this they are in the habit of saying: that in this regime alone they partake of freedom, for, as they assert, every democracy aims at this"; namely, freedom. Now? "One form, one thing in freedom," one could say, "is to be ruled and to rule in turn. Do you have that?"

"Yes."

Go on then.

"I didn't recognize that was Aristotle's -- I'll be more careful."

Yes. Now that is one element: ruling and being ruled in turn,

"The democratic conception of justice is the enjoyment of arithmetical equality, and not the enjoyment of proportionate equality on the basis of desert. On this arithmetical conception of justice the masses must necessarily be sovereign. . . ."

The multitude. There were no masses in ancient times. It's the multitude must be sovereign -- yes?

". . . the will of the majority must be ultimate and must be the expression of justice. The argument is that each citizen should be on an equality with the rest; and the result which follows in democracies is that the poor -- they being in a majority, and the will of the majority being sovereign -- are more sovereign than the rich. Such is the first form of liberty, which all democrats --"

No, such is the first sign of liberty; namely? You remember what that first sign is? Everyone talks of freedom, but freedom shows itself, manifests itself in various ways; as a matter of fact, in two ways. The first is what? Mentioned before. Where do you recognize where there is freedom? He has said it. Pardon?

"Equality."

No. Yes, equality derivatively -- he meant everyone rules and is being ruled in turn. Now, the next?

"The other form consists in 'living as you like'. Such a life, the democrats argue, is the function of the free man, just as the function of slaves is not to live as they like."

Yes. Literally, this -- for this, they assert, is the work of freedom; namely, that everyone lives as he likes, since it is the affair of the man who slaves to live not as he likes. The slave is a man who lives not as he likes, obviously, but as his master likes. Yes?

"This is the second aim of democracy. Its issue is, ideally, freedom from any interference of government, and, failing that, such freedom as comes from the interchange of ruling and being ruled. It contributes, in its way, to a general system of liberty based on equality."

Yes. Let us stop here, perhaps. Now let us see. Freedom is the aim of democracy and a sign of freedom is the equality of all citizens/rule of the majority. Another sign which is the work of freedom "everyone lives as he likes". Both are definitions of freedom. The question is: is one of them prior or not? That was a question which was discussed by Mr. Johns in his paper. Now let us see. Answer: "Such being. . . ." No, no, we must first -- in ho; we are not yet finished here. The three signs which,

one can say, of equality rather than of freedom, and I think this distinction between equality and freedom comes a bit closer than the distinction between political and civic liberty. So since the first does not speak of freedom itself, let us start from the second and there freedom is said to be to live as one likes. That is freedom -- which means -- that is crucial because to live as one likes could be meant without any regard to political science, or that could be forgotten. To live as one likes means not to be subject to anyone because if you are subject to anyone you can't live as you like. You have to live as he who is your master likes. Yes, but that is obviously impossible and therefore you must make a compromise. You must be -- you are subject to others; that can't be helped. Therefore he to whom you are subject must also be subject to you. That's the maximum which you can expect as a reasonable man and that means being ruler and being ruled in turn and equality. So from this point of view equality would be derivative from freedom. We want to live as we like. We don't want to have masters. Therefore equality: equality is not itself attractive. Yet the starting point may also be equality and Aristotle, in effect, starts with equality. And equality means that everyone is ruler and being ruled in turn. Hence, no one is simply subject to anyone else because the other is also subject to you. Hence, everyone lives as one likes. In other words, whether you start from the equality angle -- then you arrive at freedom; and if you start from the freedom angle you arrive at equality. So you cannot strictly speak of priority. Nevertheless, it is important that the key word is freedom and not equality. That is important because -- well, you see, when we speak -- can we understand that -- why freedom is the preferred term and not equality.

"You might all be equally deluded."

Yes. I think you point in the right direction, but is it not remarkable that most books which are written on broad themes deal with freedom, liberty, rather than with equality?

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, freedom seems to have an appeal which equality has only derivatively. Well I mentioned on a former occasion that there is one very simple difference between classical thought and modern thought. In classical thinking, and I mean not only in the philosophers but in ordinary popular thinking, all claims to rule were based on superiority, on a superiority. Freedom is a superiority, and everyone is free. Whether everyone should -- that everyone is not equal is clear has never denied. But equality means ruler **everyone** ought to be treated equally. You know that is not a primary goal. It is indeed -- equally is a consequence, you know, after justice, but the trouble with us is that we are here concerned with justice from with more material point of view than with spiritual. Therefore there is an

a more attractive thing. We may say justice reminds us of our duties. Freedom reminds us of something which we naturally like. One would have to go into that much more deeply but the fact is that the key word is -- not only here in Aristotle but also in other references to classical democracy -- is freedom, not equality, although it is always understood that there is -- equality comes in, but it is not the guiding consideration. Mr. Kendrick.

"Well freedom then implies a wherewithal to maintain it -- to merit equality."

Yes. It is understood that -- although that is not said here -- but it is understood not all men prefer to be free because that is the only way in which you can defend the institution of slavery. And slavery is somehow taken for granted here. Not everyone is a free man. To be a free man is a distinction. To be a human being without qualification is no distinction. Everyone is a human being and if you make the distinction -- all right, some are very incomplete human beings, say babies, well, they don't count politically anyway and so we can disregard them. The more interesting case would be that of women, but that, unfortunately, earlier political people -- not only the philosophers -- took for granted that women should not -- well that is Plato is one of the major exceptions, you know -- said women don't count, I'm sorry to say, politically. So was this an answer to your question Mr. Kendrick?

"That's what I had in mind but it would just seem that something different was implied in the modern notion."

Yes sure.

(Inaudible response).

No, I mean extremely stated, you could perhaps say this: for modern man it is not absurd to say that a defect may be the ground for a right. For example, people who are suffering particularly, say for economic reasons, should because they suffer have political rights to redress the balance. That's a perfectly defensible statement in modern times that is frequently made. But here is a defect which is a basis of rights. That was, one could say, unthinkable to the older people. A right must be based on a virtue or, in other words, a right is a privilege. There are no rights simply. You know when we speak of rights, rights of man they are meant to be which belong to every man by virtue of the fact that he is a human being. That doesn't exist here and therefore one could say every right is a privilege and therefore cannot stand until you show exactly why you should have the right. That may be very Justice, meaning that you are just a despotism from a citizen father and citizen mother which is no particular reason, but could it be something which not all people have. Now as for the difference between the modern and the classical notion of freedom there are lots of differences, but one point, and very important, is to repeat an old saying, that the equally clear that a

both freedom and equality are inseparable expressions of the same, of the same thing called democracy. Yet Aristotle adds here, and this will come out later more clearly, still there is another element which is at least equally important apart from freedom and equality and that is that democracy is rule of the poor. That you could not immediately deduce from freedom and equality without looking again at democracy. Looking again means proceed empirically. You cannot have -- you don't have here an a priori construction of what democracy is. Freedom and equality is freedom and equality of the poor. Of course, also of the rich. We come to that later. But practically -- surely the preponderance of the poor, and this implies, in a way, Aristotle's criticism. Aristotle -- and this criticism is referred to, is alluded to at any rate, here. When Aristotle speaks here of equality he says numerical equality. They don't consider proportional equality; i.e., the equality of which the democrats speak is not true equality. It's only a part -- well, it is not entirely wrong, but it's only half of the story. What about freedom, democratic freedom? Now is it -- what would Aristotle say? We can infer that from the parallel of equality. Is the freedom of which the democrats speak true freedom in Aristotle's point of view?

"No, obviously not, because it leaves the democrat . . . without a rudder then, without any direction."

In other words, to live as one likes is not a reasonable end. So Aristotle would have to say true freedom is not end of which he speaks, is something different. And this true freedom would be what in Aristotle? To live as one likes?

"No. To live a life ordered toward the attainment of the good life."

Yes. To live virtuously. Sure. That would be the simple objection of Aristotle there. Now let us consider that a bit more carefully because I think that is worth our while. To live as one likes, to do as one likes, is of course literally impossible. I mean, try to do it literally and you will get hurt, i.e., you will get what you do not like. So therefore we must understand it, to live as one likes, with a matter of course qualification; namely, to live as one likes without hurting others. That's always understood. Yes, but that again is very vague because as you doubtless know from the literature, if not from experience, there are people who are very easily hurt and you cannot live with them without hurting them, so we must have a more precise definition of that hurting means. The vanity of others where people are frequently hurt is, of course, absolutely unimportant because that is how it has to be hurt all the time: no without hurting others in their various substantive interests. Nor which are those which are their substantive interests? When we have in mind what we speak, to live as one likes with the necessarily qualified, i.e., without hurting others. And not far distant,

Mr. Dennis, you seem to have an idea.

(Inaudible response).

Yes, well I suggest a somewhat more old fashioned enumeration: life and limb, property. People are hurt if you steal or — you know — and burglarize or something of this kind. Honor of women: that was Machiavelli's enumeration and he was in such matters of very great soundness and clarity. All right; then we know that — what it means to live as one likes -- yes, surely, but you must not interfere with other people's life, property, and honor of the women. But precisely from Machiavelli we learn that this can be obtained under a tyranny. There is no direct link, it seems, between these simple demands and politics. But what would one say against this proposition: you can have them under any regime; that's not characteristically democratic. Well, under a tyrant, to take the simplest case, you have them only precariously. If the tyrant happens to be a sensible man and does not happen to be under very great pressure to interfere with life and property. So this wholly non-political interest in itself in living as one likes necessarily turns into a political interest. If you think a bit about it -- what you want with these very modest demands -- you must become politically interested. So you would demand, therefore, political rights because you say without them you are not sufficiently sure that your life, liberty, and honor of your women is taken care of. The political rights: but what kind of political rights because there is also a variety there. Now here we must start from the simple fact, equally obvious to Aristotle as to Machiavelli, that we have in every society the basic dissimilarity between the rich and the poor. and let us use these old fashioned but clear expressions. Now there are great differences; the rich and poor both want life, property, and honor of women, but still it is not quite the same politically, how the rich mean that and how the poor mean that. What do the poor want as poor? I mean, all want these three things, but what do the poor as poor want and the rich as rich want? That is decisive. Aristotle suggests this -- we can perhaps -- yes, let us turn to a passage which we have not considered last time, 1308b, towards the end: 1303b33. following. "This ones must particularly watch in oligarchies. The many do not mind it so much if they are prevented from ruling, but they even enjoy it when someone -- when one permits them to --

"Do you mean 1300 or 1303?"

1303.

"The many are not so greatly offended at being excluded from office (they may even be glad to be given the leisure for attending to their own business); what really annoys them is to think that those who have the enjoyment of office are embezzling public funds. This makes them feel a double aversion to a noble loss - not least of profit as from no office. In an aristocratical society be ruled no step will be

using office as a means of private gain, it would provide a way — The only possible way — for combining democracy with aristocracy. Both the notables and the masses could then get what they desire. The right to hold office would be open to all, as befits a democracy; the notables would actually be in office, as befits an aristocracy. Both results could be achieved simultaneously if the use of office as a means of profit were made impossible. The poor would no longer **desire** to hold office (because they would derive no advantage from doing so), and they would prefer to attend to their own affairs. The rich would be able to afford to take office, as they would need no subvention from public funds to meet its expenses. The poor would thus have the advantage of becoming wealthy by diligent attention to work; the notables would enjoy the consolation of not being governed by any chance comer.

This is enough; thank you. So, in other words, Aristotle distinguishes here in a way which is not radically different from Machiavelli later on, the demands of the poor and the demands of the rich. To repeat, both want life, property, and honor; I mean **honor** of women — not only that — they also don't want to be insulted, naturally. That's also part of honor. That's obvious but there is a difference: the poor must work very hard, must attend to their work because they are poor. The rich do not have to attend to it, to the same degree at any rate, and that switches, as you see in Aristotle's range here — not always, but here — into the better people. The better people want to be recognized as the better people, i.e., they don't want to be ruled by the poor and here you have a beautiful arrangement: the poor, say, have the right to vote or they could have the right to vote; there are electors, but in fact eligible are only the better people. Everyone gets what he wants. That is a good setting. Each function gets what he wants. No one is oppressed, because everyone gets what he wants. There is, of course, a certain part of the population which is oppressed and these are the slaves, but this is somehow taken for granted. That's taken for granted. Xerxes puts an example this way but the citizens mutually protect one another, by arms of course, against foreign enemies and against the slaves. That is part of the situation, which is not discussed here. All right; you have, then, a solution which seems to be perfectly workable. That's underlining the whole discussion of Aristotle. But we need something more. In this suffices if we have such an arrangement, or whether, are there not certain implications which we have forgotten and which must be automatically created if this is to work? Now, you remember the discussion of education last time. In every function there must be a reference to the end of the regime. This is probably the most important thing — we are in oppression "servitors" of our class as masters — resources dedication to freedom and that kind of thing. We probably don't hear rarely some fine speech of ours. — Right? — we have to do it for that and that is the importance of education. And we need also something else apart from that dedication to freedom. We need ~~education~~ class vigilance, as you call it, because that vigilance is inspired

by dedication. We need certain qualities, especially of the men in ruling offices. Those men must not merely be rich. At least some of them must have some other qualities; virtues — you remember that discussion last time. So we have here — that would simply be a perfectly satisfactory solution except for the slaves, but that is something which Aristotle has, in a way, taken care of in Book I but only very insufficiently because these slaves there, as you may recall, would be no good. I mean, they would be much too dumb to be of any use. That is the major difficulty for Aristotle, which I think he simply accepted as inevitable, that he had to get some slaves who were not so dumb and therefore ought not to be slaves. That's one of the most massive difficulties of Aristotle's Polities. Yes but — so this we must never forget, but that is of course not the only point. Why is Aristotle not satisfied with that solution? Why — you have everything here — what a sensible man could expect — I mean, disregarding slavery, but that everyone — almost everyone of Aristotle's political contemporaries would have granted him that. There were some individuals who thought of a society without slaves. Plato was the most famous man in the Republic. But the political people took that for granted. Why is Aristotle not satisfied with that? A question which I have raised on a former occasion: why is that not enough for him? Well, everything is all right except how we understand virtue here. That's the little thing with which Aristotle is not satisfied, and why? Why is he not satisfied with such a set up as described? This question will return again. You see, the strange surprise that in Books VII and VIII he will give us a polity, he will give us a regime which is not democratic, which is not even a polity — you remember this distinction — but an aristocracy. It's a consequence of that. Well, in a word, virtue here is understood in this scheme as I've stated it as instrumental. Virtue is here understood only as a means for the end of preserving the city, and more particularly, the freedom of the city. Virtue is not understood as choiceworthy for its own sake. That's the only exception. In other words, the whole scheme — I mean, up to this point, up to the point where we raise the question regarding virtue there is perfect agreement between Aristotle and Machiavelli in his better mood, let me say. You know there is a scheme — Machiavelli develops such a scheme very clearly in his Discourses on Livy, so that is, Machiavelli doubtless favored that which he thought — but one could of course say — although that's a very long question — that Aristotle would say that: once you begin to understand virtue as instrumental for preserving the freedom of the city then you have to swallow the whole Machiavelli. Then morality as a whole is a means for a social end and then society may require — you can't know that without some experience — may require very tough things, or seem to require. That's the point. That's what Machiavelli says. Machiavelli proves, then, very beautifully that humanity is, for example, surely conducive to a free society; yes, but not in war and not in a critical domestic situation. Then you have to be very harsh. Machiavelli, who doesn't mind war, says you have to be as cruel and to North. I.e. in other words, we

must not forget this crucial implication. Once we begin with this preoccupation and understand democracy as instrumental we can't know where we will end. That is the difficulty here. But now let me state the problem of freedom as it appears from Aristotle's point of view, now, as follows. Freedom is presented as the end of democracy and there of course in this respect nothing has changed. Freedom is still the key word of democracy. But Aristotle's view can be stated as follows: freedom as freedom cannot be the end because freedom means the freedom to use one's freedom, to exercise one's freedom, and freedom is always exercised for something. The end is that for which freedom is used. For example, you could say, well, all right; let the end be abundance or wealth. Everyone should be free so that he can lead a life of abundance, which requires some other things apart from political freedom, but all right. But the difficulty is the same because abundance too can never be the end for a thoughtful human being. It is again only a means. Of course modern democratic theory on the somewhat higher level knows that and therefore they would not say -- they would have a name for that end which is neither freedom as freedom as hitherto understood, nor wealth and abundance. What is the most simple, most common answer given now for that end for which freedom is needed and which justifies, not to say sanctifies, freedom?

"Development of individual capabilities."

Yes, something -- I believe it is now more popular to speak of self-realization. All right. For this reason we may need some abundance and we surely need political freedom. All right, but what does self-realization mean? Do I not realize myself by any action, by any passion, anything? Sooner or later one is compelled to make a distinction between the true self and the apparent self. So Mr. X acts on some occasions in a way which is not a realization of his self but only on some other occasions. And the simplest form to make this clear is to say -- to make a distinction between the true self and the spurious self. Expressed in a more old fashioned way the implication is to be good means to be oneself or to be self-determined. If I determine myself, i.e., if I am not other directed, if I do not follow opinions or keep up with the Joneses and this kind of thing; if I really determine myself, if I am myself, then I am good. Aristotle would say yes, that one can say provided you -- but it is a bit confusing. Why don't you speak of virtue? In other words, why do you not define -- instead of defining virtue in terms of the self, why do you not define the self in terms of virtue? Virtue is -- Aristotelian virtue can be said to be self-determination. You do the right thing because you see that it is right; you determine yourself for that. But Aristotle would say that is a very general -- it is very exciting and it is very unfair to expect this from everyone -- which he or others in this sense. Virtue is self-determination on the highest level, but a man can be absolutely virtuous in a without determining himself by simply following a decent custom, for example. You remember the discussion

of the good man and the good citizen in Book III. The good man is identical with the good-citizen in the best regime in the act of ruling. Those who do not rule cannot or do not have self-determination. They are virtuous in the act of obeying commands which they do not necessarily fully understand. But the question with which we are concerned is to get a better understanding, a more precise understanding, of the difference between the Aristotelian notion of the ends or of freedom and the modern notion. That would lead us very far because our present notion of freedom, according to which it means self-determination or self-realization, belongs to a very complicated development of modern thought. This notion emerged in connection with Rousseau and Kant -- you know -- and that is a very complicated story. Let us return -- and we cannot start from that; that's too complicated -- let us start from the simpler level, from the level, for example, represented by Locke, where there is no -- Locke says a lot about liberty. . . .

(Change of tape).

. . . are free to insult one another in the most atrocious manner because that builds a constant incitement to manslaughter naturally, and therefore there must be protection of honor too. Aristotle was familiar with that, with such a limited notion of the function of civil society and we know Aristotle's objection to that. In order to understand the difference we would have to consider the difference not between Aristotle and Locke, which would be easy to do, but the difference between Aristotle's contemporaries who had a quasi-Lockean view and, say Locke or Hobbes or whoever else you might take. Is this clear? The problem is really a very simple one across which you come every time you think about those matters, but I may have stated it in an awkward way and therefore I would be grateful if someone would save me from my own predicament. Do you see what I'm driving at? We try to -- our question is to understand the difference between the classics -- the classical view proper, say the Aristotelian view, and the modern view. That's clear. And let us take as the representative of the classics Aristotle and the moderns, Locke; a probably defensible procedure, to limit oneself to these two now because of their unusually great influence. And that is clear: virtue -- property, simple formula. The end of civil society is to make men good, virtuous: Aristotle. The end of civil society is to protect property; as easy as that. First reading of Aristotle and Locke can see that.

"Is this still a discussion of what the final end of a democratic state is when you were saying that the stated end is virtue would have to go further. I would say that it's freedom that we have to go further than virtue."

Yes, sure. You are quite right so let us make it quite clear, ancient democracy here (writing on blackboard), modern Democracy. That's our beginning and now in order to clear up first we have to present in brief what that we've done first the classical and then the ancient and modern concepts of such before we apply it to democracy as well. And then we start Aristotle - Locke simple procedure. Now, . . . no time's there. In Locke virtue comes

in instrumentally. If you want to protect property you must have civil society, you must be law abiding, . . . you must be virtuous in a restricted sense. You must be honest. Honesty is the best policy. That's all there is to it. For Aristotle virtue means much more: human excellence. Now one can rightly say and one must say yes, but Aristotle, that was one school: the gentile tradition, as some people call it. There were more tough minded fellows who had a view very close to that of Locke. Aristotle refers to the Sophist *Lycophron* in the third book -- you must remember -- when he gives the sketch, . . . The Sophists (writing on blackboard). That is a loose expression but sufficient for our present purpose. In other words, did not the Sophists develop a Lockean doctrine? To some extent they did and to that extent Aristotle was familiar with that, but still there is a subtle difference between the Sophists and Locke which is crucial if we want to understand modern thought in general and modern democracy in particular. Now how is that? What is the -- I mean if we take the crude formula which you find in the text books since about 150 years -- well, there were no text books of this kind before -- what is, according to the Sophists the end of man? Surely not virtue -- I take now the popular view of the Sophists -- surely not virtue but what? There are some among you who have read the first book of Plato's Republic, yes?

"Success."

Success, yes but still success in -- then I must proceed Socratically -- success in tight rope dancing, success in passing the preliminary examination, or what? Pardon?

"Knowledge."

Yes, I mean according to this ordinary -- I'm speaking now of the ordinary interpretation -- they wouldn't say knowledge.

"Power."

Yes, power one can say but let us break it down to make it quite simple: wealth and honor. Thrasymachus wants to get money -- you know -- and he wants to get prestige. Protagoras and the others too. Surely. In other words, these people presuppose an end which is in no way subjective. All men they, as it were, say, if they were only honest or if they are not fooled by traditions or by this want wealth and honor, and the more and the faster the better, naturally. Now what does Locke say about that? In other words, these -- I mean if we take this crude view, for a moment, of the Sophists then it's perfectly true they say the end of man, the happiness of man, consists in being rich and honored up to and they believe they can do it, in a way, better than tyrants can. That is the special thesis of the Sophists: that here for sure knowledge comes in because sometimes people learn up more to knowledge, regardless as it may sound, than we mere practical power of action. Now where does Locke come

in? What does Locke say? Protection of property: that means, of course, more the protection of those who have property than of those who have no property. That should be clear. And Locke means the protection of the increase in property, not only of static property. If you read chapter five of the second treatise you will see that. So -- all right: there is wealth -- there is perhaps less emphasis on prestige and such silly things in Locke, but on the tough thing, wealth, there is a very great emphasis. What's the difference?

(Inaudible response).

No, but they are despicable people. Who cares about that? The real guys, you know. Sure, there are always some jerks, many jerks and they are naturally ruled and ought to be ruled. That's simple. . . yes?

(Inaudible question).

Yes, but did Locke really believe that it is the function of government to bring about a fairer distribution of property? That won't do and if you say -- I think that's not the point. Locke is, compared with these Sophists or this modern image of the Sophists, of course much more reflected and he would absolutely agree with Plato and Aristotle. He would say there are some people who are truly only concerned with amassing wealth but these are very rare. Most of the people want to have wealth and conceive it as a means for an end so wealth is not the end. What's the end? The end Locke calls, as everyone did, happiness. But what about happiness? Yes?

"Happiness is subjective according to him."

Absolutely. Happiness -- in other words the end is subjective and therefore you have to find out -- you cannot build a political society on ends which differ from individual to individual. That is simply -- that's impossible. And how will you find, then, an end which can be made the end of civil society given the subjectivity of the ultimate end?

"In the form of conditions."

Conditions of happiness, and the conditions of happiness -- they can be stated: life, liberty, pursuit of happiness -- however you please, you can also include property. That is the great difference. Therefore the doctrine of Locke is so much more a thought out political doctrine than that we know of this so called Sophistic doctrine. Surely, and this doctrine -- I mean as developed classically by Locke -- came into certain difficulties because he did not make sufficient provision for the proper distribution of wealth. If I may say so, Locke somehow assumed that the rich are those who deserve to be rich and the poor are the ones who deserve to be poor. A national guard will become rich and those who are still out are the . . . the poor. He calls them the many and the national guard or working men,

who would -- I mean that would be a perfectly just order. Then later on certain difficulties developed on that ground, difficulties with which you are all familiar and which led to the rejection of Locke. You know, today he is only a historical figure for this reason. I'm not now concerned with this. This notion: that you can find the end of civil society in objective means for the subjective ends -- that has broken down today, and why? Is it not a perfectly plausible and sensible assertion that ends may differ as much as they please, but you surely need life, liberty and property to pursue any ends and therefore that's the function of civil society. What's the difference? I mean how does it appear from today, from present day social science point of view?

"The means in Locke is not seen as objective."

I don't get you.

"As I understand it, Locke's notion is that civil society provides the objective means for subjective ends."

Oh, that is relatively unimportant. Positive law doesn't have to be so objective but the main point is that you get an objective foundation for the subjectivity of the law, if I may say so. You know what I mean? That you show the necessity of law, of positive law, and whether the law is particularly influenced by digestive disturbances of some Supreme Court judge or whatever it may be -- that is a secondary consideration from a broader context. No, no; the point is this. If happiness -- I mean I try to state the objection of present day social science to Locke -- if happiness is truly subjective and radically subjective, if no holes are barred, then you have to admit the possibility that someone understands by happiness other-worldly bliss. Now for other-worldly bliss life, liberty and property are not required so obviously as they are required for this-worldly bliss. In other words what I'm driving at is only this: the older doctrine was fundamentally a secularistic doctrine. Whatever Locke might have privately thought about it is uninteresting as far as his doctrine goes, but this kind of secularism -- paradoxical as it may sound, the actual progress of secularism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been accompanied by a doubt, a theoretical doubt, of that secularism and that makes the whole secularism doubtful theoretically. If you think that I exaggerate I ask you only to read Max Weber and where you will see the decisive argument is always based on this. There is a this-worldly morality and an other-worldly morality and this controversy cannot be settled by human reason. Therefore, social actions cannot be objective. Max Weber did not do these silly things that they say -- you know the vulgar relativists who say that's my value and that's your value. That is about whether you like blondes or brunettes better. That is, of course, a really stupid form of saying it. All right, I could argue a point on the downside. All I say, but we have not

gone deep enough into that issue. Now let me start, therefore, from a somewhat different angle. The doctrine in this -- the basic stratum of modern political thought for which I use now Locke as the most convenient representative is distinguished from the so-called Sophists by one simple fact. Everyone who has ever heard of Locke -- you don't even have to read him -- knows that Locke talks about natural law, about natural right. Now what did the Sophists, the so-called Sophists, say about natural law and natural right? I mean I take again this vulgar simplistic version of what the Sophists thought. What do they say? They reject natural law. They reject it. Natural law comes much more from people -- although it is not, strictly speaking, Aristotelian, but it is much closer to Aristotle than it is to the Sophists. So from this point of view the modern thought appears to be somewhere in between Aristotle and the Sophists, but that is all still very vague. Now let me try to dig a little bit deeper and here I have to refer to this more subtle point which was made by this young man here. I forgot your name. It really won't do to reduce the Sophists to that crude level : honor and wealth, the mighty rich. The very name indicates that they were very much concerned with wisdom: Sophisthisti has something to do with sophia, wisdom. I mean that may have been entirely spurious wisdom. That's not the point. But they had a high regard for wisdom, for cleverness, for wisdom for its own sake. That, incidentally, is the reason why Socrates always gets the better of them in this particular way. You see, they cannot -- for example, Thrasymachus wants honor -- but he also wants to be a man who possesses an art, i.e., knowledge, and therefore, that is ultimately the reason why Socrates gets the better of him, because he must protect the integrity of his art as an art and there is a conflict between that and his simple self-interest, vulgar self-interest. Good. But there is something more to that and that is something which shines through this vulgar, tyrannical teaching of people like Thrasymachus as presented by Plato and that is this. The interest of the individual, be it wealth and prestige or be it knowledge -- that does not make a difference here -- is not simply in harmony with the social interest. The case can be made, the trivial case, that whatever you want you are likely to get it in society rather than if you live in a desert. That's easy. But that does not mean that you get it best by transforming yourself completely into a citizen. In other words, you can while remaining -- while being a member of civil society regard civil society as a means for your end. Well, that is exactly what the tyrant does. You can't be a tyrant in a desert. The tyrant must believe in civil society. Yes, but he regards civil society as something to exploit for his purposes. Nor not only tyrants can do that. Very humble people can do that. The question is, therefore -- and that comes out in all the famous immoralities of the Sophists -- is not a merely external concordance with civil society? Is it not so that ultimately there is a disharmony between the individual and society? On the highest level, and the only level of ultimate interest, is the relation of the interest of the man or magistrate, the philosopher, and civil society, i.e., is there a fundamental harmony between philosophy and the polis, and here we can say the ancient thinkers, high

or relatively low, all believe that there is no such harmony. The modern thinkers, with a slight exaggeration -- for example, Locke, believe in such a harmony. That I think is the most, the clearest difference which we will find and therefore a man like Locke can believe that his scheme is -- his political scheme can be simply satisfactory. The individual is in every respect better off, in every respect, by being a member of civil society. The difficulty came out only after Locke, for one moment, so to speak, in Rousseau. Rousseau re-asserted the old thesis that there is a conflict, a tension, between the individual and society: an insoluble tension, and therefore Rousseau is at the same time the originator of something which you could call totalitarianism of society. Not what we have now, totalitarianism of government, but totalitarianism of society and of anarchism. This famous and notorious fact is no accident -- follows from the tension in Rousseau's own teaching itself. Rousseau is in this respect a kind of anachronism, you can say. That I believe has very much to do with that for the following reason: because if there is a disproportion between philosophy and the polis this is a fundamentally non-democratic assertion. The highest activity of man, thinking, transcends the polis, but if there is a fundamental harmony between philosophy and the polis that can only be achieved if philosophy is radically in the service of the ends of the polis and that is the modern view. For example, if the end of philosophy or science is the relief of man's estate as Bacon said and Locke, of course, repeats, there is perfect harmony between the interests of society and philosophy itself. But if the end of philosophy should not be an, in itself, social end then the difficulty arises. I think that would ultimately come out. But of course I have to disregard quite a few very important points and if you would like me to clear up, if I can, one of these many points which I have, as it were, to swallow I shall be glad to do so.

"You said something about possibly returning to the real difficulty of the polity"

Yes, that -- no that would not be immediately relevant to that except in this way. I think that Aristotle's Politics can only be understood if one understands this problem of the complicated relation between philosophy and the polis. From a purely political point of view the democracy -- the better kind of democracy, the best kind of democracy -- or the polity, would be perfectly satisfactory. You remember, perhaps, the discussion in Book III when he described a reasonable democracy. It's perfectly satisfactory -- I mean, for everyone -- and then he brings in this strange thing who -- I mean this superman who doesn't need laws and the like, in a way, a Weltsee and doesn't need a polis. You remember that. That is -- if one would analyze that through one would discern behind that like the philosopher. And one could also end at in another way. What is that non-instrumental

virtue which is not provided for by the political scheme I have sketched before. What is that? Ultimately what would come out -- and that is even relatively simple to do in Aristotle's case -- that this non-instrumental virtue is contemplation. Moral virtue does not, as Aristotle understands it -- somehow points to contemplation as to its completion. But there is a passage to which we shall turn very shortly in which this problem comes up. Now I suggest that we turn now to where we left off in 1317b17 -- 1317b17, where we left off, after the reflection on liberty.

"Such being the idea of democracy, and the root from which it develops, we can now proceed to study its attributes or institutions. There is the election of officers by all, and from all; there is the system of all ruling over each, and each, in his turn, over all; there is the method of appointing by lot to all offices -- or, at any rate, to all which do not require some practical experience and professional skill; there is the rule that there should be no property-qualification for office -- or, at any rate, the lowest possible; there is the rule that"

Now if I may make a remark on this last point. That's interesting: a very small property qualification would not make a regime non-democratic according to Aristotle. That, I think, has a certain consequence for the understanding of the American polity because the only change politically in the narrow sense which has taken place was the abolition of the small property qualification in some states which existed at the beginning. That is not of a basic importance. In other words, must one not start from the premise in understanding American phenomena that this country was from the very beginning not only a republic which no one denies but a democracy, and that would show the difference from Britain from the very beginning as very, very powerful. You remember some people try to show that nothing changed except that the king was replaced by an elected first magistrate or vice Lord of treasury, but it is I think -- it will doubtless contribute to greater clarity if one starts from the fact that this country was from the very beginning a democratic country and not as Britain surely was for a very long time throughout the nineteenth century ever, an oligarchic country. And the difference -- I mean how one has to understand such things as what Jackson did or especially the New Deal: this would probably be only quantitative and not qualitative differences. But the crucial point, of course, is -- and here is Aristotle also very helpful -- the change from an aristocracy denied to an aristocracy, aristocratic decay. That would be, indeed, of the utmost importance. So we can leave it at those points. A little bit later toward the end of 1317b he says that -- he enumeration has nine different points and then he says since oligarchy is defined by birth, wealth and culture -- I suppose by training -- the democratic things are those to be the qualities of those few birth, wealth and lack of culture. Now, you have seen. What

belongs also as much of it, but you see the important -- Aristotle uses here a qualifier: is thought to be. He does not simply identify himself with it because he does not accept the basic premise of the oligarchs that the rich are the better people. So Aristotle sometimes uses that equation and sometimes he does not, but in strict language he always distinguishes of course. Now let us go on a little bit later in 1318a where he says the common features of the democracies are these.

"These are the attributes common to democracies generally. But if we look at the form of democracy and the sort of populace which is generally held to be specially typical, we have to connect it with the conception of justice which is the recognized democratic conception -- that of equality of rights for all on an arithmetical basis. Equality here might be taken to mean that the poorer class should exercise no greater authority than the rich. . . ."

I have the opposite: that the rich should not rule -- that is the text is here, it amounts to it -- the rich should not rule to a higher degree than the poor, nor should the rich alone be authoritative.

". . . or, in other words, that sovereignty should not be exercised only by it, but equally vested in all the citizens on a numerical basis. If that were the interpretation followed, the upholders of democracy could afford to believe that equality -- and liberty -- was really achieved by their constitution."

But, not the opponents (sic); that is a wrong addition of Barker is my opinion. Now what is the meaning of this and the somewhat complicated discussion which follows? If someone would say today democracy is rule of the poor he would be laughed out of court. What authority does he have for that? Democracy is rule of all. That is the point which Aristotle has here in mind. The democrats do not say rights only for the poor. That happens only in very extreme readings. The democrat, the established democrat, never says that. They say equal rights for all; hence, also for the rich. They know somehow that there must be rich people and the reason is easy to understand. They don't want to close to themselves the avenue to wealth -- nor to their children. But if they want to -- but Aristotle turns this against the democracy. If you want to really have equality for all, i.e. if you want to preserve the rich, then you must modify democracy correspondingly. In other words, you must make it possible that the rich as rich can survive with legal security and the only way to do this richer voting power and that he describes in the sequel in a very complicated discussion. That -- in other words, let us say further if the rich would have a much higher vote, say four times the voting power -- each rich man as the poor man you must not forget. The rich were not millionaires and the poor were not paupers -- I mean the differences,

the spread was not as large. If you say, if the rich are one fourth of the population, or the political population, of the electors, then if you give a rich man four times the voting power of a poor man then you have equality for the rich. That's roughly what Aristotle suggests. But this is only suggested here and that is one of the difficulties of the book: the many suggestions not followed up. Aristotle turns then to the democracies and the democracy is, of course, not a regime which gives different voting powers to different people. It gives the same voting power to all. It must have other means for protecting the rich in their wealth. Now let us begin there, in 1316b at the beginning, at b6 when he speaks of there being four forms of -- yes.

"Of the four varieties of democracy the best, as has already been noted in the previous section of our inquiry, is the one that comes first in the order of classification. It is also the oldest of all the varieties."

Let us stop here for one moment. The best democracy is the oldest. Now this leads to a very great difficulty, namely, I mean for Aristotle writing at a late date that's no longer possible and he has to find a way of solution of the problem on the basis of the worst, i.e., the worst kind of democracy. That he will do later. But I mention here only one point. The politically best democracy is the oldest. The simply best regime, the divine regime, the kingship, is still older than the oldest democracy and you have, then, this situation: that what is politically best is early. What is intellectually best, wisdom, is late. That is what I call the disproportion between science and society. You cannot have the best society at the same time as which you have the highest development of the intellect. That, I think, is also the basic notion of Thucydides' history. Sparta is superior to Athens politically, from Thucydides' point of view, but Athens is obviously superior to Sparta intellectually. Thucydides doesn't say anything about that but he shows it by deed. You only have to -- at the beginning he says Thucydides from Athens. So the man who understood the political things was not a Spartan but came from a very less satisfactory political society, from his own point of view, namely from Athens. That, I think, is generally true on the highest level of historical thought. Now then Aristotle develops that in the original -- the characteristics of the best democracy, and that is a peasants' democracy -- peasants, Farmers is so run-loading because that is a different -- you have farmers in this country too where you don't have peasants. And I think even in India they say that they have peasants they have Farmers. Farmers you have on the European continent and of course in Asia and in other places. And the peasantry as -- now why is the best民主 as go if they is the peasant democracy that having

Well, they are all small property owners. Therefore they have an interest in the preservation of property. Yes?

"Is there a certain emphasis on the value of the ownership of tangible property, particularly land, throughout Aristotle?"

You mean as distinguished from what? Houses are also tangible.

"As distinguished, say, from the ownership of a skill."

I see. Yes, now Aristotle reflects on that. What is -- why does he prefer the peasants to the artisans?

"Well he thinks the peasants -- well the artisans just don't have the excellences which the peasants have. Now one of the reasons for this is that the peasants are in the city -- (correcting himself) -- artisans are in the city."

Yes. Well of course there are differences -- I mean between where -- but that is the general argument developed at greater length by Xenophon in his Economics, that the soldiers, best soldiers are the peasants and this was, as far as I know, the universal opinion until the first World War. There it became doubtful for the first time. And that is, of course, a very important military consideration. I mean, you want -- you must give political power to those who fight. That was one point. There are other points which he mentions. Well, they are politically useful. They are not, they can't aggregate as easily as the urban people can. You know they live in different -- they live in some isolation even if they live in villages and that is also a stabilizing factor. Is?

"I thought it was that doesn't the fact that they have something which can be taken away from them make them a more moderating or conservative influence politically?"

Yes, well then you can take in other considerations which Aristotle does not make but which has been made more than once since: the dependence of the peasants on the elements is much greater than that of urban artisans. Therefore they are more aware of the limitations of human power, whereas art easily exudes a pride of competence and that also would contribute to make them better subjects and so on and so on. Surely. No, no, that is clear and in an indirect way it would be very interesting to compare Aristotle's analysis of the peasantry with Marx's because, as you know, for Marx it was the greatest proletariat. I mean how this -- how could the bourgeoisie or the other agitating classes organize the very numerous proletarian masses? Because there was a much more numerous peasantry and that

is a problem which Marx elaborates regarding, for example, Napoleon -- both the first and the third -- it was a victory of the peasantry over the urban workers and the question was -- and they never succeeded in that -- to win over the peasants, and only in Russia they had for one moment the golden opportunity of getting the peasants because the peasants were tired of the war, and you know and afterward that they were caught and that is a kind of indirect comment on Aristotle. Now I have -- what is the time? Oh no: then we have to finish. Pardon?

"5:35."

No, then we have to -- I'm sorry for having kept you. So I'll ask again -- Mr. Grant? He's still not here.

Aristotle's Politics Lecture 13, May 10, 1960

... you raised at the end are the most important questions arising on the basis of this section could, perhaps, be dealt with, I mean, at least -- I mean, it all depends how you mean it. From Aristotle's point of view the question would be clearly the affirmative and you -- I see you wondered if Aristotle is right on that point.

"No. I think most of the questions I would answer affirmatively."

Just as he did. Yes. But then the question would be is this a major qualification of Aristotle there although surely he's right. Now you made a number of points -- one I mentioned -- where you are surely wrong, I believe. When Aristotle speaks of the demos, the people, the common people, as characterized by lack of education etc., you say this refers only to the worst kind of demos.

"Well, I did imply that."

No, I think that's universal. We come to that. But that is minor. Your reference to the Federalist Papers was very apt. Aristotle comes here very close to this hard headed approach of the Federalists. We will read that. The distinction which Barker makes between political and civil liberty -- one may doubt whether that's the best expression of that, but surely Aristotle's definition of democracy, or of freedom rather, is in need of some spelling out. Whether it is properly done by a distinction between political and civil liberty is another question. As for your characterization of the whole section: construction. That is, if I remember well, in Barker. . . . How does? Barker has headings for the individual books, doesn't he?

"Yes he uses both construction and stability in the title of Book VI. Aristotle, in the part that I am reporting on, does not use the word stability but he does use the word construction, at one point -- "

How does he call Book VII, may I ask? What's the heading for Book VII?

"Political Ideals and Educational Principles."

Yes, I see. No, I have to take this up later; the question of the meaning of Book VIII -- Book VII. Before I turn to that -- in the Now? Yes; I find your paper. It was fascinating. Now I must take this up for our moment because you are the point which are of some general interest. Specimens of the world -- and remember the six very old friendships, relationships, political alliances, or what you will, of one of them. So

most stable of forms does not have special treatment and description of the causes which motivates its end." I suppose you mean of the causes -- of its final cause. "This could perhaps be explained by the fact that the polity is the most ideal of all Aristotelian constitutional forms." Well, what do you say to this proposition: that the polity is the -- I mean, say, the best -- most ideal -- I suppose you mean the best of all Aristotelian polities. Is this the view of the class? Or of other members of the class? Mr. Bartholomew.

"Well, given the conditions of Aristotle's day. I think he would have said it is the best possible in his day."

What do you say?

"I think that he used the word best. He is several times explicit. He explicitly said that he feels that the best form is monarchy."

Yes, kingship. Yes, sure, that's clear, but there is a difficulty to which Mr. Bartholomew referred although it is not exhausted by what he says. Aristotle speaks of the best which could be had by citizens in general. There are still better ones which require very special conditions. Is this all right? Let us leave it at that for the time being, although that is not the end of it. Now what about the end? Does Aristotle not speak about the end, the purpose, of the polity as distinguished from the other regimes? Well, oligarchy; wealth; democracy; freedom; aristocracy; virtue. What about polity?

"Is the rule."

Pardon?

"Well, actually the end of any constitution is the rule."

You, but there is common to all -- but the specific end, just as the specific end of democracy is freedom. What is the specific end of the polity according to Aristotle?

"Virtue."

Not quite. Then it would be aristocracy. I noted here the passage: 1279a39, following; we don't have to read it. Well, Aristotle says -- you see, I mentioned this before -- polity is that regime in which the citizen body or the bulk of the citizen body are the equals, equals soldiers and therefore the principle is military virtue, virtue of war, and that is, according to Aristotle, the main characteristic of the polity. But there surely does not cover all that aspect. There was one more point which I thought I omitted in which, on page two of your paper, Yes, this is a relevant point you are coming at but which would -- you should be a little more explicit. And you get to the point of Aristotle's 1279a39

to tyrants you mention that he should be externally God-fearing -- well, this should be appear to be pious -- that's correct. Is there some content in order? I mean, I believe it is not necessary to explain why the tyrant is well served if he is regarded as pious.

"Well, Aristotle himself gives an explanation for that."

Namely?

"Namely, if people see that the tyrant is God-fearing, they will think that the Gods like him and his relationship to -- people imagine there is between the tyrant and the Gods. He prays to the God that they should be kept from attacking him."

Yes, but on the other hand, his piety would give them some guarantee that he recognises some limitations."

"Of his goodness. That is what Aristotle says."

Yes, yes. But still -- that is very true, but there is another comment which Aristotle naturally does not make which we as readers can't help making.

"Similar to Machiavelli?"

That is also true. Yes, now but more immediately relevant. Well Aristotle makes no such remark -- demand -- in the case of any other regime and one explanation would, of course, be: it is particularly necessary in the case of tyranny. Good. Thank you very much.

Now let us turn to today's assignment. Well first we have to begin at the beginning. In order to understand the meaning of this book which is an easy way repetition, as Mr. Jones has seen -- what is this -- how does it come that Aristotle takes up again the issue of democracy and oligarchy, chiefly? Now let us turn first to the beginning of Book V where we have a remark about the fact. Yes: read the beginning of Book V.

"We have now practically completed our discussion of the first four subjects stated in our programme; and it only remains to treat, in conclusion, of the last. Under this head we have to consider the general causes which produce changes in constitutions, and to examine their number and nature. We have also to consider the particular way in which each constitution is liable to change -- i.e., to explain from what a constitution is most likely to change to what. In addition we have to discuss the right and likely to secure the stability of constitutions, constitutionally and financially. This is all that is left, and it will not need be long, and be best to leave you with it in a minute or two."

Yes. Well, let us stop here. Now what information -- that is then the subject of book V, isn't it? What corrupts regimes in general and each regime in particular and therefore what preserves regimes in general and each regime in particular. So we are through at the end of Book V at least. There seems to be no further subject. So what do -- by the way, the difficulties of the order of the *Politics* are so great that people have -- editors have made, in the nineteenth century, a great variety of arrangements, so when people -- sometimes when people quote according to books you have first to know according to which arrangement. This order which Barker has is the order in the manuscript and therefore the only authentic order as far as we can know. But, for example, at the end of Book III, as you may recall, where the ending -- the end of Book III is almost identical with the beginning of Book VII and therefore, some people said: well, you have to go on -- Book I, II, III, VII, VIII, and then bring in IV, V and VI. There's all kinds of other arrangements, but we cannot go into that. There is a real difficulty here. What -- the serious difficulty is what's the meaning of Book VI, following, given this statement at the beginning of Book V? Now, the remark which Barker made regarding Book VI -- how did he call it, entitle that?

"Methods of Constructing Democracies and Oligarchies with a Special View to Their Greater Stability."

Yes, that is of course -- let us say indeed, construction, establishing. That seems to be the subject, and let us turn to 1289a where we find a remark on this subject. You remember at Book IV, at the beginning of Book IV, he gives a general survey of what the subject of the political art is in analogy to the gymnastic art. For example: the best simple, the best for -- the average best, and then how to preserve any given regime regardless of whether it is good or bad. Now in 1289a; will you just read the beginning?

"The sort of constitutional system which ought to be proposed is one which men can be easily induced, and will be readily able, to melt onto the system they already have. It is as difficult a matter to reform an old constitution as it is to construct a new one. . . ."

Yes: passed. Let us stop here. What Aristotle has discussed chiefly up to now is how to improve or preserve an established regime, but he has not discussed the question of how to establish it from the beginning because -- well the reason was this. as would appear in the content. People have been much too much concerned with establishing from the beginning. In fact Aristotle's *Politics* and *Economics* which are accessible to everyone of you, they deal with establishing regimes from the beginning, not with the question of how to preserve and how to improve. And also there is the failure to distinguish clearly between the questions of preservation.

Therefore it is clear that Book VI to VIII form a unity. Book VI deals with the question of how to establish a democracy and oligarchy and Books VII to VIII with how to establish the best regime. You can say that is incomplete and it is very likely that the Politics as we have it is incomplete because there are quite a few references to things which Aristotle says he is going to do and which we do not have and that is perfectly possible; that it is incomplete. We can understand it nevertheless -- this whole situation -- by saying that democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, which we start with in Book VII and VIII, are the most important regimes. The monarchic we have dismissed for various reasons. Kingship is no longer possible. You can say, kingship cannot be established. It emerges in the olden times without special art guiding people in establishing it. And tyranny shouldn't be established; the less we say about it the better. And therefore -- the question therefore would be this: why not polity? Why not the polity? And that has to do with a certain problem inherent in the polity itself. Now what is that peculiar difficulty regarding the polity? Well, we turn, perhaps, to that later. Now first then -- now -- Aristotle turns almost abruptly to the question of democracy and oligarchy and we begin, perhaps, our study at Book IV. That is the question -- now what Aristotle says is this: let us discuss how to establish democracies and oligarchies and in the latter place, democracies, and in that we have to -- must not forget one very important lesson which we have been given before; namely, that there are various kinds of democracy. Now we see there such a variety of democracies, Aristotle asks again, and what does he say? He gives two reasons.

"There are two reasons why there are several types of democracy. One has already been mentioned. /The reference is back to Book IV/. What is the difference of character between the peoples of different states?"

On the differences of the demoses, if one can say that. The causes will differ. He doesn't say the character. The demos is different in different cities. Yes?

"Here you may have a populace of farmers; there you may have one of mechanics and day labourers. The democracies which they constitute differ but if you add farmers to mechanics, and then add day labourers to both, you create a new difference which is not so much one between better and worse sorts of the same thing, as one between totally different things."

Yes. What Aristotle means by that is that you can have in the same country better and worse. You still have the same species. For example, take a shoemaker. There is a species of artisans called shoemakers and one is good the other is bad. They belong to the same species. But then there is also -- for example -- if you take an average spectator and an average connoisseur. This is what Aristotle specifies. And he means here,

In other words.. the difference between good and bad does not in itself create a difference of species as is shown by these examples. Yes?

"The second reason for the existence -- "

No. This is clear now that democracy necessarily differs when the demos differs. Take the most extreme poles: if the demos is a peasantry and, on the other hand, it is industrial workers there are two radically different democracies even if all the other characteristics of democracy would be the same. Even the spirit of the two democracies would differ. Now this is clear. Now we come to the next point.

"The second reason for the existence of different types of democracy is the different possible combinations of the features which characterize democracy and are supposed to be its attributes. One variety of democracy will have fewer of these attributes; a second will have more; a third will have them all. Now there is a double advantage in studying all the separate attributes of democracy. Such study not only helps in constructing some new variety which one may happen to want: it also helps the reform of existing varieties."

You see here that refers to the question discussed before: improvement and establishing or preservation and establishment, but here establishing comes first. This word, the Greek word for establishing occurs very frequently in this book and I think by the mere statistics of the usage, which I haven't made and I believe no one has made, one could establish that this is really the theme here from Book VI on. Yes?

"Men who are engaged in building a constitution will often seek to bring together all the attributes connected with the idea on which the constitution is based. But this is an error as we have already noted in dealing with the subject of the destruction and preservation of constitutions."

Yes: let us stop here. What he means is the story of the nose. The nose rose: you remember that example -- and getting ever more鼻子 until it comes to be a nose -- a democracy getting ever more democratic until it ceases to be a democracy. Now what is the second theme then? The difference of the cases: that's clear... peasants, industrial workers, to extreme. What is the other point which he has in mind, because it doesn't appear very clearly from how Bauer translates. There is another reason. That is that say, in the difference of democratic institutions, there is a different point of view, although there is no difficulty to be a contradiction between the two. For example: direct democracy, representative do not. They are obviously different and representative is at all a lower qualification, no majority qualification... whatever difference. Suffrage for men and for women, for children, for adults, etc., are different. Good. Until it comes to

Now we come to the crucial point, to the most precise discussion of democracy which we find in the Politics. Let us read that slow. Let us read first the next sentence.

"Let us now consider the postulates, the moral temper, and the aims, of democratic constitutions."

Yes. Now it is hard to distinguish in the sequel these three elements, as if they were wholly independent from one another. The word which he says, postulates, is -- in Greek it is the word axiōn. But axiōn doesn't mean originally what we understand by it. It means originally that of which one is thought worthy. Axiōs is worthy. An honor: the rank, the position. Derivatively it means that which is honored, as it were, with being the beginning of a demonstration: that which is assumed as a basis of demonstration. Now Aristotle uses synonymously with that, immediately afterward, the word hypothesis, and later on also definition, and still later, the originating principle. So Aristotle is here apparently not -- deliberately, very imprecise in his terms and that has something to do with the fact that this is, after all, a political book dealing with phenomena which are accessible to everyone, every citizen, and therefore this kind of precision is not required. But I don't know whether that suffices as explanation. Now let us turn then, what the hypothesis of the democratic regime is.

"The underlying idea of the democratic -- "

Yes. That is hypothesis.

"The hypothesis of the democratic type of constitution is liberty. Header leaves out one sentence in parenthesis in Parker: apparently under the impression this is not Aristotle's. Liberty has more than one form. One of its forms consists in the interchange -- "

No. That is not good. Let me try to translate the immediate sequel. "For this they are in the habit of saying: that in this regime alone they partake of freedom, for, as they assert, every democracy aims at this"; namely, freedom. Now? "One form, one thing in freedom," one could say, "is to be ruled and to rule in turn. Do you have that?"

"Yes."

Go on then.

"I didn't recognize that was Aristotle's -- I'll be more careful."

Yes. Now that is one circumstance ruling and being ruled in turn,

"The democratic conception of justice is the enjoyment of arithmetical equality, and not the enjoyment of proportionate equality on the basis of desert. On this arithmetical conception of justice the masses must necessarily be sovereign. . . ."

The multitude. There were no masses in ancient times. It's the multitude must be sovereign -- yes?

". . . the will of the majority must be ultimate and must be the expression of justice. The argument is that each citizen should be on an equality with the rest; and the result which follows in democracies is that the poor -- they being in a majority, and the will of the majority being sovereign -- are more sovereign than the rich. Such is the first form of liberty, which all democrats --"

No, such is the first sign of liberty; namely? You remember what that first sign is? Everyone talks of freedom, but freedom shows itself, manifests itself in various ways; as a matter of fact, in two ways. The first is what? Mentioned before. Where do you recognize where there is freedom? He has said it. Pardon?

"Equality."

No. Yes, equality derivatively -- he meant everyone rules and is being ruled in turn. Now, the next?

"The other form exists in 'living as you like'. Such a life, the democrats argue, is the function of the free man, just as the function of slaves is not to live as they like."

Yes. Ideally, this -- for this, they assert, is the work of freedom, namely, that everyone lives as he likes, since it is the affair of the man who slaves to live not as he likes. The slave is a man who lives not as he likes, obviously, but as his master likes. Yes?

"This is the second sign of democracy. Its issue is, ideally, freedom from any interference of government, and, failing that, such freedom as comes from the interchanges of ruling and being ruled. It contributes, in its way, to a general system of liberty based on equality."

Yes. Let us stop here, perhaps. Now let us see. Freedom is the aim of Democracy and a sign of freedom is the equality of all citizens irrespective of the majority. Another sign which is the work of freedom is to live life as he likes. Both are definitions of freedom. The question is: is one of them prior or not? That was a question which was discussed by Mr. Scott in his paper. Now let us stop. Again: "such being. . . .?" No, no, we pass first: -- no; we are not yet about to pass the three signs which,

one can say, of equality rather than of freedom, and I think this distinction between equality and freedom comes a bit closer than the distinction between political and civil liberty. So since the first does not speak of freedom itself, let us start from the second and there freedom is said to be to live as one likes. That is freedom -- which means -- that is crucial because to live as one likes could be meant without any regard to political science, or that could be forgotten. To live as one likes means not to be subject to anyone because if you are subject to anyone you can't live as you like. You have to live as he who is your master likes. Yes, but that is obviously impossible and therefore you must make a compromise. You must be -- you are subject to others; that can't be helped. Therefore he to whom you are subject must also be subject to you. That's the maxim which you can expect as a reasonable man and that means being ruler and being ruled in turn and equality. So from this point of view equality would be derivative from freedom. We want to live as we like. We don't want to have masters. Therefore equality; equality is not itself attractive. Yet the starting point may also be equality and Aristotle, in effect, starts with equality. And equality means that everyone is ruler and being ruled in turn. Hence, no one is simply subject to anyone else because the other is also subject to you. Hence, everyone lives as one likes. In other words, whether you start from the equality angle -- then you arrive at freedom; and if you start from the freedom angle you arrive at equality. So you cannot strictly speak of priority. Nevertheless, it is important that the key word is freedom and not equality. That is important because -- well, you see, when we speak -- can we understand that -- why freedom is the preferred term and not equality.

"You might all be equally qualified."

Yes. I think you point in the right direction, but is it not remarkable that most books which are written on broad themes deal with freedom, liberty, rather than with equality?

(Inaudible remark).

Yes, freedom seems to have an appeal which equality has only derivatively. Well I mentioned on a former occasion that there is one very singular difference between classical thought and modern thought. In classical thinking, and I mean not only in the philosophers but in common sense thinking, all claims to rule were based on superiority, on a *superiorum v.* Freedom is a superiority. And suppose if there another everyone should -- that everyone is not equal is clear, that notion denied. But equality means rather **everyone** equals **each other**, equality. You know, that is not a primary notion. It is indeed -- equality is a consequence, you see, of the other thing, but the trouble with it is that we are not, commonly speaking, used to it with some exactness. If I am equal to you, then I am therefore not equal to

a more attractive thing. We may say justice reminds us of our duties. Freedom reminds us of something which we naturally like. One would have to go into that much more deeply but the fact is that the key word is -- not only here in Aristotle but also in other references to classical democracy -- is freedom, not equality, although it is always understood that there is -- equality comes in, but it is not the guiding consideration. Mr. Kendrick.

"Well freedom then implies a wherewithal to maintain it -- to merit equality."

Yes. It is understood that -- although that is not said here -- but it is understood not all men prefer to be free because that is the only way in which you can defend the institution of slavery. And slavery is somehow taken for granted here. Not everyone is a free man. To be a free man is a distinction. To be a human being without qualification is no distinction. Everyone is a human being and if you make the distinction -- all right, some are very incomplete human beings, say babies, well, they don't count politically anyway and so we can disregard them. The more interesting case would be that of women, but that, unfortunately, earlier political people -- not only the philosophers -- took for granted that women should not -- well that is Plato is one of the major exceptions, you know -- said women don't count, I'm sorry to say, politically. So was this an answer to your question Mr. Kendrick?"

"That's what I had in mind but it would just seem that something different was implied in the modern notion."

Yes sure.

(Inaudible response).

No. I mean extremely stated, you could perhaps say that for modern man it is not absurd to say that a defect may be the ground for a right. For example, people who are suffering particularly, say for economic reasons, should because they suffer have political rights to redress the balance. That's a perfectly defensible statement in modern times that is frequently made. But here is a defect which is a basis of rights. That would one could say, invariable be the older people. A right must be based on a virtue or, in other words, a right is a privilege. There are no rights gratis. You know when we speak of rights, right of man they are meant to be which belong to every man by virtue of the fact that he is a human being. That doesn't exist here and therefore one could say every right is a privilege and therefore cannot be a right except every one should have the right. That may be very difficult, meaning, unless you are just a despot from a civilization and citizen of which which is no country worth, but still it is an anomaly which not all people have, except for the old, which however is not the case. The claim of an old person to a right is not necessarily true, but it is usually clear that the right does not apply to all people. It is especially clear if

both freedom and equality are inseparable expressions of the same, of the same thing called democracy. Yet Aristotle adds here -- and this will come out later more clearly, still there is another element which is at least equally important apart from freedom and equality and that is that democracy is rule of the poor. That you could not immediately deduce from freedom and equality without looking again at democracy. Looking again means proceed empirically. You cannot have -- you don't have here an *a priori* construction of what democracy is. Freedom and equality is freedom and equality of the poor. Of course, also of the rich. We come to that later. But practically -- surely the preponderance of the poor, and this implies, in a way, Aristotle's criticism. Aristotle -- and this criticism is referred to, is alluded to at any rate, here. When Aristotle speaks here of equality he says numerical equality. They don't consider proportional equality; i.e., the equality of which the democrats speak is not true equality. It's only a part -- well, it is not entirely wrong, but it's only half of the story. What about freedom, democratic freedom? How is it -- what would Aristotle say? We can infer that from the parallel of equality. Is the freedom of which the democrats speak true freedom in Aristotle's point of view?

"No, obviously not, because it leaves the democrat . . . without a rudder then, without any direction."

In other words, to live as one likes is not a reasonable end. So Aristotle would have to say true freedom is not end of which he speaks, is something different. And this true freedom would be what in Aristotle? To live as one likes?

"No. To live a life ordered toward the attainment of the good life."

Yes. To live virtuously. Sure. That would be the simple objection of Aristotle there. Now let us consider that a bit more carefully because I think that is worth our while. To live as one likes to do as one likes, is of course literally impossible. I mean, try to do it literally and you will get hurt, i.e., you will get what you do not like. So therefore we must understand as, to live as one likes, with a matter of course qualification; namely, to live as one likes without hurting others. That's always understood. Yes, but that again is very vague because as you doubtless know from the literature, if not from experience, there are people who are very easily hurt and you cannot live with them without hurting them, so we must have a more precise definition of what hurting means. The vanity of others where people are frequently hurt, or, of course, absolutely unmercifully hurt; so this is bound to be hurt all the time; so without hurting others in their serious substantive interests. Not which are . . . of which are of course their interests which we have in mind when we speak, to live as one likes with the necessary qualification. In other words, it is not fine, though,

Mr. Dennis, you seem to have an idea.

(Inaudible response).

Yes, well I suggest a somewhat more old fashioned enumeration: life and limb, property. People are hurt if you steal or -- you know -- and burglarize or something of this kind. Honor of women: that was Machiavelli's enumeration and he was in such matters of very great soundness and clarity. All right; then we know that -- what it means to live as one likes -- yes, surely, but you must not interfere with other people's life, property, and honor of the women. But precisely from Machiavelli we learn that this can be obtained under a tyranny. There is no direct link, it seems, between these simple demands and politics. But what would one say against this proposition: you can have them under any regime; that's not characteristically democratic. Well, under a tyrant, to take the simplest case, you have them only precariously. If the tyrant happens to be a sensible man and does not happen to be under very great pressure to interfere with life and property. So this wholly non-political interest in itself in living as one likes necessarily turns into a political interest. If you think a bit about it -- what you want with these very modest demands -- you must become politically interested. So you would demand, therefore, political rights because you say without them you are not sufficiently sure that your life, liberty, and honor of your women is taken care of. The political rights: but what kind of political rights because there is also a variety there. Now here we must start from the simple fact, equally obvious to Aristotle as to Machiavelli, that we have in every society the basic distinction between the rich and the poor, and let us use these old fashioned but clear expressions. Now there are great differences: the rich and poor both want life, property, and honor of women but still it is not quite the same politically, how the rich mean that and how the poor mean that. What do the poor want as poor? I mean, all want these three things, but what do the poor as poor want and the rich as rich want? That is decisive. Aristotle suggests this -- we can perhaps -- yes, let us turn to a passage which we have not considered last time, 1308b, towards the end: 1308b33, following, "This one must particularly watch in oligarchies. The many do not mind it so much if they are prevented from ruling, but they even enjoy it when someone -- when one permits them to --"

"Do you mean 1300 or 1308?"

1308.

"The many are not so greatly offended at being excluded from office (they can still be allowed to be given the leisure for attending to their own business); what really annoys them is to think that those who have the government of cities are enriching public funds. This makes them feel a certain anger, as in the first case -- at least a profit as in the other case. In a democracy, it can be said to stop the rich."

using office as a means of private gain, it would provide a way - the only possible way - for combining democracy with aristocracy. Both the nobles and the masses could then get what they desire. The right to hold office would be open to all, as befits a democracy; the nobles would actually be in office, as befits an aristocracy. Both results could be realized simultaneously if the use of office as a means of profit were made impossible. The poor would no longer desire to hold office (because they would derive no advantage from doing so), and they would prefer to attend to their own affairs. The rich would be able to afford to take office, as they would need no subvention from public funds to meet the expenses. The poor would thus have the advantage of proceeding lawfully by diligent attention to work; the nobles would enjoy the consolation of not being governed by any chance master.

This is enough; thank you. So, in other words, Aristotle distinguishes here in a way which is not radically different from Machiavelli when say, the demands of the poor and the demands of the rich. To repeat, both their life, property, and honor; I mean honor of women -- not only that -- they also don't want to be invaded, naturally. That's also part of honor. That's clear; but there is a difference: the poor must work very much, must attend to their work because they are poor. The rich do not have to attend to it, to the same degree at any rate, and that switches, as you see in Aristotle's range here -- not always, but here -- into the better people. The better people want to be recognized as the better people, i.e. they don't want to be ruled by the poor and here you have a beautiful arrangement: the poor, say, have the right to vote or they could have the right to vote; those are electors but in fact eligible are only the better people. Everyone gets what he wants. That is a real meeting. Each person gets what he wants. No one is oppressed, because everyone gets what he wants. There is, of course, a certain part of the population which is oppressed and those are the slaves but this is somehow taken for granted. That's taken for granted. Xerxes cuts in Persia; this way but the citizens suddenly protest one another or some of course, against Xerxes' measures and burn the slaves. That is most of the situation; this is not a few of them. And rightly you have, then, a solution which is not to be perfectly workable. That's unlikely; the whole is a dream of Aristotle. But we need something more. In this civilization if we have such an arrangement, or realize, are there no common ambitions which we have forgotten and which must be remembered; most of all this is to worry. And try remember the importance of education back then. In every nation there must be a certain amount of the end of the regime. This is a difficult thing to do, but the slaves are not here in Europe. We cannot do that in Europe -- we have no relation to it. But in America, we have a good deal. It really came from Aristotle. He says that the best government is that which can think and that is the importance of education. And we need also education; apart from that dedication to freedom. We need something else: vigilance, as you call it, because that vigilance is inspired

by dedication. We need certain qualities, especially of the men in ruling offices. These men must not merely be rich. At least some of them must have some other qualities, virtues — you remember that discussion last time. So we have here — that would simply be a perfectly satisfactory solution except for the slaves, but that is something which Aristotle has, in a way, taken care of in Book I but only very insufficiently because these slaves there, as you may recall, would be no good. I mean, they would be much too dumb to be of any use. That is the major difficulty for Aristotle, which I think he simply accepted as inevitable, that he had to get some slaves who were not so dumb and therefore ought not to be slaves. That's one of the most massive difficulties of Aristotle's Politics. Yes but — so this we must never forget, but that is of course not the only point. Why is Aristotle not satisfied with that solution? Why — you have everything here — what a sensible man could expect — I mean, disregarding slavery, but that everyone — almost everyone of Aristotle's political contemporaries would have granted him that. There were some individuals who thought of a society without slaves. Plato was the most famous man in the Republic. But the political people took that for granted. Why is Aristotle not satisfied with that? A question which I have raised on a former occasion: why is that not enough for him? Well, everything is all right except how we understand virtue here. That's the little thing with which Aristotle is not satisfied, and why? Why is he not satisfied with such a set up as described? This question will return again. You see, the strange surprise that in Books VII and VIII he will give us a polity, he will give us a regime which is not democratic, which is not even a polity — you remember this distinction — but an aristocracy. It's a consequence of that. Well, in a word, virtue here is understood in this scheme as I've stated it as instrumental. Virtue is here understood only as a means for the end of preserving the city, and more particularly, the freedom of the city. Virtue is not understood as choiceworthy for its own sake. That's the only objection. In other words, the whole scheme — I mean, up to this point, up to the point where we raise the question regarding virtue there is perfect agreement between Aristotle and Machiavelli in his better mood, let me say. You know there is a schema — Machiavelli develops such a schema very clearly in his Discourses on Livy, so that is, Machiavelli doubtless favored that although he thought — but one could of course say — although that's a very long question — that Aristotle would say this: once you begin to understand virtue as instrumental for preserving the freedom of the city then you have to swallow the whole Machiavelli. Then morality as a whole is a means for a social end and that society may require — you can't know that without some experience — may require very tough things, or even to recruit. That's the point. That's what Machiavelli says, Machiavelli writes, then, very beautifully that humanity is, for example, surely conducive to a free society; yes, but not in war and not in a critical domestic situation. Then you have to be more strict for a will, who doesn't mind usury — and you have to be strict all the rest, i.e., in other words, we

must now face this crucial implication. Once we begin with this preoccupation about how we may be instrumental we can't know where we will end. That is the difficulty here. But now let me state the problem of freedom as it appears from Aristotle's point of view now, as follows. Freedom is presented as the end of democracy and there of course in this respect nothing has changed. Freedom is still the key word of democracy. But Aristotle's view can be stated as follows: freedom as freedom cannot be the end because freedom means the freedom to use one's freedom, to exercise one's freedom, and freedom is always exercised for something. The end is that for which freedom is used. For example, you could say, well, all right; let the end be abundance or wealth. Everyone should be free so that he can lead a life of abundance, which requires some other things apart from political freedom, but all right. But the difficulty is the same because abundance too can never be the end for a thoughtful human being. It is again only a means. Of course modern democratic theory on the somewhat higher level knows that and therefore they would not say -- they would have a name for that end which is neither freedom as freedom as hitherto understood, nor wealth and abundance. What is the most simple, most common answer given now for that end for which freedom is needed and which justifies, not to say sanctifies, freedom?

"Development of individual capabilities."

Yes, something -- I believe it is now more popular to speak of self-realization. All right. For this reason we may need some abundance and we surely need political freedom. All right, but what does self-realization mean? Do I not realize myself by any action, by any passion, anything? Sooner or later one is compelled to make a distinction between the true self and the apparent self. So Mr. X acts on some occasions in a way which is not a realization of his self but only on some other occasions. And the simplest form to make this clear is to say -- to make a distinction between the true self and the spurious self. But pressed in a more old fashioned way the implication is to be good means to be oneself or to be self-determined. If I determine myself, i.e. if I am not other directed, if I do not follow opinions or keep up with the Joneses and this kind of thing; if I really determine myself, if I am myself, then I am good. Aristotle would say yes, that one can say provided you -- but it is a bit confusing. Why don't we speak of virtue? In other words, why do you not define -- instead of defining virtue in terms of the self, why do you not define the self in terms of virtue? Virtue is ... Aristotelian virtue can be said to be self-determination. You do the right thing because you see that it is right; you determine yourself in doing. But Aristotle would say that is a very good -- it is very rewarding and it is very unfair to exceed this limit or norm -- it is not self-love in this sense. Virtue is self-determination on the highest level, but a man can be an absolute, complete self-lover in doing himself by simply following a desire. That is also wrong ... You remember the discussion

of the good man and the good citizen in Book III. The good man is identical with the good-citizen in the best regime in the act of ruling. Those who do not rule cannot or do not have self-determination. They are virtues in the act of obeying commands which they do not necessarily fully understand. But the question with which we are concerned is to get a better understanding, a more precise understanding, of the difference between the Aristotelian notion of the ends of freedom and the modern notion. That would lead us very far because our present notion of freedom, according to which it means self-determination or self-realization, belongs to a very complicated development of modern thought. This notion emerged in connection with Rousseau and Kant -- you know -- and that is a very complicated story. Let us return -- and we cannot start from that; that's too complicated -- let us start from the simpler level, from the level, for example, represented by Locke, where there is no -- Locke says a lot about liberty. . . .

(Change of tape).

. . . are free to insult one another in the most atrocious manner because that builds a constant incitement to manslaughter naturally, and therefore there must be protection of honor too. Aristotle was familiar with that, with such a limited notion of the function of civil society and we know Aristotle's objection to that. In order to understand the difference we would have to consider the difference not between Aristotle and Locke, which would be easy to do, but the difference between Aristotle's contemporaries who had a quasi-Lockean view and, say Locke or Hobbes or whoever else you might take. Is this clear? The problem is really a very simple one across which you come every time you think about these matters, but I may have stated it in an awkward way and therefore I would be grateful if someone would save me from my own predicament. Do you see what I'm driving at? We try to -- our question is to understand the difference between the classics -- the classical view proper, say the Aristotelian view, and the modern view. That's clear. And let us take as the representative of the classics Aristotle and the moderns, Locke; a perfectly defensible procedure, to limit oneself to these two men because of their unusually great influence. And that is clear: virtue -- property, simple formula. The end of civil society is to make men good, virtuous: Aristotle. The end of civil society is to protect property; as easy as that. First reading of Aristotle and Locke can see that.

"Is this still a discussion of that the final end of a democratic state is when you were saying that the stated end is virtue would have to go further. I would say that it's freedom which has to go further than virtue."

Yes, sir. . . . you are quite right so let us make it culture, ancient democracy here (writing on blackboard), modern democracy. I mean I think you know in order to check that we have to go further. So what we do is first the ancient one, then the modern one, modern thoughts of each before we go to a second one, third. And we can see Aristotle -- he did not say that the end of man is virtue. He said virtue is good

in instrumentality. If you want to protect property you must have civil society, you must be law abiding, . . . you must be virtuous in a restricted sense. You must be honest. Honesty is the best policy. That's all there is to it. For Aristotle virtue means much more: human excellence. Now one can rightly say and one must say yes, but Aristotle, that was one school: the gentile tradition, as some people call it. There were more tough minded fellows who had a view very close to that of Locke. Aristotle refers to the Sophist *Lysophrion* in the third book -- you must remember -- when he gives the sketch, . . . The Sophists (writing on blackboard). That is a loose expression but sufficient for our present purpose. In other words, did not the Sophists develop a Lockean doctrine? To some extent they did and to that extent Aristotle was familiar with that, but still there is a subtle difference between the Sophists and Locke which is crucial if we want to understand modern thought in general and modern democracy in particular. Now how is that? What is the -- I mean if we take the crude formula which you find in the text books since about 150 years -- well, there were no text books of this kind before -- what is, according to the Sophists the end of man? Surely not virtue -- I take now the popular view of the Sophists -- surely not virtue but what? There are some among you who have read the first book of Plato's Republic, yes?

"Success."

Success, yes but still success in -- then I must proceed Socratically -- success in tight rope dancing, success in passing the preliminary examination, or what? Pardon?

"Knowledge."

Yes, I mean according to this ordinary -- I'm speaking now of the ordinary interpretation -- they wouldn't say knowledge,

"Power?"

Yes, power one can say but let us break it down to make it quite simple: wealth and honor. Thrasymachus wants to get money -- you know -- and he wants to get prestige. Protagoras and the others too, surely. In other words, these people presuppose an end which is in no way subjective. All men they, as it were, say, if they were only honest or if they are not fooled by traditions or by laws want wealth and honor, and the more and the faster the better, naturally. Now what does Locke say about that? In other words, these -- I mean if we take this crude view for a moment of the Sophists then it's perfectly true they say the aim of man the happiness of man consists in being rich and honourable and they believe they can do it, in a way, better than anyone else. This is the special thesis of the Sophists: that here it's more knowledge comes in because some of people think we can't do it right, somehow it is not sound, we have to do it in a different way in addition. Now where does Locke go to

in? What does Locke say? Protection of property; that means, of course, more the protection of those who have property than of those who have no property. That should be clear. And Locke means the protection of the increase in property, not only of static property. If you read chapter five of the second treatise you will see that. So -- all right: there is wealth -- there is perhaps less emphasis on prestige and such silly things in Locke, but on the tough thing, wealth, there is a very great emphasis. What's the difference?

(Inaudible response).

No, but they are despicable people. Who cares about that? The real guys, you know. Sure, there are always some jerks, many jerks and they are naturally ruled and ought to be ruled. That's simple. . . yes?

(Inaudible question).

Yes, but did Locke really believe that it is the function of government to bring about a fairer distribution of property? That won't do and if you say -- I think that's not the point. Locke is, compared with these Sophists or this modern image of the Sophists, of course much more reflected and he would absolutely agree with Plato and Aristotle. He would say there are some people who are truly only concerned with amassing wealth but these are very rare. Most of the people want to have wealth and conceive it as a means for an end so wealth is not the end. What's the end? The end Locke calls, as everyone did, happiness. But what about happiness? Yet?

"Happiness is subjective according to him."

Absolutely. Happiness -- in other words the end is subjective and therefore you have to find out -- you cannot build a political society on ends which differ from individual to individual. That is simply -- that's impossible. And how will you find, then, an end which can be made the end of civil society given the subjectivity of the ultimate end?

"In the form of conditions."

Conditions of happiness. And the conditions of happiness -- they can be stated: life, liberty, pursuit of happiness -- however you please. You can also include property. That is the great difference. Therefore the doctrine of Locke is so much more a thoughts on political doctrine than what we know of this so called Sophist's doctrine. Surely, and this doctrine -- I mean as developed specifically by Locke -- runs into certain difficulties because he did not make sufficient provision for the proper distribution of wealth. If I may continue, Locke somehow assumed that the rich are those who deserve to be rich and the poor in life are those who deserve to be poor. A nation is -- in his opinion -- a nation who is well off -- the -- the rich -- he could assume -- the poor and the national power is maximized. Well,

who would -- I mean that would be a perfectly just order. Then later on certain difficulties developed on that ground. Difficulties with which you are all familiar and which led to the rejection of Locke. You know, today he is only a historical figure for this reason. I'm not now concerned with this. This notion: that you can find the end of civil society in objective means for the subjective ends -- that has broken down today, and why? Is it not a perfectly plausible and sensible assertion that ends may differ as much as they please, but you surely need life, liberty and property to pursue any ends and therefore that's the function of civil society. What's the difference? I mean how does it appear from today; from present day social science point of view?

"The means in Locke is not seen as objective."

I don't get you.

"As I understand it, Locke's notion is that civil society provides the objective means for subjective ends."

Oh, that is relatively unimportant. Positive law doesn't have to be an objective but the main point is that you get an objective foundation for the subjectivity of the law, if I may say so. You know what I mean? That you show the necessity of law, of positive law, and whether the law is particularly influenced by digestive disturbances of some Supreme Court judge or whatever it may be -- that is a secondary consideration from a broader context. No, not the point is this. If happiness -- I mean I try to state the objection of present day social science to Locke -- if happiness is truly subjective and radically subjective: if no holes are barred, then you have to admit the possibility that someone understands by happiness other-worldly bliss. Now for other-worldly bliss life, liberty and property are not required so obviously as they are required for this-worldly bliss. In other words what I'm driving at is only this: the older doctrine was fundamentally a secularistic doctrine. Whatever Locke might have privately thought about it is uninteresting as far as his doctrine goes, but this kind of secularism -- paradoxical as it may sound, the actual progress of secularism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been accompanied by a doubt, a theoretical doubt, of that secularism and that makes the whole secularism doubtful theoretically. If you think that I exaggerate I ask you only to read Max Weber and where you will see the decisive argument is always based on this. There is a this-worldly morality and an other-worldly morality and this controversy cannot be settled by human reason. Therefore "social" actions cannot be objective. Max Weber did not do those silly things that they say -- you know the will-can-moderate the fact that's my value and that's your value. That is where I think you like bananas or brunettes better. That is all common sense. I did not say saying this -- that they do not do anything on the part of man and saying but we have not

gone deep enough into that issue. Now let me start, therefore, from a somewhat different angle. The doctrine in this -- the basic stratum of modern political thought for which I use now Locke as the most convenient representative is distinguished from the so-called Sophists by one simple fact. Everyone who has ever heard of Locke -- you don't even have to read him -- knows that Locke talks about natural law, about natural right. Now what did the Sophists, the so-called Sophists, say about natural law and natural right? I mean I take again this vulgar simplistic version of what the Sophists thought. What do they say? They reject natural law. They reject it. Natural law comes much more from people -- although it is not, strictly speaking, Aristotelian, but it is much closer to Aristotle than it is to the Sophists. So from this point of view the modern thought appears to be somewhere in between Aristotle and the Sophists, but that is all still very vague. Now let me try to dig a little bit deeper and here I have to refer to this more subtle point which was made by this young man here. I forgot your name. It really won't do to reduce the Sophists to that crude level : honor and wealth, the mighty rich. The very name indicates that they were very much concerned with wisdom: Sophisthia has something to do with sophia, wisdom. I mean that may have been entirely spurious wisdom. That's not the point. But they had a high regard for wisdom, for cleverness, for wisdom for its own sake. That, incidentally, is the reason why Socrates always gets the better of them in this particular way. You see, they cannot -- for example, Thrasymachus wants honor -- but he also wants to be a man who possesses an art, i.e. knowledge, and therefore, that is ultimately the reason why Socrates gets the better of him, because he must protect the integrity of his art as an art and there is a conflict between that and his simple self-interest, vulgar self-interest. Good. But there is something more to that and that is something which shines through this vulgar, tyrannical teaching of people like Thrasymachus as presented by Plato and that is this. The interest of the individual, be it wealth and prestige or be it knowledge -- that does not make a difference here -- is not simply in harmony with the social interest. The case can be made, the trivial case, that whatever you want you are likely to get it in society rather than if you live in a desert. That's easy. But that does not mean that you get it best by transforming yourself completely into a citizen. In other words, you can while remaining -- while being a member of civil society regard civil society as a means for your ends. Well, that is exactly what the tyrant does. You can't be a tyrant in a desert. The tyrant must believe in civil society. Yes, but he regards civil society as something to exploit for his purposes. Now not only tyrants can do that. Very humble people can do that. The question is, therefore -- and that comes out in all the famous moralities of the Sophists -- is not a merely external concordance with civil society?

Is it not so that ultimately there is a disharmony between the individual and society? On the highest level, and the only level at which it is great, is the will of the dominant of the man of knowledge, the philosopher, and civil society, and is there a fundamental harmony between philosophy and the police? And here the old say the ancient thinkers, in a

or relatively long, all believe that there is no such harmony. The modern thinkers, with a slight exaggeration -- for example, Locke, believe in such a harmony. That I think is the most, the clearest difference which we will find and therefore a man like Locke can believe that his scheme is -- his political scheme can be simply satisfactory. The individual is in every respect better off, in every respect, by being a member of civil society. The difficulty came out only after Locke, for one moment, so to speak, in Rousseau. Rousseau re-asserted the old thesis that there is a conflict, a tension, between the individual and society; an insoluble tension, and therefore Rousseau is at the same time the originator of something which you could call totalitarianism of society. Not what we have now, totalitarianism of government, but totalitarianism of society and of anarchism. This famous and notorious fact is no accident -- follows from the tension in Rousseau's own teaching itself. Rousseau is in this respect a kind of anachronism, you can say. That I believe has very much to do with that for the following reason: because if there is a disproportion between philosophy and the polis this is a fundamentally non-democratic assertion. The highest activity of man, thinking, withdraws the polis, but if there is a fundamental harmony between philosophy and the polis that can only be achieved if philosophy is radically in the service of the ends of the polis and that is the modern view. For example, if the end of philosophy or science is the relief of man's estate as Bacon said and Locke, of course, repeats, there is perfect harmony between the interests of society and philosophy itself. But if the end of philosophy should not be an, in itself, social end then the difficulty arises. I think that would ultimately come out. But of course I have to disregard quite a few very important points and if you would like me to clear up, if I can, one of those many points which I have, as it were, no doubt I shall be glad to do so.

"You said something about possibly returning to the real difficulty of the polity. . . ."

Yes, that -- us that would not be immediately relevant to that except in this way. I think that Aristotle's *Politics* can only be understood if one understands this problem of the complicated relation between philosophy and the polis. From a purely political point of view the democracy -- the better kind of democracy, the best kind of democracy -- or the polity, would be perfectly satisfactory. For remember, perhaps, the discussion in Book III where he described a reasonable democracy. It's perfectly satisfactory -- I mean for everyone -- and then he brings in this strange thing who -- I mean this superior who doesn't need laws and the like in a way, a tribe and doesn't need a polis. You remember also that he -- if one would analyze that through one would discern behind that like the philosopher. And one could also think of in another way. Then in that non-instrumental

virtue which is not provided for by the political scheme I have sketched before. What is that? Ultimately what would come out -- and that is even relatively close to do in Aristotle's case -- is that this more-instrumental virtue is contemplation. Moral virtue does not, as Aristotle understands it -- somehow points to contemplation as to its completion. But there is a passage to which we shall turn very shortly in which this problem comes up. Now I suggest that we turn now to where we left off in 1317b17 -- 1317b17, where we left off, after the reflection on liberty.

"Such being the idea of democracy, and the root from which it develops, we can now proceed to study its attributes or institutions. There is the election of officers by all, and from all; there is the system of all ruling over each, and each, in his turn, over all; there is the method of appointing by lot to all offices -- or, at any rate, to all which do not require some practical experience and professional skill; there is the rule that there should be no property-qualification for office -- or, at any rate, the lowest possible; there is the rule that . . ."

Now if I may make a remark on this last point. That's interesting: a very small property qualification would not make a regime non-democratic according to Aristotle. That, I think, has a certain consequence for the understanding of the American polity because the only change politically in the narrow sense which has taken place was the abolition of the small property qualification in some states which existed at the beginning. That is not of a basic importance. In other words, must one not start from the premise in understanding American phenomena that this country was from the very beginning not only a republic which we can doubt but a democracy, and that would show the difference from Holland at the very beginning as very, very present? You remember some people try to show that nothing changed except that the king was replaced by an elected first magistrate or this kind of thing, but it is I think -- it will contribute to greater clarity if one starts from the fact that this country was from the very beginning a democratic country and not an oligarchic society for a very long time throughout the nineteenth century or so, an oligarchic country. And the difference -- I mean how one has to understand such things as what Jefferson said or especially the New Deal: this would probably be only quantitative and not qualitative differences. But the crucial point, of course, is -- and here is Aristotle also very helpful -- the change from an oligarchic demos to a urban democratic aristocratic demos. That would be, I need, of the utmost importance to us we can prove it at those points. A little bit later toward the end of 1317b he again in his summary has some different points and then he says since oligarchy is declined by birth, wealth and such and so it supports by reason -- so the democratising this we are when he says the original of the "new birth," "stems" the ancient or original -- but the new birth. That

belongs also as much of it, but you see the important -- Aristotle uses here a modifier: is thought to be. He does not simply identify himself with it because he does not accept the basic premise of the oligarchs that the rich are the better people. So Aristotle sometimes uses that equation and sometimes he does not, but in strict language he always distinguishes of course. Now let us go on a little bit later in 131a where he says the common features of the democracies are these.

"These are the attributes common to democracies generally. But if we look at the form of democracy and the sort of populace which is generally held to be specially typical, we have to connect it with the conception of justice which is the recognized democratic conception -- that of equality of rights for all on an arithmetical basis. Equality here might be taken to mean that the poorer class should exercise no greater authority than the rich. . . ."

I have the opposite: that the rich should not rule -- that is the text is here, it amounts to it -- the rich should not rule to a higher degree than the poor, nor should the rich alone be authoritative.

". . . or, in other words, that sovereignty should not be exercised only by it, but equally vested in all the citizens on a numerical basis. If that were the interpretation followed, the upholders of democracy could afford to believe that equality -- and liberty -- was really achieved by their constitution."

[The not the opponents (sic); that is a wrong addition of Berlin] is my opinion. Now what is the meaning of this and the somewhat complicated discussion which follows? If someone would say today democracy is rule of the poor he would be laughed out of court. What authority does he have for that? Democracy is rule of all. That is the point which Aristotle has here in mind. The democrats do not say rights only for the poor. That happens only in very extreme readings. The democrat, the established democrat, never says that. They say equal rights for all; hence, also for the rich. They know somehow that there must be rich people and the road to is easy to understand. They don't want to claim to themselves the exclusive to wealth -- nor to their children. But if they want to -- but Aristotle turns this against the democracy. If you want to really have equality for all, i.e., if you want to preserve the rich, then you must modify democracy considerably. In other words, you must make it possible that the poor or rich can survive with legal security and the only way do we get that richer will be poorer and that he describes in the sequel in a very complicated discussion. That is in other words, let us say that if the rich would have a much higher than, say four times the voting power -- each rich man as . . . four . . . but just not forget that rich were not mentioned and that there was no guarantee -- I mean the difference.

the spread was not as large. If you say, if the rich are one fourth of the population, of the political population, of the electors, then if you give a rich man four times the voting power of a poor man then you have equality for the rich. That's roughly what Aristotle suggests. But this is only suggested here and that is one of the difficulties of the book: the many suggestions not followed up. Aristotle turns then to the democracies and the democracy is, of course, not a regime which gives different voting powers to different people. It gives the same voting power to all. It must have other means for protecting the rich in their wealth. Now let us begin there, in 1318 at the beginning, at 50 when he speaks of there being four forms of -- yes.

"Of the four varieties of democracy the best, as has already been noted in the previous section of our inquiry, is the one that comes first in the order of classification. It is also the oldest of all the varieties."

Let us stop here for one moment. The best democracy is the oldest. Now this leads to a very great difficulty, namely, I mean for Aristotle writing at a late date that's no longer possible and he has to find a way of solution of the problem on the basis of the last, i.e., the worst kind of democracy. That he will do later. But I mention here only one point. The politically best democracy is the oldest. The simply best regime, the divine regime, the kingship, is still older than the oldest democracy and you have, then, this situation that what is politically best is old. What is intellectually best, wisdom, is late. That is what I call the disproportion between science and society. You cannot have the best society at the same time as which you have the highest development of the intellect. That, I think, is also the basic notion of Thucydides' history. Sparta is superior to Athens politically, from Thucydides' point of view, but Athens is obviously superior to Sparta intellectually. Thucydides doesn't say anything about that but he shows it by deed. You only have to -- at the beginning he says Thucydides from Athens. So the man who understood the political things was not a Spartan but came from a very less satisfactory political society. From his own point of view, namely from Athens. That, I think, is generally true on the highest level of classical thought. Now then Aristotle develops that in the magyoi -- the characteristics of the best democracy, and that is a peasants' democracy -- peasants. Farmers is so misleading because that is a distortion -- you have farmers in this country too where you don't have peasants. And I think even in India they have that they have peasants they have farmers. Look into you live in the European continent and of course in Asia and in Africa probably. And the peasantry is -- you may do the peasantry as to if they is the peasant democracy that is not

Well, they are all small property owners. Therefore they have an interest in the preservation of property. Yes?

"Is there a certain emphasis on the value of the ownership of tangible property, particularly land, throughout Aristotle?"

You mean as distinguished from what? Houses are also tangible.

"As distinguished, say, from the ownership of a skill."

I see. Yes, now Aristotle reflects on that. What is -- why does he prefer the peasants to the artisans?

"Well he thinks the peasants -- well the artisans just don't have the excellences which the peasants have. Now one of the reasons for this is that the peasants are in the city -- (correcting himself) -- artisans are in the city."

Yes. Well of course there are differences -- I mean between those -- but that is the general argument developed at greater length by Xenophon in his *Ecclesiastes*, that the best soldiers are the peasants and this was, as far as I know, the universal opinion until the first World War. There it became doubtful for the first time. And that is, of course, a very important military consideration. I mean, you want -- you must give political power to those who fight. That was one point. There are other points which he mentions. Well, they are politically useful. They are not, they can't aggregate as easily as the urban people can. You know they live in different -- they live in some isolation even if they live in villages and that is also a stabilizing factor. Yes?

"I thought it was that doesn't the fact that they have something which can be taken away from them make them a more moderating or conservative influence politically?"

Yes, well then you can take in other considerations which Aristotle does not make but which has been made more than once since the dependence of the peasants on the elements is much greater than that of urban artisans. Therefore they are more aware of the limitations of human power, whereas art easily engenders a pride of competence and that also would contribute to make them better subjects and so on and so on. Surely. No, no, that is clear and in an indirect way it would be very interesting to compare Aristotle's attitude of the peasantry with Flaubert because as you know, for him it was the greatest disgrace. I mean how they -- how could the bourgeoisie or the other bourgeoisie official appreciate the very amateurish proletarianism. The answer however where was a much more numerous peasantry and that

is a problem which Marx elaborates regarding, for example, Napoleon -- both the first and the third -- it was a victory of the peasantry over the urban workers and the question was -- and they never succeeded in that -- to win over the peasants, and only in Russia they had for one moment the golden opportunity of getting the peasants because the peasants were tired of the war, and you know and afterward that they were caught and that is a kind of indirect comment on Aristotle. Now I have -- what is the time? Oh no: then we have to finish. Pardon?

"5:35."

No, then we have to -- I'm sorry for having kept you. So I'll ask again -- Mr. Grant? He's still not here.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 14, May 12, 1960

. . . and that meant something very simple. People are elected to office supposedly, according to the stated principle, on the basis of merit alone but since this worked -- since no one who was a poor man would have the time for that it meant, of course, the relatively wealthy part were elected on the basis of merit alone, whereas in an oligarchy proper the property qualification as such was made explicit in the regime. In other words it was said, he who owns less than that amount of property cannot be eligible. Now then Aristotle changed the distinction, the meaning of aristocracy, by saying all right, aristocracy means rule on the basis of merit. It means rule of the virtuous man and that leads to his strict notion of aristocracy as sketched at the end of Book III and elaborated in Books VII and VIII. What -- in given cases one may doubt, does he speak of aristocracy severally understood or does he mean what commonly is called aristocracy? But that is not an insoluble problem because it becomes clear, usually from the context. And I would say in these sections with which we are dealing now the aristocracy meant is always what is commonly meant by an aristocracy. Now connected with this is the fact that in certain discussions -- we had an example last time -- Aristotle switches, without drawing our attention explicitly to it, from the notables or respectable men to the rich. Now here again that's not the fault of Aristotle, but that's the fault of political life. The better people happen to be the wealthier people. That is so up to the present day and I imagine even in this country, in a democratic country. But still, nevertheless, this vagueness, connected even with a certain amount of hypocrisy of course, is not entirely meaningless. It has at its bottom a very real distinction. For example, if you speak of the rich as rich strictly speaking there is no possible amalgamation of unenriched gentry, to take a simple example. Gentlemen may be very rich people, as you will know from the same sources from which I know that. But -- so that is clear. But still, no one would -- while everyone would count some gentlemen among the rich people no one would count them among the respectable people. That is clear. So the distinction is perfectly meaningful and we apply it frequently in every day life and Aristotle must not be prevented from doing in his political teaching what we do in ordinary political life. But in a more sophisticated way, since the gentry, one could rightly say, are more a matter for penal jurisdiction than for politics it comes up within politics in the following way. What kind of technical wealth how required? And there the old distinction between the landed interests and the moneyed interest comes in. So therefore an oligarchy in the strict sense does not make any distinction as to the source of wealth. The aristocracy does make such a distinction as far as the landed interests, and you can, if you want to be very "technical," -- you can only say well, of course, in the landed interests and it is however

Strange that the landed interest and their representatives are still called in some more old fashioned countries the gentlemen and that is what Aristotle repeats. Now, but Aristotle does not, however, slavishly reproduce the vulgar distinctions. Behind this is a certain thought that these common political nations are justified to some extent. Agriculture, farming, is a more human and more humane activity than trade and commerce, and of course then one would have to go into that issue. By the fact that Aristotle holds this opinion doesn't prove it is true, but that is thought out by him. Yes?

"In America today wouldn't the essence of the Aristotelian distinction, since farming has grown to be an important part of our economy, be between people who make their money and people who inherit it? I think you can make a case for inherited wealth producing more humane people. I mean, take the Rockefellers for example."

Well it is a very proper day after the death of the father of Governor Rockefeller yesterday and we -- I think that -- yes, sure, that is connected with it. But let us try to state it differently: old wealth and new wealth. Now that is a frequent experience, that people who have acquired their wealth right away are less -- have less nice manners than when there is old wealth and one can even easier -- well, you remember that at the beginning of the Republic, where that is discussed. Old Cephalus who comes from a wealthy family and he says to Socrates, and Socrates doesn't contradict that, that this is, generally speaking, true: you know, that new wine goes sour to the hand than old wine. And you can even elaborate that and say, well what does old wealth mean? It means -- it may mean that the family tradition is much more powerful than in other families. Think of the practical basis of family traditions: letters, pictures, speaking of today. They must be preserved. If people have become very poor they cannot preserve these heirlooms. Now the presence of these reminders of the past of the family are very important for the formation of the young generation, obviously. They get a sense of dignity, these children, which they would not get without the physical presence of these things. Now if these families, in addition, played a certain role in the government of the polis in the past the family tradition inextricably switched into a very pronounced political tradition. These are important facts which have to be considered and Aristotle is, of course, mindful of that. Yes?

"What is there in this situation which says that the inheritance will not breed arrogance rather than dignity?"

A rather common experience, but of course there is also such a thing which is called patrician insolence and that can be very bad. Family might can be, but still do us good, even today, though often the claimed virtue and virtue of the old, now old, aristocratic families which patrician does not always display. So what happens in a derogatory way in the parvenu?

"In a sense yes; of lack of manners. Lack of manners does not necessarily mean that he is not a good man even in the Aristotelian sense."

Yes, surely. You can only replace parvenu by the self-made man and you know -- and say what is wrong with the self-made man? Surely. Then we come back -- very good -- then we have to go into a somewhat deeper stratum, namely the whole question of stability versus mobility. Is not stability a more basic need of civil society than mobility? And in this respect I think we can say that at least the political thinkers in the past were generally of the opinion that stability is a more important consideration than mobility. I say the political thinkers because the individual man, say the individual Athenian, who wanted to become rich of course was in favor of mobility. That is clear but one could say the consideration of an interested party is not the decisive consideration. The decisive consideration is the community as a whole and there the whole case was loaded by broad political considerations in favor of stability rather than of mobility, and the question rightly to let me put is this: on the basis of what factor or factors unknown to Aristotle are modern men more willing to take chances than earlier men? Well this problem is, of course, well known but usually it is discussed on the basis of a dogmatic premise: for example, that the modern point of view is, of course, right. You know when you read, for example -- well, there are distinctions made between progressive societies and stationary societies. Now Athens surely was a relatively progressive society in this sense, but compared with any modern society it was amazingly stationary.

"Can you give another example of a society other than Athens?"

Well, in Sparta it was infinitely more --

"So, I mean out of the ancient period -- that was static and is classic."

I believe -- I mean I have not been as -- I mean I do know much too little about China and India to say anything with any authority on that subject. I can only refer to what I have read and what is always presented this way. All these societies compared with the modern western world in themselves static, especially China, you know, where the tradition is very very long, and even in India, and to say nothing of the so-called primitive people.

(Inaudible remark.)

Yes, one must have had . . . that there was a period of very great change, and let us call it broken. For example, the period where Confucius emerged in China but then that was stabilized. There was an enormous change in the Middle East with the appearance of Islam. But also, the destruction of polities in the Greco-Roman peninsula and this severe . . . the conquering tribe, as you know, in this enormous part of the Mediterranean area. Yes,

but what happened then? The principle was there is a divine law come down through Mohammed and this must be preserved and the application to new situations, that is simply deduction from the principles set out from Mohammed; no change of the premise entirely. And similar things, of course, existed also in the Western world as you know but as society -- the first societies which as a whole were "progressive," consciously, deliberately, were the modern western societies. In other words, there was progress, but unavowed progress, and the simple -- have you ever read

"s Ancient Law, which is a very very useful subject, where he tries to show the difference between ancient law and, of course, modern. Now the basic principle is ancient law is ... conceived of itself as unchangeable. Modern law is understood as a matter of course changeable. Ancient law in fact changed, but it changed unavowedly. One means was, for example, legal fiction. The law is completely changed, but a fiction is made which makes it appear that it was unchanged. This kind of thing, and others, and allegorical interpretations, you know. You say this sacred text doesn't mean that in particular . . . as an example, wine drinking is forbidden and then commentators in Persia, where they like to drink wine say that means only wine from grapes and not other wine. In a modern society that's absolutely unnecessary and therefore this doctrine of sovereignty which emerged in the sixteenth, seventeenth century is of such a crucial importance because it implies this principle of change. What is unchangeable is the location of the lawmaker, not the law. The lawmaker is the sovereign. There must be one man or body of men who are sovereign and laws regarding lawmaking must be stable, but the laws can be changed as you please. And another which belongs to the same context: the distinction between fundamental laws and non-fundamental laws. Non-fundamental laws: no problem. The fundamental laws are sacred. For example, in the French doctrine the royal domain, that's a fundamental law, or only . . . that the law is solid; that's unchangeable. Also maybe that there must be registration of the laws by the ecclesiastes: fundamental; everything else solvent. In our modern notion of constitution this distinction survives only we have provided for amendments of the constitution in order to indicate that change legitimately affects the constitution itself. But for one thing there is no provision. The changes of the constitution is the people and that the people should be sovereign is unchangeable. In other words, we still make this distinction between the unchangeable and the changeable but we reduce this level of the unchangeable to the bare minimum. Older monarchs make it more comprehensive. They never succeeded in that, as little as we succeed in reducing the unchangeable to a bare minimum but it is therefore a question of emphasis, but that is an all-important question,

Now a few more points. When Aristotle speaks of stronger you didn't know what he means, number or property. I would say that depends. There may be a situation in which the number is important. For example, if you have a military organization in which a very small part of the population can control the rest, this small part is stronger than the others. That depends:

stronger is the proper translation of that word. There can be -- that depends on all kinds of considerations, who is stronger. Numbers ordinarily do play a role, of course.

"He wasn't talking about military or law there; he seems to be talking about those who would have constitutional rights."

Yes, but the rule which Aristotle gives is this: that those who adhere to the regime must be stronger than those who do not like the regime. In what that strength consists -- it may not -- for example, people who don't have rights may believe in the divine right of their ruler and therefore the ruler doesn't need many weapons. However that strength -- that can come from a different reasons. You gave us a report about what Aristotle has to say on the law enforcing offices. You did not emphasize the fact that this remark about the law enforcing offices is unusually extensive. He devotes many more lines to this particular kind of office than to the others. It's not remarkable? I mean, the problem seems to disappear. How do you explain that? I mean, why is Aristotle so much concerned with the law enforcing offices whereas we would not ascribe to it an important role?

"Well this is an agency of stability in that if you have no enforcement of the law --"

Yes, that everyone would admit, but still why did he not regard the question of the law enforcing offices as a major political problem? Very simple. Replace United States of America by the old fashioned New England town where fellow citizens have to be the law enforcers . . . That is the reason. We do not have this simple direct democracy, or however you might call it, which Aristotle presupposes and therefore this particular difficulty is connected with this question. And now the last point regarding your power: you said the end of Book VI was particularly confusing. Why? I mean there are many confusing things in this section without any question but why did you find the end particularly?

". . . I really didn't understand what states he was talking about or if he meant states in general or applying it to oligarchies. Barker says that, but Aristotle doesn't. Barker says he's speaking of states in general in the summary above, but Aristotle didn't say that he was talking about. I didn't really know whether to take Barker's word for . . ."

Yes, that is very good. You should not take anyone's word for it, but I will take it up. I would say that the difficulty of this last section, I think, is this: that one would expect Aristotle to speak of the different executive offices in terms of the different regimes, i.e., which are good for democracy,

for the oligarchy and so. But finally he says very little about it. The emphasis is simply on which kind of executive offices are required in any city, but there are a few remarks, nevertheless about the distinctively democratic and distinctively oligarchic offices at the end. There are some. But the observation is correct and there is a great difficulty regarding this whole end which I will take up later. There is only one point which I mentioned already which was brought up by Mr. Snyder in his paper. Where is Mr. Snyder? Any benefit which he could derive from writing his paper he loses because he can't read my handwriting. Now here he says, in a paper on last week's assignment, in this type of democracy all should have the right to elect to office and property qualifications should be made for holding office. With the more important the office, the greater should be the qualification. And this brings him into certain difficulties. Now what do you say to this assertion itself? I mean, disregarding the Aristotelian text. All should have the right to elect to office and property qualifications for holding office. Is this a democracy? You say it is, on the basis of what? I mean in the moment you make property the qualification and especially considerable property qualification of office that's oligarchy by this very fact and you can say there is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy because everyone can elect, but not everyone is eligible; but you cannot say democracy. Now if you would look up the passage, 1319a, 29 to 32 -- no, that can't be correct; that cannot be correct, I'm sorry, I must have made a slip. But at any rate in the context it appears that Aristotle does not make this simply a demand -- the property qualifications. . . . Do you have it?

"On the one hand all the citizens will enjoy the three rights of electing the magistrates, calling them to account, and sitting in the law courts; on the other hand the most important offices will be filled by election, and confined to those who can satisfy a property qualification. The greater the importance of an office, the greater might be the property qualification required. Alternatively, no property qualification might be required for any office. . . ."

Surely, namely, only in the latter case would it remain a democracy. That was one point and the other point --

(Inaudible question).

Yes, we come to that and that is a great, great question which was also raised by someone else -- no, by Mr. Snyder at the end of his paper. The aim of democracy is liberty, one form of which consists in the interchange between ruling and ruled. He means of course one form of which consists in the fact that everyone rules and is being ruled in turn. "Is a system which restricts this right such as Aristotle's agricultural democracy actually a democracy. Is it not some new form of constitutionalizing between democracy and oligarchy?" That's a good question

and I think the question was also in your mind. So he didn't here so I can't help him. Now perhaps we consider again this passage regarding democracy and that is, after all, a subject to which we all have the easiest access by virtue of our living in a democracy. 151/b17, after he has given the general definition of democracy -- after we have made this premise and this being the initiating principle, namely of democracy, the following things are democratic -- yes?

" . . . we can now proceed to study its attributes and institutions."

Yes, but not enough, apparently not clearly enough, that all choose the ruling offices from all. That's essential to the democracy proper. All are electors and all are eligible. If not, the democracy is qualified. But here now let us apply this to the rule of agricultural democracy. In what sense is it a democracy? Because everyone is eligible to office according to law. Let us go on to the next point.

" . . . there is the system of all ruling over each, and each, in his turn, over all. . . ."

Now that is, I think -- that is not identical with the first condition, namely this brings out the fact that every individual citizen is eligible. That is an implication of this . . . but it is important that each has the prospect of being elected and not merely eligible. How can you get that? And that is said in the next item.

" . . . there is the method of appointing by lot to all offices -- or, at any rate, to all which do not require some practical experience and professional skill. . . ."

You see, how will our rule of democracy everyone can be elected and every individual has as much of a chance of being elected as the oldest Athenian patrician because not. Undoubtedly we must make here a qualification. In certain cases where experience and skill is needed you have to consider that. Well take the case of a general; the simple example. And someone who has never been in a war because he was badly unfit or particularly averse to such dangers. For the life of a soldier is fraught with dangers -- therefore you have to look at the individual and therefore you have to make an election but not election by lot and then the chances of our simple citizens, the simple citizen, decrease. Or there can also be other cases. For example, health officers. You have to see if this man is capable. Does he have medical training, and so on and so on. Yet? This next point.

" . . . there is the rule that, apart from the military offices, no office should now be held twice. . . . the same --"

"No, no. First, no property qualification or a very small one. That is also perfectly compatible with agricultural democracy, where if you say a very small property qualification then the owner of a very small plot of land may very well have the property qualification. Now the next point.

"... there is the rule that, apart from the military offices, no office should ever be held twice by the same person -- or, at any rate, only on few occasions, and those relating only to a few offices."

Why that? Why is this necessary for a perfect democracy? To give to everyone the chance -- the chance that everyone will come to the top increase with the decrease of the tenure. Think of a man has, say, roughly an opportunity thirty years where he can be politically active and, say, the highest offices are tens three hundred -- only three hundred of that generation can ever get it. Now if people can be re-elected all the time the chances for the individual decrease. It is strictly logical. Next point.

"... there is, finally, the rule that the tenure of every office -- or, at any rate, of as many as possible -- should be brief."

This is clear. In other words, if you reduce the tenure from one year to a half a year, you immediately increase the chance for everyone by two and so on. Yes?

"... there is the system of popular courts, composed of all the citizens or of persons selected from all, and competent to decide all cases -- or, at any rate, most of them, and those the greatest and most important, such as the audit of official accounts, constitutional issues, and matters of contract."

You see, as much as possible everyone has a chance to act in a judicial capacity. That's another point. As much as possible; there are limits, surely. Yes?

"There is the rule that the popular assembly should be sovereign in all matters -- or, at any rate, in the most important; and concretely that the executive magistracies should be sovereign in none -- or, at any rate, in as few as possible."

Now let us stop here. Does it not also follow, because everyone can be actually a member of the assembly everyone does not care, in fact, the certainty that he will become an executive官吏. The consequences vest as much power as possible in that part of the body politic to which everyone actually belongs. Under the circumstances you cannot have any executive office. If

is absolutely clear. That's democratic and the question would then be, is this compatible with the rule in democracy. You remember; that was the question raised. Is the rule in democracy not a concealed polity or aristocracy. I would say no. It is a true democracy in this sense because all these conditions can be met by a rule of democracy or especially -- well, you have to make some concessions. If you have an assembly every two weeks and no railways and helicopters around them, of course, you can only have rare assemblies, but let us say you have in winter and after harvest and before sowing time, have three assemblies and they must do business for the whole year and all important business is to be made there to the extent to which it is possible. If there should be suddenly a war scare before harvest time then, of course, you have to do something else. You must have some man or body of men who can act on behalf of the assembly. That is clear. But otherwise you can -- I would say the first democracy, the agricultural democracy, is really a genuine democracy although it, by virtue of the necessities that these people do not want to be elected because they can't afford to stay away from their farms for a year, or for a shorter time even, will bring it about that people in whom they have trust, i.e. respectable squires or respectable patricians, will in fact have the most important offices. Now the example in Athens; the most well known example, is of course that of Pericles -- I mean, his legal basis, the legal basis of his position was that he was elected and re-elected for many years as general. Generals had to be elected not by lot and he succeeded in being trusted by the majority of his fellow citizens and therefore he could do it. He could do it and not without troubles as you may remember from history but still, on the whole he succeeded. Now there was one point regarding the democratic section here which we have not discussed and which is of special importance, in 1318b, the beginning. Right at the beginning of 1318b.

"To find theoretically where truth resides, in these matters of equality and justice, is a very difficult task. Difficult as it may be, it is an easier task than that of persuading men to act justly, if they have power enough to secure their own selfish interests. The weaker are always anxious for equality and justice. The strong pay no heed to either."

Yes. Now of course theoretically is not in the text and -- in Aristotle -- and is wholly superfluous. To find the truth about the just is not always -- is rather difficult, but infinitely easier than to make it accepted because people -- as Hobbes put it, whenever reason is against a man the man will be against reason. Now why I thought we should read it will appear when we turn to the end of 1318b, the to do what one wills,

"The power of acting at will leaves men with no defence against the evil impulses present in all of us."

Well, Aristotle says in every one of the human beings. That is not all of us because the Greek word human beings is sometimes used in contra-distinction to man and you all know what Aristotle thought about the men. Well, let me explain this terminology. Human being, in Greek anthropos, in French -- yes anthropos. That means any human being, surely, but it is also used in contra-distinction to people who are not merely human beings but real guys, hombres, that is in Spanish the same thing, in Latin too and even in Latin the word is man, meaning a male man but not every male human being because not every male human being is an hombre and that is in Greek , in Latin , in Spanish hombre. In German you also have a distinction: mensch, human being, and man. So Aristotle -- God knows whether he did not mean -- did not wish to exclude the real men. One must be careful. I wouldn't say either but I would also preserve the ambiguity in the translation. Yes?

"Where there is responsibility, the result must always be an advantage of the first order in any constitution: government will be conducted by men of quality, and they will be saved from misconduct, while the masses will have their just rights."

Yes. The student who read the paper last time rightly referred to the Federalist Papers. You know, that no one -- and the famous thing, "Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely." You know?

"Tends to corrupt."

Tends to corrupt. Is this what Lord Acton precisely said? Ah ha. So that's good because otherwise it would be -- now tends is good. That is absolutely true and therefore we must -- but still very certainly -- in the Federalist Papers it goes beyond that, through the liberal formulation I do not remember at the moment. No, for Aristotle, of course, it is not true. Power also can bring out the best in a man. That's clear. But here in this crude political consideration he thinks let us be on the safe side and have some guarantees. Good. Now we turn to the subject of today. Pardon? Or is there a point which you would like to raise. Yes? (Inaudible remark). Nay I say, I must take that up later. I would like to take up the example of last time again because that was surely important.

Now let us first say a few words about the end of Book VI. You at 1320b will begin with a discussion of oligarchy and the meaning here also is how to establish or to convert an oligarchy. There is also here a terminological difficulty as you will see, if you will read at the beginning there, where he begins. Yes?

"We have now explained how oligarchies should be established and in doing so we have virtually shown how all regimes ought to be established. Each variety of oligarchy should be based on the principle of opposites -- that is to say,

121

the structure of each should be calculated by that of the corresponding variety of democracy. The first and best balanced of oligarchies is closely akin to the constitution which goes by the name of "polity".

You see: is closely akin. It is never identical. Aristotle calls it well-blended and that, of course, would apply also to the best democracy: that it is well-blended, but not by being not a democracy but by coming close in its actual working to something better than a democracy in the rural democracy. Why is it not identical? Let us read the sequel.

"In an oligarchy of this type there should be two separate assessment rolls, a higher and a lower. Entry in the lower roll should qualify men for appointment to the lowest offices that have to be filled; but entry in the higher should be required for appointment to the more important. On the other hand any person who acquires sufficient property to be put on an assessment roll should be given constitutional rights; and by this means a sufficient number of the people at large will be admitted to make those who enjoy rights in the state a stronger body than those who do not. The persons newly admitted to rights should always be drawn from the better sections of the people."

Yes; let us stop here. You see, it is an oligarchy because of the open preponderance of wealth as wealth. That it is -- the wealth is not very great which is required for being a full citizen member -- for being a member of the citizen body -- doesn't do away with the principle of wealth. Now a little bit later he speaks of the problem of oligarchy in general and uses two images for describing the function of the statesman. One is the body and the other is a vessel and there are famous images: the body politic and the vessel of state. Both are apt because there is something -- in a way the polis is natural like the body, but in another way it is also artificial and therefore it can be compared to an artifact and why he chooses the vessel, the ship, is clear because of the particular stormy which -- it would be foolish to compare a city to a shoe, for example, which is worn and what also implies that in the case of the body there is, strictly speaking, no separation between ruler and ruled whereas in the case of the vessel you have first the state and then the ruler. You know -- this distinction is also -- both things are true. In a way it is a unity without an extraneous ruler and you in another way the polis is a unity with an extraneous ruler even in a popular regime because the government is distinguished from the governed. Yes?

In this particular passage it seems to strike me that the very place for oligarchies which Aristotle makes of the wealthy with oligarchs or the few is too limited for a general approach to the study of oligarchies when he talks about, namely the oligarchies and aristocracies in so words look around us in

sort of modern oligarchies we find that wealth isn't just -- it isn't the only sort of basis or even main basis for making modern oligarchies and the association should be much broader I think. For example, on this case of two roles an interesting example, I think, would be the case in central Africa where the whites have tried in the various instances to have separate roles for the blacks and the whites and they put this in terms of education; that is, civilized man and the uncivilized or the other to a certain extent, see, so that really you have many elements connected with an oligarchy besides wealth. You have education, you have white skins, and other things. So to be perfectly general about oligarchy I think that the association with wealth makes it too narrow."

Yes, but the point is this: Aristotle would say, nor without going into the merits of the matter, merely taking the claims literally, i.e. uncritically, which to extent we must do. To the extent to which the claim is based on education it would be an aristocratic regime and not an oligarchy, he would say. He has provided for that. Now the question of, for example, that a new difficulty arises which is not discussed very much by Aristotle because apparently he did not regard it as very important; we will consider why. And that would be a racially heterogeneous society. Now that is, of course, you can say, a great flaw, that he has not provided for that, at least that he has not discussed it, but what would Aristotle's excuse be if we would accuse him of having disregarded such an important consideration.

"He believed in apartheid."

Yes, but apartheid means, of course, the denial of equal citizen rights. What Mr. Dennis spoke about was a city, a community which consists of racially heterogeneous elements.

"But Aristotle disapproves of that because . . . stability."

Yes, in other words we don't get a discussion right in Aristotle of this issue, but we get it in a later thinker who to some extent tried to restore Aristotle against Hume and Locke and that was Rousseau who saw in his Social Contract, which to some extent is a new plan for the city as distinguished from the modern state. This goes into that question and he makes this clear, that the democracy or republic which he regards as the only legitimate regime is possible only if the citizen body is of reasonable homogeneity. The chapter or chapters on the people in the Social Contract, Book II or III, I forget now, are crucial. The reason there is not only racial -- well, what do we mean by racial? Say, ethnic, because the question arises not only in the case of different programming, you know; it can also come in the case of different ethnic, religious and economic. But certainly knowledge of all these three things, three politically important things, is a prerequisite for a stable democracy or a public according to Rousseau and of course in the name it is

comes necessary for a variety of reasons to visualize heterogeneous societies of this kind very new devices will be needed, and that is true. Aristotle did not discuss that. He would simply say I would not wish to be in charge of such a society.

"Well, I think you could extend this. I don't think it has to be just in terms of race. I probably shouldn't have mentioned education because I think it's more dubious about education but certainly we have lots of societies where not only racial heterogeneity undermines this kind of stability but also things like religion, heterogeneity in things like language. We have an enormous range of things, it seems, which Aristotle really doesn't take into account . . ."

No. Let me put it this way. He takes it very directly into account -- by the way, language, that they knew every day because that is one of the most divisive things if people can't talk to one another; that's in a way the most divisive thing among human beings. Aristotle knew that very well and his contemporaries too and that was one of the objections to these big empires like the Persian empire, where people who couldn't talk to one another were supposed to be fellow subjects. No, Aristotle knew this very well but he would say there are such obvious incompatibilities with the indispensable unity of the polis. That is, I think, his implicit reason. Now that doesn't mean, of course -- and some societies had shown that it is possible to have linguistic and racial diversities. /Switzerland./ Yes, Switzerland -- yes, but also many other states have done that. But the question is under what conditions what is possible. For example, is the difference between the Germans and French in Switzerland sufficiently fundamental as to -- what was the alternative for these people? The alternative for these people was to be members of the German empire on the one hand and the French monarchy on the other and apparently they felt it is better to live with these barbarians -- I mean barbarians being people who you don't understand. . . (inaudible due to airplane) than to be subject to the French king or the German emperor.

". . . aren't we getting now into what . . . really the difficulty and that is that once Aristotle states the need for homogeneity, does he really say anything about the manner in which this can be built, developed. I mean, the absorption of heterogeneous elements, let's say."

No, because that he doesn't do for the very reason which I stated. If this is such an enormous burden in itself then try to avoid it in the first place. That is an extreme case where he would say that the people with the experience on the spot are in the best position to solve that. It does not belong to the theoretical question. But this difficulty -- I mean the question which my point would be this: since there are admittedly difficulties, what are the conditions in the different circumstances for a successful state? Under what conditions? One could be that the only alternative given there would be worse for

everyone concerned. For example, in other words one would have to study this in Switzerland. The situation is very different in different countries. It is not without difficulties in Switzerland either.

"... yes, but if you use what he was in applying to Carthage, the mark of a fairly good regime ..."

Yes, but Carthage -- that was homogeneous. They had a heterogeneous mercenary army but that is easy provided you have a very brutal discipline, as you know, like the foreign legion in France. That is a simple problem which men have always been able to solve and it's sometimes the common interest -- the booty -- that it could -- the army becomes, as it were, the fatherland of the mercenary soldiers. Yes, surely -- that in some countries, I believe this country could also be counted among them, these questions are of the utmost practical importance and only a great fool could deny them, but one way in which they can be minimised and which is underlying our whole approach today is, of course, the view that from the most fundamental point of view these differences are secondary. The theoretical expression of that is the doctrine of the rigours of war and the modern doctrine -- I mean that is not applicable to Switzerland because that goes back beyond that time but in present day discussions there, of course, always prevails. The difficulty comes back in spite of the fundamental admission of human rights. That's the trouble and how to handle them -- these difficulties -- depends entirely on the situations, a given situation; no general statement is possible, but that it creates an unusual difficulty, an additional difficulty to the difficulties inherent in any political organisation is manifest, and therefore from the point of view of common sense you could say well, if you can have it without that complication, better. You know, it's easier to -- this problem exists to an infinitely smaller extent in the British Commonwealth than -- disregarding the Commonwealth as it is now called -- there in this country, for example. That's clear. Yes?

"Would it be fair to say from Aristotle's discussion of the best form of oligarchy that a very carefully restricted amount of mobility adds to stability?"

Under certain conditions, yes sure. I mean, Aristotle did not exclude that. He refers frequently to the fact that those -- for example, the gentlemen should have the possibility of becoming wealthy and in specific later on, and you will be quite shocked to read that -- I mean, excepted from the point of view of logic, not of morality -- that Aristotle says it is necessary to hold out the prospect of emancipation to the slaves. So you gradually get a population who are not citizens. They are freedmen, which also adds a problem.

"It seems to me that you're really very close to describing a British oligarchy."

Yes, to some extent. Yes, what he means on this particular point -- you mean an oligarchy which doesn't form a caste but is open. Sure, yes but still this kind of mobility is absolutely under control. So they pick from time to time someone worthy to ascend; in other words, he must give them a guarantee that he will not upset the apple cart, but if you have mobility simply you have no guarantee against the mobility upsetting the apple cart. Now let us turn then to the more detailed discussion of oligarchy. I don't know whether we have -- yes, he refers first to the military; read the beginning: 1321a5 -- there are chiefly four parts of the multitudine.

"Just as there are four chief divisions of the mass of the population -- farmers, mechanics, shopkeepers, and day-labourers -- so there are also four kinds of military forces -- cavalry, heavy infantry, light-armed troops, and the navy." (Reader interjects: "I think he means that they -- reasonably that they correspond.")

Yes, but there is unfortunately no such simple correspondence. Yes? Yes, but still farmers are not the knights.

"Where a territory is suitable for the use of cavalry, there is a favourable ground for the construction of a strong form of oligarchy."

So, that is important and that, in a way, settles the issue. Wherever you do not have a preponderance of cavalry or can surely count on the knights, then oligarchy is very difficult to establish because here the superiority of the rulers is not only in wealth but also in military power, but that is unfortunately, or fortunately, not always possible and therefore oligarchy is much more difficult to establish than a democracy, as will appear from the sequel. Now this -- but we can't read the sequel -- you can of course make the heavy armed soldiers a very important element in oligarchy but then you have to have the first kind of oligarchy where the property qualification is not high. The question is under certain conditions of civil war -- you must not forget what is characteristic of Aristotle's position we can say is the eternal presence of the danger of civil war. This is now a simple self-explaining book; it's a tough book. And therefore let us go into the details. Now Aristotle doesn't give us too much facts, but you know the importance of these matters for political things: the famous significance of the barricades up to a certain point -- you know -- and therefore taken care of by Haussmann (?), the French town planner who rebuilt Paris so that the barricades could no longer be of military importance -- discredited with gross intent by Marx and Engels, this kind of ruling -- you know there was a practical thing, and Aristotle from a different point of view has the same practical thing. He says, this: there are situations in which the knightly infantry, light or heavy armed infantry, has great military advantages. Now, think on American history. These fellows, you

know, who did not move in heavy columns like the Redcoats but were just shooting from behind a tree, a great military advantage under certain conditions. Aristotle says let us try to find an equivalent for that if you can, if you want to have an oligarchy and that would mean let your younger boys who are not yet say seventeen or nineteen or so -- let them learn to fight as light infantry and then they can help you a bit if you are in such a situation. That's all. He replies to a military problem in military terms which is the only way to solve a military problem, isn't it? I mean that is strictly limited here. Now we come to a more political discussion in the sequel, Book VI. This is the first recipe indeed. The oligarchy must beat the demes at its own game; otherwise it can't last. That's the first recipe. Then he gives the second recipe: there must be the possibility of ascent, not a closed caste. That was a point which impressed you; we can read that in 26 through 31. Yes?

(Change of tape).

(Tape resumes during the reading of page 272, paragraph 4, in Barker). " . . . , Massalia, is to compile a list of all who are worthy of office, whether or no they have at the time a place in the civic body."

Yes, in other words weeding out of the unworthy from time to time, not to have a kind of impossible burden on the ruling class. That's clear. Yes, and the last point?

"The most important offices, which must necessarily be held by full citizens, should involve the duty of performing unpaid public services. This will have the effect of making the people willing to acquiesce in their own exclusion from such offices, and it will make them ready to tolerate officials who pay so heavy a price for the privilege. These higher officials may also be properly expected to offer magnificent sacrifices on their entry into their office, and to erect some public building during its course. The people -- sharing in these entertainments, and seeing their city decorated with votive ornaments and edifices -- will readily tolerate the survival of oligarchy; and the nobles will have their reward in visible memorials of their own cutlery."

Yes; let us stop here. So that's the third recipe: making ruling offices undesirable by putting special burdens on them. Now this is all Aristotle has to say about oligarchies and he says nothing whatever here about the extreme forms of oligarchies -- you know -- he takes only the mildest form because it is fairly easy by analogy to find out. It's infinitely more difficult to maintain those cults under very unusual conditions and so on. We can figure that out for ourselves. Now then there begins the last section of Book VI and this is a survey of the different of the ruling classes and without any opinions on how these various

offices are related to the different regimes and that's very strange because Aristotle had discussed already the question of the different executive offices in Book IV much more -- in 1299a to 1300b -- much more extensively here. And it is a great question for the understanding of the Politics as a whole, why does he bring this here, this seemingly unnecessary repetition. That is a very difficult question which I can barely answer. We must perhaps -- let us look at it a bit more closer. Now Aristotle states first two general principles: first, a distinction between two kinds of ruling offices, the ones which he calls necessary and those which are required for good order. Now that must be well understood. The others later are also necessary from another point of view. Necessary means in Aristotle frequently merely necessary without any inherent dignity. For example, garbage being collected is obviously necessary given certain conditions but no one would regard this as something to look up to. Judges are also necessary but judges are respected. So Aristotle always distinguishes -- not always -- frequently distinguishes between the necessary and the noble where the meaning is the necessary is something which is merely a means and cannot be understood as an end. The noble can be understood as something choiceworthy for its own sake. And the second general principle is that there is a difference regarding ruling offices between small and large cities. Small cities can't have as many offices -- as great a variety of offices in small ones. Therefore you have to wonder which offices can be combined with which, and which are not combinable. Those are the two general principles. Now -- then first he speaks of the necessary offices and mentions six of them: supervision of the markets, supervision of streets and buildings, supervision of buildings and so on and rivers and so on in the country-side, revenue collectors etc., recorders, secretaries, and finally, the penal executive offices. This last form is discussed by Aristotle with unusual length because that seems to create especial difficulties and it surely does if you have a polis, a small society where the men responsible for your executions and so on are your fellow citizens. You know, there are all kinds of pressures which your family can bring on the family of the other. You must know that, and therefore that is a particularly difficult thing. But it is not one of the jobs desirable for their own sake; I mean where there are really . . . And then he turns to the most respectable ruling offices in 1302 b/7, 8 following. Now the first are military offices: surely generals are looked up to. That's clear. The second: the highest financial officer: the auditors. And the third which -- that we must read: 1303a2 where we come to an especially important one -- do you have that?

"Besides the various offices already mentioned, there is another which exceeds more than any other office, the whole range of public affairs."

In other words, as come now to the highest executive office, which has nothing to do with the generals, but the simple revenue men,

the highest offices must be civil, civilian and not military, except accidentally, and what is that?

"The office in question is one which, in a large number of states, possesses the double power of introducing matters and of bringing them to completion. Short of that, and where the people itself is in control, it presides over the assembly; for there must be a body to act as convener to the controlling authority of the constitution. The holders of this office are in some states called Probusuli, or the preliminary council, because they initiate deliberation; but where there is a popular assembly, they are called Boule or Council."

Yes; let us stop here. In other words, in a democratic regime the power of these men who prepare bills is much smaller than in an oligarchic and so; that's clear. But even there, even in a democracy that is the highest executive office from his point of view and the highest because however sovereign the assembled people may be as to what they want to do, the timing and the preparation of the bills in formal is, as you all have learned in many classes in political science, of the utmost importance and you -- I suppose you can bring some American examples of committees, Senate committees especially, which enormous power they wield in spite of the fact that this is a democracy. That is what Aristotle means. That is the most important office: that which prepares the business of the assemblies. That is the highest because what we would call the executive -- where is that -- what we would call the executive -- where is that here? The commander in chief, that's military. That is as such subject to civilian control. There is no chief, no single chief executive as you have in American constitution, nor a prime minister in the British sense; that is not provided for. It is a colligium, a body, a small body of men who has the highest executive power in society even in a democracy. Now -- then we come to the last point: because these nine are the political offices proper; now we'll come to the next.

"But there is also another province of affairs, which is concerned with the cult of the civis deities. . . ."

Yes; of course Aristotle simply says, with the gods. Barker should not bring in his distinction here: with the gods.

". . . and this requires officers such as priests and custodians of temples --- custodians charged with the maintenance and repair of fabrics and the management of any other property assigned to the service of the gods. Occasionally (for example, in small states) the whole of this province is assigned to a single office; in other states it may be divided among a number of offices, and apart from priests there may also be the superintendents of sacrifices, the guardians of shrines, and the stewards of religious property."

Of the sacred things. There is no Greek word for religion: the sacred things. (Inaudible remark). Yes, all kinds of things, any vessel or what have you. Yes?

"Closely related to these various offices there may also be a separate office, charged with the management of all public sacrifices which have the distinction of being celebrated on the city's common hearth, and, as such, are not legally assigned to the priests. The holders of this office are in some states called archon, in others king, and in others prytaneis.

Yes. Do you know where they were called kings? Rome?
 Athens -- Athens in particular. I mean, the highest officials -- the Athenians elected ten rulers, archons, every year and one had the title, the additional title the ruler king and he was in charge of the sacred things, therefore also in charge of Socrates' trial because Socrates' trial fell within this domain. Now then afterward Aristotle repeats the enumeration in a different way and gives as the first item that the offices which have to do with the demonic things, i.e., the gods and war. For some strange reason he takes them together and ends again in this enumeration with the council. The whole enumeration ends here with the council. Now there is a certain difficulty here. You see the council was the highest, we have seen before, and here the list ends with that. What about -- and that, of course, is a very dubious inference but one must try it at any rate. Does it not -- would not be the first then the lowest, the things which have to do with the gods? In this case we find an easy solution straight from the horse's mouth, meaning Aristotle, because he takes up that question again in Book VII and there -- we will read that next time -- he gives a solution in this formula. He gives another enumeration of the offices in order of importance, one, two, three and so, and then when he comes to number five he says the fifth and first, what has to do with the gods. In one sense it is -- does not belong to the important ones. Only number five: a judicial system and executive offices and legislative is much more important. But in another sense, by its inner claim, because gods are so much superior to men it must be the first. That is a problem of very great importance for Aristotle, much more important than appears from the number of lines devoted to this problem. You know, that has also to do then with the great question raised before. One of the heterogeneities you mentioned are religious heterogeneities. Now but if you have a civic religion that means there is no religious heterogeneity. This can be very "liberal" in practice. If you fall in love with a certain Egyptian goddess no one may prevent you from worshipping her there at home and all this kind of thing, but in principle, of course, it is not liberal at all. You have to comply with the public and Aristotelian view for a natural supports any liberalism in this respect. He would suggest a liberal handling, an easy-going

handling as gentlemen would, naturally, but not -- there no legal leg, and that is one important difference between the modern democracy and the ancient democracy. The ancient democracy was not secular. It was -- I mean that has been confused very much because in the eighteenth century especially in France and other countries -- England too -- when they fought against the established church they always looked back to classical antiquity with its beautiful liberalism -- you know -- men like Voltaire and others. Yes, but surely Athens was much more liberal, say, than the Spain of Torquemada; there is no doubt about that. But it was, of course, not liberal in the strict sense because that was only an easy-going practice. There was no right involved here. That people have rights, full civic rights, regardless of whether they belong to the established religion or in the more -- clearer case there is no established religion. Think how long it took until the non-conformist Christians in England acquired -- non-conformist Protestant Christians acquired full civic rights in Britain. But still the modern society from its very beginning tended to be a purely secular society and one can -- we find that very clearly in Hobbes right at the beginning and that is a major difference and that -- it still plays a certain role, naturally, even in the western democracies and the passionate interest which politically interested people have in that race in Virginia is a simple contemporary proof of that if you need a proof. Yes?

"Well even though it seems that Aristotle is assuming a fairly simple set of conditions, that is if you have homogeneity of all these things: religion, ethnicity, all the things which one could wish, nevertheless we've faced the one factor which varies -- that is, wealth, the rich and the poor, and discusses the principles -- how this is descriptive within the polity or democracy, I think we have extended this to cover these other cases in our particular democracy as follows. That is, we have done such things as balance tickets . . . so even though he doesn't discuss this there is a sense in which you can say the principle is still the same."

Very good. I would go with you up to this point, but I have to add some important qualifications. Now first only an additional remark. That is in a way what I meant on the very simplicity of the scheme in Aristotle compared with the enormously complex situation in modern times is so eminently helpful in clarifying our more complex problems. Simply -- well, can the polis as analysed by Aristotle -- is as it were a natural model for analysing more complex societies. That is that was always in my mind throughout, but there is something else. The question is whether the other sovereignties other than the so-called economic one, rich and poor, are simply of the same character as rich and poor. In other words -- you know -- whenever you do your sum to take into consideration the existence of those sovereignties -- well, poor, where I know, for example a very small entity, like Switzerland from poverty to wealth or vice versa has in itself nothing to do with a change of

convictions. Only accidentally. The man may have exactly the same convictions prior and after his bankruptcy, for example. Only accidentally, but that is not essentially different. But in the case of religion conviction would ~~and similar~~ in the case of languages as languages one could say that is in itself nothing particular. That is in a way politically more superficial, you can say, than rich and poor, but practically of the very greatest importance because what people think about the difference of languages makes it a very divisive force. That would have to be taken into consideration. Now the last point I want to make regarding Book VI concerns the end: that is 1322b97. That really must be the last sentence in 1322b. How there are peculiar offices for those cities which have greater leisure and are more wealthy or more better off -- yes -- and furthermore for those which are concerned with --

"In addition there are offices peculiar to certain states which have a more leisured character and a greater degree of prosperity, and concern themselves with good discipline -- offices for the supervision of women; for enforcing obedience to law; for the supervision of children; and for the control of physical training. We may also include the office for the superintendence of athletic contests and dramatic competitions and all other similar spectacles. Some of these offices -- those for the supervision of women and children, for example -- are clearly out of place in a democracy: the poor man, not having slaves, is compelled to use his wife and children as followers and attendants."

Yes; let us stop here. Now here that is only a specimen of how offices are affected by the difference of regime. They obviously need all deliberative and judicial, priests and so on and so on, but here is a difference because in a democracy there cannot -- well, take a modern example: an institution like censorship is an undemocratic institution, I believe. Most people would say -- an undemocratic institution. It interferes with that freedom to live as you like which is a principle of democracy and now Aristotle gives these examples which correspond. There are censors who watch the manners of women and of children. That is an undemocratic institution as Aristotle does to say because -- why is this undemocratic -- because the democracy is the interests and the tastes of the many, i.e. of the poor, decide. Now the poor cannot keep their women at home -- you know -- that was at least the Athenian understanding of female propriety -- that they are not -- don't walk in the streets and this kind of thing. The poor are unfortunately forced to send out their women doing all kinds of work, on the marketplace and whatever else you. Therefore it doesn't work. So I think the principle is perfectly clear. . . . (airplane passes). This is all that I think especially I have to say now about Book VI and I have -- but you raised the question which has very much to do with the broader question we discussed last time. I also

would like to bring up another question but what's the time now?
 Quarter to five. Now let's -- Mr. Brown, will you come to me after class because you brought up the question a short time ago which I would like to bring up and I don't know the context in which it came up. Will you come to me after class? Good. Now what was your question, Miss ?

(Inaudible question).

Yes. That is true. There is a real difficulty. Now I remind you of the problem. Ancient democracy, modern democracy. Aristotle gives a definition of democracy -- you remember, the overall definition, in which we recognize crucial elements of modern democracy: freedom in the sense of doing what one likes to the extent to which it is at all possible. To do what one prefers is a formula which I read in a present day theorist. And the second: ruling and being ruled in turn, which is, of course, considerably modified by representative democracy but in some way, at least legally, everyone is an elector and everyone is eligible, is preserved. Only the eligibility -- no care is taken that the eligibility of everyone becomes a fact. That cannot be done -- is not even desirable under modern conditions. What are the differences then? Now I would first say the differences are due to the fact that Aristotle thinks of democracy in the polis, in a small society where a representative government is out of place and unnecessary; and secondly, the institution of slavery. That's always there. And that, of course, accounts for certain differences. Now -- but still, let us try to understand -- we once we realize this we realize also that we cannot start in understanding the difference between Aristotle's democracy or the ancient democracy and modern democracy by looking only at the different democracies, but we have to look at the difference between modern society and ancient society as a whole because ancient society, regardless of whether it was democratic or not, was a polis, and modern society, regardless of whether it is democratic or not, is not a polis; and similarly the same applies to slavery: the presence of slavery in the old scheme, the absence of slavery in the modern scheme. We have then to consider, contrast, ancient society with modern society, but this is not possible in a clear way except if we consider ancient thought, ancient political thought, in its difference from modern political thought, and why this switch from society to thought? I would explain that as follows: when we speak of societies we think, in the first place, of peculiar social institutions characteristic of a society, but these institutions are all meant to be means for an end, whether that end is clearly indicated or not. Institutions are never ends in themselves. Therefore we have to consider the ends as intended by the institutions in classical times and the institutions in modern times. But those ends become clear, become visible, only in thought and not as mere facts. Therefore the emphasis on thought as distinguished from the mere institutions is due to the ordinary or what is called a distance from the ends. Now what

are the different ends of society as a whole according to Aristotle and according to the modern doctrine? I discussed that last time in a very limited way, naturally, taking Locke as a good representative of modern thought and Aristotle, of classical thought, and then we see clearly for Aristotle the end is virtue; for Locke it is the protection of property. We can reduce this to a more fundamental principle by using some other terms which are not identical but which are implied in that; by saying in Aristotle the emphasis is on duties; in the modern doctrine the emphasis is on rights. Both admit, implicitly or explicitly, duties or rights, naturally, because they are, in a way, inseparable. But it is a question of the emphasis. Whether the rights are in the service of duties or the duties in the service of rights and in this respect the distinction is very clear. I cannot now develop to show that this orientation by rights is underlying the more recent orientation by such things as self-realization. I give you only one link between right and self-realization and that is creativity. The individual — the bearer of the rights is the individual and this individual is conceived of then on the basis of a deeper reflection as the originator of all values — creative — self-realization in the sense of realizing those ends which he fundamentally creates. Now that only in passing. The real difficulty in such an analysis stems from this: Aristotle is a very outstanding man, naturally, but there were other classical thinkers who thoroughly disagreed with that and those other thinkers are popularly known by the name the Sophists and therefore, since the Sophists are much closer to Locke than Aristotle is, the real difference between ancient and modern thought will appear from a comparison not between Aristotle and Locke but between the Sophists and Locke. Now the first difference which strikes one immediately is this: that the Sophists, and I use this word really only for the sake of gross convenience, but I cannot go into that question now. The Sophistic thesis can be stated as follows: there is nothing which is just by nature. Justice is altogether a matter of convention. And here you see the difference from Locke very clearly. Locke speaks all the time of natural rights and a natural law. Yes, but what does this mean? The Sophistic teaching implies that there is no harmony, no fundamental harmony, between self-interest and the common interest. There is no harmony; I mean, of course if people are fooled then they believe in such a harmony and that's very desirable as they say. But the really bright guys, the tyrants, know that there is no such harmony: Thrasymachus, first book of the Republic. Rules in the Gorgias, and so on. Locke, on the other hand, takes it for granted that there is a harmony between self-interest and the common interest. What does this mean however? That is a very nice doctrine and we are, as decent people, all in favor of such a harmony but that is misleading. What does it mean? If the self-interest becomes concentrated in property and only as such is it politically interesting, then — and property means of course not just to protect your property but includes also acquisition of personal property etc — then it means that

this acquisitiveness is in harmony. The, in principle, unlimited acquisitiveness is in harmony with the public interest, and if we want to understand this in a non-hypocritical way we have to go back to the man who formulated that principle in the most brutal manner and that was this unspeakable fellow, Mandeville, who wrote a book Private Vice, Public Benefit. Now here you have the difference very clearly. The ancient Sophists said private vice is of course not public benefit and in modern times we find this in various forms. We could even find it in a different way in Machiavelli; I can't go into that. That there is no harmony between -- in modern times there is a harmony between private vice and public benefit. Now from here we can by one further step reach an overriding formula which applies to the Sophists and Aristotle as well and therefore is really the crucial difference. The word for profit which the classics use, or gain, is the Greek word called . Now what is gain, what is profit? Well, ordinarily you know what every business man understands by it, whether he's honest or dishonest, but then there is a dialogue, which is now regarded as spurious, by Plato, called the Hippotamus, which deals -- where Socrates himself raised the question what is gain and then, of course, he shows very well that wealth is not solid gain because that, as you know, can be easily taken away from you, and so on. And so, what is then the true gain? The highest good and the highest good, according to Socrates, consists in knowledge. So we have then here -- that is the highest private benefit, private good, is wisdom, philosophy, science, however you call it, and here again we find the thesis, there is no pre-established harmony between the private good and the public good. So in other words what you find on the lowest level of mere acquisitiveness in the vulgar sense you find again on the highest level and therefore we can say the real difference, with the qualification I bring immediately, between the classics and the moderns is this: a fundamental harmony between the individual and society in modern thought; the questioning of that harmony in pre-modern thought.

Now there is one crucial qualification. In a way of course the classics admit such a harmony, but how is this harmony -- where do we find that harmony according -- I mean where do we find it in Aristotle? You have read it all the time: the polis. There is a harmony between the polis and the individual; that's the meaning. The polis is natural. I, the human being, cannot be truly a human being except by being fully a citizen. The harmony between private interest and public interest is brought about by moral virtue, not by philosophy as philosophy nor by self-seeking as self-seeking. If you replace moral virtue by justice you are in a way more precise, in a way less clear. But they are in this context practically synonymous. In other words, the perfection of the individual is identical with the perfection of the citizen; the perfection of man is identical with the perfection of the citizen because the perfection of man is moral virtue. That is, indeed, the Aristotelian solution but the difficulty here -- and you can say that is the solution

which all decent men at all times believed in. It is however exposed to certain theoretical difficulties. It is a good formula but which is so good also because it conceals the deeper difficulties. Aristotle, being a theoretical man, does not conceal difficulties and therefore he sets them forth. Now where does the difficulty appear in Aristotle in what we have read? Good man and good citizen. They do not -- even if we don't go into any deeper reflection the good man and the good citizen do not always coincide -- you remember. The good man and the good citizen coincide only if the city is of a certain kind, namely the best city but this best city unfortunately is rarely if ever possible -- one difficulty. But even in the best city it requires only the ruling -- the citizen only as a ruling man is a good man, not as long as he is ruled only. But ultimately, of course, one has to go much beyond that. In other words, how is the problem solved on this level in modern thought? We can say this: moral virtue proper has no place in that basic modern scheme, the scheme of Hobbes and Locke. What you need as virtue is instrumental virtue, i.e. not virtue choiceworthy for its own sake but only in a utilitarian sense, and that means also that the content and the range of virtue is enormously limited as is indicated by the phrase honesty is the best policy which is -- and honesty is much narrower than human excellence as it was understood by the classics. Strictly speaking, moral virtue is not needed. Two things are sufficient: enlightenment, which means also the enlightened self-interest, but it means much more, and secondly positive law. Enlightenment and positive law together establish the harmony between private and public interest. Now if we apply this to our question -- I mean I disregard completely and deliberately the enormous complication which arose from the fact that the unsatisfactory character of the Lockean scheme led to that great and justly famous moralistic reaction started by Rousseau and in a way completed by Kant which tried to restore morality to the position which it had in the Aristotelian scheme. That would not fundamentally affect what I say although it is, of course, very important, but I cannot explain now why it does not fundamentally affect it. Those who happen to be in the Marx seminar will remember the few remarks I made last time about this process, the historical process establishing the rational order which is as Machiavellian in Kant as it was in a different way in Adam Smith, to say nothing of Machiavelli himself. I limit myself now to this point. I'm trying to understand modern democracy in its contradistinction to ancient democracy. We cannot possibly overestimate the importance of that phenomenon once called the Enlightenment, and not as a historical fact of the eighteenth century but as a fact present, co-present with the modern democracy in all its stages. When Aristotle says democracy is the rule of the uneducated, modern democracy denies that by virtue of its notion of popular education. Connected with all this is what I mentioned before: the secular character of modern democracy and -- which is only another expression of that -- the liberal character. There are certain fundamental rights of the individual, one of which being the right of religious freedom.

which has no parallel in ancient thought. And this furthermore: Enlightenment means also the essential harmony between science and society and this harmony finds its expression in the phenomenon of a science serving society; in one word, technology, which is, of course, wholly absent in any strict sense from the classical democracy and this in itself leads, of course -- in itself -- to the absolute impossibility of small states in the way of the ancient polis because -- I don't have to labor that point. Another point which is also implied in everything I said and I can here only enumerate it is the distinction between state and society, which is implied in everything I said and which is wholly absent from classical notions, and with this interesting difficulty, that it is impossible clearly to decide which of the two is higher, state or society. You may remember that from a former discussion: the aims of the individual -- the ultimate end is happiness; happiness is that for which man lives and happiness is subjective, whereas the conditions of happiness -- life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness -- are objective. They apply equally to all. Therefore the state is higher because it stands for the only thing in these matters objective, but this objective, unfortunately, is not the end. Therefore -- I mean in our respect -- that I think is a minimum one must say about the modern distinction between state and society. One could say to live as one likes, this formula of ancient democracy as given by Aristotle, is in modern times elaborated infinitely beyond the ancients and becomes in that elaborated form the distinction between state and society. In ancient times, and that may be an answer to your question, happiness was always understood, if we use these modern terms, as objective. And the very simple reason is this: if you start from the lowest level and do not go into those refined analyses of Plato and Aristotle what does happiness mean? Yes, surely a state of contentedness. That's clear. If someone is always dissatisfied he is clearly not happy, but a man can be content, for example, because he is a moronic individual or an idiot of some kind and that is not -- you wouldn't call that man a happy man. Now, make this implication clear: happiness is a state of enviable contentedness and this element of enviable contains the objectivity. That is not something which is a peculiarity of this fellow, but something which everyone somehow wishes for himself. And taking, again on the crudest level -- to be reasonably wealthy and to have a pleasant life, lots of fun. That is sought; that is what most men desire and like and that is happiness in the vulgar sense. Somehow connected with that -- that is again mere enumeration, not analysis; I don't have the time now -- is this: that in the classical notion I believe it is clearer than in the modern notion of democracy that freedom itself is an end, is the end not only of democracy but of the individual; freedom as an end. Of course that is said all the time, that in modern democracy that's the case, but it is not so clear. It is very far from being clear whether it is so. Why is it not so clear? in the classical notion of the pre-eminence of slavery. That never, apparently, did not so clearly experienced

as a good. We do not in the one/by virtue of the non-existence of slavery proper, we cannot sense that daily, constantly, as a good. Now, did I answer your question or did I not?

(Inaudible response).

Yes, but from Locke's point of view -- well let me state it this way. Locke and Hobbes state explicitly that happiness -- they don't use the word subjective but apart from the word they say in effect happiness is subjective. In all these ancient discussions it is taken for granted that there is a difference of opinion as to what constitutes happiness, but that is surely not subjective in itself and therefore this whole line of argument arising from Hobbes and Locke does not start in classical thought. I must leave it today, and Mr. Brown will you come to me. . . .

Aristotle's Politics; Lecture 14, May 12, 1960

... and that meant something very simple. People are elected to office supposedly, according to the stated principle, on the basis of merit alone but since this worked — since no one who was a poor man would have the time for that it meant, of course, the relatively wealthy part were elected on the basis of merit alone, whereas in an oligarchy proper the property qualification as such was made explicit in the regime. In other words it was said, he who owns less than that amount of property cannot be eligible. Now then Aristotle changes the distinction, the meaning of aristocracy, by saying all right, aristocracy means rule on the basis of merit. It means rule of the virtuous men and that leads to his strict notion of aristocracy as sketched at the end of Book III and elaborated in Books VII and VIII. What — in given cases one may doubt, does he speak of aristocracy severally understood or does he mean what commonly is called aristocracy? But that is not an insoluble problem because it becomes clear, usually from the context. And I would say in these sections with which we are dealing now the aristocracy meant is always what is commonly meant by an aristocracy. Now connected with this is the fact that in certain discussions — we had an example last time — Aristotle omits, without drawing our attention explicitly to it, from the notables or respectable men to the rich. Now here again that's not the fault of Aristotle, but that's the fault of political life. The better people happen to be the wealthier people. That is so up to the present day and I imagine even in this country, in a democratic country. But still, nevertheless, this vagueness, connected even with a certain amount of hypocrisy of course, is not entirely meaningless. It has at the bottom a very real distinction. For example, if you speak of the rich as rich strictly speaking there is no possibility, I mean, of manipulating, gangsters, to take a similar example. Gangsters may be very rich people, as you will know from the same sources from which I know that. But — as that is clear. But still, no one would — while everyone would count some gangsters among the rich people no one would count them among the respectable people. That is clear. So the distinction is perfectly meaningful and we apply it frequently in every day life and Aristotle must not be prevented from doing in his political teaching what we do in ordinary political life. But in a more sophisticated way, since the gangsters, one could rightly say, are more a burden for penal jurisdiction than for politics it comes up within politics in the following way. What kind of wealth, British law requires? And there the old distinction between the landed interests and the newish interests comes in. So this can be an oligarchy, in the strict sense, does not make any distinction as to the source of wealth. The aristocracy does make such a distinction in favor of the landed interests, and you can, if you want to be very "aristocratic," — you can play off the landed interests against the newish interests.

strange that the landed interest and their representatives are still called in some more old fashioned countries the gentlemen and that is what Aristotle reports. Now, but Aristotle does not, however, slavishly reproduce the vulgar distinctions. Behind this is a certain thought that these common political positions are justified to some extent. Agriculture, farming, is a more human and more humane activity than trade and commerce, and of course then one would have to go into that issue. By the fact that Aristotle holds this opinion doesn't prove it is true, but that is thought out by him. Yes?

"In America today wouldn't the essence of the Aristotelian distinction, since farming has grown to be an important part of our economy, be between people who make their money and people who inherit it? I think you can make a case for inherited wealth producing more humane people. I mean, take the Rockefellers for example."

Well it is a very proper day after the death of the father of Governor Rockefeller yesterday and we -- I think that -- yes, sure, that is connected with it. But let us try to state it differently: old wealth and new wealth. Now that is a frequent experience, that people who have acquired their wealth right away are less -- have less nice manners than when there is old wealth and one can even easier -- well, you remember that at the beginning of the Republic, where that is discussed, Old Cephalus who comes from a wealthy family and he says to Socrates, and Socrates doesn't contradict that, that this is, generally speaking, true: you know, that new wine goes more to the head than old wine. And you can even elaborate that and say, well what does old wealth mean? It means -- it may mean that the family tradition is much more powerful than in other families. Think of the practical basis of family traditions: letters, pictures, specializing or today. They must be profound. If people have become very poor they cannot preserve those heirlooms. Now the presence of these reminders of the past of the family are very important for the formation of the young generation obviously. They get a sense of dignity, these children, which they would not get without the physical presence of these things. Now if these families, in addition, played a certain role in the government of the polis in the past the family tradition irresistibly switched into a very pronounced political tradition. There are important facts which have to be considered and Aristotle is, of course, mindful of that. Yes?

"What is there in this situation which says that the difference will not breed arrogance rather than dignity?"

A rather common experience, but of course there is also such a thing as the old patrician insolence and that can be very bad. That is North can be, but still do we not, even today, speak about the old patricians? The old patricians of the Hypo alliance in Milan. That still exists and is not at all the case. Is not that a heresy, my dear parvenu?

"In a sense yes; of lack of manners. Lack of manners does not necessarily mean that he is not a good man even in the Aristotelian sense."

Yes, surely. You can only replace parvenu by the self-made man and you know -- and say what is wrong with the self-made man? Surely. Then we come back -- very good -- then we have to go into a somewhat deeper stratum, namely the whole question of stability versus mobility. Is not stability a more basic need of civil society than mobility? And in this respect I think we can say that at least the political thinkers in the past were generally of the opinion that stability is a more important consideration than mobility. I say the political thinkers because the individual man, say the individual Athenians, who wanted to become rich of course was in favor of mobility. That is clear but one could say the consideration of an interested party is not the decisive consideration. The decisive consideration is the community as a whole and there the whole case was loaded by broad political considerations in favor of stability rather than of mobility, and the question rightly to let me put is this: on the basis of what factors or factors unique to Aristotle are modern men more willing to take chances than earlier men? Well this problem is, of course, well known but usually it is discussed on the basis of a dogmatic premise: for example, that the modern point of view is, of course, right. You know when you read, for example as will, there are distinctions now between progressive societies and stationary societies. Now Athens surely was a relatively progressive society in this sense, but compared with any modern society it was amazingly stationary.

"Can you give another example of a society other than Athens?"

Well, in Sparta it was infinitely more --

"No, I mean out of the ancient period -- that was static and is classic."

I believe -- I mean I have not been as -- I mean I do know much too little about China and India to say anything with any authority on that subject. I can only refer to what I have read and what is always presented this way. All these societies compared with the modern western world in themselves static, especially China, you know, where the tradition is very very long, and even in India, and to say nothing of the so-called primitive people.

(Inaudible remark)

Yes, one must have had . . . that there was a period of very great change, and let us call it broken. For example, the period where Confucius existed in China but then that was stabilized. There was an enormous change in the Middle East with the appearance of Islam. Muslims who destroyed all of positions in the Christian peninsula and thus became . . . an conquering tribe as you know in the enormous part of the Mediterranean area. Yes,

but what happened then? The principle was there is a divine law come down through Muhammad and this must be preserved and the application to new situations, that is simply deduction from the principles set out from Muhammad; no change of the premise entirely. And similar things, of course, existed also in the Western world as you know but as society -- the first societies which as a whole were "progressive," consciously, deliberately, were the modern western societies. In other words, there was progress, but unrecorded progress, and the simple -- have you ever read

"s Ancient Law, which is a very very useful subject, where he tries to show the difference between ancient law and, of course, modern. Now the basic principle is ancient law is ... conceived of itself as unchangeable. Modern law is understood as a matter of course changeable. Ancient law in fact changed, but it changed unavowably. One means was, for example, legal fiction. The law is completely changed, but a fiction is made which makes it appear that it was unchanged. This kind of thing, and others, and allegorical interpretations, you know. You say this sacred text doesn't mean that in particular . . . as an example, wine drinking is forbidden and then commentators in Persia, where they like to drink wine say that means only wine from grapes and not other wines. In a modern society that's absolutely unnecessary and therefore this doctrine of sovereignty which emerged in the sixteenth, seventeenth century is of such a crucial importance because it implies this principle of change. What is unchangeable is the location of the lawmaker, not the law. The lawmaker is the sovereign. There must be one man or body of men who are sovereign and laws regarding lawmaking must be stable, but the laws can be changed as you please. And another which belongs to the same content: the distinction between fundamental laws and non-fundamental laws. Non-fundamental laws: no problem. The fundamental laws are sacred. For example in the French doctrine the royal domain, that's a fundamental law, or only . . . that the law is solid; that's unfundamental. Also saying that there must be registration of the laws by the codifiers: fundamental; everything else solvent. In our modern notion of constitution this distinction survives only we have provided for amendments of the constitution in order to indicate that change legitimately affects the constitution itself. But for our thing there is no provision. The changer of the constitution is the people and that the people should be sovereign is unchangeable. In other words, we still make this distinction between the unchangeable and the changeable but we reduce this kind of the unchangeable to the bare minimum. Older wanted to make it more comprehensive. They never succeeded in that, as little as us succeed in reducing the unchangeable to a bare minimum but it is therefore a question of emphasis, but that is an all-important question,

Now a few more points. When Aristotle speaks of stronger you didn't know what he means, number or property. I would say that diversity. There may be a situation in which the sum of the individuals, less and less, if you have a military organization in which a very small part of the population can control all rest. this small part is stronger than the others. That depends

stronger is the proper translation of that word. There can be -- that depends on all kinds of considerations, who is stronger. Numbers ordinarily do play a role, of course.

"He wasn't talking about military or law there; he seems to be talking about those who would have constitutional rights."

Yes, but the rule which Aristotle gives is this: that those who adhere to the regime must be stronger than those who do not like the regime. In what that strength consists -- it may not -- for example, people who don't have rights may believe in the divine right of their ruler and therefore the ruler doesn't need many weapons. However that strength -- that can come from a different reasons. You gave us a report about what Aristotle has to say on the law enforcing offices. You did not emphasize the fact that this remark about the law enforcing offices is unusually extensive. He devotes many more lines to this particular kind of office than to the others. It's not remarkable? I mean, the problem seems to disappear. How do you explain that? I mean, why is Aristotle so much concerned with the law enforcing offices whereas we would not ascribe to it an important role?

"Well this is an agency of stability in that if you have no enforcement of the law -- "

Yes, that everyone would admit, but still why did he not regard the question of the law enforcing offices as a major political problem? Very simple. Replace United States of America by the old fashioned New England town where fellow citizens have to be the law enforcers . . . That is the reason. We do not have this simple direct democracy, or however you might call it, which Aristotle presupposes and therefore this particular difficulty is connected with this question. And now the last point regarding your power: you said the end of Book VI was particularly confusing. Why? I mean there are many confusing things in this section without any question but why did you find the end particularly?

". . . I really didn't understand what states he was talking about or if he meant states in general or applying it to oligarchies. Barker says that, but Aristotle doesn't. Barker says he's speaking of states in general in the summary above, but Aristotle didn't say that he was talking about. I didn't really know whether to take Barker's word for . . ."

Yes, that is very good. You should not take anyone's word for it, but I will take it up. I would say that the difficulty of this last section, I think, is this: that one would expect Aristotle to speak of the different executive offices in terms of the different regimes, like, the good for democracy,

for the oligarchy and so. But finally he says very little about it. The emphasis is simply on which kind of executive offices are required in any city, but there are a few remarks, nevertheless, about the distinctively democratic and distinctively oligarchic offices at the end. There are some. But the observation is correct and there is a great difficulty regarding this whole end which I will take up later. There is only one point which I mentioned already which was brought up by Mr. Snyder in his paper. Where is Mr. Snyder's big benefit which he could derive from writing his paper he loses because he can't read my handwriting. Now here he says, in a paper on last week's assignment, in this type of democracy all should have the right to elect to office and property qualifications should be made for holding office. With the more important the office, the greater should be the qualification. And this brings him into certain difficulties. Now what do you say to this assertion itself? I mean, disregarding the Aristotelian text. All should have the right to elect to office and property qualifications for holding office. Is this a democracy? You say it is, on the basis of what? I mean in the moment you make property the qualification and especially considerable property qualification of office that's oligarchy by this very fact and you can say there is a mixture of democracy and oligarchy because everyone can elect, but not everyone is eligible; but you cannot say democracy. Now if you would look up the passage, 1319a, 29 to 32 — no, that can't be correct; that cannot be correct, I'm sorry, I must have made a slip. But at any rate in the context it appears that Aristotle does not make this simply a demand — the property qualifications. . . . Do you have it?

"On the one hand all the citizens will enjoy the three rights of electing the magistrates, calling them to account, and sitting in the law courts; on the other hand the most important offices will be filled by election, and confined to those who can satisfy a property qualification. The greater the importance of an office, the greater might be the property qualification required. Alternatively, no property qualification might be required for any office. . . ."

Surly; namely, only in the latter case would it remain a democracy. That was one point and the other point --

(Inaudible question).

Yes, we come to that and that is a great, great question which was also raised by someone else -- no, by Mr. Snyder at the end of his paper. The aim of democracy is liberty, one form of which consists in the interchange between ruling and ruled. He means of course one form of which consists in the fact that everyone rules and is being ruled in turn. Is a system which restricts this right such as Aristotle's agricultural democracy actually a democracy. Is it not more true of constitutional liberty, whether democracy and oligarchy? What's a good question.

and I think the question was also in your mind - So he came here so I can't help him. Now perhaps we consider again this passage regarding democracy and that is, after all, a subject to which we all have the easiest access by virtue of our living in a democracy: 1317b17, after he has given the general definition of democracy -- after we have made this premise and this being the initiating principle, namely of democracy, the following things are democratic -- yes?

" . . . we can now proceed to study its attributes and institutions."

Yes, but not enough, apparently not clearly enough, that all choose the ruling offices from all. That's essential to the democracy proper. All are electors and all are eligible. If not, the democracy is qualified. But here now let us apply this to the rule of agricultural democracy. In what sense is it a democracy? Because everyone is eligible to office according to law. Let us go on to the next point.

" . . . there is the system of all ruling over each, and each, in his turn, over all. . . ."

Now that is, I think -- that is not identical with the first condition, namely this brings out the fact that every individual citizen is eligible. That is an implication of this . . . but it is important that each has the prospect of being elected and not merely eligible. How can you get that? And that is said in the next item.

" . . . there is the method of appointing by lot to all offices -- or, at any rate, to all which do not require some practical experience and professional skill. . . ."

You see, now make our rule of democracy everyone can be elected and every individual has as much of a chance of being elected as the old-time Athenian patrician because lot. Unfortunately we must make here a qualification. In certain cases where experience and skill is needed you have to consider that. Well take the case of a general; the simple example. And someone who has never been in a war because he was badly unfit or particularly averse to such dangers. For the life of a soldier is fraught with dangers -- therefore you have to look at the individual and therefore you have to make an election but not election by lot and then the offices of our simple citizens, the citizens citizen, example. Or there can also be other cases. For example, health officers. You have to see if this man is capable. Does he have medical training, and so on and so on. That? The next point.

" . . . there is the rule that, apart from the rule of the 120, the 120 members should not be held to . . . the same --"

"... No, no. First, no property qualification or a very small one. That is also perfectly compatible with agricultural democracy, where if you say a very small property qualification then the owner of a very small plot of land may very well have the property qualifications. Now the next point.

"... there is the rule that, apart from the military offices, no office should ever be held twice by the same person -- or, at any rate, only on few occasions, and those relating only to a few offices."

Why that? Why is this necessary for a perfect democracy? To give to everyone the chance -- the chance that everyone will come to the top increase with the decrease of the tenure. Think of a man has, say, roughly an opportunity thirty years where he can be politically active and, say, the highest offices are ten three hundred -- only three hundred of that generation can ever get it. Now if people can be re-elected all the time the chances for the individual decrease. It is strictly logical. Next point.

"... there is, finally, the rule that the tenure of every office -- or, at any rate, of as many as possible -- should be brief."

This is clear. In other words, if you reduce the tenure from one year to a half a year, you immediately increase the chance for everyone by two and so on. Yes?

"... there is the system of popular courts, composed of all the citizens or of persons selected from all, and competent to decide all cases -- or, at any rate, most of them, and those the greatest and most important, such as the audit of official accounts, constitutional issues, and matters of contract."

You see, as much as possible everyone has a chance to act in a judicial capacity. That's another point. As much as possible; there are limits, surely. Yes?

"There is the rule that the popular assembly should be sovereign in all matters -- or, at any rate, in the most important; and moreover that the executive magistracies should be sovereign in this -- or, at any rate, in as far as possible."

Now let us stop here. Does it not also follow, because everyone can be, roughly a member of the assembly everyone does not care, in fact, the certainty that he will become an executive magistrate. The executive must vest as much power as possible in that sort of office, which is such as everyone actually deserves. This is not the case, of course, but they are public offices. If

is absolutely clear. That's democratic and the question would then be, is this compatible with the rule in democracy. You remember; that was the question raised. Is the rule in democracy not a concealed polity or aristocracy. I would say no. It is a true democracy in this sense because all these conditions can be met by a rule of democracy or especially -- well, you have to make some concessions. If you have an assembly every two weeks and no railways and helicopters around then, of course, you can only have rare assemblies, but let us say you have in winter and after harvest and before sowing time, have three assemblies and they must do business for the whole year and all important business is to be made there to the extent to which it is possible. If there should be suddenly a war scare before harvest time then, of course, you have to do something else. You must have some man or body of men who can act on behalf of the assembly. That is clear. But otherwise you can -- I would say the first democracy, the agricultural democracy, is really a genuine democracy although it, by virtue of the necessities that these people do not want to be elected because they can't afford to stay away from their farms for a year, or for a shorter time even, will bring it about that people in whom they have trust, i.e. respectable citizens or respectable patricians, will in fact have the most important offices. Now the example in Athens, the most well known example, is of course that of Pericles -- I mean, his legal basis, the legal basis of his position was that he was elected and re-elected for many years as general. Generals had to be elected not by lot and he succeeded in being trusted by the majority of his fellow citizens and therefore he could do it. He could do it and not without troubles as you may remember from history but still, on the whole he succeeded. Now there was one point regarding the democratic section here which we have not discussed and which is of special importance, in 1318b, the beginning. Right at the beginning of 1318b.

"To find theoretically where truth resides, in these matters of equality and justice, is a very difficult task. Difficult as it may be, it is an easier task than that of persuading men to act justly, if they have power enough to secure their own selfish interests. The weaker are always anxious for equality and justice. The strong pay no heed to either."

Yes. Now of course theoretically is not in the text and -- in Aristotle -- and is wholly superfluous. To find the truth about the just is not always -- is rather difficult, but infinitely easier than to make it accepted because people -- as Hobbes put it, whenever reason is against a man the man will be against reason. Now why I think so should read it will appear when we turn to the end of 1318b, the to do what one wills,

"The power of acting at will leaves men with no defence against the evil impulses present in all of us."

Well, Aristotle says in every one of the human beings. That is not all of us because the Greek word human beings is sometimes used in contra-distinction to man and you all know what Aristotle thought about the men. Well, let me explain this terminology. Human being, in Greek anthropos, in French -- yes anthropes. That means any human being, surely, but it is also used in contra-distinction to people who are not merely human beings but real guys, heroes, that is in Spanish the same thing, in Latin too and even in Latin the word is man, meaning a male man but not every male human being because not every male human being is an honore and that is in Greek , in Latin , in Spanish honor. In German you also have a distinction: mensch, human being, and man. So Aristotle -- God knows whether he did not mean -- did not wish to exclude the real men. One must be careful. I wouldn't say either but I would also preserve the ambiguity in the translation. Yes?

"Where there is responsibility, the result must always be an advantage of the first order in any constitution: government will be conducted by men of quality, and they will be saved from misconduct, while the masses will have their just rights."

Yes. The student who read the paper last time rightly referred to the Federalist Papers. You know, that no one -- and the famous thing "Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely." You know?

"Tends to corrupt."

Tends to corrupt. Is this what Lord Acton precisely said? Ah ha. So that's good because otherwise it would be -- now tends is good. That is obviously true and therefore we must -- but still very certainly -- in the Federalist Papers it goes beyond that, through the liberal formulation I do not remember at the moment. No, for Aristotle, of course, it is not true. Power also can bring out the best in a man. That's clear. But here in this crude political consideration he thinks let us be on the safe side and have some guarantees. Good. Now we turn to the subject of today. Passion? Or is there a point which you would like to raise. Yes? (Inaudible remark). May I say, I must take that up later. I would like to take up the example of last time again because that was surely incomplete.

Now let us first say a few words about the end of Book VI. You at 1320b1f he begins with a discussion of oligarchy and the meaning here also is how to establish or to reconstitute an oligarchy. There is also here a terminological difficulty as you will see, if you would read it for beginning there, where he begins. Yes?

"... gave very valuable for democracy a mild form of oligarchy and is doing so we have already shown how a ... limited number of men ... with variety of qualities ... could be ... limited in the principia of opposites ... that is to say,

121

the structure of each should be calculated by that of the corresponding variety of democracy. The first and best balance of oligarchies is closely akin to the constitution which goes by the name of "polity".

You see: is closely akin. It is never identical. Aristotle calls it well-blended and that, of course, would apply also to the best democracy: that it is well-blended, but not by being not a democracy but by coming close in its actual working to something better than a democracy in the rural democracy. Why is it not identical? Let us read the sequel.

"In an oligarchy of this type there should be two separate assessment rolls, a higher and a lower. Entry in the lower roll should qualify men for appointment to the lowest offices that have to be filled; but entry in the higher should be required for appointment to the more important. On the other hand any person who acquires sufficient property to be put on an assessment roll should be given constitutional rights; and by this means a sufficient number of the people at large will be admitted to make those who enjoy rights in the state a stronger body than those who do not. The persons newly admitted to rights should always be drawn from the nobler sections of the people."

Now let us stop here. You see, it is an oligarchy because of the open preponderance of wealth as wealth. That it is -- the wealth is not very great which is required for being a full citizen member -- for being a member of the citizen body -- doesn't do away with the principle of wealth. Now a little bit later he speaks of the problem of oligarchy in general and uses two images for describing the function of the statesman. One is the body and the other is a vessel and there are famous images: the body politic and the vessel of state. Both are apt because there is something -- in a way the polis is natural like the body, but in another way it is also artificial and therefore it can be compared to an artifical ship and city -- he chooses the vessel, the ship, is easier because of the particular storms which -- it would be foolish to compare a city to a ship, for example, which is worn and when also implies that in the case of the body there is, strictly speaking, no separation between ruler and ruled whereas in the case of the vessel you have first the state and then the ruler. You know -- this distinction is also -- both things are true. In a way it is a water without an extreme ruler and you in another way the polis is a unity with an extraordinary ruler even in a popular regime because the government is distinguished from the governed. True?

In this particular passage it seems to strike me that the very first oligarchies which Aristotle makes of the wealthy with oligarchs or the few or the kindred for a general oligarchy -- they are all based on the same idea like every, namely the oligarchs are the ones who rule over the mass around us in

sort of modern oligarchies we find that wealth isn't just -- it isn't the only sort of basis or even main basis for making modern oligarchies and the association should be much broader I think. For example, on this case of two roles an interesting example, I think, would be the case in Central Africa where the whites have tried in the various instances to have separate roles for the blacks and the whites and they put this in terms of education; that is, civilized man and the uncivilized on the other to a certain extent, see, so that really you have many elements connected with an oligarchy besides wealth. You have education, you have white skins, and other things. So to be perfectly general about oligarchy I think that the association with wealth makes it too narrow."

Yes, but the point is this: Aristotle would say, nor without going into the merits of the matter, merely taking the slaves literally, i.e. uncritically, which to extent we must do. To the extent to which the claim is based on education it would be an aristocratic regime and not an oligarchy, he would say. He has provided for that. Now the question is, for example, that a new difficulty arises which is not discussed very much by Aristotle because apparently he did not regard it as very important; we will consider now. And that would be a racially heterogeneous society. Now that is, of course, you can say, a great flaw, that he has not provided for that, at least that he has not discussed it, but what would Aristotle's excuse be if we would accuse him of having disregarded such an important consideration.

"He believed in apartheid."

Yes, but apartheid means, of course, the denial of equal citizen rights. What Mr. Donadio spoke about was a city, a community which consists of racially heterogeneous elements.

"But Aristotle disapproves of that because . . . stability."

Yes, in other words we don't get a discussion right in Aristotle of this issue, but we get it in a later thinker who to some extent tried to restore Aristotle against Hobbes and Locke and that was Rousseau who saw in his Social Contract, which to some extent is a new plus for the city as distinguished from the modern state. This goes into that question and he makes this clear that the democracy or republic which he regards as the only legitimate regime is possible only if the citizen body is of reasonable homogeneity. The chapter or chapters on the people in the Social Contract, Book III or IIII, I forgive you, are crucial. But if you want to do not only racial -- well, what do we mean by racial? Say, ethnic. Before the question arises not only in the case of different nationalities, you know, it can also arise in the case of different ethnic, religious and economic. Because there is no doubt that the more heterogeneous a population is, the less likely it is to be capable of a stable democracy in the sense of a majority and of course in the majority all the

comes necessary for a variety of reasons to visualize heterogeneous societies of this kind very new devices will be needed, and that is true. Aristotle did not discuss that. He would simply say I would not wish to be in charge of such a society.

"Well, I think you could extend this. I don't think it has to be just in terms of race. I probably shouldn't have mentioned education because I think it's more dubious about education but certainly we have lots of societies where not only racial heterogeneity undermines this kind of stability but also things like religion, heterogeneity in things like language. We have an enormous range of things, it seems, which Aristotle really doesn't take into account. . . ."

No. Let us put it this way. He takes it very directly into account -- by the way, language, that they knew every day because that is one of the most divisive things if people can't talk to one another; that's in a way the most divisive thing among human beings. Aristotle knew that very well and his contemporaries too and that was one of the objections to these big empires like the Persian empire, where people who couldn't talk to one another were supposed to be fellow subjects. No, Aristotle knew this very well but he would say there are such obvious incompatibilities with the indispensable unity of the polis. That is, I think, his implicit reason. Now that doesn't mean, of course -- and some societies had shown that it is possible to have linguistic and racial diversities. /Switzerland./ Yes, Switzerland -- yes, but also many other states have done that. But the question is under what conditions what is possible. For example, is the difference between the Germans and French in Switzerland sufficiently fundamental as to -- what was the alternative for those people? The alternative for these people was to be members of the German empire on the one hand and the French monarchy on the other and apparently they felt it is better to live with these barbarians -- I mean barbarians being people who you don't understand. . . . (inaudible due to airplane) than to be subject to the French king or the German emperor.

". . . aren't we getting now into what . . . really the difficulty and that is that once Aristotle states the need for homogeneity, does he really say anything about the manner in which this can be built, developed. I mean, the absorption of heterogeneous elements, let's say."

No, because that he doesn't do for the very reason which I stated. If this is such an enormous burden in itself then try to avoid it in the first place. That is an extreme case where he would say that all people with the experience on the spot are in the best position to solve that. It does not belong to the theoretical question. But this difficulty -- I mean the question where or not would be the case where there are sufficient grounds and so forth to admit the different religious practices. And so, in what kind of conditions? One could be given the only answer that given there would be worse see

everyone concerned. For example, in other words one would have to study this in Switzerland. The situation is very different in different countries. It is not without difficulties in Switzerland either.

"... yes, but if you use what he was in applying to Carthage, the mark of a fairly good regime --"

Yes, but Carthage -- that was homogeneous. They had a heterogeneous mercenary army but that is easy provided you have a very brutal discipline, as you know, like the foreign legion in France. That is a simple problem which men have always been able to solve and it's sometimes the common interest -- the booty -- that it could -- the army becomes, as it were, the fatherland of the mercenary soldiers. Yes, surely -- that in some countries, I believe this country could also be counted among them, these questions are of the utmost practical importance and only a great fool could deny them, but one way in which they can be minimised and which is underlying our whole approach today is, of course, the view that from the most fundamental point of view these differences are secondary. The theoretical expression of that is the doctrine of the rights of man and the modern doctrine -- I mean that is not applicable to Switzerland because that goes back beyond that time we're in present day discussions there, of course, always providing. The difficulty comes back in spite of the fundamental admission of human rights. That's the trouble and how to handle time -- these difficulties -- depends entirely on the situation a given situation; no general statement is possible, but that it creates an unusual difficulty, an additional difficulty to the difficulties inherent in any political organisation is manifold, and therefore from the point of view of common sense you could say well, if you can have it without that complication, better. You know, it's easier to -- this problem exists to an infinitely smaller extent in the British Commonwealth than -- disregarding the Commonwealth as it is now called -- time in this country, for example. That's clear. Yes?

"Would it be fair to say from Aristotle's discussion of the best form of oligarchy that a very carefully restricted amount of mobility adds to stability?"

Under certain conditions, you sure. I mean, Aristotle did not conclude that. He makes frequently to the fact that those -- for example, the peasants should have the possibility of becoming wealthy and so on and so on, and you will be quite shocked to find that -- I mean, starting from the point of view of logic not of morality -- that Aristotle says it is necessary to hold out the prospect of emigration to the slaves. So you gradually get a population who are not citizens. They are citizens, which also adds a problem.

"It seems to me that we're really very close to democratic principles at the moment."

Yes, to some extent. Yes, what he means on this particular point -- you mean an oligarchy which doesn't form a caste but is open. Sure, yes but still this kind of mobility is absolutely under control. So they pick from time to time someone worthy to ascend; in other words, he must give them a guarantee that he will not upset the apple cart, but if you have mobility simply you have no guarantee against the mobility upsetting the apple cart. Now let us turn then to the more detailed discussion of oligarchy. I don't know whether we have -- yes, he refers first to the military; read the beginning: 1321a5 -- there are chiefly four parts of the multitudine.

"Just as there are four chief divisions of the mass of the population -- farmers, mechanics, shopkeepers, and day-labourers -- so there are also four kinds of military forces -- cavalry, heavy infantry, light-armed troops, and the navy." (Reader interjects: "I think he means that they -- reasonably that they correspond.")

Yes, but there is unfortunately no such simple correspondence. Yes? Yes, but still farmers are not the knights.

"Where a territory is suitable for the use of cavalry, there is a favourable ground for the construction of a strong form of oligarchy."

So, that is important and that, in a way, settles the issue. Wherever you do not have a preponderance of cavalry or can surely can not of the knights, then oligarchy is very difficult to establish because here the superiority of the rulers is not only in wealth but also in military power, but that is unfortunately -- or fortunately, not always possible and therefore oligarchy is much more difficult to establish than a democracy, as will appear from the sequel. Now this -- but we can't read the sequel -- you can of course make the heavy armed soldiers a very important element in oligarchy but then you have to have the first kind of oligarchy where the property qualification is not high. The question is under certain conditions of civil war -- you must not forget what is characteristic of Aristotle's *Politics* we can say is the eternal presence of the danger of civil war. This is one a quite trifling book: it's a tough book. And therefore let us go into the details. Now Aristotle doesn't give us too much facts, but you know the importance of these matters for practical things: the famous significance of the barricades up to a certain point -- you know -- and therefore takes care of Mr. Molenaar (1), the French town planner who rebuilt Paris so that the barricades could no longer be of military importance -- circumvented with great difficulty by Marx and Kropotkin this kind of thing -- you know there was a practical theory and Aristotle from a different point of view had the same practical theory. He says, thus there are situations in which the heavy infantry, like an army of heavy armed infantry, has great military advantages, in a. like an army in industry, three soldiers per

know, who did not move in heavy columns like the Redcoats but were just shooting from behind a tree.. a great military advantage under certain conditions. Aristotle says let us try to find an equivalent for that if you can; if you want to have an oligarchy and that would mean let your younger boys who are not yet say seventeen or nineteen or so -- let them learn to fight as light infantry and then they can help you a bit if you are in such a situation. That's all. He replies to a military problem in military terms which is the only way to solve a military problem, isn't it? I mean that is strictly limited here. Now we come to a more political discussion in the sequel, 1321ff. This is the first recipe indeed. The oligarchy must beat the demes at its own game; otherwise it can't last. That's the first recipe. Then he gives the second recipe: there must be the possibility of ascent, not a closed caste. That was a point which impressed you; we can read that in 26 through 31. Yes?

(Change of tape).

(Tape resumes during the reading of page 272, paragraph 4, in Barker). "... , Messalina, is to compile a list of all who are worthy of office, whether or no they have at the time a place in the civic body."

Yes, in other words weeding out of the unworthy from time to time, not to have a kind of impossible burden on the ruling class. That's clear. Yes, and the last point?

"The most important offices, which must necessarily be held by full citizens, should involve the duty of performing unpaid public services. This will have the effect of making the people willing to acciesce in their own exclusion from such offices, and it will make them ready to tolerate officials who pay so heavy a price for the privilege. These higher officials may also be properly expected to offer magnificient sacrifices on their entry into their office, and to erect some public building during its course. The people -- sharing in these entertainments, and seeing their city decorated with votive ornaments and edifices -- will readily tolerate the survival of oligarchy; and the notables will have their reward in visible manerials of their own cutlery."

Yes; let us stop here. So that's the third recipe: making ruling offices undesirable by putting special burdens on them. Now this is all Aristotle has to say about oligarchies and he says nothing what they have about the extreme forms of oligarchies -- you know -- he takes only the mildest form because it is fairly easy to sustain them only under very unusual conditions and so on. He can figure out one not unusual. Now there begins the last section of Book VI we find in a survey of the different kinds of oligarchies and without any emphasis on how those various

offices are related to the different regimes and that's very strange, because Aristotle has discussed already the question of the different executive offices in Book IV much more -- in 1229a to 1300b -- much more extensively here. And it is a great question for the understanding of the Politics as a whole, why does he bring this here, this seemingly unnecessary repetition. That is a very difficult question which I can barely answer. We must perhaps -- let us look at it a bit more closely. Now Aristotle states first two general principles: first, a distinction between two kinds of ruling offices, the ones which he calls necessary and those which are required for good order. Now that must be well understood. The others later are also necessary from another point of view. Necessary means in Aristotle frequently merely necessary without any inherent dignity. For example, perhaps having collected is obviously necessary given certain conditions but no one would regard this as something to look up to. Judges are also necessary but judges are respected. So Aristotle always distinguishes -- not always -- frequently distinguishes between the necessary and the noble where the meaning in the necessary is something which is merely a means and cannot be understood as an end. The noble can be understood as something characterizing for its own sake. And the second general principle is that there is a difference regarding ruling offices between small and large cities. Small cities can't have as many offices -- as great a variety of offices in small ones. Therefore you have to wonder which offices can be combined with which, and which are not combinable. These are the two general principles. Now -- then first he speaks of the necessary offices and mentions six of them: supervision of the markets, supervision of streets and buildings, supervision of buildings and so on and rivers and so on in the country-side, revenue collectors etc., recorders, secretaries, and finally, the penal executive offices. This last item is discussed by Aristotle with mutual respect because that seems to create especial difficulties and it surely does if you have a tribe, a small society where the men responsible for your executions and so on are your fellow citizens. You know there are all kinds of pressures which your family can bring on the family of the others. You must know that, and therefore that is a particularly difficult thing. But it is not one of the jobs admirable for their own sake; I mean where there are really . . . and then he turns to the most respectable ruling offices in 1322/23. Following. Now the first are military offices. Small generals are looked up to. That's clear. The second: the highest financial officer: the auditors. And last third which -- but we must read: 1323d2 where we come to an especially important one -- do you have that?

"Besides the three offices already mentioned, there is one which is far more than any other office: the whole range of public affairs."

In other words we come now to the highest executive offices. What follows is that in 1323d2 generals for the small ones and then

the highest offices must be civil, civilian and not military, except accidentally, and what is that?

"The office in question is one which, in a large number of states, possesses the double power of introducing matters and of bringing them to completion. Short of that, and where the people itself is in control, it presides over the assembly; for there must be a body to act as convener to the controlling authority of the constitution. The holders of this office are in some states called Procuruli, or the preliminary council, because they initiate deliberation; but where there is a popular assembly, they are called Boule or Council."

Yes; let us stop here. In other words, in a democratic regime the power of these men who prepare bills is much smaller than in an oligarchic and so; that's clear. But even there, even in a democracy that is the highest executive office from his point of view and the highest because however sovereign the assembled people may be as to what they want to do, the timing and the preparation of the bills in formal is, as you all have learned in many classes in political science, of the utmost importance and you -- I suppose you can bring some American examples of committees, Senate committees especially, which enormous power they wield in spite of the fact that this is a democracy. That is what Aristotle means. That is the most important office: that which prepares the business of the assemblies. That is the highest because what we would call the executive -- where is that -- what we would call the executive -- where is that here? The commander in chief, that's military. That is as such subject to civilian control. There is no chief, no single chief executive as you have in American constitution, nor a prime minister in the British sense; that is not provided for. It is a collegium, a body, a small body of men who has the highest executive power in society even in a democracy. Now -- then we come to the last point: because these nine are the political offices proper; now we'll come to the next.

"But there is also another province of affairs, which is concerned with the cult of the civic deities. . . ."

Yes; of course Aristotle simply says, with the gods. Barker should not bring in his distinction here: with the gods.

". . . and this requires officers such as priests and custodians of temples -- custodians charged with the maintenance and repair of fabrics and the management of any other property assigned to the service of the gods. Occasionally (for example, in small states) the whole of this province is assigned to a single office; in other states it may be divided among a number of offices, and apart from priests there may also be the superintendents of sacrifices, . . . guardians of shrines, and the trustees of religious property."

Of the sacred things. There is no Greek word for religion: the sacred things. (Inaudible remark). Yes, all kinds of things, any vessel or what have you. Yes?

"Closely related to these various offices there may also be a separate office, charged with the management of all public sacrifices which have the distinction of being celebrated on the city's common hearth, and, as such, are not legally assigned to the priests. The holders of this office are in some states called archon, in others king, and in others prytaneis.

Yes. Do you know where they were called kings? *Rome.*
 Athens -- Athens in particular, I mean, the highest officials -- the Athenians elected ten rulers, archons, every year and one had the title, the additional title the ruler King and he was in charge of the sacred things, therefore also in charge of Socrates' trial because Socrates' trial fell within this domain. Now then afterward Aristotle repeats the enumeration in a different way and gives as the first item that the offices which have to do with the domestic things, i.e., the gods and war. For some strange reason he takes them together and ends again in this enumeration with the council. The whole enumeration ends here with the council. Now there is a certain difficulty here. You see the council was the highest, we have seen before, and here the list ends with that. What about -- and that, of course, is a very dubious inference but one must try it at any rate. Does it not -- would not be the first then the lowest, the things which have to do with the gods? In this case we find an easy solution straight from the horse's mouth, meaning Aristotle, because he takes up that question again in Book VII and there -- we will read that next time -- he gives a solution in this formula. He gives another enumeration of the offices in order of importance, one, two, three and so, and then when he comes to number five he says the fifth and first, what has to do with the gods. In one sense it is -- does not belong to the important ones. Only number five; a judicial system and executive offices and legislative is much more important. But in another sense, by its inner claim, because gods are so much superior to men it must be the first. That is a problem of very great importance for Aristotle, much more important than appears from the number of lines devoted to this problem. You know, that has also to do then with the great question raised before. One of the heterogeneities you mentioned are religious heterogeneous. Now just if you have a civic religion that means there is no religious heterogeneity. This can be very "liberal" in practice. If you fall in love with a certain Egyptian goddess no one may prevent you from worshipping her there at home and all this kind of thing, but in principle, of course, it is not liberal at all. You have to carry with the public and legitimate power for a natural purpose any liberalism in this respect. It would suggest a liberal handling, allocracy,

handling as gentlemen would naturally, but not -- there no legal leg, and that is one important difference between the modern democracy and the ancient democracy. The ancient democracy was not secular. It was -- I mean that has been confused very much because in the eighteenth century especially in France and other countries -- England too -- when they fought against the established church they always looked back to classical antiquity with its beautiful liberalism -- you know -- men like Voltaire and others. Yes, but surely Athens was much more liberal, say, than the Spain of Torquemada; there is no doubt about that. But it was, of course, not liberal in the strict sense because that was only an easy-going practice. There was no right involved here. That people have rights, full civic rights, regardless of whether they belong to the established religion or in the more -- clearer case there is no established religion. Think how long it took until the non-conformist Christians in England acquired -- non-conformist Protestant Christians acquired full civic rights in Britain. But still the modern society from its very beginning tended to be a purely secular society and one can -- we find that very clearly in Hobbes right at the beginning and that is a major difference and that -- it still plays a certain role, naturally, even in the western democracies and the passionate interest which politically interested people have in that race in Virginia is a simple contemporary proof of that if you need a proof. Yes?

"Well even though it seems that Aristotle is assuming a fairly simple set of conditions, that is if you have homogeneity of all these things: religion, ethnicity, all the things which one could think nevertheless we've faced the one factor which varies -- that is, wealth, the rich and the poor, and discusses the principles -- how this is descriptive within the polity or democracy, I think we have extended this to cover these other cases in our particular democracy as follows. That is, we have done such things as balance tickets . . . so even though he doesn't discuss this there is a sense in which you can say the principle is still the same."

Very good. I would go with you up to this point, but I have to add some important qualifications. Now first only an additional remark. That is in a way what I meant on the very simplicity of the scheme in Aristotle compared with the enormously complex situation in modern times is so evidently helpful in clarifying our more complex problems. Simply -- well, can the polis as analysed by Aristotle -- is as it were a natural model for analysing more complex societies. That is what was always in my mind throughout. And there is something else. The question is whether the other hierarchies other than the so-called economic one, rich and poor, are simply of the same character as rich and poor. In other words -- you know -- whatever happens to the rich and poor concerning the existence of their hierarchies -- what party, where I know, for example a very rich family, will be liable in an emergency to women or their slaves has an equally possible to do with a change in

convictions. Only accidentally. The man may have exactly the same convictions prior and after his bankruptcy, for example. Only accidentally, but that is not essentially different. But in the case of religion conviction would and similar in the case of languages as languages one could say that is in itself nothing particular. That is in a way politically more superficial, you can say, than rich and poor, but practically of the very greatest importance because what people think about the difference of languages makes it a very divisive force. That would have to be taken into consideration. Now the last point I want to make regarding Book VI concerns the ends: that is 1322b37. That really must be the last sentence in 1322b. How there are peculiar offices for those cities which have greater leisure and are more wealthy or more better off — yes — and furthermore for those which are concerned with —

"In addition there are offices peculiar to certain states which have a more leisured character and a greater degree of prosperity, and concern themselves with good discipline — offices for the supervision of women; for enforcing obedience to law; for the supervision of children; and for the control of physical training. We may also include the office for the superintendence of athletic contests and dramatic competitions and all other similar spectacles. Some of these offices — those for the supervision of women and children, for example — are clearly out of place in a democracy: the poor man, not having slaves, is compelled to use his wife and children as followers and attendants."

Yes; let us stop here. Now here that is only a specimen of how offices are affected by the difference of regime. They obviously need all deliberative and judicial, priests and so on and so on, but here is a difference because in a democracy there cannot — well, take a modern example: an institution like censorship is an undemocratic institution, I believe. Most people would say — an undemocratic institution. It interferes with that freedom to live as you like which is a principle of democracy and now Aristotle gives these examples which correspond. There are censors who watch the manners of women and of children. That is an undemocratic institution as Aristotle does to say because — why is this undemocratic — because the democracy is the interests and the tastes of the many, i.e. of the poor, decides. Now the poor cannot keep their women at home — you know — that was at least the Athenian understanding of female propriety — that they are not — don't walk in the streets and this kind of thing. The poor are unfortunately forced to send out their women doing all kinds of work, on the marketplace and whatever else you. Therefore it doesn't work. So I think the principle is perfectly clear. . . . (airplane passes). This is all that I think especially I have to say now about Book VI and I have . . . but you raised the question which has very much to do with the broader question we discussed last time. I also

would like to bring up another question but what's the time now?
 Quarter to five. Now Mr. Brown, will you come to me after class because you brought up the question a short time ago which I would like to bring up and I don't know the context in which it came up. Will you come to me after class? Good. How what was your question, Miss ?

(Inaudible question).

Yes. That is true. There is a real difficulty. Now I remind you of the problem. Ancient democracy, modern democracy. Aristotle gives a definition of democracy — you remember, the overall definition, in which he recognises crucial elements of modern democracy: freedom in the sense of doing what one likes to the extent to which it is at all possible. To do what one prefers is a formula which I read in a present day theorist. And the second: ruling and being ruled in turn, which is, of course, considerably modified by representative democracy but in some way, at least largely, everyone is an elector and everyone is eligible, is preserved. Only the eligibility — no care is taken that the eligibility of everyone becomes a fact. That cannot be done — is not even desirable under modern conditions. What are the differences then? Now I would first say the differences are due to the fact that Aristotle thinks of democracy in the polis, in a small society where a representative government is out of place and unnecessary; and secondly, the institution of slavery, that is always there. And that, of course, accounts for certain differences. You — but still, let us try to understand — you once we realize this we realize also that we cannot start in understanding the difference between Aristotle's democracy or the ancient democracy and modern democracy by looking only at the different procedures, but we have to look at the difference between modern society and ancient society as a whole because ancient society, regardless of whether it was democratic or not, was a polis, and modern society, regardless of whether it is democratic or not, is not a polis; and similarly the same applies to slavery: the presence of slavery in the old society, the absence of slavery in the modern society. We have then to consider, contrast, ancient society with modern society, but this is not possible in a clear way except if we consider ancient thought, ancient political thought, in its differences from modern political thought, and why this switch from society to thought. I would explain that as follows: when we speak of association we think in the first place, of peculiar social institutions characteristic of a society, but these institutions are difficult to be aware of at all, whether they end in slavery or not. Institutions are never ends in themselves. Therefore we have to consider the ends as indicated by the institutions in ancient times and the institutions in modern times. But those ends become clear, become visible, only in the life and not as mere words. Therefore the emphasis on thought as distinct indeed from the mere institutions is due to the necessity of the association which starts the polis. Now this

are the different ends of society as a whole according to Aristotle and according to the modern doctrine? I discussed that last time in a very limited way, naturally, taking Locke as a good representative of modern thought and Aristotle, of classical thought, and then we see clearly for Aristotle the end is virtue; for Locke it is the protection of property. We can reduce this to a more fundamental principle by using some other terms which are not identical but which are implied in that; by saying in Aristotle the emphasis is on duties; in the modern doctrine the emphasis is on rights. Both admit, implicitly or explicitly, duties or rights, naturally, because they are, in a way, inseparable. But it is a question of the emphasis. Whether the rights are in the service of duties or the duties in the service of rights and in this respect the distinction is very clear. I cannot now develop to show that this orientation by rights is underlying the more recent orientation by such things as self-realization. I give you only one link between right and self-realization and that is creativity. The individual -- the bearer of the rights is the individual and this individual is conceived of thus on the basis of a deeper reflection as the originator of all values -- creative -- self-realization in the sense of realizing those ends which he fundamentally creates. Now that only in passing. The real difficulty in such an analysis stems from this: Aristotle is a very outstanding man, naturally, but there were other classical thinkers who thoroughly disagreed with that and those other thinkers are popularly known by the name the Sophists and therefore, since the Sophists are much closer to Locke than Aristotle is, the real difference between ancient and modern thought will appear from a comparison not between Aristotle and Locke but between the Sophists and Locke. Now the first difference which strikes one immediately is this: that the Sophists, and I use this word really only for the sake of gross convenience, but I cannot go into that question now. The Sophistic thesis can be stated as follows: there is nothing which is just by nature. Justice is altogether a matter of convention. And here you see the difference from Locke very clearly. Locke speaks all the time of natural rights and a natural law. Yes, but what does this mean? The Sophistic teaching implies that there is no harmony, no fundamental harmony, between self-interest and the common interest. There is no harmony I mean, of course if people are fooled then they believe in such a harmony and that's very desirable as they say. But the really bright guys, the tyrants, knew that there is no such harmony. Thrasymachus, First book of the Republic, Rules in the Gorgias, and so on. Locke, on the other hand, takes it for granted that there is a harmony between self-interest and the common interest. What does this mean however? That is a very nice doctrine and we are, as decent people, all in favor of such a harmony but that is misleading. How does it mean? If the self-interest becomes concentrated in property and only at such an ideologically interesting, then -- and property means of course not just to own your property but to own also all the acquisitions of your activity and so on -- then it means that

this acquisitiveness is in harmony. This, in principle, unlimited acquisitiveness is in harmony with the public interest, and if we want to understand this in a non-hypocritical way we have to go back to the man who formulated that principle in the most brutal manner and that was this unspeakable fellow, Mandeville, who wrote a book Private Vice, Public Benefit. Now here you have the difference very clearly. The ancient Sophists said private vice is of course not public benefit and in modern times we find this in various forms. We could even find it in a different way in Machiavelli; I can't go into that. That there is no harmony between --- in modern times there is a harmony between private vice and public benefit. Now from here we can by one further step reach an overriding formula which applies to the Sophists and Aristotle as well and therefore is really the crucial difference. The word for profit which the classics use, or gain, is the Greek word called . Now what is gain, what is profit? Well, ordinarily you know what every business man understands by it, whether he's honest or dishonest, but then there is a dialogue, which is now regarded as spurious, by Plato, called the Hippotamus, which deals --- where Socrates himself raised the question what is gain and then, of course, he shows very well that wealth is not solid gain because that, as you know, can be easily taken away from you, and so on. And so, what is then the true gain? The highest good and the highest good, according to Socrates, consists in knowledge. So we have then here --- that is the highest private benefit, private good, is wisdom, philosophy, science, however you call it, and here again we find the thesis, there is no pre-established harmony between the private good and the public good. So in other words what you find on the lowest level of mere acquisitiveness in the vulgar sense you find again on the highest level and therefore we can say the real difference, with the qualification I bring immediately, between the classics and the moderns is this: a fundamental harmony between the individual and society in modern thought; the questioning of that harmony in pre-modern thought.

✓ Now there is one crucial qualification. In a way of course the classics admit such a harmony, but how is this harmony --- where do we find that harmony according --- I mean where do we find it in Aristotle? You have read it all the time: the polis. There is a harmony between the polis and the individual; that's the meaning. The polis is natural. I, the human being, cannot be truly a human being except by being fully a citizen. The harmony between private interest and public interest is brought about by moral virtue, not by philosophy as philosophy nor by self-seeking as self-seeking. If you replace moral virtue by justice you are in a way more precise, in a way less clear. But they are in this content practically synonymous. In other words, the perfection of the individual is identical with the perfection of the city; the perfection of man is identical with the perfection of the citizen because the perfection of man is moral virtue. That is, indeed, the Aristotelian solution but the difficulty here --- and you can say that in the solution

which all decent men at all times believed in. It is however exposed to certain theoretical difficulties. It is a good formula but which is so good also because it conceals the deeper difficulties. Aristotle, being a theoretical man, does not conceal difficulties and therefore he sets them forth. Now where does the difficulty appear in Aristotle in what we have read? Good man and good citizen. They do not -- even if we don't go into any deeper reflection the good man and the good citizen do not always coincide -- you remember. The good man and the good citizen coincide only if the city is of a certain kind, namely the best city but this best city unfortunately is rarely if ever possible -- one difficulty. But even in the best city it requires only the ruling -- the citizen only as a ruling man is a good man, not as long as he is ruled only. But ultimately, of course, one has to go much beyond that. In other words, how is the problem solved on this level in modern thought? We can say this: moral virtue proper has no place in that basic modern scheme, the scheme of Hobbes and Locke. What you need as virtue is instrumental virtue, i.e. not virtue choiceworthy for its own sake but only in a utilitarian sense, and that means also that the content and the range of virtue is enormously limited as is indicated by the phrase honesty is the best policy which is -- and honesty is much narrower than human excellence as it was understood by the ancients. Strictly speaking, moral virtue is not needed. Two things are sufficient: enlightenment, which means also the enlightened self-interest, but it means much more, and secondly positive law. Enlightenment and positive law together establish the harmony between private and public interest. Now if we apply this to our question -- I mean I disregard completely and deliberately the enormous complication which arose from the fact that the unsatisfactory character of the Lockean scheme led to that great and justly famous moralistic reaction started by Rousseau and in a way completed by Kant which tried to restore morality to the position which it had in the Aristotelian scheme. That would not fundamentally affect what I say although it is, of course, very important, but I cannot explain now why it does not fundamentally affect it. Those who happen to be in the Marx seminar will remember the few remarks I made last time about this process, the historical process establishing the rational order which is as Machiavellian in Kant as it was in a different way in Adam Smith, to say nothing of Machiavelli himself. I limit myself now to this point. I'm trying to understand modern democracy in its contradistinction to ancient democracy. We cannot possibly overestimate the importance of that phenomenon once called the Enlightenment, and not as a historical fact of the eighteenth century but as a fact present, co-present with the modern democracy in all its forms. When Aristotle says democracy is the rule of the undiscerning modern democracy denies that by virtue of its notion of popular opinion. Connected with all this is what I mentioned before: the peculiar character of modern democracy and -- which is only another expression of that -- the liberal character. There are several fundamental rights of the individual, one of which being the right of religious freedom.

which has no parallel in ancient thought. And this furthermore: Enlightenment means also the essential harmony between science and society and this harmony finds its expression in the phenomenon of a science serving society; in one word, technology, which is, of course, wholly absent in any strict sense from the classical democracy and this in itself leads, of course -- in itself -- to the absolute impossibility of small states in the way of the ancient polis because -- I don't have to labor that point. Another point which is also implied in everything I said and I can here only enumerate it is the distinction between state and society, which is implied in everything I said and which is wholly absent from classical notions, and with this interesting difficulty, that it is impossible clearly to decide which of the two is higher, state or society. You may remember that from a former discussion: the aims of the individual -- the ultimate end is happiness; happiness is that for which man lives and happiness is subjective, whereas the conditions of happiness -- life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness -- are objective. They apply equally to all. Therefore the state is higher because it stands for the only thing in these matters objective, but this objective, unfortunately, is not the end. Therefore -- I mean in our respect -- that I think is a minimum one must say about the modern distinction between state and society. One could say to live as one likes, this formula of ancient democracy as given by Aristotle, is in modern times elaborated infinitely beyond the accidents and becomes in that elaborated form the distinction between state and society. In ancient times, and that may be an answer to your question, happiness was always understood, if we use these modern terms, as objective. And the very simple reason is this: if you start from the lowest level and do not go into these refined analyses of Plato and Aristotle what does happiness mean? Yes, surely a state of contentedness. That's clear. If someone is always dissatisfied he is clearly not happy, but a man can be content, for example, because he is a moronic individual or an idiot of some kind and that is not -- you wouldn't call that man a happy man. Now, make this complication clear: happiness is a state of curvilinear contentedness and this element of curvilinear contains the objectivity. That is not something which is a peculiarity of this fellow, but something which everyone somehow wishes for himself. And taking, again on the crudest level -- to be reasonably wealthy and to have a pleasant life, lots of fun. That is sought; that is what most men desire and like and that is happiness in the vulgar sense. Something connected with that -- that is again mere enumeration, not analysis; I don't have the time now -- is this: that in the classical notion I believe it is clearer than in the modern notion of democracy that freedom itself is an end, is the aim not only of democracy but of the individual: freedom as an end. Of course that is said all the time, that in modern democracy that's the case, but it is not so clear. It is very far from being clear whether it is so. Why is it an end? So clearly in the classical notions of the past we find clarity. But where in our modern society is there clarity?

as a good. We do not in the one/by virtue of the non-existence of slavery proper, we cannot sense that daily, constantly, as a good. Now, did I answer your question or did I not?

(Inaudible response).

Yes, but from Locke's point of view -- well let me state it this way. Locke and Hobbes state explicitly that happiness -- they don't use the word subjective but apart from the word they say in effect happiness is subjective. In all these ancient discussions it is taken for granted that there is a difference of opinion as to what constitutes happiness, but that is surely not subjective in itself and therefore this whole line of argument arising from Hobbes and Locke does not start in classical thought. I must leave it today, and Mr. Brown will you come to me. . . .

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 15, May 17, 1960

... but your paper seems to be distinguished by a particularly high degree of caution, if this is of any help to you, and that is a very good quality. But sometimes caution is also -- prevents one from a necessary daring and therefore -- but I will come to that. You make many very good remarks. What I regard as the defect of your paper is this: you discussed very clearly the Aristotelian discussion of imperialism of the polis vs. self-preservation or defensive posture. You did not make clear the relation of this problem of imperialism to the question of the good life of the individual. You showed some awareness of it but you did not draw the conclusions. I mean, what is -- if I present it in the form of a proportion -- let us call it imperialism -- imperialism to defenses. That's the polis. What is the equivalent of that for the individual?

"Well there are a number of distinctions. One is simply between the life of political activity and involvement in it and the life of contemplation, but there is a more extreme version of the political life which would be being a tyrannical ruler which would in a sense ... "

Yes. All right. Tyranny to what?

"To being an active citizen."

Say a republican citizen. All right. That's true, but there is also the other thing to which you alluded.

"Which is the life of contemplation which -- "

Could I say the practical life proper, the political life proper, to the theoretical life. That is the lack of courage which you showed. It is very strange that the practical political man is -- corresponds, on the level of the individual life, to the imperialistic polis, and the theoretical man corresponds to the self-contained polis. But we must discuss it later. Now there were a few other points. Regarding the worship of the gods: first in order of merit is Parker's addition, "Fifth and first" is what Aristotle says. We come to that later. Now, then you made a remark which I did not quite understand about -- that all things have been discovered hitherto, only they must be brought together. You referred wisely to the parallel in the second book. Did you say anything about the difference between the two statements? That did not become clear to me.

"I didn't really. I think there was more emphasis in the earlier statement that most things have already been discovered -- a relativelessness in Book VII that discovery proper should be limited to what had not been discovered but also an implication that much could be gained by using things which already had been and not losing -- "

Well, what I'm concerned with now only is this. The statement in Book VII is not an identical repetition of what is said in Book II and I think we can say that's the general rule. There are no identical repetitions. There's always something -- new twist to a thought in a repetition. Then, I did not quite understand what you said about the question of the good citizen in Book VII as distinguished from Book III.

"Well, the main point would be that the good citizen would also necessarily be a good man and he would be relative to the regime, but he would be relative to the best regime."

So therefore it is not relative.

"To be relative to the best would be, in a sense, absolute."

That's absolute. So I see; that was the difficulty which I had. Now the last point, regarding slavery: there I think you seemed rather obviously to lack daring. Now let us read that passage: in 1330a25 following. We may begin with that: 1330a25, toward the end of 1330a. Mr. Reinkin, will you tell the class on which page it is.

"I would assume that it started with 13 on page 306 -- The class which farms it should ideally, and if we can choose at will, be slaves -- "

Yes, now this -- where he says ideally means in Greek if it could be done according to wish. You remember that? Aristotle uses this much simpler and clearer expression. What an ideal is is very hard to say, but what a wish is we all know. We must only understand that the wish is not an arbitrary wish but the wish of sensible people. You understand. Good. Yes?

" -- but slaves not drawn from a single stock, or from stocks of a spirited temper. This will at once secure the advantage of a good supply of labour and eliminate any danger of revolutionary designs. Failing slaves, the next best class will be one of serfs who are not of Greek origin and whose character is like what has just been described. The farm hands employed on private estates should belong to the owners of those estates; those who are employed on public property should belong to the public. How the slaves who till the soil should be treated, and why it is wise to offer all slaves the eventual reward of emancipation, is a matter which we shall discuss later."

Yes but surely we don't -- that has not come down to us if Aristotle has written it. But one thing he makes clear: it is better to offer all slaves as a reward, freedom, emancipation. That is -- what do you say to that in the light of Book I, of what we heard about slavery in Book I? Yes?

"Well, this is why I brought up this question of natural slavery -- "

Yes, that's absolutely necessary, but you should have -- you should not have stopped so early. Go on. What is the natural slave?

"The natural slave was supposedly not capable of living his own life. Hence, certainly Aristotle would not recommend that they should just be turned loose because it wouldn't be doing them a favor and it wouldn't be doing anyone else a favor."

Very well. Now what follows?

"If he makes any reference to the emancipated slaves it seems to me that in a way he's in a difficult position because -- one point I wanted to bring up which I didn't have time on -- is that in his best regime he really has built a system which needs leisure for citizens, which means somebody has to do the menial duties and this would be the slaves. On the other hand, he speaks of offering emancipation whether it's because it's wiser to do that sort of thing or because it's the only justifiable thing to do. There seems to be a problem."

Well, that is an understatement.

(Someone else): "Where Barker translates wise to offer all slaves, isn't the word is very prudent?"

Is better, better.

"The good master educates the natural slave -- "

What do you say to that Mr. ?

"It can't be done."

Why not?

"Because they're natural slaves -- "

He's too dumb for being educated. Well, what I'm driving at is that is a manifest contradiction to Book I. The slaves which Aristotle needs for his so-called ideal state are not natural slaves. That -- common sense could have told you that. These fellows who are very -- so dumb that they can't count, say, beyond five, you see, are useless except for -- I mean you would have needed more supervisors than you have slaves. So that, in other words, what Aristotle says implicitly -- you have to have slaves who are not by nature slaves and you can even -- I mean you should keep the case wide open and say that the polis is then based on a certain kind of injustice. It makes people slaves who ought not to be slaves and that -- a real understanding of the Politics would have to face that issue, and that is very important for the whole question of natural justice, natural right. If the polis as such must transgress somewhere natural right, then

natural right must be qualified, to put it mildly, in order to be politically relevant. That's a very great point. That is probably one of the... I mean people have said a lot about Machiavelli and Aristotle, you know, and the section on tyranny in the fifth book, that this foreshadows Machiavelli. That is not true, but this is much closer to what Machiavelli says. Only still there are fundamental differences, but in this respect the difference is not as radical as it might seem. Of course, one can try to get around it and say -- the way in which Thomas Aquinas interpreted the first book, the doctrine on slavery. Then it appears, according to that interpretation which is, I think, not correct, that the conventional slaves are not unjustly slaves, meaning this: a conventional slave is a man who has been made a prisoner in war and this is a benefice because the alternative would be killing. That was the Roman law tradition of this time; Thomas didn't figure that out. But I don't think that is what Aristotle means, and in addition it would raise the great question -- the more fundamental question -- with what right can you kill people who have laid down arms? Locke's question. Do you not have to -- the moment a man ceases to be a warrior by laying down his arms do you still have a right to kill him?

"It's just a formulation of might makes right in this situation."

Yes, you can say that, but it is more specific here because the specific principle appealed to is this: that slavery is a benefice of, let us say, international law by virtue of which a defeated enemy is protected against annihilation. That is not Aristotle's thesis, I would say. Aristotle regards the slave who is not by nature a slave as a man who has been unjustly made a slave. Therefore the situation is very clear in Aristotle. Yes?

(Inaudible exchange, followed by following remark by a student). "On the other hand, the offer may not necessarily be a lie but it's just that the slave fails to live to an old enough age so that he can become emancipated."

Yes, but still Aristotle makes a very simple rule that obvious lies which are discovered very soon are extremely stupid and self-defeating and you may have heard something about this subject in the last weeks or so. (Transcriber's note: this reference to the U-2 incident brought an uproar from the class). We are dealing here strictly with Aristotle. If I may only repeat that: this question of slavery has a very great bearing on the fundamental question of natural right and that is a point where one can dig much deeper. . . . Plato, who is, generally speaking, much more outspoken than Aristotle is, much less Jane Austinian than Aristotle -- Plato says in perfect frankness in the fourth book of the Republic, when he indicates the seven titles to rule which consist, for example, father over son and other things; he mentions this one: the right of the stronger, by which Plato means, in all political rule which we find this element of mere force enters. It is not the only thing, but it enters. Well, of course Aristotle too admits that when he says the people in favor

of the regime must be stronger than those who are not in favor. Stronger does not necessarily mean numerically stronger because that depends, as you know, on military techniques and other kinds of considerations: what constitutes strength. That is so. I mean, one cannot disregard that. I mean, unarmed justice is politically not necessarily effective to put it mildly. You know? After all, there is a use of force, of legitimate force, which everyone admits, but it is force all right and therefore there must be force around and force enters. Plato indicates it, by the way, most simply at the beginning of the Republic. There is a brief scene where Socrates is kept in the Piraeus first by force, and then persuasion comes: it is better for you to stay there because there will be a beautiful spectacle tonight. Now both elements, force and persuasion, combined are the secret of politics and we call a free regime one in which the persuasion element is stronger than the force element and a tyrannical regime where the proportion is different. That cannot be spelled out easily in numerical terms, quantitative terms, but I think that the idea itself, the thought itself is easily intelligible. Now you wanted to say something Mr. Faulkner?

"Wouldn't there be a problem if you freed the slaves. Wouldn't that detract from the homogeneity of the polis, to put it mildly?"

Yes, it would create a problem, but then in order to answer that question one would have to understand the obvious secret of Aristotle's best regime. Only then will your observation acquire its proper force. I'm perfectly willing to state that. There is no harm done in stating a secret which is obvious. But you wanted to say something? No. All right: what is that secret? You remember in Book III where the fundamental exposition is given we had an argument in favor of democracy, not as a universal solution, but in a certain -- if the demes has a certain character, is tolerably civilized. Then a democracy in this kind where also the best men form part of the assembly, to say nothing of the ruling offices, and can make themselves felt. One could very well say that in such a society the collective wisdom of the citizen body, which includes the wisdom of the best members, could be said to be superior to the wisdom of any individual. You remember that argument. Now that was elaborated and everything seemed to be fine. We had our democracy, except it is now representative. And then Aristotle, apparently without any reason, begins to bring in the kingship, and then it works up to a point where the absolute king, wisdom incarnate, appears to be as the highest, as the most divine regime. You remember that. And we were convinced with the absolute . Why did he not leave it at this wonderful democracy he had painted? And something must be deficient (?) from Aristotle's point of view and by studying the Politics as a whole one can find it. Every democracy, however good, requires the subordination of those who are by nature best to those who are not by nature best. That is clear. The decisions are made by the citizen body. That is against nature. Now -- I mean, it is also possible to state this in more practical terms but I leave it now at this moment.

theoretical formula. It is according to nature. Those who are by nature better should rule those who are by nature inferior to them. In other words, the city must be a hierarchic structure and that is not sufficiently recognized in a democracy, in any democracy. But still, this kingship on the other hand -- we learn that true, admirable as it may be, belongs somehow to the past. It is impossible once you have these large cities which you had in Aristotle's time. Then in Book IV we received a somewhat different suggestion which was in between the democracy and kingship and that was the polity, the rule of the middle class you can also say. This is in between and that also seemed to be perfectly satisfactory, politically speaking. But still this question always remains: those who are by nature best. And from this point of view -- here you have, you can say, here you have the rule of the demos. Here you have no demos. All are subjects. No one is a citizen. In the polity you had something which was a qualified demos; qualified, property qualifications and so on. And now in Books VII and VIII Aristotle gives his account of the best regime. This is neither a democracy nor kingship nor polity. It is an aristocracy. In other words, that is in between democracy and kingship but closer to the kingship than the polity was, but of course not a kingship. What is the secret of that aristocracy? It's absolutely unique. What about -- you remember throughout the work the discussion -- the demos -- the great problem. The multitude of Greek citizens who are poor and are, therefore, unable to acquire the necessary education, and yet, on the other hand, being free men demand rights. That's the political problem for Aristotle. How does he solve that problem in the best regime, Book VII?

"Well, you mean through education?"

No, what does he do? What does he do with the demos?

"Well, he starts out with a very superior group of people."

All right. But what about the others: the craftsmen, farmers, etc.?

"They are not citizens."

That's it. But what does that mean in political terms?

"They don't rule."

Yes, but more clearly. There is no demos. Aristotle solves the problem of the demos by abolishing it. Beautiful. Whether he meant it quite seriously or not -- that might be a long question -- but that is the open secret of Aristotle's Politics. He comes as close as possible to the best regime simply, the kingship, by this solution. So -- well, we will turn to that later. In other words, Aristotle's Politics is as "utopian" as Plato's. In a way, even more, because Plato's Laws, the only political work of Plato -- the Laws -- is not a political work properly speaking -- you have a demos. You do not have it here. That's very strange. In other

words you have no demos but you have slaves who do not deserve to be slaves. In other words, you replace one inconvenience by another. Generally stated, politics is the realm of inconveniences and you cannot get any political order which is free from inconveniences, which is not an unimportant lesson. By utopianism proper I think we understand today a political order which is free from inconveniences. I mean when people say the utopians they mean that. That's impossible, really. Now you wanted to say something?

(Inaudible exchange).

By emancipating the slaves, Aristotle seems to generate a demos. That is the great danger -- sure. Either you perpetuate the injustice of having made people slaves who should not be slaves. That's one way of solving it. Or you try to be just. You bring in a demos; you gradually generate a demos which can be fatal, but of course that is not so simple. You remember that, for example, a city like Venice was a rather restricted aristocracy or oligarchy for many, many centuries because if people know always, and are constantly reminded of the fact, that they are freedmen or descendants from freedmen and the others are sufficiently strong they can last for some time. We must not forget that. But nevertheless it creates a problem of having people around who are not slaves and, indeed, not legally citizens but who by their very bulk would make themselves felt. That problem exists.

(Inaudible question).

Yes, we come to a parallel passage very soon. Let us postpone that and now turn to a coherent discussion of the first part of Book VII. Now we must remember the context. The question is to construct the best regime -- not only to analyze it or to describe it but how to establish it -- and the theme is the best regime and the best regime is that which is most conducive to the best life, to the most choiceworthy life. Let us see near the beginning in 1323a17, the third sentence from the beginning of the book -- for it is proper that -- do you have that?

"As long as that is obscure, the nature of the ideal constitution must also remain obscure; and we may thus expect that -- unless something unexpected happens -- the best way of life will go together with the best constitution possible in the circumstances of the case."

Yes. In other words, here is already a reference to chance. If nothing unexpected or strange happens. That can. Someone can live well and lead the most choiceworthy life in a very imperfect regime. That can happen. Socrates is the most famous example. That can happen. But that is not rational. It is better if the whole order of society is so as to further the best life of the individuals. Now, therefore, we have then to raise two questions. First, what is the best life? And second, is the same life, way of life, the best for the individual and for the polis? We don't know that prior to investigation. Then first the question what is the

best life. This is Aristotle's settling of the famous problem of value judgments. He does this in a few lines. Let us read them: a little bit later, where you left off.

"The nature of the best-life is a theme which has already been treated by us in works intended for the general public. Much of what has been said there may be considered adequate, and we must use it here. There is one classification of the constituent elements of the best life which it is certain that no one would challenge. This is the classification of these elements into external goods; goods of the body; and goods of the soul. It will also be generally agreed that all of these different 'goods' should belong to the happy man. No one would call a man happy who had no particle of fortitude, temperance, justice, or wisdom; who feared the flies buzzing about his head; who abstained from none of the extremest forms of extravagance whenever he felt hungry or thirsty; who would ruin his dearest friends for the sake of a farthing; whose mind was as senseless, and as much astray, as that of a child or a madman. These are all propositions which would be accepted by nearly everybody as soon as they were stated."

Now let us stop here. There is no value problem. What the good life is -- everyone knows that. You have to be reasonably well off, in the first place. Say if you are starving or freezing to death -- no one would call such a man happy. Also health and a reasonable condition of the body, and also goods of the soul. Clear? Is there anyone who doubts that, that a man who has all these three things is a happy man? Elementary. Yes?

"What about potential debate on what is a good of the soul?"

Clear? Is it not true that a man who is frightened of everything, i.e., who is completely deprived of courage, must be absolutely miserable because there are so many occasions for being frightened every minute? We cannot even be sure that this house will not collapse, for instance, to say nothing of someone shooting -- taking a pot shot here. So, in other words -- and the same applies to temperance and the other things too.

"Then how about potential debate on what is happiness, on which all of these rest?"

No question, really no question. We forget these simple -- we are in a false sense sophisticated. We forget that simple stratum underlying all the sophisticated questions. I am aware of the fact that there are certain difficulties, but practically, politically speaking, as we ought to do when we speak of political matters, the problem in this way is not so difficult. I would advise you to read in the first book of Aristotle's Historic the chapter on the good things and since the sum of the good things is happiness he gives an enumeration of that and see whether there is anything in it to which you could not fully subscribe, although you are a twenty-first century American and Aristotle was a fourth century Greek. For example, to

have many friends. It's a part of happiness. To have good friends: naturally a part of happiness. To have children: happiness. That there are certain people who don't want it -- we know that -- but then we say that is a special case or in some cases we even say something wrong, and so. That is simple. That this is -- you see you must not forget this: there is a sophisticated level where all these things are in need of a more detailed investigation, but in political matters, as long as you want to understand the citizen as citizen, this sophistication is out of place.

"It seems to me that it is exactly in political matters where certain choices are made to a statesman that this problem would become greater than anywhere else."

Yes, but on the basis of that. On the basis of that the generally speaking man have this notion of happiness and that they say we don't get enough happiness if we -- well, think of a policy: guns vs. butter or butter vs. guns. What is the issue? The issue is that some people say we want to have the happiness of butter regardless of what might happen to the happiness of our children, and other people say the other way around. That is of course -- I mean, I have no doubt that's clear. But all these questions arise on the basis of things agreed upon. That is the point. The questions arise even earlier, as Aristotle will say immediately, but here we have had only one point. Happiness consists of three elements: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. What else do you want? Anything you can think of will fall under that. But this gives rise to a very important question immediately, which Aristotle takes up, naturally, immediately. But you had a point -- you wanted to make a point.

"Well, it would seem to me since Aristotle's obviously right here that modern liberals basically accept this as an implicit premise."

Unfortunately, only as an implicit premise. It is the sake of science not to make implicit premises, especially if they are important.

"I agree with you. It's unfortunate it's only implicit, but I think if it's made explicit a lot of the difficulties of modern liberals would be resolved."

Yes, all right. Now let us see whether Aristotle has our universal agreement when he goes on. Let us read the next sentence.

"But differences begin to arise when we ask, 'How much of each good should men have? And what is the relative superiority of one good over another?' Any modicum of goodness is regarded as adequate -- "

Of virtue, virtue. Yes, all right.

" --- but wealth and property, power, reputation, and all such things, are coveted to an excess which knows no bounds or limits."

You see, that is the immediate problem. Everyone admits that, but may I state with you the problem in the most simple manner: slightly differently, the same formula from Aristotle's Ethics. Happiness: what is happiness? Aristotle says virtue plus equipment; equipment -- nice word. You must have some in order to be virtuous. And now there arises this interesting question. You (several inaudible words) and the question arises what has priority and there are people who say first let me get the equipment by hook and by crook and then I will be virtuous. That's one way of putting it. That is the question which Aristotle means; only some people take such a long time in acquiring the equipment that they can never come to . . . so that's the question, what's the proportion? If you think of the famous formula of Harold Lasswell, what are the three -- the unholy trinity of political man? You remember that? Safety, income, deference. Safety, income, deference. That is what Aristotle -- he doesn't speak of income; he speaks of wealth, but income is only the modern equivalent of wealth, and so on. That is it. He doesn't even mention virtue, which I think is imprudent because think of someone running for office with the only thing we know about him is that he is concerned with safety, income, deference, and we would not elect him, so he would at least have to add that probably an implication of deference is deference to virtue, and therefore virtue would come in. So, all right. But still that is the question. Some people say, yes, surely you must be a decent man, but that is relatively minor. The main point is to be rich and powerful. Good. That is then a difficulty immediately and now, therefore, we have to get the true answer to this question. Which is the most important of these three elements, or, let us say, two elements: virtue and the things which are not in themselves virtue? What does he say?

"There is an answer which can be given to men who act in this way. 'The facts themselves make it easy for you to assure yourselves on these issues. You can see for yourselves that the goods of the soul are not gained or maintained by external goods. It is the other way round. You can see for yourselves --"

Yes, now wait; do you see that? Do you remember? Does this remind you of something?

"The Apology of Plato."

Absolutely; the utilitarian argument for virtue. You want riches; all right. But if you lack virtue completely you would not be able to keep the wealth for a single day because wealth, in order to be kept, must be judiciously administered. Judgment is a virtue, and so on, and even acquiring requires some virtues. So that is the simple point which, I think, must also be admitted. Now let us first read this whole argument of Aristotle. This is based on the deeds, as he says, on the acts, and things which we see. Everyone can see that. Now the next point.

You can see for yourselves that felicity -- no matter whether man find it in pleasure, or goodness, or both of the two --

belongs more to those who have cultivated their character and mind to the uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods within moderate limits, than it does to those who have managed to acquire more external goods than they can possibly use, and are lacking in the goods of the soul."

In other words, even if you assume what Aristotle regards as wrong, that bliss, felicity, happiness, consists in pleasure as distinguished from virtue — Aristotle leaves that question open here — even in that case you will see that people who have a sensible temper are happier men than those who do not have a sensible temper, and therefore virtue, the sensible temper, is the most important element of happiness. Yes?

"But the problem can also be easily solved if we consider it theoretically."

Yes, now theoretically means -- that is, if we consider it according to the logos, according to the reason as distinguished from observation of the facts or deeds; if we go back from the facts which are always consequences of something to the reasons, to the basic things, and that he does in the sequel.

"External goods, like all other instruments, have a necessary limit of size."

In other words, now we begin to think. We do not speak anymore about riches and how wonderful it is to have a mink coat and Rolls Royces and whatever it may be, but now we begin to think. What are external things? They are means for life and then means as means are necessarily in the service of something else. They cannot give us -- as such they are limited. Yes?

"Indeed all things of utility are of this character; and any excessive amount of such things must either cause its possessor some injury, or, at any rate, bring him no benefit. The greater the amount of each of the goods of the soul, the greater is its utility — if indeed it is proper to predicate 'utility' at all here, and we ought not simply to predicate 'value'."

The noble, the noble. In other words, what is merely means can never be, strictly speaking, noble. I mean one can loosely say that's something noble -- in the Greek the same word as beautiful -- but it is not, strictly speaking, that. Yes?

"In general terms, we are clearly entitled to lay down this proposition: 'The best state of thing A is to the best state of thing B, as thing A itself is to thing B.' If, therefore, the soul is a thing more precious -- intrinsically as well as in relation to us -- than either our property or our body, the best state of the soul must necessarily bear the same relation to the best state of either our property or our body."

In other words, the hierarchy of goods follows, is consequent upon the hierarchy of beings, so that if the soul is higher in dignity than possessions then the good of the soul, virtue, must be higher in dignity than wealth. That's clear. Or let us take another example: if man is a higher being than a louse, the goodness of man is higher than the goodness of the louse. That's clear. And the question -- yes -- let us first, if you don't mind, finish that argument; we are soon through; the next sentence only.

"Let us add that it is for the sake of the soul that these other things are desirable, and should accordingly be desired by every man of good sense -- not the soul for the sake of them."

Yes. Now, furthermore, he says in this sentence, those things are by nature choice-worthy for the sake of the soul and therefore -- I add therefore -- all well-thinking men must choose in accordance with that. Wise choice, practical wisdom, follows the natural order of things. Yes? Follows the natural order of things. Practical wisdom is -- of course, other considerations enter in a subordinate -- a subordinate level -- but primarily prudence consists in choosing the good things according to the natural order of the good things. This is the argument of Aristotle by which he settles roughly the fundamental question. The good life consists in the good activity of the soul and the other things -- the good activities of the body and property and other external goods -- are only secondary and are valuable only to the extent to which they contribute to the good activity of the soul. That is the view of Aristotle, naturally, but one can say that has been the view of thinking men throughout the ages. I mean, questions arise where things become complicated but that is a kind of natural stratum of human orientation throughout the ages, even today, although modern thinking questions -- does no longer allow of a theoretical expression of this view in these terms anymore. The natural hierarchy has gone and any other things too. Now, but Mr. Bartholomew, please express your dissatisfaction.

"I think there's a large section of the modern view that would accept this, but I simply say this: that they would be the first to agree that the structuring of these goods as Aristotle has set it forth is the correct structure. Yet they would say, while I agree with this and I see it this way, let us say forgive the nasty word, but if I want to understand the behavior of a certain man in a certain situation it is quite possible that he's operating in terms of a construct which is totally alien to this thing. Therefore, this would falsify my looking at him."

No, this can easily be replied. The answer: that there are people who do not act on this true order no one knew better than Aristotle. I mean everyone knows that and Aristotle too knew it; but now we want to study the man who prefers wealth to all other considerations. Aristotle says you can't understand that man if you do not start from the true order, true order of things; if you do not see the fundamental perversion in the mere wealth-seeker you do not give a true analysis of the wealth-seeker. Sure we must

have an analysis of the wealth-seeker, of the seeker of prestige, of the various sub-divisions like names dropping and so; we must have that by all means. Aristotle himself gave some sketches of it in his Rhetoric and we should have it in the most detailed form. That's absolutely necessary. But this knowledge, so-called knowledge, is blind if you don't see simultaneously the particular vice inherent in that. For example, let us take the names dropper, a relatively mild form of vice. You know these kind of people: what a names dropper is. When you speak in ordinary language, names dropper is a derogatory term, derogatory term. As a social scientist in the strict sense you must not use derogatory terms so you get a sterilized term and call it, perhaps, type α alpha. All right: α alpha behaves in this way. No value judgment, but you must admit that you fool yourselves because if you want to understand you tacitly translate α alpha into names dropper. That's the point. There is no question that the empirical understanding of all kinds of human behavior is absolutely necessary and desirable if one has sufficient time for that, but the question is only how to approach behavior. Can you approach behavior intelligently without having a proper notion of the place of that behavior in the whole of possible human behaviors? That's one rather bad way of putting it, but that is the question. I mean, take a more interesting subject, after all, because names droppers are not as such a political problem or a social problem, but for example, prostitution. Can you really analyze that without thinking about what prostitution does to the relation of the two sexes and the function of men's bisexuality? Can you do that? I mean, can you disregard that?

(Inaudible response).

Yes, but why do people generally regard prostitution as a social evil, which I think we have -- almost every social scientist who works on that starts from that premise -- unless they assume some -- whenever you speak of such a thing -- you can even take something as neutral morally as the eyesight. You can't help distinguishing between people of normal sight, good sight, defective sight. There you have it and you have it more importantly and more massively in the things which are dependent on the human will in the way in which the eyes are not dependent simply on the human will. That is a question. I mean no sensible man, and least of all sensible men, Aristotle, had any objection to empirical studies. The question concerns only the premises of the empirical studies because there is no empirical study without premises. I think that is today generally admitted. You know? And the question is, what are the right premises and can a neutrality as to good and bad in the widest sense of the word -- is this compatible with any understanding of social phenomena? I do not deny that there may be some very limited studies from time to time where you merely count, for example, and where no good or bad enters anyway; but this can be done only in a very limited way. Any interesting study, tolerably self-sufficient study of social phenomena, always implies that. Now, I think, a scientific study must rest upon important premises on a basis of implausibility. It must set them forth clearly. It must make them explicit in order to enable everyone, the researcher as well as his

victims, to form a judgment as to the truth of these premises. That alone is the question. And even if it were true that the people who don't care for virtue but care only for safety, income, deference, are the 99% majority -- which I don't believe, but let us assume that -- it would still be important, of course, for any reasonable judgment, to know that, to know that 99% of men are vulgar. It would still be important even if it cannot be helped, if it cannot be changed. That has terrific consequences for our overall orientation because it would lead to the consequence that in important matters we would not pay any attention whatever to what 99% of people say, for example. That is an infinite question, but it is truly a question. It is not, as it is presented by the reigning positivistic superstition, a foregone conclusion. Yes?

"Isn't it a very different thing though to say that a certain order of goods is preferable to people like me who have studied philosophy or who have certain tastes, than to say such and such is a true order of goods. It seems to me that the word *true* implies that there is a certain relation between a statement and a state of affairs and that a word like (rest of remark inaudible)?"

Yes, but that means simply -- that's only a re-statement of the positivistic view. There are no, if I may use the lingo, there are no objective principles of preferences. All principles of preference are subjective. That I know. Of course, they would say that everyone has a value system, or his group of people, type of people has, but there are n such value systems and it is impossible to say which is reasonable not. That's the point. The question only returns. I mean, what Aristotle says, of course -- it is not merely preference of certain individuals, but it is the preference of reasonable individuals and this preference of reasonable individuals must have a title and the title is the nature of things

"Well, it would seem to me that very intelligent, educated, and such people down through the ages have disagreed very fundamentally about such things --"

Excuse me; that's not true. Who -- which sensible man ever said wealth is a higher virtue? I don't know of anyone.

"Well then, a sensible, a reasonable man, becomes one who agrees with those people who have written books --"

No, no, no, no, no. That's impossible for a thinking man as you would see immediately if you try to build your own life, including your evaluations, on the premise that wealth is the highest good. Only thoughtless people can do that.

"A lot of people have built lives that have satisfied them on the principle that -- well, everyone agrees -- most people agree that wealth is instrumental -- but not as many people would agree that pleasure is instrumental."

No. Aristotle admits that. That is a more difficult question and this discussion here is neutral to the issue between hedonism and the people who regard virtue as distinguished from pleasure, as choiceworthy for its own sake. You remember that? Because these hedonists must then come around with saying well, the most pleasant thing is virtue. All right. I think that is still theoretically a great problem, but for most practical purposes that amounts to the same thing as if we would say virtue is the most choiceworthy thing.

"It's been pointed out by Mr. Lipset that Marx and Tocqueville had very different evaluations of admittedly very complex phenomena, but still very different evaluations of the social fact of organized religion and a strong legal tradition -- "

Yes, but that is already -- oh God, now you come to -- surely that is an immensely difficult question, the question of religion. That is not decided here. We are speaking here only of virtue in a very simple sense, but if you take Tocqueville and Marx as a whole surely you cannot -- they had absolutely opposed views and the question is but both -- that we must say in fairness to each of them -- thought about their principles and they stated why -- why Marx thought, for example that such -- Marx's ultimate notion is that goodness consists in the development, the full development of the faculties of each which as such is not possible, except in a society in which each, every member, has opportunity. All right. That is in a modified way what Aristotle says because a full development is something like virtue, but with this great difference: that for Marx the element of moral effort, which is implied in the notion of virtue, isn't there. Then we have to turn to this question: is it possible to understand the perfection of man by assuming that under certain conditions this perfection will be forthcoming, as it were, automatically. Then we have to go into that. Sure. Oh, and Tocqueville -- I mean Tocqueville would substantially agree with Aristotle in these matters. Therefore, there is no problem.

"Well, the only part I hoped you might comment on was that although they disagreed about the goodness and the positive contribution of the law and of religion toward a good society or a good regime, they did agree on what the effects were and it seems to me the point is that in this case you have social philosophers or social thinkers disagreeing on the value or goodness of something and yet agreeing on what happens. It seems to me there is some kind of social investigation which is independent of what you think -- "

Not quite; surely -- I mean the question is this, and the ancients had the great merit of stating these questions in the simplest and most honest way. Somehow it is presupposed that this thing called virtue, or as Barker translates, goodness, excellence, is, being the most important good, supplies you all the goods, and now there is plenty of experience that people who were virtuous perished by virtue of their virtue. In other words, a clever coward has, under certain conditions, greater opportunities to survive than an unclever

brave man, and maybe than a clever brave man. In other words, the recommendation you find so frequently that it pays to be a brave soldier because the chances of being hacked to pieces on flight are greater than your survival if you fight on. That is surely ambiguous, but do you think there was ever any sensible man who didn't see that ambiguity and still thought it is necessary when you train soldiers and you have to reckon with the fact that someone will get cold feet and a very obvious possibility. That you have to make certain comforting speeches stressing the survival value of courage -- that is a very easy problem. Sure, but the question would then come down -- the whole problem which you have in mind is really implied in this very simple equation. To some extent the equipment is the condition of virtue and therefore it becomes, in a way, prior -- in a way. That leads to the great difficulties, surely, but that doesn't do away with the fact that you cannot suppress the most important element of the equation because -- and the experiment is very simple. Take a society of men who have the most perfect technique of survival including everything like. . . .

(Change of tape).

. . . in fact not an intention; that is, I don't believe this intention -- in fact an attempt to load the dice in favor of the equipment people who don't care for virtue and the merely numerical device -- you know -- the larger the number of people who vote for something decides the issue, of course works in the same direction. I have no other -- I don't want to hand down you a doctrine. I wish I could, but my intention is only to prevent a certain terrible narrowing of our theoretical horizon which is a consequence of positivism. I mean, how can you possibly handle the question of the so-called underdeveloped people if you do not have a horizon larger than that of a mid-twentieth century western man and in particular American man. You must understand more human possibilities than are developed and fostered in our society and one way of that is, of course, to study earlier western thought which did not yet have the peculiar narrownesses of our thought. It may have had its narrownesses; I don't deny that. But it surely doesn't have our narrownesses. So it's not, by no means, a purely theoretical question, but it has very much to do with all intelligent practice and it is not sufficient to talk to the westernized members of, say, Asiatic societies to understand Asiatic societies because these westernized people may be the least able to tell us what the true basis of old China, old India, and so on, was. And first of all we must get rid of the blinders and be open that the categories we use now are not necessarily the natural categories and the study, for example, of Aristotle is helpful for that because these were different categories and that alone is a help, but I think they have also the additional advantages that they are truly elementary categories. You know, they are now in a false sense sophisticated as so many of our categories are. Forgive me this relapse into the lingo -- words like categories and so -- but after all we cannot always be very strict. That would make life unbearable. Test

Well, in reference to your point about
I
think Mr. Edgerton would say that it's important to know that

for instance, experience with the English law would probably be a great positive benefit. The point would be that we know this in part because people with very different opinions on the value of the English law have the same on the results and the effects upon people -- "

I mean, I don't quite understand the problem and its relevance for our discussion.

"Well, the point was, it seems to me, that Marx and Tocqueville disagree violently on the value of the law or advice to society in terms of values and yet agree on the specific behavioral facts."

You mean now the English law as it exists in the nineteenth century, or what?

"Well deTocqueville -- well as modified by America or by the American experience in the nineteenth century, deTocqueville said it had conservative effects -- "

Which Marx never denied of course.

"The point which I posit makes -- that Marx asserts this although he says that this is bad -- "

Yes, sure, but Marx didn't say it because he liked blondes in preference to brunettes or so, but Marx said this because he believed it is possible to have a classless society on the highest level, human level, higher than any human individual had ever reached in the past. On the basis of that alone does Marx's criticism make sense so we have to see -- we have first to investigate whether Marx's notion of the communist society is a rational criterion of criticism or a fantasy. Before we know that we cannot pronounce on Marx's criticism of anything, not even of his criticism of women working under -- in mind, because there's connected with that -- you know, his specific criticism.

"I would say that Marx was wrong and even as wrong as he was he agreed with deTocqueville on the specific effects."

All right -- because Marx surely was not completely deprived of common sense, for example, and therefore -- that wouldn't help us. But you were speaking of a difference of opinion, a difference of value judgments. Is?

"I was going to say that the major point is that starting from two totally different -- they both approach the problem, the same problem, with a set of values, let us say -- with an ideal -- what was the good and what was the bad. Can we simply say that they?"

Can. What could even one be about. One could hardly say they start from different sets of values about the whole, but behind those --

because it was not merely a question of values. It was also a question of the structure of the universe -- as important. One can even go further and say one can discern behind Tocqueville and Marx certain common premises; a problem regarding the terms of which they would have agreed -- and start -- and then understand the bifurcation and the reason why they deviated. This talk about values only leads to a neglect of analysis: to nothing else. You say simply that's the value of Mr. X and that's the value of Mr. Y and that's that. That's not enough. You have to go -- why -- why does he have this preference and these preferences lead then back always to theoretical premises and the theoretical premises have to be investigated and if they are sound then the conclusions, of course, also can be, must be taken soundly. If they are unsound or even unfounded then the value of the criticism based on it decreases proportionately.

"Irrespective, you have English law as modified in America. You have a set of social circumstances. Those are two things. Both Marx and Tocqueville looked at English law and let's say that was A and they said that from A followed B. They were saying something quite meaningful, it seems to me, about the understanding of these societies. Yet the point comes that apparently -- and this is where I think you introduce something new to the analysis -- apparently, they started with totally different ideas which got in their criticism of this situation. Their criticism and evaluation of it was different but they totally agreed on the actual relations."

Too, but I'm sure that the same differences would also show in their analyses of so-called factual things as if people did not agree *(sic)* regarding facts as much -- disagree *(corrected himself)* -- as they disagree regarding values. That is only their hope that men would eventually -- or at least all scientific men would agree eventually regarding facts, but that's a hope. There is, of course, disagreement regarding worth in every science; wherever you look. The distinction between facts and value is, it seems to me, only confusing. The interesting problem regarding it is only how did it come to possess the tremendous power it now possesses and that question has never been properly answered by anyone including myself, of course, and I have had the impression that economics had more to do with that than anything else. That is the impression I gradually get, but that has, of course, its pre-history because in the original schools of economists, say in Adam Smith, there is a balancing of the economic -- of the morally undesirable effects of capitalist society with other considerations, but here the value judgments, the so-called value judgments, belong to the problem. They are not something which are artificially introduced into the problem; they are there. I don't know whether you have read Mr. Gressey's study on Adam Smith where he brings this out very well. Mr. Franklin?

"If the Hippocratic Foundation of the medical order is now weak or rather challenged by various thought are we reduced, then, to the Hippocratic substituted two arguments, such as too ignorant, etc., smart and cleverness?"

Yes, that is the simple way of stating the problem. In other words, a return to common sense and disregard the Aristotelian cosmology or the Platonic cosmology. That will not quite do and I believe the problem is this, still in practical terms: you have -- well, let me state it as follows -- that is a question we discussed in the very first meeting and to some extent it is true to say that Aristotle's moral teaching is based on his cosmology, on his cosmology, and since this cosmology has been destroyed and that you hear everywhere from your eighth year on, therefore this whole thing breaks down. That's easy, and ultimately that is, of course, what is underlying the fact-value -- that is the real premise because physics as we understand it has no place for good and bad, for complete or defective, however you call it, and therefore if all the other sciences are derivative from that there cannot be any place for such a distinction in science. Yes. Now let us look at the other side of the picture. There is one theoretical science which is indeed a part of cosmology -- cosmology I use now for natural science -- there is one science, a part of cosmology, which is an immediate link between cosmology and moral political science and that science is called psychology. The characteristic of Plato's and Aristotle's cosmology is that they start in their cosmology, their account of the whole, from the soul and the mind. The characteristic of modern cosmology is that it starts from the inanimate beings and tries to ascend from that to the soul and the mind. Therefore the problem is concentrated in psychology. Is the psychology which is the alleged or real basis of the social scientist scientific? It does not become scientific by the fact that it is experimental and so on and so on. That's the question. Is it possible to understand the life of man, the life of the soul of man, according to methods and on the basis of premises which are -- stem from the study of inanimate beings and, in addition, of unintelligent beings, plants and brutes. That's the question. That's the question, but that is a real question and no one has a right to say that is settled by definitions in favor of present day scientific psychology, whether in the form of Watson and Pavlov and other schools including Gestalt psychology as it exists now. That is the question. That it is a very great difficulty -- a very difficult problem and for people like me, absolutely insoluble problem, I admit, but there is a great difference between very great difficulties and absurdities. The absurdity has no reason -- do you understand the point -- however it may be recommended by certain prejudices. Something very difficult should not surprise us. What gives us the right to assume that there are simple clues to the fundamental question? That's only another way of putting the same thing, but we must think, of course, of the seventh book of the Politics. That has very much to do with that. Yes?

"You can say, if a lot of people of several centuries ago hadn't made all kinds of seemingly absurd assumptions about the universe which didn't quite fit into any pretty scheme which seemed to account for a lot of things, the kind of physics which has destroyed Aristotle's physics would never have arisen, and seemingly you could argue from analogy that

unless people make this kind of assumption about human behavior it is possible it will never -- "

Yes, but the trouble is it is absolutely impossible to show an analogue to the great physical theories developed in modern times within the field of psychology or what is called the scientific social sciences. There are not such.

(Inaudible response).

Yes, sure. That we know. That is a blank check which is -- a new promise, renewed every time without anyone having knowledge whether there is -- are any funds on the bank. But I'm afraid, or I'm happy or whatever you might say that we must now return to the text. Now -- so Aristotle -- the conclusion is this: that the best life, the most choiceeworthy life is essentially one which man has through himself in the way in which he is not responsible for and can never be responsible for the goodness of his body and his possessions. Now, after having reached this conclusion, Aristotle begins to discuss whether happiness of the individual is the same as that of the polis. You remember? That was an old question. First we have a very general notion, the common sense notion: even the wealth-seekers will admit, from time to time, that wealth is only a means and when speaking about other people they will surely refer to that. They will only not act upon it. So after having re-stated that -- so we know in a rough way, or rather we are reminded of what we all know; Aristotle raises this second question, what about the felicity of the polis? Is this not something entirely different than the felicity of the individual? Aristotle says, 1324a, that everyone will admit that they are the same. What do you say to that? And when Aristotle says this we can be certain that this was so, that no one questions that. Is it not a bit strange for us today or would you say whatever you find your happiness in you necessarily will find the happiness of your society? Would you say that or how is it still immediately intelligible? Would not a really religious man wish to have a religious society? Would not a sensuous man wish to have a sensuous society and so? Is it not true or is there a difficulty for us? Have you never heard the proposition that the morality of the individual differs from the morality of society or the state? Have you never heard that? Aristotle seems to deny that. I give you a formula which I remember from Spinoza. The end or aim of the individual is liberty. The end of the state is security. Different ends. So I think that has something to do with that problem I discussed on a former occasion: the relation between happiness and the conditions of happiness, you remember, which leads then, if developed, to the distinction between state and society. That creates here for us, to some extent, a difficulty, but still -- we still can understand directly the assertion. Wherever you find your own bliss for yourself, you would also find the bliss of your society in that. That's Aristotle's assertion. But what is the controversy? Answer: the controversy is, is the political life or the unpolitical life the best. And is first the question for the individual. Is the practical life or the life of contemplation the best? And secondly, Aristotle says,

assuming that the political life is best for all or most men, which is the best regime? Now let us turn to 132a19.

"It remains to discuss whether the felicity of the state is the same as that of the individual, or different. The answer is clear: all are agreed that they are the same. The men who believe that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, will also believe that the state as a whole is happy when it is wealthy. The men who rank the life of a tyrant higher than any other, will also rank the state which possesses the largest empire as being the happiest state. The man who grades individuals by their goodness, will also regard the felicity of states as proportionate to their goodness. Two questions arise at this point which both need consideration. The first is, 'Which way of life is the more desirable -- to join with other citizens and share in the state's activity, or to live in it like an alien, absolved from the ties of political society?' The second is, 'Which is the best constitution and the best disposition of a state -- no matter whether we assume that a share in its activity is desirable for all, or regard it as desirable for the majority only?' This second question -- unlike the first, which raises the issue of what is good for the individual -- is a matter for political thought and political speculation; and as we are now engaged on a discussion which belongs to that field, we may regard it as falling within the scope of our present inquiry -- as the other question can hardly be said to do. There is one thing clear about the best constitution: it must be a political organization which will enable all sorts of men to be at their best and live happily. But if that is clear, there is another point on which opinions diverge. Even those who agree in holding that the good life is most desirable are divided upon the issue, 'Which way of life is the more desirable? The way of politics and action? Or the way of detachment from all external things -- the way, let us say, of contemplation, which some regard as the only way that is worthy of a philosopher?' Here, we may say, are the two ways of life -- the political and the philosophic -- that are evidently chosen by those who have been most eager to win a reputation for goodness. . . ."

Yes, now let us stop here for one second, just regarding the question with which we started. Here you can say you see the specific premises or the prejudices of Aristotle. The value problem, if I may use this term, for Aristotle is limited to this. People who do not care for human excellence just are despicable human beings and we don't pay any attention to them, but among the people who care for human excellence there is a controversy. That alone is the value question. Very well, and here what is said? And Aristotle says either the political life, the life of the statesman, is the highest end, or the life of the thinker. That is the question: which has priority? Now today people would say there are a lot of such possibilities among men caring for human excellence.

All right. Then one would have to -- that is a sensible objection to Aristotle, whether he has not narrowed the problem. Where are the poets, for example? But what would you answer to that question about the poets? Where are they?

"Censored."

No, the poets are in this general statement of the problem included among the philosophers. That becomes then a question whether the philosophers proper or the poets have the higher rank. That becomes then a question. But there are other things which he has omitted, as you obviously see. So Aristotle, in other words, returns from the question as whether the political life is best -- what the best regime is -- he returns to the question of, is the political life or the philosophic life the best. How does he reply? Now in the sequel -- we have really no longer the time to read; I will summarize it therefore and I think that we must stop. Aristotle states now this question of the political or the theoretical life in its political form. The political or practical life in its political form is "imperialism." Imperialism. The political form of the theoretical life is non-imperialism. The case against imperialism is therefore, by implication, the case for contemplation. Now what is the relation? Imperialism -- how do we call -- the alternative to imperialism we should call autarchy, the autarchy. Imperialism to autarchy: that's the political form of the question. The political life to the theoretical. The theoretical life is the form of the autarchic life of the individual. The political autarchy is the political form of the contemplative life. That may sound very strange to us but that is crucial for Aristotle as well as for Plato. Yes, but there is one great implication. Moral virtue, the field of moral virtue, is practically identical with the field of practical or political life. Temperance, justice, courage and so on, strictly speaking, have no place in the theoretical life. We speak of intellectual courage but that is not courage proper; we have to add intellectual. We speak of intellectual temperance, caution, but that is not ordinary caution. We speak of intellectual honesty, intellectual honesty, but that's not ordinary honesty. So the field of morality and the field of the practical life coincide, but if this is so there must be -- if this situation is correct, imperialism here and here morality -- there must be a "imperialistic element" in morality. Is this not strange? That you must understand. How morality is, of course, not a Greek word and let us use virtue or, more simply the most interesting of all virtues, namely justice. Of justice, Aristotle teaches in the Ethics that it is the only virtue which has not two vices corresponding to it, as courage, for example, has over-boldness and cowardice, and temperance has intemperance or insensitiveness to pleasure. Justice is the only virtue which has only one opposite vice called injustice. Now let us think about that. What is an unjust man? A man who wants to have more than he deserves or than belongs to him; a man who desires to have more than is his or ought to be his. And that is the vice and it is the vice he is guilty of. With what in this or ought to be linked. Let's think about the dollars we want: to ... life is necessarily satisfied with less than he has or less than he ought

to possess? What about him? That's not a vice, whereas the insensitivity to pleasures is, from Aristotle's point of view, a vice, although not a punishable vice but it is some -- a man who has no ears to hear music or no eyes to see beautiful sights is a defective human being, but a man who does not desire to have what is his has -- that's not a vice. It's not strange? The man who does not stand up for his rights you can say. The unjust man stands up for things which are not -- which do not belong to him. The just man is the man who defends what belongs to him, but the man who does not stand up for his rights as his rights is not a vicious man. It's no defect. It's not strange? The implication of this is that in moral virtue as moral virtue the element of self-assertion, of sensible self-assertion, is included as a matter of course, whereas the theoretical man as theoretical man is free from that. That is the point. You can say that's a fantastic notion, but you can also say that the theoretical man in the Aristotelian sense is something like the saint in the religious tradition; however you may try to explain it to yourself, but here we are, and therefore the lack of self-assertion against others is not a vice. Therefore, there is an element of self-assertion, of toughness in the simple sense, which belongs to moral, political, practical man as a matter of course. It is not unimportant to consider that, I believe. Now, that is -- in other words, the virtuous city which is not aggressive and doesn't wish to take away from others what belongs to them is only a reflection of the man of contemplation because being a city consisting of gentlemen it has built in, of course, the element of self-assertion in them. It is diluted. Well, if I may use the word saintliness, gentlemen virtue can only be a diluted form of saintliness if I may, which in this form stated is trivial. The problem consists in understanding the relation of Aristotle's theoretical life to saintliness and they are naturally not identical. One more point in 133b, shortly after the beginning. Do you have that Mr. Reinkind? "With some people this is the line drawn" -- yes?

"Some of the advocates of the practical and political life are willing to stop at this point: others go further, and argue that the despotic and tyrannical form of constitution is the only one which gives solidity; and indeed there are states where the exercise of despotic authority over neighbouring states is made the standard to which both constitution and laws must conform. It is true that, in most states, most of the laws are only a promiscuous heap of legislation. . . ."

In other words, they are not directed toward one highest end. They just make laws as occasions arise and there is no end or overall end of the legislation. Those who have such an overall end -- what do they do?

" . . . but we have to confess that where they are directed in any degree, to a single object, that object is always conquest. In Sparta, for instance, and in Crete the system of education and most of the laws are framed with a general view to war. Similarly all the militarized peoples which are strong enough -- "

And so on. . . . There is not a single polis known to Aristotle which is directed toward human excellence as such. Either it has no direction, has no overall end, or if they have an end it is that low grade end called power, superiority. But is this not a very great difficulty for Aristotle? The polis is according to nature and according to nature it is directed toward human excellence and not a single polis exists which is in fact directed toward human excellence. In other words, is the whole thing not absolutely utopian? That was the starting point of Machiavelli, this simple observation, and that has a certain force, and what is wrong with Machiavelli's beginning does not appear immediately. One has to think through the consequences, but here that is a strong point of Machiavelli at first glance. If there is not a single polis directed toward virtue then the whole doctrine of Aristotle is wrong. They are imaginary , imaginary republics which they have described. That's what Machiavelli says and that is not -- we have not so much time; let us not fool ourselves with pipe dreams and let us begin not with what cities ought to pursue, but with what they, in fact, pursue. Then we will get a realistic political science which will be useful. That was Machiavelli's point and you see the ultimate consequence of Machiavelli in present day social science, of course. It comes from that, they know. That is, the somewhat more educated among them know. And then -- how do we proceed then? Well, what is the end which they all pursue? Well, let us say survival, being, just mere being, and if possible, aggrandizement. That's so. All right. Virtus doesn't play any role. It does come in, however, because they all talk of virtue all the time and that is not entirely meaningless talk, but virtue cannot be understood as the end of the polis. Virtue must be understood as a means for the end of the polis. A polis or a state cannot exist except if some of the citizens, a majority of the citizens, develop certain habits which we call virtuous. But if these virtues are justified only by the polis the polis itself is not subject to that. It's not clear? If the virtues are only means for the polis, the polis is above them and all the horrors for which Machiavelli is so famous, that the end justifies any means -- you know -- follows from that simple principle. If virtue is not above the polis, if I might say so, but the polis is above virtue, or in our language if virtue is a means of society, morality is a means of society -- values -- then the society is, of course, above the values and the society can do with these values what it sees fit. If needs change and these values prove to be cumbersome through them out and get other ones. No holes are barred except the good-heartedness -- those supplied by the good-heartedness of some social scientist, from which we must, of course, abstract in any theoretical consideration; and everything else follows from that. You can still get some very powerful and interesting and also historically very powerful doctrines. All typically modern doctrines, I venture to say, are based on this little thing, on this little change effected by Machiavelli, more or less complicated in different cases but fundamentally that is so. That is the crucial point and the starting point of Machiavelli is very impressive as I think it appears. He argues: if the polis is by nature and is by nature directed toward virtue and there is not a single polis which, in fact, directs all its efforts ultimately toward virtue, what shall we do?

One must try that, and I think that has affected all social thought since Machiavelli in the most different forms, but you still can recognize it, and when it has disappeared from the overall picture of the good society so you have a good society which looks like the Platonic-Aristotelian good society -- only more democratic but otherwise has the same formal structure, a shining end -- then the question arises, how to get it, how to get it, and if the Machiavellianism doesn't enter the picture of the perfect society it necessarily enters the thought people have of the way in which it is established. The high falootin name for that reflection is philosophy of history. The philosophy of history shows you the way toward -- at least in the original version -- toward the best society and the philosophy of history teaches you that crime, stupidity, and everything wicked and mean fulfill the function of bringing about that beautiful, final society. So that is, only the locus of the Machiavellianism is, as it were, put in the way to the end as distinguished from the end, but fundamentally it's the same notion and such extreme moralists like Kant -- you know -- who tried to restore the integrity of virtue to the greatest possible splendor -- Kant is the one who teaches that. The way to get the right society is passion and crime and this type of thing. There is no other way. So therefore the justification for Aristotle's seemingly fantastic suggestion including his city without a demos. . . is only that you think through the alternative, the modern type of doctrines, and see whether Aristotle has not got a point which is more important and which has been lost fundamentally in modern times, namely the question that there is something higher than the polis and what Aristotle seriously meant by that is, of course, the life of the mind, what he calls philosophy. That the polis ultimately derives its dignity from the life of the mind which is possible within it and yet there is no clear -- no possible clear institutional expression of that. Rule of philosophers is a simple formula which is wholly unworkable as Plato himself knew and so there is no institutional expression of that. The modern solution is you don't need an institutional expression of that. You give perfect freedom to the life of the mind. That's all there is to it. That was not acceptable to Aristotle for reasons which we may see next time. You know that is clear. The mind cannot be institutionalized. That is obvious, but the question is, is this identical with unqualified freedom of the mind or of whatever calls itself mind, because the law is so crude as law that it cannot make a legally clear distinction between the mind or pseudo-mind; and you know what these people did who try to do this: they said books larger than 500 pages are scientific books and are not subject to censorship. You see, you must admit that this quantitative distinction is not a very intelligent solution to that problem. So next time we will take this up here.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 16. May 19, 1960

. . . . discussion of the second half of Book VII, but before I do that I will take up a few points that struck me in some of the papers. The first, Mr. Ben Cohen. There are two passages which I would like to discuss. That refers to what we discussed last time. You say, in order that the poor be raised up a fund should be accumulated. The fund should be given to the poor in grants large enough to buy a plot of land or to start a man in agriculture or commerce. That is correct. "It is difficult to imagine that in an extreme democracy the rich will be willing to do this even with the exemption from providing useless public services, for it would seem, perhaps, that the rich would prefer to change the system to oligarchy so that they might rule in their own behalf." I suspect that there is here a kind of reflection of certain experiences in this country, reactions to the New Deal etc., but is your objection justified? I mean, what does Aristotle mean by that?

"Well, I think that Aristotle too glibly assumes that the rich in a democracy will be in favor of the democracy, in favor to such an extent that they will be willing to make large sacrifices for it and I just wonder if this holds true for his time."

Well, no, I would say this: from the context it appears that the situation is so that there is no ghost of a chance for the rich to establish an oligarchy. So what can they do? The demos is stronger than they: that's the premise. What can they do in order to prevent the demos from going to extremes? The demos also must act in a certain way to prevent breakdown, but what can the rich do, and in this connection he makes this proposal. So Aristotle is not glib, as you put it. The limitations are implied in the statement of the problem. Then you say "Aristotle lauds Carthage for the use of this kind of devices saying it has secured the good of the people. However, Carthage is not an extreme democracy. Aristotle describes it in Book II, chapter 11, as being a sort of aristocracy with both oligarchic and democratic features, but the system has been advocated for use in extreme democracy." Now I see no -- is there a difficulty -- that you can learn something from another regime which you can embody in an essentially different regime.

"Not so much that, but that he lauds Carthage as an example of this, whereas perhaps he could have picked out an extreme democracy as an example of it, or perhaps there wasn't any --"

And you know, you must not forget what he's trying to do is not to present merely descriptively an extreme democracy, but to show how an extreme democracy can last, and the answer is it cannot last if it is simply an extreme democracy. To some extent this was better understood by Miss Judith Field -- the lady is not here? No. She says -- now let me see whether that refers to that immediately -- no that seems to be some other point. All right. She says in her paper, "Though Aristotle has theoretically made it possible for the philosopher, the man of internal activity, to live in the best state and even be its guiding principle, he seems to

have decided that this type of state is actually impossible and forgets it, preferring instead a state which at least theoretically is not really best at all." Yes, well since Miss Field is not here it's of very little use because I have to take this up anyway in a somewhat broader context. Maybe there was another point. Yes, well it is really not worth my while then.

Now let us then turn to our text and begin with certain remarks in 1330b. The context is how the city should be built -- you know the town, the central town should be built. Do you have that in 1330b? We can't read everything; the remark where he refers to Hippodamus, you know our friend Hippodamus from the second book? You remember him? There is another -- the town planner -- here is another reference to him here.

"The arrangement of private houses is generally considered to be more sightly, and more convenient for peace-time activities, when it is regularly planned in the modern style introduced by Hippodamus."

Yes, in the modern style or the more recent -- yes, the more recent. Well, we know that Hippocrates /sic/ not only was an innovator; he even made -- developed a theory of innovation. You remember that. You will see what I'm driving at -- a little bit later, probably the next paragraph, when he begins to speak about the walls. "Those who say one should not have walls" -- yes? Do you have that?

"It is sometimes argued that states which lay claim to military excellence ought to dispense with any such aids. This is a singularly antiquated notion. . . ."

Yes: archaic notion, old fashioned. You see, here the question of modernity and antiquity comes up. Let me first get all the evidence together and then we discuss it. At the beginning of 1331a there is another reference.

". . . the surest possible barrier of walls should be deemed the best of military methods -- especially today, when the invention of catapults and other engines for the siege of cities has attained such a high degree of precision."

Yes, you see, we are now on the top of the world in a way. That Aristotle says in his own name, of course. Now another passage a bit later: 1331a 14 to 16. Well, I will find it; paragraph 12.

"It is always the concern of the offensive to discover new methods by which it may seize an advantage; but it is equally the concern of the defensive, which has already made some inventions, to search and think out others. An assailant will not even attempt to make an attack on men who are well prepared."

Yes. No, that is all we need. You see, we find here Aristotle praising his own time as technically superior to the past and even

recommending further innovations and that seems to be in contradiction to the conservative, backward looking position he took in Book II when he took issue with Hippodamus. Do you remember that? That is very important to understand. As a matter of fact, it's of crucial importance. Now before we say Aristotle is simply guilty of inconsistency let us first see in what connection he recommends inventions and innovations. Well, what's the context?

"The good regime."

No, much too general.

"He's talking about military security."

Military, absolutely. Military, yes. Now let us try to elaborate that point. The good city should have the proper kind of laws and customs, if possibly the best, and then should not change them. Yes: the minimum of change. That is very well. You have then an old tradition which becomes deeply ingrained in the course of generations by virtue of the absence of change, but there is one sphere where the city cannot possibly do it. Let us take a city ruled by gentlemen: nice, decent people and who don't deviate from the ways of their fathers and forefathers. Then you find in the neighborhood a city of very tough innovators who don't care for virtue at all, but for wealth and power, and they innovate as much as they can in all respects and therefore also in military respects, and what will happen at the next war? The good city will be subjugated and perhaps even destroyed. Can a reasonable member of the good city accept that? No. They must imitate the wicked city. Yes?

"But this would assume that the sphere of military technology is very easily separable from the spheres of technology in general."

We do not even have to go so far. That is perfectly true that technological change, even limited technological change; you don't know where it will lead to in the end. Surely, but let us limit ourselves to this simple problem. They try to have a separate compartment, as it were, a military compartment including military technology, and there they innovate but in all other matters they follow the ancestral ways. But what does this mean in principle? That the wicked city imposes its law on the good city. You are quite right because things won't stop at military technology, but even if it would stop there we would have this situation. Now that is exactly again the point which Machiavelli made, only Machiavelli, with his strange mixture of caution and insulting brutality, didn't state it as simply and soberly as I try to state it but said -- how is the formulation of Machiavelli in The Prince? The good cannot be good -- those who wish to be good cannot be good in a world in which there are so many bad men. That is, in a sense, the principle of Machiavelli. Goodness is impossible. Goodness is impossible because there are so many bad men and the bad men impose their law on the good. That is, one can say, if one tries to understand Aristotle, I think -- and so many objections which one makes to

Aristotle are valid only once one accepts principles which Aristotle rejects. Say, if you criticize Aristotle from the point of view of present day democracy, then you argue from premises which Aristotle rejected. The only difficulty of which I am aware, which really is built in Aristotle and has nothing to do with principles extraneous in Aristotle is this: that by virtue of the facts of foreign policy the good city, the best regime, however you call it, is absolutely limited; it is, in a way, dependent on the bad cities. How would Aristotle have -- do you see the significance of that point? Here is a real, an inherent weakness, and Aristotle could, of course, say that is not a weakness inherent in his doctrine. That's a weakness inherent in any human order. But how would Aristotle nevertheless -- why did Aristotle not draw the conclusion which Machiavelli drew? I mean, why could he say from this fact that there is such an influence of the wicked on the good -- why could he say this does not lead to the consequence that the whole notion of the good city is impossible? How could he do that? We have then to go a bit more closely into the question of military technology. I mean I'm not thinking of terribly technical things, but these rather obvious things.

"A simple answer might be that all this means is that a polis can be good up to the extent to which it can defend itself."

Yes, but since here in this respect -- you see, you have here the principle of innovation admitted and with a view to the innovations made by others. You can control the intrinsic -- the internal actions of your citizens. You cannot control the actions of other cities unless you conquer them which would bring another difficulty: the difficulty of imperialism. You remember? Mr. Faulkner?

"Weren't these essentially minor in extent; the technological events?"

Ah ha. That's it. Yes, but why were --- that's very good -- why were the inventions of which Aristotle thought here very minor of extent and with what right did he assume that?

"Well, technology in his day was a very different thing from technology in our day in that it was pretty much a piecemeal thing. There wasn't a large body of theoretical knowledge upon which it was based and a snowballing. A little innovation here, a little innovation there. It was something like art rather than an engineering study."

And why has technology, military technology, ceased to be a piecemeal affair and become a methodic enterprise?

"Would you say it is partly because of the changed relationship between technology and science?"

Yes. What did Aristotle think about science?

"It was part and parcel of philosophy."

Yes: it was theoretical. In other words, science has no practical, productive function at all and no scientist who understands himself as a scientist would do that. We have the beautiful story of Archimedes — you know, one of the greatest scientists of antiquity — when he was practically compelled in his home town, Syracuse, to do something for the defense of the city against the Romans, but he regarded — and he made fantastic inventions on that occasion — but that was for him something which was a kind of citizen duty which had absolutely nothing to do with his true interest. So for Aristotle science is theoretical and therefore technology in our sense, which somehow presupposes science, was an impossible notion, whereas in Machiavelli this new notion is already emerging. That's one point. Now that is surely of the greatest importance: the different understanding of science and therefore the problem doesn't arise, but there is also another point which one must mention and that is what one can call, colloquially, Aristotle's notion of history. Now what does that mean? For Aristotle the visible universe is always. I mean the visible universe has not come into being and will perish as we assume and as quite a few Greek philosophers assumed, but the visible universe is always. There have always been the sun and the stars and cats and dogs and men, and that is a very reasonable idea in itself. Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to work. Because otherwise you are confronted with the question of how could there be a first man, a man not generated by men. I mean what we see all the time is that men generate men, cats generate cats, and that if this — either there's an absolute miracle; that's, of course, the Biblical view; or else — yes, but that is, then, hard to accept for scientists and philosophers as such, so the other people have to assume a kind of a miracle without admitting the possibility of miracles. The Aristotelian view is really the only rational view in this — you know — simply rational view. Good. There were always men and will be always men, but there will not always be civilization, as we say. There are periodic cataclysms: say floods, deluges, earthquakes, whatever it may be, and this takes place with a kind of natural periodicity so immense trees will never grow into heaven. There will always be an end. There is a kind of strange beneficence of nature which prevents man from overreaching himself. This is also a part of the same Aristotelian view. Therefore the question does not come up, the question as we know it today. Good. But this is a serious difficulty. Now, is there any other point regarding this question which you would like to discuss? Yes?

"Even given the kind of technology Aristotle had — not one based on — isn't it true that different forms of military organization would require certain forms of social organization? If your enemy, for instance — you're located near a sea and you have a big fleet or something and you have to break up a fleet. This would change the political problem."

That could. Sure we know that. Aristotle knew that very well: what the navy did to Athens. I mean the Athenian democracy was almost inevitable by virtue of "Themistocles' famous decision to make

Athens a naval power. But still — that could perhaps be mitigated but surely Aristotle knew that and therefore that was the burden of his argument against Hippodamus in the second book. You recommend innovations and how can you have stability if you have constant innovations. That is — this difficulty, of course, is very important in modern times and somehow we believe that you can have stability in the midst of change by having a kind of expanding constitution. That people don't say, of course; they speak of an expanding economy, but somehow the question at one point or another might well become a question of an expanding constitution. Now to some extent this expanding constitution is, of course, an old story because the very notion of constitution as we have it, as a fundamental law as distinguished from ordinary laws, implies, of course, provision for very speedy and very comprehensive change. You know? The constitution gives only the framework and within the constitution you can do almost anything. So this question is truly of the utmost importance. Now we turn to a few other passages: in 1331b17 there is a remark about the character of Aristotle's -- of the best regime, when he speaks about temples in the countryside. Do you have that? Some for the gods and some for the heroes: a little bit before the middle of 1331b. Here: paragraph 9.

"But it would be a waste of time to linger here over details and explanations. It is easy enough to theorize about such matters: it is far less easy to realize one's theories."

Yes, now well, it is not difficult to think such like things but rather is it difficult to do them. Yes?

"We talk about them in terms of our wants. . . ."

No, that is very bad. The speech, the thinking, the blueprint — that is a matter of wishing — and wishing is easy, but that it should happen, that it should take place is the affair of chance. Yes: that we may leave it at here. Now this is an important remark about the character of, or the status of the best regime. Now I will try to explain that, from the very beginning because it's really a very simple thought. In all political action you are concerned either with preserving or with changing and you preserve what is worth preserving, what's good as it is, and you change for the better. That's the general, simple notion. Now, so we have always notions of good and bad in all political action, or rather of better or worse, to begin with, but you cannot speak intelligently of better and worse without having some notion of what is good and bad. Let us assume it is possible to replace these opinions about good and bad, to replace them by knowledge of good and bad, and let us furthermore say that what we mean politically by good or bad, if fully spelled out, is the good society or bad society on the other hand so that every particular political good which we have in mind ultimately forms part of a whole which we call the good society. Therefore, if we want to act rationally we should have clarity in our minds as to what constitutes the good society. Aristotle says the best regime, which is the same as what we mean by good society, may it puts the emphasis on the crucial importance of government. The good society can only be such a society in which the best men are habitually

in control and therefore the good society is the best regime, but this best regime does not necessarily exist. It is something which we presuppose in all our political judgments, dimly, which we do not elaborate ordinarily but which we somehow imply, and now we elaborate it. It does not necessarily exist, but nevertheless it is the object of wish, of a reasonable wish. This -- what we desire, what we reasonably wish, must be, if we are -- since we are reasonable men -- by definition: we reasonably wish -- must be possible. Otherwise we are crazy, if we wish the impossible. Possible means much more than it does not involve a contradiction. It means that it can be shown to be compatible with the nature of man and with the fundamental needs of man in their proper order. But to repeat: this possibility, this compatibility with the nature of man does not guarantee actuality. Aristotle presupposes, just as Plato, throughout the work that as far as he knows the best regime has never been actual, but it could have been actual. So that is then the precise theoretical status of the best regime: that it is possible but not necessarily actual, and therefore as such it exists only in speech as they say -- as such -- that's of its essence. We could say as such it is essentially a blueprint because a blueprint is only a somewhat more familiar expression for what the Greeks meant by speech. Whether it should be indeed actual is in no way essential, although we would wish it. But it does not depend on us whether it is actual or not. It depends on things which are beyond our control. It depends on chance. And Aristotle makes this remark here regarding a very special case; for example, how the various buildings and especially holy buildings of the countryside should be erected. He would say well, every sensible man on the spot would immediately see what is the wisest arrangement. That's easy. But to get it done -- that's a great difficulty, because you may not have such a desirable countryside where this can be done. Is this clear, because there was some difficulty in the paper last time about -- I think you, Miss Greenwald, had some difficulties, or who was the speaker? Oh, you had some difficulties about it. Is this now clear, what he means by that? I will have to come back to this question of chance later on but for the time being we can leave it at this. Yes?

"Chance is morally neutral. Well, how is it possible to say there exists such a thing as a bad polis under conditions . . . no fault of the citizens -- "

Well, all right, but the polis as polis is not, for Aristotle, a person. That was underlying what discussion we had last time, I believe, that the end of the polis must be the same as that of the individual. If the polis were a person but not an individual -- for example, a person which does not eat and drink and die and so on, and not generated -- then it could have an entirely different end than the individual, but since the polis is only a multitude of persons the polis as polis cannot be said to be morally responsible. That can only be true, for example, of the governors, the regime and so on. Now if you have a bad polis, that -- for example, let's take a tyranny. Who is responsible for the tyranny, if you take the simple case where every man would say it is a tyranny?

Who would be responsible? Who would be blameworthy? The tyrant. Aristotle implies, and he said so somewhere, that a tyranny in the strict sense is simply bad. I mean there is no justification under any circumstances. If there would be a situation in which centralized government, extremely tough centralized government -- you know, what we loosely call tyranny -- would be necessary, then that is not a tyranny, strictly speaking. Then one would have to -- in other words, necessity excuses; true necessity. Pretended necessity does not excuse. As you know, if someone says I had to hold up this man because I want to take my girl to a night club that is a pretended necessity; but if it is a matter of true life and death for that individual it is a genuine necessity. Necessity excuses; but we must also turn it the other way around. What is excused by necessity is in need of excuse. It is not intrinsically good. But that someone -- for example, let us take a man who has lived in necessity, in duress, his whole life and therefore he had to do all kinds of undesirable things; then he is a worthy subject of compassion. But you will never say: look at this man. Therefore there is indeed -- that is quite true -- one needs a certain minimum of favorable circumstances for some life which deserves to be called human. If this is a harsh assertion regarding the limitations of morality I think we cannot well avoid it. Think of a man who was brought up in an absolutely impossible slum and other surroundings and was then, at an early age, framed so that he came into a reformatory and that is not such a healthy, reforming thing, as you may have heard, and so on, and you know, by a chain of accidents of this kind so that any good intentions, any good heart which he might have would become wholly unaffected throughout his life. Such a thing is possible, at least from Aristotle's point of view and there you cannot -- in other words, if you put it this way: that there is a certain minimum of good luck needed for virtue I think Aristotle would say yes. To repeat, there is a great difference between pretended necessity and genuine necessity, but I would be grateful if you were to restate your difficulty. (Inaudible response but not a restatement of the difficulty). Well, we come back to this question a bit later, the question of chance. That is of the utmost importance. The whole doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, classical doctrine, is inseparable from the notion of chance. There is no question about that, and of course that created a very great difficulty in modern times, especially in the formative stratum, seventeenth century thought, where determinism somehow was taken for granted. But determinism doesn't dispose of the difficulty and one can show it very simply by the simple example used by Aristotle, the simple example which everyone knows: I go into a garden in order to dig potatoes and I find a treasure. That's chance. I did not go into the garden in order to find a treasure, but to dig potatoes, and yet I found it. Now if I say, oh that's folklore; two causal chains: one, that which led me to dig potatoes, and then that which led that other fellow 100 years ago to bury the treasure, just met. That's still absolutely determined. That strangeness does not cease for one moment by your following up these chains of causation. The mere show of coincidence, coincidence, cannot be -- what we can understand and what we understand is the possibility of

coincidence: that such things are possible. But we cannot explain the individual case any more if we go beyond the statement, it so happened, and no deterministic doctrine can do away with that. This word coincidence, by the way, occurs -- is used by Plato in the key passage of the Republic when he says: evil will not cease from the cities unless philosophy and political power coincide. There is nothing in the nature of philosophy, on the one hand, and of political power on the other, that they should come together, but they may come together. There is no intrinsic impossibility. Therefore, whether they come together or not is a matter of coincidence, and no one -- I mean if you look at, go beyond the general assertion of determinism which is of no help -- but who attempts to show the necessity, the chanceless necessity in concreto, then you see that people cannot avoid it. Trotsky's discussion of the Russian revolution is very revealing. He takes up the question, what would have happened if Lenin had not come to Russia in that famous sealed car. After all, he could have died or he could have been assassinated. Any n things were possible. With much bawling and hawing he admits that the Russian revolution as we know it would not have taken place. In other words, the objective problems would have remained the same and they would have called for a solution, according to Trotsky, along the same lines, but when, and whether that would have been -- there would have been a man around with that particular ascendancy which Lenin possessed no one can know and Trotsky doesn't claim to know. This element of chance one cannot disregard. One can perhaps say by certain laws of great numbers these various things cancel one another out. One can say that, but this element of irrationality is essential and leads to great consequences; also we will come to that later. Now let us turn to another passage in Ethics.

"It has been argued in the Ethics (if the argument there used is of any value) that felicity is 'the energy and practice of goodness, to a degree of perfection, and in a mode which is absolute and not relative'."

Now let us first -- the energy is, of course, a wholly unintelligible word today because empty, through its physical meaning, has changed. . . Analogy (?) means to be in action, in actuality. For example, the dancer is in action if he dances. If he stands around or is about to dance he's still a potential dancer, if in a very proximate potentiality, whereas the young child who cannot dance is in a very remote potentiality a dancer, and someone who cannot dance at all is perhaps -- the potentiality approaches zero. So, to be in actuality; virtue is the actuality of virtue and the use of virtue, and now he explains that, what that means, not hypothetically or on the basis of a premise but simply. Yes?

"By 'relative' we mean a mode of action which is necessary and enforced; by 'absolute' we mean a mode of action which possesses intrinsic value. Consider, for example, the case of just actions. To inflict a just penalty or punishment is indeed an act of virtue; but it is also an act which is forced on the agent, and it has value only as being a necessity. (It

would be better if neither individuals nor states ever needed recourse to any such action.) Acts done with a view to bestowing honors and wealth on others are in a different category: they are acts of the highest value. An act of punishment is a choice of something which, in a sense, is an evil: acts of the order first mentioned have an opposite character -- they are foundations and creations of something good. We may argue along the same line, that while a good man would handle well the evils of poverty, sickness, and the other mishaps of life, the fact remains that felicity consists in the opposites of these evils. The truly good and happy man, as we have stated elsewhere in our arguments on ethics, is one who by the nature of his virtue has advantages at hand which are absolute advantages. It is plain that his use of such advantages must also show an absolute virtue, and possess an absolute value. But the fact leads men to think that external advantages are the causes of felicity. One might as well say that a well-executed piece of fine harp-playing was due to the instrument, and not to the skill of the artist."

Yes, let us stop here. Do you see that point? Now let us compare virtuous activity to something analogous to it. Virtue is human excellence. Let us compare it to another excellence, the excellence of flute playing or harp playing. Harp playing is impossible without a harp and whether a man who does not possess a harp or -- at least or have it at his disposal -- is or is not a harp player can never be known. He himself may not know. So virtue is in need of instruments, of tools, and without these tools no virtue, but that does not mean, of course, that the virtue is due to the tools. That would be absurd. Then everyone who owns a harp would be a good harp player and that is the absurdity of the rich as rich: that they think by virtue of the fact that they have the instruments of virtue they are virtuous, which is clear nonsense. But on the other hand, also the need for the external goods to play on. You can say virtue is -- I mean, if we use the Aristotelian simile -- virtue means playing well on the external goods. But that presupposes the external goods, of some kind. Do you see that? I mean that is very -- we have certain difficulties in understanding because the moral doctrines with which we are most familiar are rather silent about this aspect; or when they come in they come in in discussion, for example, say of the importance of clubs and other bad conditions on morality. That is, of course, admitted. In this way we still understand it from present day discussions: that there are conditions so unfavorable as to make it practically impossible for any ordinary human being to become a decent human being when he comes from such circumstances. But I wish you would spell out your difficulty clearly for this reason: that is one reason why Aristotle and Plato too think that moral virtue cannot be the highest excellence of man, because of its intrinsic dependence on the availability of tools, of instruments. And therefore -- well, the discussion in Plato or in Xenophon: Socrates, the poor man -- yes, but Socrates -- why was he able to be a good man although he was poor? Because his virtue was not the kind of virtue for which you needed tools. It was the theoretical virtue.

Yes, but that — we should understand that because that is, to begin with, a very great difficulty... We have for example — I mean, to say nothing about the Biblical tradition -- for example, in the Stoic teaching: you know, the slave; the man in fetters, in prison, who is a perfectly virtuous man; you know this figure with which we are also familiar. So no need for anything external, not even for health, of course. Yes, but one thing we forget, however.

That is true, that the Stoics teach that, but one must never forget that virtue as the Stoics understand it always implies theoretical wisdom as a part. That is overlooked in the vulgar, ordinary notion of stoicism. If you speak of the Biblical tradition, well I think you must then always make a distinction between -- analogous to that philosophic distinction -- a distinction between saintliness or something of this kind and simple moral virtue, and saintliness is also -- is, of course, infinitely rare compared with -- moral virtue is something of which almost all people, as Aristotle would say, are capable. That requires conditions. That is truly essential because a consequence of that is, of course, the aristocratic teaching of Aristotle. You see this immediately. If virtue requires tools, instruments, equipment, then not all men can be virtuous.

All those who lack equipment cannot be truly virtuous and therefore democracy is absurd. So there is a connection, obviously, between that -- central for Aristotle. Therefore we must try to understand that. Did you understand the first part, why Aristotle speaks here of the simply good as distinguished from the good under conditions or relatively good. Let us take the extreme case. A man has committed a crime. Then he is caught, or maybe he repents, and he is justly punished and he bears the punishment. In a way, he commits the just action. I mean, it is inflicted on him but he accepts it as just. Aristotle says, well, that is not in itself a virtuous action. It is better than to run away from punishment, but it is not -- we wouldn't call a man virtuous whose life consists of a chain of such action. Aristotle goes beyond it and he says even the actions inflicted on him by fair judges, the punitive actions; they also are not simply noble because of their relativity to that evil, that evil of punishment which it inflicts. That is one of the passages which makes intelligible to us a distinction which is crucial for the classical understanding of morality. You see, the Greeks have no word for morality as we use it. They speak of the noble and the just things. This distinction is essential between the noble and the just. For example, to undergo deserved punishment is just and evil inflicted is just, but surely to undergo just punishment is not noble. So in a way -- there are other examples by which one can make clear this distinction, of course, blurred when one speaks of morality generally and therefore another way of putting it is that Aristotle says virtuous actions simply and virtuous action relatively, qualifiedly. Do you have the passage — can you continue where you left off, Mr. Reinkin?

"It follows from what has been said that some elements of the state should be 'given', or ready to hand, and the rest should be provided by the art of the legislator."

By the legislator. Is it clear? I mean you must not -- we are now trying to establish the best regime and this man who estab-

lished the best regime is here called by Aristotle the legislator. The legislator is not a governing body, a legislative body, as it is now, which is constantly in sessions. He has in mind the founding legislator, like the founding fathers; something like that. Whether that's an individual or a group is, of course, not an essential difference. Now this founding legislator is, in a way, an artisan. The product of his art would be the perfect regime, but as every other artisan he needs material. He needs people; he needs a territory and so on and of the proper type which Aristotle discusses here. And some things must be available to the legislator which he cannot produce as little as the carpenter produces the wood, but other things -- and the most important thing, of course is what he, the legislator, does to that material. That is the legislative art. Yes?

"We may therefore pray that our state should be ideally equipped at all points where fortune is sovereign -- as we assume her to be in the sphere of the 'given'. The virtue of the state is a different matter: here we leave the realm of fortune, and we enter the realm of human knowledge and purpose. A state is good in virtue of the virtue of the citizens who share in its government. In our state all the citizens have a share in the government. We have therefore to consider how a man can become a virtuous man. True, it is possible for all to be virtuous collectively, without each being virtuous individually. But the better thing is that each individual citizen should be good. The virtue of all is necessarily involved in the virtue of each."

Yes, let us stop here for one moment. You see here in passing that Aristotle's best regime is an aristocracy, if any proof is needed, because the virtue of the citizen coincides with the virtue of the man. But that is not, nor was, the main point. Here we have another remark about the power of chance. . . chance: virtue as such can never be a matter of chance; virtue as such. But the conditions of virtue depend on chance. For example, that a man who died this morning does not commit now, is incapable now to commit, to perform virtuous actions is clear. Why is he unable? By something which happened to him. He died. There can be other ways in which a man is prevented from acting virtuously: illness or distress or what have you. That is not under his power. Virtue as such is under man's power, but not the conditions of virtue. This simple -- I mean, this distinction is not sufficient between chance and art, chance and human art, but at a first glance it is the most important distinction. To take an example from Xenophon: you want to have an orchard and you must know something about that and you do it in the proper way, according to the rules of the art, but the end of what you are doing is, of course, not the planting of the orchard but the enjoyment of the orchard. The art which you possess does not in any way guarantee the ultimate end, namely the enjoyment of the orchard. You may also after having completed the orchard according to all the rules of that art. That was the way in which the ancients understood the art of divination. The art of divination was meant to be the compilation of every possible art. The causes

The art can tell you what to do in order to achieve this more immediate end, say the planting of the orchard, but that the ultimate outcome in which you are interested, namely that you should enjoy it, is not guaranteed by the art and therefore you would need a super-art called divination, which, of course, is not admitted by Aristotle, but that only throws light on this problem. Aristotle will now make, in the immediate sequel, a more detailed distinction regarding what I now call the art which we need here, because the whole context here is the question of how to get the right kind of citizens once the city is established, i.e., the right kind of education. Let us see; let us read the sequel.

"There are three means by which individuals become good and virtuous. These three means are the natural endowment we have at birth; the habits we form; and the rational principle within us."

Yes; more literally, nature, habit, reason.

"In the matter of endowment we must start by being men -- and not some other species of animal --"

This is clear. That's an absolute pre-condition, but here we cannot speak of accident, of chance, because virtue as such is the perfection of man. There's an essential relation of virtue itself to the nature of man.

(Change of tape).

. . . whenever we say happened to: I happened to pass and then I saw this hold-up. I happened to pass. The policeman on the beat is not supposed to happen to pass but be around. So you happen to sneeze and therefore some people -- this kind -- certain kinds of happenings -- there is no connection whatever like sneezing and discussing something -- lead therefore to the view that there is a necessary connection and sneezing means -- is either good or bad only; or, for that matter, a cat crossing -- happens to cross the street, happens, and then some people say there is a necessary connection that both were. Now what Aristotle has, of course, in mind is not such superstitious interpretations, but take chance as chance. The sneezing is truly irrelevant when they deliberate, but that you find a treasure cannot be irrelevant to you.

"It seems to me also that he does not really take purpose out of chance completely, out of one sense of chance. There is purpose or designs connected --"

Yes, but in which way?

When he speaks in chapter 1, I think, of this chapter 7 that the external goods come by chance he does not mean that he holds by the treasury. It is for them, but they are accidents, so to speak. They are essential things.

Yes, no the close analysis given in the second book of the Physics is this: that we speak of chance especially in cases where things happen which we could have intended. We could have intended to dig for, to find a treasure and to that extent the relation to end or purpose is implied, but not beyond. I mean, to explain -- the religious interpretation is in terms of providence for which the chance is a part of a divine teleological order, but that is not part of Aristotle's analysis and therefore the chance is simply the unexpected and strange end, in their individual case, unaccountable. Unaccountable. As I said before, the account you give by telling the pre-history of that treasure does not do away with the unaccountability of the crossing of the two lines. Now -- yes, we must first be born as human beings, sure, but that's not sufficient.

" --- and men too who have certain qualities both of body and soul."

So in other words that belongs to that. That is what nature must supply. If someone is going to take an extreme case and has a moronic human being nothing can be done about it. That is given, over which the legislator has no control. Yes?

"There are, indeed, some qualities which it is no help to have had at the start. Habits cause them to change: implanted by nature in a neutral form, they can be modified by the force of habit either for better or worse. Animate beings other than men live mostly by natural impulse, though some are also guided to a slight extent by habit. Man lives by reason too and he is unique in having this gift. It follows that all the three powers of man must be tuned to agree. Men are often led by that principle not to follow habit and natural impulse, once they have been persuaded that some other course is better."

Yes, let us stop here. Is this distinction clear, between nature, habit, and reason? The last case: that we do not have something by nature nor by habit and yet reason tells us we ought to have it, and we might do it. Is this intelligible?

"Can we then speak of the essential nature of man?"

Yes sure -- essential nature -- yes but here we are concerned not only with the essential nature of man, but also with the nature of individuals, of course. But even when you speak -- let us assume that man is by nature right-handed, as Aristotle thought, and then that can be reinforced by habit, of course, and yet at a certain moment a man, for example, loses his right arm and then his reason tells him if he doesn't want to be completely useless and helpless -- his reason tells him that he must train his left arm and he does so; simple case. Or another case: if someone is born with very poor eyesight and reason tells him he ought to undergo a certain operation to get better eyesight and he does that. These are the elements from which every understanding of education must draw: the natural endowment, as one can say, natural gifts; what someone has

acquired by habituation, because habituation is something like a second nature -- it is not nature but it can take on the force of nature and can be as difficult to change as nature; and the third is conviction, we can say, or persuasion, which also influences us to some extent. Mr. Faulkner.

"Is there a distinction between the natural and the reasonable, or reason and nature, implied in this particular passage?"

No, no, no. Nature is that -- yes, the natural gifts -- yes, but where does nature come in the case of reason?

"You mean the gift of the faculty?"

Yes, we have the faculty, but beyond that.

"Reason's standard."

Sure, yes. Therefore, in other words, reason is not unlimited. There are limitations. There are standards in the light of which reason is able to discern the preferable from the less preferable and so on; yes. Now, let us read a few more lines beyond that.

"We have already determined, in an earlier chapter -- "

Aristotle does not speak, of course, of chapters because he didn't divide the book into chapters. Yes, all right.

" -- in another place, the character of the natural endowment which is needed for our citizens, if they are to be easily moulded by the art of the legislator. When they have that endowment, the rest is entirely a matter of the education which he provides; and they will partly learn it from a training in habits, partly from a system of instruction."

In other words, the nature is a condition of education. Not all men are educable. That's the implication. But education itself consists of two elements: habituation and listening. Listening: that corresponds to reason; listen to reason, listen to speeches. Yes, but which were these conditions -- do you remember that -- of the nature? Which is a desirable nature? Do you remember that? Miss Fremm.

"It was the combination of spirit and intelligence. . . ."

Yes, but spirited, not sluggish, and intelligent. These are the conditions; yes. They cannot be supplied by education, although reason, education can do something to improve them. But they cannot be -- they must be presupposed indeed. Now we -- perhaps when we have time later we may turn to this passage about the nature later on. There is -- let us see; where were we? Now in the sequel -- we cannot read everything -- in the sequel Aristotle makes it clear that this regime which he desires will be one of equality among the citizens. In other words, there is only -- it is a republic. It

is a republic, but an aristocratic republic. This we do not have to go. Yes, let us first turn to what he says about the principles of education in 1334b, shortly after the beginning. Using the distinction already made earlier? One second; what did I say? Yes. Yes, let us see. We have already divided -- we have already explained earlier that one needs nature, habit, and reason.

" --- we may say that the means required for achieving general excellence are natural endowment, habit, and reason. So far as the first of these is concerned, we have already determined the character of the endowment with which our citizens should start. It remains to consider the other two means, and to determine whether training in habit or training in reason ought to come first. The two modes of training must be adjusted to one another as harmoniously as possible; otherwise rational principle may fail to attain the highest ideal, and the training given through habit may show a similar defect."

Now is this clear? In other words, habituation and reason are two different principles of education and what is important is to have a harmony between both. Good habits and good speeches; otherwise there will be disharmony. There will be disharmony between the habits and the convictions.

"First, in the sphere of man's life (as in all life generally), birth has a first beginning, but the end attained from such a beginning is only a step to some further end. The exercise of rational principle and thought is the ultimate end of man's nature. It is therefore with a view to the exercise of these faculties that we should regulate, from the first, the birth and the training in habits of our citizens. Secondly, as soul and body are two, so there are also two parts of the soul, the irrational and the rational; and there are also two corresponding states of these parts -- the state of appetite, and the state of pure thought. In order of time and in date of birth, the body is prior to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul is prior to the rational. This is proved by the fact that all the signs of appetite -- such as anger, self-will, and desire -- are visible in children from their very birth; while reasoning and thought are faculties which only appear, as a rule, when they grow older. The conclusion which follows is obvious. Children's bodies should be given attention before their souls; and their appetites should be the next part of them to be regulated. But the regulation of their appetites should be intended for the benefit of their minds -- just as the attention given to their bodies should be intended for the benefit of their souls."

The habituation refers to the mere appetite: a regulation of desire and aversions, which is of course always done accompanied by speeches. Do that; do not do that, and so on and so on, but the understanding of why this is good and that is bad is not necessarily -- is not possible in that early stage, and therefore the reasoning, the understanding, comes later. Is this clear, this point? But

the regulation -- but what comes earlier is, in all these cases, the inferior, and therefore the regulation, the good condition of the body is meaningful only as a means for the good condition of the soul; and secondly, the good condition of the appetitive part of the soul, of the desires and aversions, is ultimately necessary only for the perfection of the pure mind. But in education itself the lower is the immediate theme -- the body and the appetitive part -- but still, in the mind of the educator, as distinguished from the being to be educated, this ultimate goal of man must be foremost. Rabbi Weiss.

"Insofar as external goods go, wouldn't the bare minimum of external goods be possible in order for a person to be habituated from childhood in moral virtue -- "

Yes but the question is this: I mean if this child were meant to lead a strictly private life on the highest level, strictly the theoretical life, that would be true. But if it is to lead a political life, if he is to be a statesman, that is not sufficient according to Aristotle. I mean, I gave this example -- you know -- that the family traditions are very important for the political horizon. If someone knows only his parents and perhaps his grandparents and the family tradition stops fifty years ago or so at the most, that is something different from where the family tradition, let me say, the family tradition is coeval with the whole history of the polis, but this requires, as you can easily figure out, some fortune. Think of very simple things: the preservation of letters, of pictures, and what have you, is not possible for people who have really only the bare means of subsistence; to say nothing of other things: of social graces which are, politically, eminently necessary as you could have seen when you heard, listened perhaps to Mr. Khrushchev. That is not possible without some family background, as they say now, and the family background means, in plain English, some property. That -- we come always back to the same point and which -- we may say Aristotle is wrong there; that's a long question, but that is essential to Aristotle: that the good life presupposes equipment and therefore at least the practically or politically active men, i.e. the men who are -- one reason, by the way, of the difficulty is this: that when we speak of morality we mean sometimes something very restricted, some simple honesty, of course, of which indeed most men are capable -- perhaps all men are capable -- but that is, of course, not what Aristotle means. That is only a small part of what he understands by human excellence. Think only of the difference -- for example, justice. What opportunities do people like you and I, for example, have for being just or unjust? Extremely limited. If we were judges or if we were in charge of great public responsibilities then the degree of justice, the rank of justice which would be our affair would be infinitely greater and without opportunity of actions the possibilities of faculties do not develop. You see the ancients knew that, Plato and Aristotle and so on, and, for example, there is in Plato's Laws a remark about one virtue: what we call honesty, simple decency, is frequently called by Plato sophercarne (?), which we may translate by moderation or temperance. Of course, that is a very common thing. Most people have that,

but that's also very uninteresting. If a man is, in this sense, honest that is in no way a qualification for political office, obviously. Aristotle turns then to the question of the age of the parents, beginning with the body, and he figures that out very nicely: that the father should be 35 or thereabouts and the mother 18, and he goes into quite some details so that the end of this human activity should coincide on both sides and not to create problems for one or two of the people if they get old at different stages of their married life. More important for our purpose of general understanding of Aristotle is the passage in 1335b19; paragraph 15 on page 327.

"The question arises whether children should always be reared or may sometimes be exposed to die. There should certainly be a law to prevent the rearing of deformed children. On the other hand, there should also be a law, in all states where the system of social habits is opposed to unrestricted increase, to prevent the exposure of children to death merely in order to keep the population down. The proper thing to do is to limit the size of each family, and if children are then conceived in excess of the limit so fixed, to have miscarriage induced before sense and life have begun in the embryo. (Whether it is right or wrong to induce a miscarriage will thus depend on whether sense and life are still to come, or have already begun.)"

Yes, let us stop here. In other words, the line is drawn: is it a living being, is it already a living being, or not yet? If it is already a living being and, of course, a potential human being then it would be murder to destroy it. That's the point, but before that there is no problem for Aristotle. But as regards the exposure of deformed infants -- he doesn't say what he means by that but perhaps children where one can see immediately that they are moronic or something of this kind -- Aristotle has no objection to that. That is very characteristic, of course, of Aristotle. Now in the sequel, then, Aristotle discusses the sexual morality which is -- well, one can say -- neither particularly strict nor particularly severe. You can read that for yourself. More practical to discuss is a passage a bit later in 1336b, shortly after the beginning, the question which is --

"It should therefore be a primary duty of the legislator to exorcize the use of bad language everywhere in our state. To use bad language of any sort lightly is next door to acting badly. The young, especially, should be kept free from hearing, or using, any such language. Those who are guilty, in spite of all prohibitions, of talking or acting indecently must be punished accordingly. The younger freemen, who are not yet allowed to recline at the common tables, should be subjected to corporal punishment and other indignities; and men of an older age should pay the penalty for behaving like slaves by undergoing indignities of a degrading character. If the use of indecent language is thus to be prescribed, it is obvious that we must also prevent the exhibition of indecent pictures and the performance of indecent plays. It should therefore

be the duty of the government to prohibit all statuary and painting which portrays any sort of indecent action. An exception may, however, be made for the festivals of deities where even the use of scurrility is licensed by the law. (But here, we may note, the law also allows men who have reached a proper maturity to acquit their wives and children from attendance by attending in person themselves.) The seeing of mimes or comedies should be forbidden to young persons by the legislator, until they have reached the age when they are allowed to share with the older men in the right of reclining and taking wine at the common tables. By that time their education will have made them all immune from the evil effects of such performances."

Yes, I thought you should be aware of that whenever the question of censorship comes up because that is of some -- you see the -- it follows necessarily. If the function of civil society is to produce virtue censorship is inevitable and therefore the horror of censorship which we have is a sign of the fact that we do not believe that the purpose of civil society is to produce virtue. That follows necessarily. Yes?

(Inaudible question about the passage on deformed children).

Yes, I think that in modern motherhood. . . . Now this surely goes back to the Biblical tradition but then difficulties arise in other ways. For example, if people are in a way incapable to live must there not be a way of legally ending their suffering, and (several words inaudible) is simply based on the fact, apart from the religious basis, that the danger of misuse by unscrupulous physicians . . . is so great that society . . . a much smaller risk . . . and this example throws light again on the question we discussed on a former occasion: Aristotle and natural law. Strictly speaking, there is no natural law in Aristotle. There is natural right, but the content of that natural right differs conspicuously from what we, on the basis of the Biblical tradition regard as right. There is no question about that. Also, if you would read the section on sexual morality you would see there are also considerable differences. It is by no means lax, but it is not as strict as it would be on the basis of the Biblical tradition. One must know this, of course, and understand it in a general way. Now there were a few more passages which we should consider. Yes; now this argument in the first part -- I saw this from the paper -- is difficult and I will, therefore, repeat it although I mentioned it last time. What Aristotle does in the beginning of the seventh book is to establish . . . passage where this proportion: the theoretical life to the practical political life of the individual, corresponds somehow to the self-sufficient city to the imperialistic or expansionist city. You remember that. There are many difficulties here; one I have not discussed last time, which I think I should mention. There is obviously something awkward about this proportion. Why should imperialism be the political equivalent to what in the life of the individual is the practical, political life, and I tried to explain that last time by referring to the element of self-assertion, which is

essential, according to Aristotle in moral virtue and virtue in general. But there is also the other -- there he wasn't concerned with the other side. What has self-sufficiency to do with the theoretical life? Self-sufficiency of the polis: that it is not expansionist and simply tries to preserve its integrity: what has this to do with the philosophic life? Well, because from the highest form of self-sufficiency, according to Aristotle, for the individual, consists in the theoretical life. Therefore, also, the lesser needs of the theoretical man than the needs of the gentleman. But there is also another consideration which it is important to consider and that is trivial: the polis as polis cannot lead a theoretical life. I mean, the polis cannot theorize. That can only be done by individuals. Now to explain that let us turn to an earlier passage, 1328b, near the beginning.

"It remains for us now to enumerate all the elements necessary for the existence of the state. Our list of these elements will include what we have called the 'parts' of the state as well as what we have termed its 'conditions'. To make such a list we must first determine how many services a state performs; and then we shall easily see how many elements it must contain. The first thing to be provided is food. The next is arts and crafts; for life is a business which needs many tools. The third is arms; the members of a state must bear arms in person, partly in order to maintain authority and repress disobedience, and partly in order to meet any threat of external aggression. The fourth thing which has to be provided is a certain supply of property, alike for domestic use and for military purposes. The fifth, and first, is an establishment for the service of the gods, or, as it is called, public worship. The sixth thing, and the most vitally necessary, is a method of deciding what is demanded by the public interest and what is just in men's private dealings."

Yes, let us stop here. The last is government. It is only a somewhat more detailed description of what government is because the decision about what is advantageous, publicly advantageous and just, is obviously government and the executive offices are simply subordinate to that. I mean, he speaks here explicitly only of what he calls the deliberative part of the government, but that is, according to him, the core of the government. Now the passage which I have in mind is the one to which we have referred before about the priesthood. That is the fifth and first: fifth in the order of the enumeration, first -- well Barker says in rank. That is true to that extent that from the point of view of religion, of course the gods are higher than men. To that extent it is the highest. Now this is of a very great importance for the understanding of Aristotle with a view to this question: the theoretical life and the polis. All these are, in the wider sense of the words, parts of the polis. What was the highest part of the polis in Plato's Republic, may I ask? The philosophers, the philosopher. In no Aristotelian -- there are three enumerations of the parts of the polis in the Polity. In none of them are the philosophers mentioned. The place

of the philosophers -- yes, now I make a further step. Aristotle does not say what the function of the priest is except in a very general way: concern about the divine, with the divine. He doesn't say more about that. A medieval follower of Aristotle who followed him rather strictly in all these matters, Marcellus of Padua, 14th century, gives this indication, gives this kind of commentary on this passage, saying the priests are teachers, which -- well Aristotle never says here and which is partly due to the Biblical tradition, to certain passages in the Bible. The priests are teachers. Now if we consider this non-Aristotelian remark -- I mean, Marcellus, after all, not Aristotle, but he understood him -- we have to say, we are entitled to say that the only teachers who are as such, as teachers, parts of the polis are the priests, not the philosophers. That is very very important to observe. Now what can this mean?

What can this mean? You will see from a passage which I shall read to you very soon that this is, has an Aristotelian basis, this interpretation. What do the priests teach? Well, in the first place, the ritual, of course: how to sacrifice, to whom, which god, what time and this kind of thing, and which crimes are sacrilegious and which are not and all this kind of thing. Now there is a passage in Aristotle's Meteorics, Book XII, which is very well known and was especially well known in the Middle Ages, 1074b, near the beginning. I just read it to you in the translation. "Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition, in the form of a myth, that these bodies" -- the heavenly bodies -- "are gods and that the divine encloses the whole. The rest of the tradition" -- I mean apart from that teaching about the cosmic gods as we could say -- "has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency" -- well I'm sure Aristotle says about what is useful in regard to law -- "they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned." Here you are. There is -- the divine as Aristotle knew about it was an understanding of the highest principle of the universe, of heaven, heaven being the wall surrounding the whole and therefore, somehow, the seat of the divine and especially the heavenly bodies. That was, you could say, a kind of natural religion because that was -- were views which were also shared by many non-Greeks. Somewhere in Aristoteles we read a passage where he calls these Gods, sun, moon and star, the gods, although worshipped by the barbarians, not the Greek gods, Olympian gods in particular. But still, this is, in Aristotle's opinion, a sound view that the heavenly bodies are living beings, living beings, because nothing of attraction and repulsion being accepted by Aristotle, they move under their own power, and they move -- self-moving; in this sense, living. But then certain other stories were added with a view to the enforcement, to man's accepting the laws: notion of divine punishment inflicted on those who disobey the most important laws, especially those which are so difficult to reinforce: hospitality, and the unprotected stranger, the unprotected orphan and widow -- this kind of thing especially but the other, of course, and so on. This is what the function of the priests is and the polis requires that.

Therefore, to repeat, philosophy as philosophy is beyond the polis. It is a preserve of some individuals. The political reflection of the philosophers are the priests. That, I think -- and that leads us up to another point I have mentioned on a former occasion: the polis as unphilosophic cannot be secular, if we understand by secular that it does not have a religious establishment as civil society. It must have, and that is a view not peculiar to Aristotle. I don't know of a single Greek thinker who denied that. That is a notion which has come up only in modern times, partly as a consequence of the wars of religion. There is one more point; is Mr. Brown still here? I believe I have seen him. No, then that is of no use to take it up. Now, is there any point you would like to take up? There are many things here. By the way, as regards the religious use -- the political use of religion, you have a good example here in 1335b12, when he speaks of pregnant women. Do you have that?

"Pregnant mothers should pay attention to their bodies: they should take regular exercise, and follow a nourishing diet. The legislator can easily lead them to a habit of regular exercise if he requires them to make some daily pilgrimage for the purpose of worshipping at the shrines of the goddesses who preside over childbirth."

Do you see? That is simply the belief that there are goddesses who protect women in childbirth is given and the legislator, the rational legislator whom Aristotle advises, uses this belief for a rational purpose: to give the necessary exercise, bodily exercise, to the pregnant woman. That is a little illustration of the principle. You wanted to say something?

"This frequent recurrence of the image of the flute-player: it would seem to me that the excellence of the flute-player is given just when you talk about flute-playing. It follows from flute-playing . . . whereas it would seem that Aristotle couldn't . . . assume that the excellence of man also follows from the very -- "

Oh, it doesn't follow. The excellence of the flute-player doesn't follow from his owning a flute. Then we all would become excellent flute players immediately if we had the flute.

"No. I mean, the idea of flute playing, the nature of the flute playing implies a certain conception of the excellence. If you know what flute playing is, you know what good flute playing is. It is similar to see that if you know what man is, you know what -- "

(Mr. Strauss' response too far off microphone).

"No, the point I wanted to make though is that it seems that the excellence of man follows from a conception of what is the nature of man and it would seem that the remark you made earlier about Aristotle . . . the question of whether there is a human nature would have all kinds of problems raised

by the modern belief in evolution."

Well, after all, whatever the genesis of man may have been once he has emerged he was man. At a certain moment man ceased to be something in between apes and man and was man and that is . . . evolution is irrelevant, to say nothing of the fact that it is practically irrelevant. No one for one moment worries about the question did not part of the human race (rest of these remarks inaudible). . . . For example, take a worm and a bird and a horse, beings with which we are familiar. Now, for example, you cannot possibly say that a worm is defective at this moment because he doesn't fly or that the bird is defective because . . . horses. Each being has a specific nature and its perfection or deficiency is determined by its nature. I mean, for example, a bird which can't fly, for some reason: there's something wrong with that bird because it's a bird. In the case of a horse there's nothing wrong with it if it can't fly. There would be wrong if it can't run; a horse runs. And now the case of man is fundamentally the same. . . . There is a specific work of man, activity as they say here -- specific activity of man just as the specific activity of the bird is to fly. There are other activities; for example, eating, but these they all have in common. Therefore it's not characteristic. The characteristic activity of the bird is to fly. Now what is the characteristic work of man? That's the question. Everyone knows that. How do we call the other animals? The dumb. Man is the animal which talks and even if some individuals do not talk because they are mute, we know they are defective to that extent. There is something missing which belongs to man. Now then of course we have to go into the question, what means -- what does it mean to be good as a talking animal? Does it mean to be able to talk at great speed? . . . That we do not mean. Ah ha, so there is a certain use of talk . . . and then we come to develop that, Aristotle contends. Then we discover, re-discover theoretically what we know from habit in practice: the so-called virtues. The virtues, the various virtues, the various kinds of virtues, are forms of goodness of an animal whose characteristic is speech and the question of the origin of the human race does not immediately reject that; only a certain interpretation, namely that -- a certain interpretation of evolution according to which all changes are merely quantitative changes. However, that is an arbitrary and dogmatic assertion. If the changes of more and less, say of weight of brain, proportional to weight of brain or whatever else you take -- if these changes at a certain time issue in qualitative differences then it does not make much sense to stick to the quantitative difference as the illuminating difference. That's so. This does not create a difficulty. The difficulty in Aristotle's Ethics is rather this: that he never attempted to give an account of the human virtues deductively, if I may say so. You know what I mean by that? Starting from the fact that man is a speaking animal, or the rational animal, to show now how, given the various subdivisions of rationality as well as the necessary subdivisions of human pursuits, fundamental subdivisions, how these and those virtues and only these and these virtues can exist. To some extent you had such a deduction in Thomas Aquinas' Summa, but Aristotle himself never gave that and Thomas could not do it except with the help of

certain Platonic speculations. You know, Plato did give a deduction in the Republic. When he distinguishes the three parts of the soul, there is a virtue of desire, temperance; a virtue of spiritedness called courage, and then virtues which have to do with the whole: moderation -- no, I made a mistake, did I not -- no, the virtue of the rational part itself, wisdom; and then, well, is the chief point, the proper relation of the three, justice. I made a slight mistake, namely that moderation or temperance is not called by Plato in the Republic the virtue of the desiring part. That I think is no difficulty. It would be much more interesting to see why it appears to us a difficulty. I do not believe that the ultimate reason for that is the doctrine of evolution because long before Darwin, or for that matter Lamarck, appeared a new moral teaching was developed in the seventeenth century and afterward which is wholly at variance with the Aristotelian teaching. The theory of evolution came much too late to effect this change. Is there any other point? So next time -- yes, let us see whether we will be betrayed next time again. To prevent that within the limits of the possible, Mr. -- you will be present? Good.

Aristotle's Politics: Lecture 17 (Concluding), May 24, 1960

. . . the question which you raised at the end as to whether Book VIII is complete, whether the whole book is complete. You did not dispose of the difficulty created by references to subjects which he is going to handle, going to treat, and which he did not treat. Yes, that's true. Now regarding the mean -- what you said. That was good of you to think of Book IV as it is discussed in there, but does not Aristotle mean here also by a mean, by a determinable mean, what he meant when he spoke of the Dorian mode: namely, the mean character, meaning the moral character, not the musical mean.

"Well, I was wondering if Plato, in including just those modes, might possibly have had in mind musically."

That could be. Yes, but it was good you brought that out. Well, you referred -- the only -- these were the only points where you raised questions going beyond summarizing Aristotle's argument. There were, of course, other points which must have struck you as relevant. For instance?

"Well, I was interested in the use of language 'it is customary' and that which is innovated. For example, he refers to the ancestors in originating. . . . but later when they became related to pride and became interested in experimenting with all forms of education and habit they included the flute, but as soon as they had received a wider knowledge and more experience it was excluded again. . . . another point would be the judging of the Spartans."

Now, first what is the more general lesson you would draw from this discussion of the changed judgments on the flute?

"The initial educational program was just set up under no particular principle, but the idea of just studying all subjects regardless. . . . they did experiment with all of these and then they would realize that some were suitable and some were not and this was the wider experience they eventually gained when they rejected the use of the flute."

Yes, but still can you state it more simply and more clearly -- what the general distinction is which makes this passage interesting? Well, anyone here who sees an overall subject which we even may have discussed here in this class already? Progress. Yes? Good. Well, we will turn to that passage later. Thank you very much, Mr. and, of course, the question of leisure is also very interesting if you think what role it plays in present day social problems. Good. But we will turn to that later. First, is Mr. Gowen here? There were a few points which I thought would be of interest to the class. That concerns the second half of Book VIII. Mr. Gowen says "The Politics has no place for a purely speculative discussion." Now that is in connection with what Aristotle says about the end of man -- that's happiness -- and no reason is given for that. Why?

Why does Aristotle refrain from speculation? "Tentatively we may suggest that the Politics has no place for a purely speculative discussion. This leads to the seemingly absurd conclusion that the end of the polis is not a matter for political discussion per se. This absurdity however suggests that it is cover of the underlying tension between speculation, philosophy, and prudentialism, politics." What would you say to this suggestion? Why does Aristotle not give an argument establishing that happiness consists in the practice of virtue? How would you explain that in this passage of the seventh book? Well, in the context he explicitly refers to the Ethics. That's a simple answer, and from Aristotle's point of view the Ethics and the Politics are a unit. The Politics is the second part of a comprehensive study of which the Ethics is the first part, but still Mr. Gowen is not entirely wrong. How do we know, in the most exact way, what the end of man is? Is this knowledge supplied by the Ethics? That's a question which is not explicitly discussed by Aristotle, but it was discussed in the Middle Ages very clearly. Well, the question of the end of man is in itself a theoretical question and therefore belongs to the theoretical sciences, to what they understood in the Middle Ages, the Aristotelians, natural science; and that is indeed true: the Ethics and Politics do not go into these matters theoretically. What Aristotle does when he discusses happiness at the beginning of the Ethics especially is that he takes common opinions and by a scrutiny of these common opinions he arrives at a certain view as to what constitutes happiness. That's a full account and the clear account would be a theoretical account. Now then he has a difficulty which I suppose has been felt by some of you -- the others. "The individual endowments, . . . and intelligence is the result of chance. This being the case the actualization of the ideal good and happy polis is truly a chancy business." Yes -- now this is -- to what extent is this true? Surely Aristotle says so at a certain passage. He says so, but what does he mean? Is this the last word on the subject: that the actualization of the best regime is simply a matter of chance? Now let me explain that. One of the crucial conditions of the best polis is that you have the right kind of a citizen body, combining spiritedness and intelligence. Now is the fact -- is this condition merely a matter of chance, the fulfillment of this condition merely a matter of chance? When Aristotle starts the discussion -- that is generally the procedure -- he uses expressions which are at first glance correct. The political art, the art of the legislator, is an art, in a way like any other art and in every art we distinguish the activity of the artist or artisan as such from that which his art presupposes. The shoemaker must have leather or wood or whatever it may be and this is not a matter of his art. That is given to him. His art is applied to this material. Now from this point of view the simple distinction is what does the art do and what is the thing for which the art is not responsible? That which is outside of the art is then called simply chance. It does not depend on the peculiar kind of rationality which is that art, but that is, of course, not quite sufficient because that there are such things as leather and wood around somehow, although to different degrees, is not a matter of chance. Now let us look at the human beings here. What about the intelligent and spirited beings which he wants as citizens?

Is the existence of such human beings a matter of chance? Where do we find them especially, this beautiful mixture of spiritedness and intelligence, according to Aristotle?

"The Greeks."

Yes, but more generally and more precisely: in the temperate zone. So you have nature here. It is not chance. It is as little chance -- for example, no one would say "I saw a dog who chanced to have four legs." That's not chance; the dog has four legs. That he barked at this particular moment: that may be chance, surely, but that he has four legs or a stomach -- you wouldn't say that this is an accident, is chance. So that there are spirited -- that this combination occurs rather frequently in the temperate zone is natural and therefore we have to introduce a finer distinction between nature and chance, as distinguished from art, and so on. But still, regarding the best regime: that is much more chancy than that you would find this combination in the temperate zone. And that, of course, as Plato puts it in the fourth book of the Laws: one can say that chance is the legislator. Very little -- I mean there was very little advance planning in the world -- you can say because there was no fully clear political science, political philosophy, in the world. To that extent, chance -- and since the influence of political philosophy from Plato's or Aristotle's point of view is very limited one can say on the whole the world is governed by chance, they would say, and yet that does not make superfluous a rational consideration, but it also induces us to be not too sanguine about its possible influence. Now, do you have any other point because I felt all the time that this chance problem is one of the major obstacles we have to overcome if we want to understand Aristotle. You see we are -- almost everything -- what we call today historical with any emphasis is what is called by Plato and Aristotle chance. That's the difficulty. You know: history, historical changes. We somehow imply that these are all either meaningful changes in the sense of a historical process of a progressive character, or if not, that they are, surely, necessary: necessary in a non-teological sense. It had to happen. Given these conditions it had to happen and therefore there is no -- we cannot speak of chance. That was not the view because you could also go back to the simple example of chance: digging potatoes and finding a treasure. That also had to happen given these conditions, because the treasure was there, this man was compelled by his hunger and foresight to dig potatoes, and just as the older man was compelled to bury his treasure through fear of enemies who would take away his treasure, so -- and yet that doesn't do away with the chance character.

(Inaudible question regarding Machiavelli's teaching on this point, and as to the difference between the ancients and the moderns).

Yes, but what is the difference between Machiavelli, on the one hand, and the ancients, on the other? (Inaudible response). No, to that extent he would merely repeat. I mean, that fortune is elusive: this is implied in the clear understanding. The historicity of Machiavelli is not that he says fortune is elusive,

That's the orthodox view. But that he says you can catch her; she's a woman who can be caught. Catch is the word. That is the new thing. Machiavelli teaches, at least explicitly -- you know, that needs some qualification -- fortuna is a woman who can be forced by the right kind of man and the ancients might have said she is a woman, but she cannot be forced. That is the difference. Now I can't go into all these things. He says also, "The educational system will be different for the young ruled than it will be for the old rulers, but old men do not normally go to school. On its face, the suggestion that old men must be educated is ridiculous." Do you recognize here anything what Aristotle says? Of course not. I mean this difficulty is merely one which Mr. Gowen has found without its being there. Well, I think I leave it at these points, especially since he is not here and doesn't have the benefit, if any, of these critical remarks.

Now let us turn to our text because that is our last meeting and one should try to give this class a proper conclusion. Let us read the beginning of Book VIII.

"All would agree that the legislator should make the education of the young his chief and foremost concern."

You see? Do you see the massive difference between the modern political notion and the classic political notion? Education is the most important theme for the legislator. What does Hobbes say about the most important theme of the founder of a city? Protection. What does John Locke say?

"Security of property."

You see; and we could give many other examples. Education is the most important theme. Rousseau, to some extent, restates it. But then, Rousseau's claim was that he is the man who restored classical thought against the moderns. But i Rousseau it means something rather different, nevertheless. Yes? Go on please.

"In the first place, the constitution of a state will suffer if education is neglected. The citizens of a state should always be educated to suit the constitution of their state."

Yes, the peculiar constitution, the peculiar regime. Yes?

"The type of character appropriate to a constitution is the power which continues to sustain it, as it is also the force which originally creates it. The democratic type of character creates and sustains democracy; the oligarchical type creates and sustains oligarchy; and as the progression ascends each higher type of character will always tend to produce a higher form of constitution."

Yes, let us stop here. Now you see the most important thing is education of the young towards the regime, and therefore democratic education differs from oligarchic education, monarchic education, and so on and so on, but this does not lead to any relativism

for Aristotle because there is a hierarchy of regimes. Is this clear? You have some doubts. Is this clear? I mean, I'm not now concerned whether Aristotle is right, but only the difference. Is this clear? There are n different regimes and education must be relative to the regime, but this does not lead to "relativism," in Aristotle because there is an order of rank of the different regimes. So I misunderstood the expression of your face. Aristotle has said a lot about this education toward the regime before, as you remember, and we compared that with the present day discussion or -- how is it called -- political socialization -- is that the term? Good. Now what is the difference between what Aristotle means by education and political socialization? I believe we haven't made that clear, the simple and basic difference. What's the difference? Why do they not speak of political education? Why do they call it socialization?

"Doesn't the term education apply more to a rational kind of thing?"

Yes, exactly, but try to make -- let us -- give us all an opportunity to see what you divine.

"Well, the idea in education, it would seem, is that you can establish certain values. Well, certain values can be established on the basis of reason, whereas in socialization you really try to form change of habits."

No; forming of habits is decisive for Aristotle. That's not the difference, but when education is a conscious thing on the part of the educator. He looks at the goal; he looks at the matter, the material, the human beings, and then he molds the material in accordance with that end, but political socialization may very well mean a process which goes on without anybody except the political scientist being aware of it. So. That's the difference. Aristotle would say this: that generally speaking an unconscious process is inferior to conscious processes. Generally speaking. Why? Why is an "unconscious education" inferior to a conscious education. (Inaudible response). Yes, in the case of an unconscious process you literally do not know what you are doing, and therefore you have no possibility of knowing whether you do it well or not. Sure. Now in the sequel Aristotle speaks -- goes on with this notion -- we cannot read everything -- and he speaks of a pro-education. Yes?

"The distinction you're drawing seems to imply that -- the implication would be that political socialization denies the value of conscious education."

No, of course not. It is indifferent to it, whereas the term education puts the emphasis on that. You see now the trouble with much of present day social science is that it admits everything and therefore -- the answer is very simple. Obviously we know that. The question is how it is known and how clearly it is known. That's always the question. The notion -- it is decisive -- when Aristotle speaks of education he means a conscious and consciously conducted

process. This is not meant when you speak of political socialization. It may be implied in it or admitted by it, but it is not meant by it.. That's all I said.

"... the one is better or which is really more important? Aristotle says that in reality the conscious education is better, but is it, in fact, more important?"

What does that mean? What does here mean more important? (Inaudible response). In other words, this happens most of the time in an unconscious way, you can say. This political socialization happens most of the time in an unconscious, in an unplanned way. Yes, sure. That might be so, but must we not also -- do we not make such studies, of political socialization for example, in order to see what might be wrong with it and in order to improve that habit? Must we not therefore -- is it not then from this point of view more important although it occurs more rarely? You see, in other words, what entitles you to say that that which is most frequent is the most important in such matters? That's a question, because every possible -- as long as you do not completely divorce the study of political phenomena from the question of improvement you cannot say that the most frequent is the most important. Yes?

"But I think that when you say that part of the reason that it's unconscious today is because of the state and society distinction, because it goes on in the social sphere -- "

Yes, many other things, yes. Yes, surely, it is connected with that. That's a long story and which visibly begins with embryonic birth (?) -- the assertion that a constitution which has come into being by growth, as they formally state it, meaning by unconscious growth, is absolutely superior to a made constitution like the American constitution. Surely that is behind it, but that is now almost forgotten, but that is the beginning; surely.

"I think the crux of the argument between Aristotle and the invisible hand position in this area too although somewhat less clear -- "

Yes, sure. No, there is a close connection. Just as the invisible hand doctrine says you contribute best to the common good if you never think of the common good, you work best toward the best regime by never thinking of it, and only do that in a fit of absent-mindedness. Sure. Yes?

"Well, is the point that Aristotle's making that political education is superior to political socialization because it works better or is more efficient, or is it because conscious activities are more peculiarly human than -- "

No, because they are more likely. They do not preclude the possibility of producing the good. That I think one could say, because you cannot produce the good -- that is Aristotle's implication -- without knowing it, at least not in human matters. You can procure

a perfect puppy without any conscious planning. That is clear, but you cannot do that -- perhaps also perfect babies as babies, in the state in which they are born -- but you cannot bring up a child if you do not know what you want to do to him or her. . . . If that is called rationalism, which is a somewhat complicated word, then surely Aristotle was a rationalist, if that is meant. You know, by conscious -- I mean, some people think that around 1900 or so, in the first decade of this century, there was a man called Sigmund Freud who made this amazing discovery that men are mostly irrational and therefore -- I mean, I give a crude version of a crude view -- and this condemns to insignificance all earlier political thought which was based on the principle that reason is most important. Yes, that is something -- I mean, there is a little element of truth only one thing is, of course, wrong: to think that these people did not know how unreasonable most of us are most of the time. That was always known and I think you have found plenty of evidence for this view in Aristotle's Politics. Only the question is that men must be irrational. That, indeed, was not held by Aristotle, for example. Now to follow, First, this argument: but if education is necessary that cannot begin early enough. It must be preceded by a pre-education, by a preliminary education. Now that is not developed here by Aristotle. It is developed more fully by Plato in the first book of the Laws by this illustration: you want to bring up someone as a house builder and then you have, surely, the process of educating him in house building, i.e. when he is an apprentice, but there is a preliminary education which is helpful to that proper education and that is if he plays at house building while he is a little child. That is what Aristotle means: a pre-education. The true education to civic virtue can come only much later, but there is a pre-education which can already begin at a very early age. Then he explains that -- should this education be public or common and his answer is it should be public or common because it is the education for public activity, ultimately because the polis is prior to the individual and the individual belongs to the polis: the thought with which he had begun the work. Now you see, that is, of course, -- take the example of the education to democracy. He should grow up towards an already existing democratic regime. In that sense, a democracy is surely prior to that baby who is to be brought up as a future democrat. That's clear. The issue is not this. The issue is what is to be taught with a view to that guiding principle. Especially, is the education to be intellectual or moral education? Now what if the question is stated in this general way: intellectual or moral education. What is Aristotle's general answer? What would you say Mr. Argria? (Inaudible response). Still, is there not --

"Well, moral."

Much more, I would say. Just as in Plato, when you read, for example -- the equivalent in Plato would be, say, Books II and III of the Republic. You know the education of the guardians, not yet of the three classes; that's a different story. That is also almost exclusively moral education, and generally speaking when the ancients speak of education in a political context they mean much more moral

education, the formation of character, than what we call intellectual education, much more, whereas in present day usage I think the emphasis is much more on intellectual education, the acquisition of skills and so on, than on the formation of character. Yes, but this education is, of course, as Aristotle has it in mind -- is the education in an aristocracy. Now let us turn to 1337b, shortly after the beginning. Shortly after the beginning: that the necessary things must be taught. Yes?

"There can be no doubt that such useful subjects as are really necessary ought to be part of the instruction of children. But this does not mean the inclusion of every useful subject. Occupations are divided into those which are fit for freemen and those which are unfit for them; and it follows from this that the total amount of useful knowledge imparted to children should never be large enough to make them mechanically minded."

And so on. In other words, the education in an aristocracy must be liberal education, liberal and not banal or unfree, and Aristotle illustrates this by a number of examples. The education is to be gentleman's education, which is distinguished not only from the education of the vulgar but also from some other things. Shortly after you left off Mr. Reinkin, he says something about the education in -- on the sciences. It is not unfree; it is not illiberal. Do you have that?

"Some of these branches can be studied, up to a point, without any illiberality; but too much concentration upon them, with a view to attaining perfection, is liable to cause the same evil effects that have just been mentioned."

Well, what he translates perfection means exactness. The gentleman is not concerned with exactness. That's an important point. Well, take a very simple example to be exact regarding every penny. That's one kind of exactness; that's illiberal from the gentleman's point of view. But where do we find exactness in ordinary life? I mean, disregarding the sciences proper. Well, in the arts to some extent. For example, a house builder, a carpenter, has to be exact. What would you do with a door which is done by an inexact man? You can't be gentlemanly in such matters. You have to be exact. Yes?

"Therefore, no scientist is a gentleman."

In a way, yes. Yes, Aristotle discusses that. Well, you must try to understand it. The scientist as scientist. They may coincide in the same individual. Aristotle gives some example in his scientific writings, the so-called biological writings. What does the scientist do? He touches dirty, utterly despicable beasts: worms and all this kind of thing. And he apologizes. You see, such was the state of the world at that time that he still has to apologize for what that he sleeps to these low things. surely there is a difference, but I think -- one thing is to laugh about it, but another thing is also to recognize the seriousness in this

ridiculous matter. You see? Is it not a problem? Assuming that man is by far superior to the brutes, brutes or beasts -- I say this in order to avoid the word animal. The Greek word animal comprises man; it means living being. We constantly act on that premise. We could not understand one another without this assumption. Now is it not strange then that the higher should devote such a great attention to the lower? That's a problem. That we are accustomed to it by a tradition of more than two thousand years is not a good answer because, you know, a merely traditional answer means, of course, some George has the answer but I don't have it. You know? Do you see that point? So one must think about -- one must really see why is this a problem. Yes, but it is possible that Aristotle meant here not so much the exact sciences proper as such things as medicine. I mean, according to the then prejudices a gentleman could be a physician. He could not be a carpenter or shoemaker. Still recognizable, you know. Do you not distinguish between the professional man and those who are not professional men? I believe I have heard that, so you see, but Aristotle -- let us continue to see what Aristotle has to say -- if that is the best example about the medical profession. I mean, how does he say? Where you left off.

"A good deal depends on the purpose for which acts are done or subjects are studied. Anything done to satisfy a personal need, or to help a friend, or to attain goodness, will not be illiberal; but the very same act, when done repeatedly at the instance of other persons, may be counted menial and servile."

In other words, a man who studies medicine in order to practice it for everyone: that is something slightly degrading. But if you do it in order to be of some help to your family and your friends or out of sheer curiosity, that's a different story. Yes, sure. But the point in which I'm interested is here immediately that this is of a very -- Aristotle does not share the mere prejudices of these people. That goes without saying but he accepts these prejudices to some politically -- by which I mean not merely accommodating himself, but so -- but if it is true that the rule -- that gentlemen are the best men for ruling the polis then the prejudices go with the gentlemen, have to be accepted for that purpose too. That is clear. Either you -- if you accept the principle of rule of gentlemen and gentlemen are constituted by certain opinions also, then you have to accept these opinions for that purpose. Aristotle himself is not under the spell of these prejudices. Now what he is driving at will appear gradually as we go, but someone raised his hand and I had to postpone it. Yes? (Inaudible remark regarding how the art of music pertains in this context). Yes, sure, Aristotle looks at that from this way.

"But apparently this would not be a gentlemanly art."

Yes, he says so later on. Whenever a man is by what he does dependent on the opinion of incompetent people that is deplorable . . . the gentleman is a man who does not depend on the opinion of non-gentlemen. That is so. That makes him a gentleman. He is

dependent, to some extent, on the opinion of the other gentlemen, but what the non-gentlemen think about it is irrelevant. Now whenever -- there is something venal about it. I mean, that is not complete nonsense. Look around today. Forget about Aristotle. Look at your fellow political scientists. They have to make a living and that means they are dependent; they become dependent on all kinds of departments and prejudices and so on. That is not always. I mean, I take now the case of thoughtful and well-prepared people. Do you not think that the problem of a degrading dependence can arise? What is the only way of avoiding it? Now let us be quite honest or, if you please, simple. . . . How can you avoid that? Being a man of independent means. And now then, of course, you can say -- then there will be some nasty people around who will say where did that wealth come from originally? Now I take the best case. In the very old family one doesn't even know where it came from. But then there come some people who make very radical reflections, like Rousseau and Marx. You remember -- who tried to show it could not have had an honest origin. Surely, but these questions -- but then these doctrines are truly and literally subversive -- these doctrines. They are subversive, and not only of the order which we have today but perhaps of any possible social order, and therefore one can rightly say these questions are meaningless questions -- shouldn't be raised. So let us leave it, then, at the simple practical view. The only way of avoiding degrading dependence is either an extremely high degree of one's own asceticism. You know, it is obvious that you need -- if you can live on a thousand dollars a year, then you are much less dependent than if you need five thousand a year and so on and so on. I don't have to labor that point, I believe. And therefore -- but assuming that very few men are willing or able to live in this extremely ascetic way, we become dependent on others and more than once on the good will of people on whom we should not be dependent, as self-respecting men. That is behind that. I think only a little bit of observation and reflection is needed to see that Aristotle may be wrong in his solution, but it is at least a respectable solution, one respectable solution to a problem which is causal with man. I don't say that I have proved that Aristotle is right, but I only hope there is proof that he doesn't talk nonsense and this is not simply dated stuff. We can recognize our own problems in that immediately. Yes?

"The implicit doctrine of freedom that you see here is suspiciously like that of the extreme democrat in one sense. In other words, a man dependent on himself acting only in terms of what lies within himself. And it also seems to me to clash somewhat with Aristotle's great saying that man is a social animal. I mean, it seems that there is obscured here what we find today as an essential fact of human existence: the extent to which people are in fact dependent upon each other."

Well, there does -- I mean, the mere fact that -- let us take this man of independent means -- is of course wholly impossible cut-side of asceticism. The very simple fact that so many things which he must not do as a gentleman but which have to be done for him show that he could not live in isolation, not to go into any deeper

question. So, furthermore -- and that is perhaps more relevant -- a single gentleman in this way could not maintain his gentlemanship simply physically if there were not other gentlemen who had the same interest and who would defend him and his cause and his interests against others. So there is no difficulty. I mean, that men are dependent on others, that every man is dependent -- even the most powerful tyrant, as you know, is dependent on other human beings for the simple reason that every man is killable by any other man. You know that? Hobbes' great insight. That is trivial and of course Aristotle knew it. In other words, now you -- I think you are guilty of an unfair remark. When we speak of an independent man we use a crude practical expression. We mean that kind of independence which is possible and that is, of course -- includes many dependences. That goes without saying. But the question is whether there are not -- President Eisenhower occasionally said that in politics everything is a matter of degree. Nothing could be truer, and all these political terms have this relativity in them. Absolutely independent no man can be, but in the practical sense we say that. For example, if you have children and you say at a certain moment they become independent that is not a meaningless expression. It's very clear in its meaning in the context and it's the same as you say the man who lives independently of the opinion of people inferior to him. That makes sense. And if you say that a thoughtful beggar is more independent than a king -- also makes sense. He needs men infinitely less than the king needs them. Yes?

" . . . talking about what seems to be a very fundamental point here, that as well as the virtues of these liberal gentlemen, this aversion to exactness indicates what it would seem to me would be the defect of a regime that's controlled by them, which would be that if the regime is controlled by them it will mean the ultimately dominant attitudes have an aversion to exactness and it seems to me that this leads to a kind of culture where fewer really important things get done on a large scale, but I think one of the reasons that England has succeeded so much is because it's accepted -- the leaders have accepted into their ranks men who are so concerned with exactness and these men have been able to balance the people who have an aversion to it and if the society was totally concerned with liberal things it might be very dull."

Yes, whether it is dull is perhaps not the highest consideration. Perhaps the purpose of life is not fun but virtue. But surely, there is no question, but still I can only say this in order to show the difficulty here. What is the net result that they have a Newton in the mint, a Newton in the royal mint and John Locke. . . . and which of the famous scientists was in the House of Lords or in Parliament? John Stewart Mill was in the House of Commons and so on and so on. What is -- very well. What is the ultimate outcome of that?

"You mean in England?"

Yes, all right, even in England, but generally.

"Well, I'm not certain I follow where you're going."

Well, I mean only that is simply the hydrogen bomb.

"Oh I see."

So in other words that is not interesting. I mean, I don't say that this was nonsense, but I say only that is not such a simple thing: the belief that there is a perfect harmony between the men of exactness, the scientists, and the political men; that this creates problems of its own. You see, you can put it this way: there are perhaps, for convenience sake, two fundamental possibilities of solving the political problem. One was the Aristotelian, which is the same as Plato and so; that is clear. The other is the modern. They have something in common, surely, but they are also fundamentally different. We have become aware in various ways of certain difficulties, of basic difficulties of the modern solution, and that is our predicament -- you know? I mean, why do we have beatniks and this kind of thing? That is all due to the fact that part of the population, and not necessarily the most thoughtless part, doesn't have a clear way in front of itself as it had for many many generations. We believe progress and we know in a very vague and general way where it leads to: to ever greater abundance, to ever greater freedom, to ever greater equality, and to ever greater culture. All good things. And then we went on and suddenly an abyss opened and I think that was, for the popular consciousness, the atomic bomb, more, I think, than the economic crisis and this kind of thing because the economic crisis -- then one could say we get in another expert called Lord Keynes and he will take care of that. But here we have no expert. There are experts for producing atomic bombs, but there are no experts telling us what to do with Khrushchev. You see? That is the practical form of the question: the hydrogen bomb. And therefore we try -- we want to understand our situation and I think one can say that all social scientists who are thoughtful are concerned with this very problem. What is the basic defect: that which has been overlooked somehow, in these last three centuries? My suggestion is only let us do it in the clearest and simplest way by looking at the alternative proposal of equal breadths: that was the master of those who know, Aristotle. That is the most convenient way of doing it -- Plato -- that is all much more complex. And then if we do that we see that. The alternative is indeed not in every respect beautiful and the modern men who revolted against it since the sixteenth century were not fools. I mean, there was something which is unattractive in Aristotle, but the question is, is it simply inferior? One should really begin a course on Aristotle with Chapter 16 of Hobbes' Leviathan, where Hobbes draws up the indictment against Aristotle and many of those things are identically the same as you would find them in John Rawls, for example. So they have their certain reasons, very good reasons, but the questions were, were the reasons so great as they thought they were? I think for all the attempts made by quite a few people today; I don't want to mention names, but you know there are very many people who are concerned with trying would gain in clarity if the alternative were as articulate

as it is in Aristotle. If you take some documents of, say, Archbishop Lord's fear of what would come with the emancipation of the capitalists -- you know, this kind of thing -- that's a very narrow issue. Here it is stated in all comprehensiveness. That is the point. Yes? Good. But we are not yet where we should be regarding -- so the education, to repeat, is the gentleman's education. Now how does it look? Let us go on. What are its subjects?

(Reading of paragraph 1, page 335 of Barker, begins, followed immediately by change of tape).

. . . because it is also controversial, whereas the other things are admitted. Yes?

"At present, indeed, it is mainly studied as if its object were pleasure; but the real reason which originally led to its being made a subject of education is something higher. Our very nature has a tendency (on which we have often remarked) to seek of itself for ways and means which will enable us to use leisure rightly, as well as to find some right occupation; indeed it is the power to use leisure rightly, as we would once more repeat, which is the basis of all our life."

Yes, let us stop here. Aristotle tries to answer the question by returning to the nature of man. The consideration that music is pleasant would not decide the issue. This much is clear. According to nature now this is, of course, the key word regarding the best regime. Do not forget that in the best regime the most important issue, namely regarding the relation of the element of strength and the element of understanding, the military element, the governing element was decided entirely on grounds of nature. The same man must be both the warriors and the governors, but they can't be it at the same time, because at the time they are best as a soldier they are not so good as a governor, generally speaking, and vice versa. But nature does it because they are the two stages in man's youth and maturity, and so we can even get the final solution, the priests, the old fellows. You have the three stages: youth, maturity, old age; a natural distinction is the basis for the distinction between the warriors, the governors, and the priests: according to nature. Here again we consider nature as our guide. Go on. We need both then. Yes?

"It is true that both occupation and leisure are necessary; but it is also true that leisure is higher than occupation, and is the end to which occupation is directed. Our problem, therefore, is to find modes of activity which will fill our leisure. We can hardly fill our leisure with play. To do so would be to make play the be-all and end-all of life. This is an impossibility. Play is a thing to be chiefly used in connection with one side of life -- the side of occupation. (A simple argument shows that this is the case. Occupation is the translation of work and sustenance; the worker needs relaxation; play is intended to provide relaxation.) We may therefore conclude that play and games should only be admitted into

our state at the proper times and seasons; and should be applied as restoratives. The feelings which play produces in the mind are feelings of relief from exertion; and the pleasure it gives provides relaxation. Leisure is a different matter: we think of it as having in itself intrinsic pleasure, intrinsic happiness, intrinsic felicity. Happiness of that order does not belong to those who are engaged in occupation: it belongs to those who have leisure. Those who are engaged in occupation are so engaged with a view to some end which they regard as still unattained. But felicity is a present end; and all men think of it as accompanied by pleasure and not by pain."

Yes, let us stop here. Now Aristotle makes here the crucial distinction which has somehow been forgotten between recreation and leisure. He establishes this hierarchy. The lowest is recreation. Then comes business, occupation, and the highest is leisure. Recreation: you relax in order to work or to work better, but you work not for the sake of work but for the sake of your leisure. That is absolutely crucial. In the ordinary discussions of leisure and leisure time, of course, these two things are identical, as you know. Yes?

"What of the academician?"

What do you mean by an academician?

"What of yourself?"

Let us -- well, you must know the answer. According to Aristotle if I were -- not -- academician is a dubious thing, but teachers are surely men who do work, who are workers of some sort. Let us forget about me; if you don't mind, but for what you mean, people like myself should stand for. That is extremely simple. Where is their place? . . . You know what the Greek word for leisure is? Shall I write it down? Schola. Latinized, schola. English, school. That was surely -- a school was supposed to be the place of leisure. What it has become the place of anguish, boredom, and so -- that is another . . . that is the fate of almost all human things. But let us -- that's a very pertinent question. I mean, that you put it into slightly inciting personal form only made it more clarified. Yes. So this relaxation is what Aristotle calls play, and it is also rather the same as what is now frequently called fun, but fun and leisure are two entirely different things. Aristotle will give some examples of such recreating things which are fun, enriching fun, and yet have nothing to do with leisure. For example, there is one recreating activity which we all indulge from time to time, I'm sure, and that is sleep as Aristotle mentions later, but a man who would work in order to sleep would be a rather perverse human being. Another example which Aristotle gives is getting drunk. That, as you know, came from the literature I am sure; that can also contribute to relaxation, but a man who would work in order to get drunk from time to time . . . that is the end -- would also be a very strange fellow -- do you see? Business is with pains, cares and annoyances. Recreation is incompatible with annoyances, but business

is unthinkable without annoyance, and leisure is also without annoyance. That is, I quasi-translate pain by annoyance to make it clear because I'm aware of the fact that there are quite a few businesses which are not accompanied by bodily pain, but the annoyances are the pain. Now, in order to understand the distinction which Aristotle makes I would like to use a simple suggestion made by a German writer, P.----- (?), who wrote a very interesting book on the subject of leisure. Now what was the traditional name for leisure time. I mean, traditionally in the western world. Now how does our day or how do our days and weeks pass? We work in the day, sleep in the night or have recreation after work and then, what was the institutional form of that which is neither work nor recreation?

"Religion."

Yes, we work on certain days which we call working days and also weekdays; and then there are other days; now what is the traditional word for that? Holidays. That gives us a very good help for the understanding of what Aristotle means: holidays. That is neither work nor mere recreation. It is a dedication to something which is the end of that. Aristotle will not say that, as I warn, tell you in advance, but this gives all of us an idea, and therefore one can say, which was said by people, that the problem of the leisure time is simply the problem of the obsolescence, disappearance of the holidays as holidays. I mean not only in the sense where it stands for vacation, i.e., recreation, but in the original meaning: holy days. Yes. Now let us go on. We come very soon to the crucial passage. Yes! Where we left off. Yes, everyone -- in other words, all believe and when all believe it, literally all, then it is not a mere accident. Then it has some ground: when all believe it. For example, when all believe that the sun turns around the earth -- this terrible error which was committed until Copernicus came -- that was, of course, not an accidental folly. That has some truth, in fact. We still see it every day and that has to be corrected on the basis of rather complicated considerations. That is also true, but that everyone in his sound mind sees it every day is also important and for practical, terrestrial purposes, terribly important. Now let us -- so everyone says the felicity, the bliss, the happy state is accompanied by pleasure. That all admit. Yes?

"It is true that all are not equally agreed about the nature of the pleasure which accompanies felicity. Different persons estimate its nature differently, according to their own personality and disposition."

Personality! Personality doesn't exists according to themselves and according to their habit. Yes? That shouldn't happen. Now, the next point.

"But the highest pleasure, derived from the noblest sources, will be that of the man of greatest virtue."

You see again: that great variety, infinite variety, but no

relativism because of the hierarchy. Yes. Now?

"It is clear, therefore, that there are some branches of learning and education which ought to be studied with a view to the proper use of leisure in the cultivation of the mind. It is clear, too, that these studies should be regarded as ends in themselves, while studies pursued with a view to an occupation should be regarded merely as means and matters of necessity. This will explain why our forefathers made music a part of education. They did not do so because it was necessary: it is nothing of the sort. Nor did they do so because it is useful, as some other subjects are. Reading and writing, for example, are useful in various ways --- for money-making; for house-keeping; for the acquisition of knowledge; and for a number of political activities. Drawing may be held to be useful in helping men to judge more correctly the works of different artists."

And artisans: no difference in Greek. Carpenters, for example. Surely.

"Nor is it, like physical training, useful in improving health and military prowess: it has no visible effect upon either. We are thus left with its value for the cultivation of the mind in leisure. This is evidently the reason of its being introduced into education: it ranks as a part of the cultivation which men think proper to freemen. This is the meaning of the lines in Homer, beginning,

Such are they who alone should be called to the bountiful
banquet,
and continuing (after a mention of various guests) with the words,

With them call they a minstrel, to pleasure all men with
his music.

Again, in another passage, Odysseus is made to say that music is the best of pastimes when men are all merry, and

They who feast in the hall lend their ears to the
minstrel in silence,
Sitting in order due."

Yes, let us stop here. Incidentally, Barker shouldn't say Odysseus is made to say. Odysseus says. Just as Homer says, Odysseus says. That is not uninteresting for the question of how Aristotle read Homer, and since he may have read him better than we did it may be of some help for understanding Homer himself; but let us now come to the main point. We get now --- here we have the answer to the question, not to the question as to what gentlemen's education is but the more specific question: the relation of music to gentleman's education. The gentleman must have the liberal studies, the necessary only in a subordinate manner. Liberal studies are such studies as enable him to spend his leisure appropriately, i.e., nobly. Yes, but what is that activity? How does the gentleman spend his leisure? Here we have the answer. What does he do? He listens to the singer --- the singer --- yes, the poet. I make one addition which is not stated here, but which I take for granted Aristotle implies. He listens to the singer with understanding. This seems

to be -- now if the leisure activity is the end of man, then the end of the gentleman's life is to listen to the poets. That is the end. We have seen -- some of you, us, have seen a corresponding statement at the end of the Ethics, which is a more -- in many ways a more comprehensive work than the Politics is. What does he say there as to the end for the sake of which all business? Same argument fundamentally: recreation for the sake of business; business for the sake of leisure. Leisure is the true end. What is that true end according to the end of the Ethics?

"Virtue."

No -- yes, well, virtue but a certain kind of virtue.

"Contemplation."

Contemplation, understanding. Contemplation. The gentleman does it in his way and therefore not in the highest way. That is, in a sense, the end of the gentleman's life: to sit there -- look at Odysseus, who was in a way a gentleman. He did these amazing deeds with great anguish and annoyance when he was with this Cyclops and Calypso and Circe also was not exactly unmitigated bliss, and to say nothing of the other adventures which he had. But why did he do that? Ultimately, in order to listen to the singers when he comes to the Phaeacians. You remember? When the minstrel comes his [] are parted from this connection. That was his activity. If you would say, what would be the present day equivalent? I think you must have heard of people, very active and successful businessmen, who still do all what they do ultimately for the sake of culture. You must have heard that. And what does that culture mean? I mean, I know there are also others who would say they do it in order to become philanthropists. That is another way which Aristotle also considers, but that is one answer of very great importance. But what do they mean by culture?

"May I offer a respectable example?" Yes, ⁷ . . . was quoted as asking, "What does it mean to die?" "It means that we will no longer be able to listen to Mozart".

Well that would be an example, but Einstein is not the best example because he was more a scientist than a gentleman in this sense. No, I don't deny that he was, but I mean he is not such a clear example of a gentleman as, say, Colonel Blimp. Colonel Blimp, a famous British figure. Have you never seen that? A really wonderful character. Good. Now, that is so; that is one answer. Here you see the difference very clearly. In understanding the poet and music was always, practically always inseparable from speeches so we could perhaps better say poetry: that is obviously different from business. That's clear. It is also different from mere recreation, like a swimming pool, because it is really a proper occupation of the mind. Yes!

"I'm bothered by the fact that artists themselves pay so much attention to exactness and even go through annoyance and travail

to produce their works of art and yet, properly speaking, I'm not sure (several inaudible words) for creativity itself. Maybe I'm wrong, but -- "

Well, what does creativity mean? Let us not go into this question and simply say you mean the production of such songs, more than understanding them. Do you mean that? (Inaudible response). The gentlemen. Now let us consider for one moment Odysseus: beautiful example. Odysseus listens to the singers, to the Phocians, and then what does he do afterward? He himself sings. Singing, I mean -- you know -- describes worthwhile things in a worthwhile manner. So Odysseus is both a listener and what you call a creator. Yes, but the creator -- I mean, as such -- what is a poet from Aristotle's or from the Greek point of view? He is not a gentleman -- not in the sense that he is a crook or a villain or whatever have you -- but he is higher than a gentleman. He is a wise man. And that is a complicated question: what is the relation of the wisdom which the poets have to the wisdom of the philosophers? That's another matter. But there is clearly an enormous difference between the man who writes Homeric poems and a man who recites Homeric poems, and they were generally regarded as very stupid asses, the rhapsoids. There is a Platonic dialogue called in which Socrates has a conversation with such a fellow and he is presented a very vain and stupid man, and -- that is something entirely different. The poets -- and their status is not discussed here, but that is implied. One can safely say that.

(Inaudible question regarding whether the contributing of time for construction of religious edifices is part of leisure).

Yes, workmen.

"It wasn't work in the sense of earning a living. It was work in the sense of a holy -- an exercise -- "

Yes, but that is entirely -- that is a subject not discussed by Aristotle here in the passage we read. He will take it up later and that is -- we don't have the time for that any more; Aristotle in the sequel -- I would like to mention only this point -- in the sequel he goes into -- but we must not forget this very important passage which we read. He takes up later on the purpose of musical education. Up to now he has said what is music for. What is its place in the life of the adult human being, of the adult gentleman? And later on he raises the question what is the purpose of music in education and in this connection the moral education, the moral element, is emphasized, namely that the right kind of music makes us better men, makes a man a gentleman. But the question he has voiced here: what is a gentleman who is no longer in need of being made into a gentleman. What does he do with music? That's one thing, and the other question is that does music do in order to form gentlemen originally, i.e., what is the purpose of musical education and there the emphasis is, of course, most strongly on moral education. And that plays a very great role in the sequel. We read only one brief passage in Lyd, shortly after the beginning.

"Perhaps there is more in question than our sharing in the common pleasure which all men derive from music -- a pleasure, indeed, which is natural and instinctive, and which explains why the use of music appeals to all ages and all types of character -- and perhaps we ought to consider whether music has not also some sort of bearing on our characters and our souls. It will clearly have such a bearing if our characters are actually affected by music. That they are so affected is evident from the influence exercised by a number of different tunes, but especially by those of Olympus. His tunes, by general consent, have an inspiring effect on the soul; and a feeling of inspiration is an affection of the soul's character. We may add that, in listening to mere imitative sounds, where there is no question of time or tune, all men are moved to feelings of sympathy."

Yes. Now let us stop here. In other words, music does two things. It makes us -- how did you say -- inspired, and it makes us imitative of characters. The latter is clear. For example, you say a martial song, martial modes arouse -- make us to that extent have martial feelings and therefore contribute to our education and courage and so on. Others make us tame in a good sense, make us gentle, and therefore contribute to our education. What does this inspiration mean? Now the Greek word is enthusiasm, but that must be understood. We must consider its original meaning. That means inspired by a god, possessed by a god, and therefore, derivatively, inspired. That is something different from the moral education and here is where the problem of what you meant, namely religion, comes in: only in this form and in this connection Aristotle speaks later on of tragedy. Tragedy has very much to do with this; not with the formation of character, but with creating this enthusiasm inspired by a god. But what is meant by that in Aristotle? Very generally speaking, Aristotle makes another distinction later between music and other things which teach us, of course, moral character and then there are forms of music which excite, inspire us in this religious way, as we would say. Their function is not teaching but purification, purgation, and you know the famous definition of the tragedy by Aristotle: that it is a form of purging of our souls. This is Aristotle's answer to this question. Whether it is sufficient is, of course, an entirely different question. Now this passage which Mr. Agrie -- there are only two more points which I would like -- that needs a very long -- is very difficult. Aristotle is very brief on these matters and without an analysis of his Postudes, and especially the analysis of tragedy this is almost unintelligible, but the main point however that we must understand is this (airplane overused). . . music which is partly moral and partly cathartic. Cathartic is something different from moral. In a way, the cathartic is more elementary, more basic than the moral. The cathartic has the function of getting -- liberating us from fundamental obstacles to true moralit, whereas the moral education is directed immediately toward this moral. . . . One thing I say is the function of music in education and another, and in a way a more important question is what is the function of music in the life of the already educated or mature gentleman and that question,

the first question, we have seen Aristotle's answer. This passage which we briefly discussed in 1341a26 following about the history of the flute is very interesting and you see that what some people think — historical understanding is a product of the 19th century or so — is sheer nonsense. Aristotle says here very clearly what happened, that the Greeks won the Persian War. They won it. They defeated the greatest power of which they knew, the Persian Empire, and then they became more courageous, more self-confident than they were before. Out of that grew ultimately that glory of the intellectual development of Athens. This simple historical observation was as much within the reach of Aristotle as of any modern historian. That goes without saying. That is only in passing. The last point which I would like to mention is a reference in 1342a -- yes, I wish I could read that. Yes, I wish I could read that; I can't. I would like to know how Barker translates it. At any rate, it is unimportant. There is a passage here -- there is an expression of Aristotle: the natural -- the excess according to nature -- oh yes: in 1342a23. I will find it for you. Here: paragraph 7. Will you read the beginning of paragraph 7.

"Just as the souls of its members are distorted from their natural state --"

Yes, the natural state. That is also the way in which the mediæval translation translates it, but literally translated: from the habit, from the condition according to nature. But let us say the natural state, the state of nature. That is the origin of this famous term, but the state of nature means here, of course, the state according to nature: the normal, healthy, good state. If you are sick in one way or the other you are not in your natural state. For example, if you can't walk your feet are not in natural state or if you can't see your eyes are not in their natural -- that's the original meaning of state of nature. The state of nature of man is, of course, the state of which man is under the best conditions and since man is a political animal man is in his state of nature if he is a citizen of a good society. If he is a citizen of a bad society he is not quite in the state of nature. Now here you see the enormous change which has taken place in modern times where the term state of nature became so crucial and so much more emphatically used as it is in Aristotle: that the state of nature is the most primitive stage. One could very well, by contrasting the meaning of state of nature, say in Hobbes, with the meaning of state of nature in Aristotle, develop the whole problem of the ancients and the moderns, of classical political thought and modern political thought, and therefore that would only be a more technical and seemingly more abstruse formulation of the problem of the H-Pemb. I don't have to explain that to you I know. Good. Now there is one point I wanted to make in connection with the remark on an earlier occasion, but he isn't here and you would not, perhaps, be very much interested in that. Therefore, I will omit that and ask you whether there are any questions you would like to bring up in the few minutes we still can be together.

"... the crucial difference between the moderns and the ancients is that the moderns look on the natural or the important thing as sort of . . . the efficient cause, you might call it. . . ."

Yes, we could say that.

"And it would seem that much of the change is due just to the abandonment of a sense of purpose in nature and it would seem to me that if you accept this much of what follows from Aristotle's acceptance of an end in nature isn't really tenable for modern man. It isn't a matter of overlooking things and not deriving insights from the ancients, but of a fundamentally different way of looking at the world in general."

Yes, but still does not your responsibility ultimately extend to the basic premises which you accept? I mean, can you ultimately, as a thinking man, pass the buck and can say Galileo did it? No; you must do it somehow. I mean, that's very hard, but still if you want to be -- really to have any say in such matters you must face that responsibility. Do you see that?

". . . Well, sure. . . you have to accept the responsibility for your choice of first principles or your basis, but it seems to me that if you start with a basis which essentially denies that in the universe, independent of the world of man, there is a purpose; things have a place; the world is not really a desert . . ."

Yes, but to which -- well, we cannot go into that question, of course, now. But may I suggest two lines of approach. The first is that it is not true that all pre-modern thought was, in the Aristotelian sense, teleological. When Plato presented his notion of the universe in the Timaeus that's greatly different from that of Aristotle. It is also teleological, but in a different way: much more mathematical for some reasons. But something else: when modern science emerged in the seventeenth century the common name for that was the corpuscular doctrine, in Bacon, for example, and later, Leibnitz and so. Corpuscular; atomistic doctrine. There were such non-teleological doctrines in classical antiquity so that is a difference between modern thought and Aristotelian thought and perhaps even Socratic thought, but not between modern thought and ancient thought: number one. Number two: and here I come to something which is not as much a question of historical learning as the first question is. That is this: modern natural science was developed primarily as a doctrine of the inanimate beings, the heavenly bodies as well as of terrestrial bodies, which are inanimate beings. Think of the crucial Galilean and Newtonian discoveries and laws. Good? And now this doctrine of the inanimate bodies was meant to be -- at least that is the most simple assumption -- the basis of an account of everything; in particular, of that thing commonly called the soul. There were great difficulties, very great difficulties, and if you read the more intelligent materialists in modern times, Thomas Hobbes, you see that -- there you would have the impression it is absolutely hopeless to solve it. Then there came somewhat

more ingenious men than Hobbes, for example, Spinoza, and tried to solve it. They developed a certain psychology; I can't go into that. Today the whole thing is, in a way, abandoned. If you take the extreme forms of psychology, say behaviorism, you study in all cases behavior. The distinction between body and soul never arises for these people. Well, in brief, the modern science is burdened with what I believe is an absolutely hopeless problem: to give an account in its terms of the human soul and his actions and his motions. The Aristotelian natural science is open to very great difficulties and no one in his senses could say it can be restored as he stated it, although it is, perhaps, not as easy to refute as some people sometimes think, even as he stated it. But Aristotle's natural science has one very great advantage and in this respect it is still absolutely superior to anything you find in modern science, and that is that it begins not with inanimate bodies but with the soul. You can say Aristotle suffers defeat because he thinks the understanding of the soul gives him a key to the understanding of inanimate bodies. That may be so. You know the famous story: the stone falls because it tends. That may have been entirely wrong for all I know, but on the other hand we have legitimately a perhaps greater interest in understanding the soul than in understanding the fall of bodies, although we also must be concerned with the fall of -- I don't deny that. You know? Therefore the thing is not as simple as that and the question -- when you say final causes then, of course, everyone's back is up against that terrible thing. But when someone would speak of inclinations and tendencies and so that doesn't sound so terrible and that is teleology. When you use such a simple word as growth you mean a movement from, to, in the sense of a perfection. It grows to something. That is a simple, obvious phenomenon: a puppy becoming a grown up dog and anything of this kind; from which Aristotle starts and he contends, by implication, you can never understand that if you compare that to the fall of a body. That's something entirely different. How to reconcile that: that is, of course, a very great question and only a man who would be a genius equal to Aristotle could even hit on a conceit, on a notion which would give us a start, but on the other hand no one can sensibly expect of us that because of these tremendous things done in the exact natural sciences the only way of understanding human things must be one -- a way modeled on the way of the exact natural sciences. That is a wholly unwarranted, although prior to investigation, plausible assumption. How plausible it is -- you see that. Everyone falls for this notion at least once in his life when he says, hears that the natural sciences made this tremendous progress by the use of these methods -- well, why don't you do the same thing in the social sciences? You must have heard this n times, and yet while it is plausible, on inspection it proves to be very questionable. I think that's the issue and even, for example, I talk to people who know these things infinitely better than I do, psychologists and so. But what is really proven, I think unknown to the ancients or at least not mentioned anywhere and of any importance is very, very little. I mean, for example, if one knows how a bit more when the baby begins to have the so-called social smile. Well, that finds a very easy place in any psychology. Or if one can, perhaps, give a somewhat better account of slips of the tongue

if it is a better account than Aristotle gave, who doesn't mention it, or of dreams, which he did discuss, perhaps. But that doesn't necessarily mean that the whole context in which these modern observations are made is the sound one. I mean, and one must here really keep one's head and make a distinction without which I think one will not be able to understand anything. That the human things are not intelligible in these terms. I mean, read any of these scientific studies of human things and see whether they enlighten you. They may contain certain factual observations which are interesting; surely, but they could have been made by any intelligent man on the basis of any metaphysics if he had looked at them. They have nothing to do with his particular methodology. The example of Mr. Brown concerns something -- I will mention this now. The question was Aristotle's analysis of the tyrant and Aristotle says something about what moves the tyrant; in present day lingo, the motivations of the tyrant. And you know, Aristotle has simple fairy-tale like stories: he is a man who loves wealth and power. And, well of course, one could say -- the first conjecture which one would make -- well, Stalin and Lenin probably meant something more than that they are rich and powerful. They stood for a cause: the famous thing. Of course, that must be considered and I gave some indications to that: the question of so-called ideologies which are, in the strict sense, absent of ancient thought. But Mr. Brown meant something else. He meant such things as sadism for example, like Hitler. What motivated him was ultimately not a certain theory about the master race and the Jews as the enemy of the master race. You know? This kind of thing. Nor was it his desire to eat ten steaks a day and other things of this nature, or to wield power for its own sake, but sadism. Yes, that is the so-called psychological explanation and some people think oh, that is much -- where do you find any reference to such delicate things as sadism in Aristotle? Now, all right, let us consider that for a moment. What is a sadist? I suppose it means a man who derives pleasure from inflicting pain on other people without any regard to his own advantage. In other words, he is not merely a ruthless man who pursues his advantage at all costs, but there was a simple language not taken from -- how do you call that -- psychopathology, sexual psychopathology and so on, but from ordinary life. There is a word for that: cruelty, a cruel man; a cruel man who, as a cruel man, is not only ruthless but derives pleasure from inflicting pain on other people. Now this is a phenomenon which exists and then we are confronted here with a psychological explanation: that this cruel conduct is rooted in a sexual perversion. That's the theory; that's the progress. Of cruelty people knew. . . . But that's, of course, the question. Is this theory true or could it not be that even the sexual perversion stemmed from a more fundamental perversion? Applied to Hitler, whether Hitler was sexually perverted or not I believe has not been shown by the social scientists. I have not read that. So it would be a mere hypothesis that his cruelty could be explained by sexual perversion, but even granting that, how do we know that these kind of sexual perversions are not themselves the consequences of a more fundamental perversion which also demands to say. This question is just pushed by sides and, of course, the sexual perversions are more fundamental than any others. How do we know that? This kind of psychology,

this particular kind of psychology dismisses this question. Now how could this be understood? There is, again starting from the surface -- there is something wrong with a sadist. That is common to the psychological explanation in question and what, for example, I would say: something wrong with him. Sure, but what does this mean? The normal thing, the not wrong thing, is that one does not derive pleasure from inflicting pain on others for its own sake. Then if this is the normal thing it becomes a necessary question what defect, what suffering, or if you want to talk Greek, what trauma, induces a man to derive pleasure from inflicting pain on others? It would be a question, but here you would again have to make a distinction between three phenomenally very different things: inflicting pain on all others or on some others or on a single other. These are obviously very different cases. Now if we take -- that is one case which is very simple and where the reference to this kind of psychology would be absurd. That is the case of revenge. Someone killed X's father. X wants to hit back. It is not sufficient for him somehow that the law does it. He must do it. But this kind of revenge cannot possibly suffice as an explanation if the objects of that sadism are all others. We could legitimately speak of revenge if the objects of sadistic actions is one man or some men. Some men may be a whole nation, of course. But all: how can this be understood? How can we understand a man who hates all other men? The ancients knew that. There was Timon of Athens. There was a very hurt misanthropist, a man who hates other human beings. But I think we have today a special reason for that. I think this phenomenon has probably changed as a phenomenon: namely, by virtue of the personification of Society as a capital S there are people who hate society. I do not believe that this phenomenon was possible before society became personified. I suggest this only as kind of reflections which are absolutely necessary and indispensable before one can even dream of using such so-called scientific doctrines, and therefore . . .

(End of tape).